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Executive Summary
How can support to SMEs be improved in such a way that it contributes 
to regional employment and wealth? One strategy that has been developed 
over the last decade is the ‘cluster’ approach. Through the regional cluster 
approach, business support is provided not in a generic form, but targeted 
at certain business groups. Within the targeted groups, the regional cluster 
approach seeks to improve business performance through facilitating 
networking and the instilling of collaborative attitudes among firms and 
with support organisations. The cluster approach thus works on the ‘soft 
side’ of regional economic development. It tries to make firms more aware 
of how, through working together and working with regional agencies, 
they can improve business performance, and contribute to regional 
development.
The lessons drawn out in this report stem from the analysis of cluster 
initiatives in the so-called ‘CORE’ regions. CORE was a project running 
from 1996 to early 1999 funded under the EU ADAPT programme. The 
aim of CORE was to develop innovative approaches to business support 
by supporting practical support programmes as well as research. Besides a 
more general discussion of the cluster concept, the present project 
analysed the following cluster initiatives in the CORE regions:
1. Hessen (automotive and environmental businesses)
2. Northrhine-Westphalia (NRW) (automotive, environmental- 
chemical)
3. Aragón (wine production)
4. Tyneside in North East England (automotive, marine industries, 
business services, among others)
The selection was based on the actual policy initiatives found in the CORE 
regions. The research methodology consisted of on-site expert interviews 
and the analysis of policy documents and policy reviews.
During the project, one of the main problems was to come to terms with 
the different interpretations of ‘clusters’ (Table 1) and the different ways 
cluster initiatives were designed and implemented. Despite this handicap, 
the study was able to identify common factors in the cluster initiatives and 
to distinguish various elements of good practice. The following points 
summarise the conclusions from the research and give an overview of 
what has been found good practice in cluster approaches.
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Table 1 Six changes in the conceptualisation o f ‘clusters’ identified in the report
1. Perceiving of clusters as an analytical model, derived from observations of the 
dynamics of co-located interrelated industries (Porter’s Competitive Advantage of 
Nations)
2. Associating clusters with spatial agglomeration (introducing the concept among 
geographers)
3. Linking clusters to concepts of innovation (notably to the notion of ‘systems of 
innovation’), moving the concept further into the arena of policy-making
4. Building a bridge between clusters and an associative approach to economic 
development (toning down the ‘rivalry’ element in the original cluster approach)
5. Gearing cluster approaches towards the development of SMEs (inciting a close 
marriage with the notion of networking), introducing the concept into the arena of 
business development,
6. Inserting the cluster concept in various ongoing debates, such as the ‘learning 
economy’, ‘traded’ vs. ‘untraded’ linkages, the local-global nexus, and issues of 
regional specialisation; here the difference between clusters as analytical model 
and policy strategy is increasingly blurred.
1 A strategic approach
The regional cluster approach is not just another form of delivering 
regional support to SMEs. The innovative aspect of the cluster approach is 
that it frames business support in a regional strategic perspective. This 
means, in practice, that cluster initiatives, by helping groups of firms, also 
aim at strengthening the regional economic structure. Structural changes 
are achieved by strengthening specific sectors such as the ones indicated 
above: automotive, environmental etc., but also by improving the links 
with and quality of the support infrastructure. Hence:
The novel contribution o f cluster approaches is that they facilitate better 
interaction between firms (and regional support agencies) while at the 
same time (re)shaping the regional economic structure.
Using academic terms, one could also say a bridge is built between the 
micro-meso levels of business development, and the meso-macro level of 
regional development.
2 Clusters as target and method
Both at the business and regional level, cluster initiatives serve two 
purposes: (1) shaping groups of networked businesses in targeted sectors 
(2) improving business capabilities by offering tailored support and 
encouraging inter-firm learning. Most initiatives show a mix between these 
two objectives. This invokes a double role of the ‘cluster’ concept:
In helping firms and regions, the cluster concept plays a double role: 
first, as target (shaping related business activities in certain sectors), and 
second as method (to facilitate inter-firm learning and tailoring o f 
support)
In the CORE regions, the Aragonese wine initiative represented the 
clearest case of a cluster-as-target approach, while the German initiatives
isa
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tended towards the cluster-as-method approach. The activities of one 
support organisation on Tyneside, the Real Service Centre (RSC) show a 
strong mixing of the two objectives.
3 Cluster selection
Cluster-as-targets pose the dilemma of how targets are chosen and set, i.e. 
how business sectors (or related activities) are selected. Two principal 
routes are available here. One is the ‘top-down’ route, in which a cluster 
priority list is drawn on the basis of a cluster analysis. The other is 
‘bottom-up’, in which the initiative to develop a cluster strategy comes 
from actors within sectors themselves. Both routes have disadvantages. 
The ‘top-down’ approaches face the problem of why certain activities 
were included (especially if some of these turn out to be less successful), 
while other were excluded. It appears to be difficult, in particular, to resist 
the temptation to include ‘fashionable clusters (new media, telecom, 
culture), even if any genuine background in these activities is lacking. 
Even if this temptation can be resisted, however, the process of prioritising 
will inevitably be based on certain arbitrary choices. ‘Bottom-up’ 
approaches, on the other hand, generally benefit from already existing 
inclinations to undertake joint action and to co-operate. For the same 
reasons, however such approaches fail to reach sectors of the economy 
where collaborative attitudes are lacking, even if they have clustering 
potential. The best approach may well be one that strikes a balance:
Cluster targeting, because o f the inclusion-exclusion dilemma, presents 
one o f the most controversial aspects o f the cluster approach. In general, 
a mixture o f top-down (pre-selection) and bottom-up (self-selection) may 
well provide the best approach to this problem.
In the CORE initiatives, cluster selection occurred largely on arbitrary 
grounds or in a bottom-up way. The RSC manifested a good mix between 
‘top-down’ pre-selection of clusters for new projects and bottom-up cases, 
where the initiative was taken by participating business actors. Examples 
of comprehensive ‘top-down’ approaches can be found outside CORE 
regions, for instance in the Basque Country and Scotland.
4 Self-sustaining clusters
Over the last decade, clusters-as-target have had a strong appeal to 
regional policy makers and others with interest in regional development. 
This appeal stems from the double promise delivered by the cluster 
approach (see 1): helping local firms while at the same time (re)shaping 
the regional economic structure. In time, however, the focus on clusters as 
an outcome may also pose a problem. What should be done if a cluster 
does not really materialise, if the interaction between firms remains limited 
and if no collective action and identity are achieved? Given that cluster 
support generally involves close relationships between the support sector 
and firms, there is an inclination to continue support in the hope that the 
future will bring improvements. In doing so, however, cluster initiatives 
may run the risk of turning targeted business into the ‘babies’ of support
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agencies. The only kind of dependency that should be accepted, or even 
appreciated, is when the initiative to apply for additional funding come 
from the participating business themselves.
The result o f cluster facilitating should be to avoid situations o f 
continuing dependency on aid, and to work towards clusters that are 
largely independent, in organisational as well as financial terms.
Tyneside demonstrated cases of both self-sustaining clusters - in the 
marine and automotive sectors - and dependent clusters (RSC), NRW 
shows an intriguing contrast of a failed and successful, i.e. continuing, 
cluster.
5 Instilling collaborative attitudes
Clusters-as-method refer to the use of the cluster concept not so much to 
shape clusters, but as a way to improve business capabilities by 
encouraging inter-firm learning and by tailoring support to groups of 
related firms. The aim of this approach is not so much to facilitate 
clustering in certain sectors, but rather the aim is to instil collaborative 
attitudes among firms, to help them to learn more from each other and 
from the regional support infrastructure. Through demonstration effects, it 
is generally hoped that such attitudes spread to other firms, and to other 
sectors. This dimension of clustering should be seen as a response to the 
lack of focus, depth and continuity, as well fragmentation and internal 
rivalries, that have characterised a large part of the regional business 
support services. Evidence shows that because of these factors firms have 
become increasingly wary of using support services.
The structural outcome o f the clusters-as-method dimension is not so 
much a reshaping o f the regional sector profile, but changing business 
attitudes and an improved support sector performance.
The NRW environmental sector manifested a shift in focus from ‘cluster- 
as-target’ to ‘cluster-as-method’ because of the firms were more interested 
in inter-firm learning than in ‘cluster-building’. A similar shift can be 
observed in the case of the RSC, which also shows how clustering has 
contributed to improved co-ordination of business support.
6 Regional and business interests
Like all forms of business support, regional cluster approaches should not 
simply respond to business needs (in the sense of self-declared wants). 
Rather, the specific objectives of a cluster initiative should be based on an 
assessment of how business performance can be modified in order to serve 
regional interests. Regional interests may be based on the wish to keep 
firms in the area, to build links between large firms and SMEs, to improve 
regional assets (technological capacities, labour market, collective 
intelligence on external technological and market development). Such 
regional assets have been defined as ‘club goods’. Obviously, business 
actors will only co-operate with regional strategies if they feel it is also in 
their (individual or collective) business interest. For this reason, the
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initiatives examined in this report have been assessed from a business and a 
regional development perspective, and from the intersection between the 
two. Hence:
Cluster initiatives can only be successful i f  they manage to align business 
and regional interests. One result o f this alignment is the creation o f 
‘club goods’, productive assets anchored into regions underpinning the 
competitiveness o f specific regional business groups.
A recurrent regional interest shown by the CORE cases was the inclination 
to prevent local firms, or skilled staff, from relocating. The Aragonese 
wine case, and the NRW automotive cases manifested tensions between 
regional and business interests. Examples of ‘club goods’ are the 
institutionalisation of wine districts in Aragon, the sector associations on 
Tyneside, and the collective intelligence on quality certification in NRW.
7 Underpinning business competitiveness
Finally, when assessing regional and business needs, careful attention 
should be paid to which factors underpin business competitiveness. This 
means that business development should be perceived from an integral 
perspective, taking account of management issues, technology, training, 
quality, finance, marketing etc. This should be followed by a strategic 
assessment of how a group of regional firms may (re)position itself in the 
global market, and an assessment of which (business and regional) 
capabilities are most in need of improvement. A problem is that policy­
makers as well as support agents tend to overplay the role of 
(technological) innovation. While this may be important in the long term, 
the first thing many SMEs need is to catch up with competitors in terms of 
management, quality control, environmental accreditation, etc. The 
regional support infrastructure should be geared to providing tailored 
support in these areas.
Cluster approaches should take a broad view o f business development, 
based on careful assessment o f the competitive positioning o f groups o f 
regional firms in the global economy. This may result, at least initially, in 
an emphasis on modernisation (upgrading) rather than on innovation 
(creating unique technological advantages).
In effect, nearly all cases examined here endorse this point.
Good practices
A summary of the good practice recommendations is included in Table 2.
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Table 2 Good practice in clustering
DO: DO NOT:
• facilitate clusters • build clusters
• use clusters as demonstration • see clusters as ‘static’ end goals
models • be committed to the survival of firms
• encourage firms to submit new or clusters
funding applications • fund single clusters in the long term
• strive for broadening of the clusters • provide unfocused
(e.g. through association building) support/intelligence
• assess carefully the (potential) • focus on innovation when the key
position of regional businesses in issue is modernisation
the global market • compete with other business support
• engage with large firms, support agencies
agencies in/outside the region, etc.
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Chapter One. Introduction
1.1. ADAPT-CORE European research
How can support to SMEs be improved in such a way that it contributes 
to regional employment and wealth? Over the last three years, five regions 
in Europe have collaborated in a European programme developing new 
strategies and approaches to assist SME development. The five regions are 
Tyneside, Hessen, Northrhine-Westphalia, Aragón and Bedfordshire. The 
programme, co-operation of Regions in Europe (CORE) brought a unique 
combination of local support and international exchange, and of practical 
support projects and research activities. The international dimension has 
been managed by an international network of CORE participants, called 
COMECON. The cluster project has benefited particularly from the 
COMECON activities.
This document reports one of the research strands, European research on 
clustering. While the research had its own specific focus - that of 
clustering - it was carried out in close interaction with the other CORE 
strands. The CORE cluster project started two years ago and was 
completed at the end of 1998. The research was carried out by the Centre 
for Urban and Regional Development Studies (CURDS) in Newcastle 
upon Tyne. Dr. Arnoud Lagendijk has been the core researcher, who 
joined the transnational exchanges to compare business cluster 
developments in Germany, Spain and the UK. Not only CORE regions 
were targeted (Tyneside, Hessen, Northrhine-Westphalia, Aragón) but 
also other regions in which the ‘cluster’ approach has featured (Scotland, 
Wales, Basque Country, Baden-Württemberg). The project was 
supervised by Dr David Charles at CURDS and the CORE team.
1.2. What are clusters?
This project has explored different cluster initiatives that are used within in 
the context of regional development. Two general categories can be 
distinguished, regional clusters and business clusters:
Regional clusters are defined at the level of regional economic sectors, 
which derive their competitiveness from various form of interaction, the 
use of common assets, and/or the provision of common services
Business clusters are groups of neighbouring firms with different, but 
related activities, which through joining forces create processes of mutual 
learning and synergy.
In practice, the two varieties may come close together, especially in the 
case of small regions.
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Why do cluster approaches help? Small firms often suffer from isolation, 
because entrepreneurs do not have the time for regular meetings with 
peers in their own environment. They may thus miss out on important 
opportunities for exchanging experiences and for undertaking joint 
development of products and services with greater market potential. Not 
only is there a problem of time and effort, small firms also tend to see 
nearby firms in similar sectors as competitors rather than potential partners 
for collaboration. The cluster approach aims at overcoming the practical 
and cultural obstacles to collaboration. Clustering may also serve to make 
firms more oriented to the national and global markets. By overcoming 
‘petty rivalries’ in the firms’ own backyard, forces can be joined to be 
competitive (inter)nationally.
The innovative aspect of recent cluster initiatives is that it frames support 
to local business within a wider local and regional economic context. 
Business development through clustering thus becomes part of a strategy 
of regional economic development. This framing has two dimensions. 
First, it involves the forging of links with other regional actors (specialised 
support and technology centres, colleges and universities, Chambers of 
Commerce, etc.). Second, it supports a vision of regional specialisation. 
Such a vision may be depicted in ‘cluster maps’ which indicate in which 
groups of related economic activities regions have their competitive edge.
Based on this first introduction of clusters an important conclusion can be 
drawn. Cluster dynamics contribute to the competitiveness of the 
economic actors that are part of the cluster. In doing so, cluster dynamics 
also add to regional economic performance. The impact of clusters should 
thus be perceived at these two levels. However, the link between business 
development and regional development is not as straightforward as is 
sometimes presented. Indeed, it is one of the main undertakings of this 
report to show under what conditions regions benefit most from cluster- 
based business development. A basic distinction will be made between the 
business development perspective and the regional development 
perspective. This distinction will serve to structure both the methodology 
and case studies, which will be presented later in the report.
1.3. CORE research questions
Three of the five CORE regions do not belong to Europe’s core regions. 
Aragón is an intermediate region which benefits from its geographical 
position between Madrid, Barcelona and the Basque Country but which 
lacks a strong economic profile. Northrhine-Westphalia, more specifically 
the Ruhr, and NE England can both be characterised as ‘old industrial 
regions’. So far, these regions have not been able to nurture new economic 
activities at a sufficient level to overcome a long period of industrial 
decline. Hessen, more specifically Frankfurt and Bedfordshire, on the 
other hand, are part of Europe’s core. However, this does not mean that 
all sectors are thriving. On the contrary, particularly SMEs in more mature 
economic sectors, notably in manufacturing, are often in need of 
modernisation and overcoming problems of isolation. Therefore, one case
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out of these German regions has been added. This concerns the 
automotive sector in the Frankfurt area, because of its relationship to the 
concept of regional clusters.
As expressed in the very first sentence of the introduction, the aim of this 
project is to expand and sharpen our knowledge about how SMEs should 
be assisted so that they add to regional development. The central question 
of the study is derived by narrowing this broad question down to cluster 
approaches:
How can cluster-oriented forms o f business support improve the 
way SMEs contribute to regional employment and wealth?
SMEs are defined here as firms with up to 100 employees. This question 
will be answered by addressing the following issues:
First, how has the cluster concept been conceived and developed?
What are the main dimensions o f regional-economic development 
underpinning the concept o f  clustering as an analytical tool? What 
has been the contribution o f policy learning to adopting the cluster 
concept in policy strategies?
Second, when exploring cluster-based policy strategies, what are 
the main methodological questions? In particular, how should the 
various stages o f the policy cycle (conceptualisation, planning, 
implementation, evaluation) be approached? What are the main 
issues for business development? What are the main issues for  
regional development?
Third, what can we learn from the CORE regions about the use o f  
cluster concept in regional policy making? In what kind o f  
economic and policy context have cluster-oriented policies been 
conceived, planned and implemented? What have been the benefits 
from a business perspective? What have been the benefits from a 
regional perspective?
To answer these questions, both desk research and empirical research has 
taken place to explore the cluster concept. For the empirical part, nearly 
80 interviews have been held with representatives of authorities, support 
agencies and businesses in the ADAPT-CORE regions and with related 
organisations elsewhere. Three lines of inquiry were followed: (1) the 
description of various cluster initiatives (targeting the chemical, 
automotive and environmental sectors in Germany, the wine sector in 
Spain, and the automotive, maritime, and business services sectors in the 
UK); (2) the examination of the business perspective on clustering and (3) 
the position of clustering in regional economic development.
1.4. How is the report structured?
The report will follow the research questions closely. Chapter Two and 
Chapter Three are dedicated to the conceptual discussion, in a seven-steps 
presentation, addressing the first question. Chapter Two focuses on the 
more general aspects, while Chapter Three focuses on the dimensions 
which have particularly contributed to the application of the cluster 
concept at the regional level. In response to the second question, Chapter
AL ADAPT report (02/11/99) -  13 -
Four presents the methodological framework. This results in the research 
Pro Forma, a detailed issue list which will serve for the case studies. 
Chapter five introduces the CORE regions, with emphasis on the 
economic and policy context for cluster-oriented policies. Chapter Six and 
Seven present the cases: first the regional cluster cases, followed by the 
business clusters cases. The conclusion follows in Chapter Eight.
1.5. Researcher profile
Born in 1963 in Amsterdam, Arnoud Lagendijk attended the Municipal 
Gymnasium in Dordrecht, near Rotterdam. He studied regional geography 
at the University of Utrecht, where he wrote his Master's Thesis on 
regional development in Spain. From 1989 to 1994, he was a research 
assistant at the Tinbergen Institute in Rotterdam where he received his 
doctoral degree in December 1993, and a lecturer in economic geography 
at the Erasmus University in Rotterdam. In 1994, he started working in the 
UK, first as a visiting research fellow at the University of Reading, and 
later as a Research Associate at CURDS, Newcastle, where he was 
involved in work for the EU and OECD. He has developed an expertise in 
the area of innovative approaches in regional economic development, 
focusing on the role of large firms as well as small and medium sized firms. 
Last August he took up a research post at the University of Nijmegen in 
the East of The Netherlands, where he will continue his work on policy 
learning across Europe.
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Table 3 Interview list and schedule.
Tit. First
name
Last name Organisation City/County Count interview 
ry period
Dr Michael Rasper Agiplan - Mülheim Mühlheim FRG Jan. 97
Prof. Ekkehard Frieling Gesamthochschule Kassel Kassel FRG March 97
Dr Peter Strutynski Gesamthochschule Kassel Kassel FRG March 97
Dr Clemens Büter Handwerkskammer Rhein-Main Darmstadt FRG May 98
Dr Gerhard Bauer Hessische Technologiestiftung 
GmbH
Wiesbaden FRG March 98
Dr Jürgen Zabel Hessische Technologiestiftung 
GmbH
Wiesbaden FRG March 98
Mr Hans­
Peter
Laux Industrie- und Handelskammer Frankfurt/Main FRG May 98
Dr Dieter Rehfeld Institut Arbeit and Technik Gelsenkirchen FRG Jan. & Sept.
97
Sept. 97Ms Doris Baumer Institut Arbeit und Technik Gelsenkirchen FRG
Dr Ralf Loeckener ISA Bochum FRG Jan. 97
Ms Vivien Lo Johann Wolfgang Goethe­
Universität
Frankfurt/Main FRG March 97
Prof Eike Schamp Johann Wolfgang Goethe­
Universität
Frankfurt/Main FRG March 97
Mr Roland Schneider Regionalbüro Bergisches 
Städtedreieck
Wuppertal FRG July 97
Mr Bernard Wirth RKW Eschborn FRG March 97
Ms Doris Krüger-Röth Umlandverband Frankfurt Frankfurt/Main FRG March 97
Mr Sebastian Müller Universität Dortmund Dortmund FRG Jan. 97
Mr Martin Strasser Verband der Chemischen 
Industrie
Düsseldorf FRG Sept. 97
Ms Anette Vogt Wuppertal GMBH Wuppertal FRG July 97
Mr José Chueca Bodegas Aragonesas Fuendejalon Spain Oct. 97
Mr Juan Barbacil Bodegas Barbacil Zaragoza Spain June 98
Mr Montal Bodegas Montal Zaragoza Spain June 98
Mr Juan Palacios Bodegas Pirineos Barbastro-Huesca Spain Oct. 97
Mr Enrique Artasona CIA Vitivinicola Aragonesa 
(COVISA)





Confederación de Empresarios 
de Zaragoza (CREA)
Zaragoza Spain Oct. 97
Mr José I Domingo
Regidor
Confederación de Empresarios 
de Zaragoza (CREA)
Zaragoza Spain Oct. 97
Mr Juan Mateo Confederación de Empresarios 
de Zaragoza (CREA)
Zaragoza Spain Dec. 97
Mr Luis Vivias
Varieta
Confederación de Empresarios 
de Zaragoza (CREA)
Zaragoza Spain Oct. 97
Mr José
Antonio
Barrería Cooperativa Viticola San José Aguaron - 
Zaragoza
Spain Oct. 97
Dr D. Juan Bruned Gobierno de Aragón Zaragoza Spain Dec. 97





Gobierno Vasco Vitoria-Gasteiz Spain Sept. 97
Ms Itziar Urizar
Elcano





Ms Teresa Ascona Instituto Aragonés de Fomento Zaragoza Spain June 98
Dr Chema Gil Universidad de Zaragoza Zaragoza Spain Oct. 97
Dr Alberto Lafuente
Félez
Universidad de Zaragoza Zaragoza Spain Dec. 97
Dr Jesus Mur Universidad de Zaragoza Zaragoza Spain Dec. 97
isa
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Prof. Vicente Salas Universidad de Zaragoza Zaragoza Spain Sept. 97
Mr Javier Bilbao
Ubillos
Universidad del Pais Vasco Bilbao Spain Sept. 97
Ms Marian Diez Universidad del Pais Vasco Bilbao Spain Sept. 97
Ms Beatriz Plaza Universidad del Pais Vasco Bilbao Spain Sept. 97
Mr David Mallon Affinitas Limited Tyne and Wear UK May 98
Mr Paul Robson Automotive Sector Strategic 
Alliance (ASSA)
Washington UK June 97
Mr Keith Burge Economic Research Services Newcastle u.Tyne UK May 97
Mr Hayasaki Elta Plastics Ltd Cleveland UK June 97
Mr Kevin Parker ENTRUST Newcastle u.Tyne UK Aug. 97
Mr Dave Ward Express 2 Automotive Ltd Stanley (Durham) UK June 97
Mr David M Cairns ICONS Limited Tyne and Wear UK May 98
Mr Ian Diggory ISD Tyne & Wear UK June 98
Mr Terry Clarke Kigass Engineering Limited Sunderland UK June 97
Mr John Price Kigass Engineering Limited Sunderland UK June 97
Mr Colin Argent MACAW Tyne & Wear UK June 98
Mr Nicholas Mapletoft Nimis Limited Newcastle u.Tyne UK May 98
Mr Bob Gray Nissan Tyne & Wear UK Dec. 96
Mr Geoffrey Smith Nissan Tyne & Wear UK Dec. 96
Mr Peter Stoddart Nissan Tyne & Wear UK Dec. 96
Mr Graham Baines Nissan Yamato Engineering 
Limited
Sunderland UK June 97
Mr Angus Garrett North Tyneside Real Service 
Centre
Tyne & Wear UK Aug. 97
Mr Phil Hastie North Tyneside Real Service 
Centre
North Shields UK 4 meetings 
May 97- 
Oct. 98
Ms Sanjee Ratnatunga North Tyneside Real Service 
Centre
North Shields UK 6 meetings 
May 97- 
Oct. 98
Mr Simon Dove Northern Development 
Company
Newcastle u.Tyne UK May 97
Mr Ian McMurty Northern Development 
Company
Newcastle u.Tyne UK May 97
Mr Jim Kinson Northern Offshore Federation Washington UK June 97
Mr Alastair Rodgers Northern Offshore Federation Tyne and Wear UK May 97
Mr Paul Mitchell Orbitel Marketing Tyne and Wear UK June 98
Mr Gordon Eadie Scottish Enterprise Glasgow UK Sept. 97
Mr Peter Rossitter Sir Joseph Isherwoods Tyne & Wear UK June 98
Mr Arthur Chadwick South Tyneside College Tyne & Wear UK May 97
Mr Ian Cullen South Tyneside College Tyne & Wear UK May 97
Mr R M Williams SP Tyres UK Limited Tyne & Wear UK June 97
Mr Hodgson Ron Stadium Tyne & Wear UK July 97
Mr Gerard Kroese Swan Hunter Limited Newcastle u.Tyne UK May 97
Mr Adam Jeffries TRW Occupant Restraint 
System
Tyne & Wear UK July 97
Mr Martin Haywood University of Sunderland Sunderland UK June 97
Mr Simon Parker Valeo Security Systems (UK) 
Ltd
Northumberland UK July 97
Mr Jago Atkinson Welsh Development Agency Cardiff UK Aug. 97
Mr Alan MacDougall Wilson Ross MacDougall Tyne & Wear UK June 98
Information derived from interviews, as far as not explained in the text, is indicated with ‘(iv)’
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Chapter Two. The cluster concept in seven 
steps: from the analytical stage to policy­
making
The evolution of clusters in quotes (emphasis added by the author)
1. (conception) “A consequence of the system of [diamond] determinants is that a 
nation’s competitive industries are not spread evenly through the economy but are 
connected in what I term cluster consisting of industries related by links of various 
kinds” (Porter, 1990 p.131-132)
2. (spatial communality)“The rationale for using the relatively broad term, regional 
cluster, is that all of the terms alluded to describe geographic agglomerations of firms 
in the same or related industries and as such are used to describe aspects of the same 
broad phenomenon” (Enright, 1994a p.2)
3. (innovation)“In many cases and increasingly in the future, industrial innovation 
requires the intelligent conception of different forms of knowledge, technology and 
skills. A cluster approach provides a relatively new basis for the development of 
effective innovation strategies” (Jacobs, 1997 p.22)
4. (institutions) “Interestingly, there are pronounced signs (....) that associative 
thinking, partnership building and encouragement of policy networks to facilitate the 
emergence of new industrial clusters are developing” (Cooke, 1995a p.12).
5. (SMEs) “The requirements of small and medium-sized business seldom are simple or 
one-dimensional. Needs for new technology, for example, are linked to needs for 
capital, training and reorganisation and markets (...). Providing specific services 
organised by specific clusters is another service option. Such services can be provided 
by agency staff drawn from, and therefore able to understand the industries served, or 
can allow current staff the opportunity to learn a particular industry in-depth.” 
(Rosenfeld, 1995, p.37)
6. (typology) “In this way the different possible cluster dimensions can be seen as a 
menu, out of which these business strategists and public policy-makers can choose, 
according to the specific situation they are confronted with.” (Jacobs, 1997, p.24)
7. (debate) “(...) criteria for clusters have proven exceedingly difficult to pin down, and 
there are as many definitions as there are types of organisations using the term” 
(Rosenfeld, 1997 p.8)
“It [the cluster concept] stands at the cross-roads between regional action, industrial 
and labour market policy, education and research policy, urbanism and town planning, 
and perhaps also opinion forming and political leadership - no mans land astride the 
conventional organisation of administration and public life” (1997, p. 16)
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What are ‘clusters’? Since the early 1990s, this question has intrigued and 
puzzled many academics and policy-makers. The term was first used by 
Porter in his seminal volume ‘The competitive advantage of nations’. Then 
it became part of a busy, fascinating tour through which clusters became 
associated with ‘competitiveness’, ‘innovation’, ‘restructuring’, ‘spatial 
agglomeration’, ‘supply chains’, ‘small firm networks’, ‘industrial 
districts’, the role of industrial associations, and more. Academics in their 
research, policy makers in addressing structural economic problems, 
business support agencies in devising more tailored services, consultancies 
in developing new services, businesses confronted with questions of 
alliances and supply chains, readers and writers of the economic columns 
in their local newspaper: a highly diverse group of people and 
organisations has emerged trying to come to terms with, and use, the 
concept of clusters, but which, in doing so, is also producing new 
definitions, new approaches and new applications. Clusters, so writes an 
expert on the issue, “have the discrete charm of hard-to-define objects of 
desire.” (Steiner, 1997, p.17). The reader looking for a common definition 
and a ‘magic formula’ for regional development will be disappointed. The 
only magic that will presented here is the recounting of the ‘story of 
clusters’ in seven steps, each reflecting a major source of inspiration and 
desire for the cluster concept. Hopefully this will create a better 
understanding of how clusters have been applied in practice, as will be 
discussed in more detail later in this study.
2.1. Step one: the conception of clusters
“A consequence of the system of [diamond] determinants is that a 
nation’s competitive industries are not spread evenly through the 
economy but are connected in what I term cluster consisting of 
industries related by links of various kinds” (Porter, 1990 p. 131­
132)
The steps in this concise history of the cluster concept are accompanied by 
seven quotes on clusters, taken from what may be regarded as - within 
their own context - influential writers on the issue. The story of clusters 
can be seen as a process of proliferation of ideas and understandings, of 
adoptions in a variety of fields of research and policy making, followed by 
attempted reconciliation, categorisation and re-definition.
Quote One presents what may be seen as the conception of the cluster 
concept. Porter did not define the term, but used it as an intermediary 
between his ideas on the pillars of economic success and the performance 
of a country in the global economy - what is summarised under the term 
‘competitiveness’. Porter braced the concept by identifying a list of sixteen 
named clusters that he saw as crucial for economic development at present 
(see Porter, 1990). The list formed the basis for the imaginative cluster 
maps that lied at the heart of his empirical studies. In 1990, Porter did not 
attach so much value to ‘clusters’ as reflected in follow-up work by 
others, as well as his own recent work. Essentially, Porter attributed 
competitiveness to the interaction of a complex set of factors, called the
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‘diamond’ factors. The diamond consisted of ‘factor conditions’, ‘demand 
conditions’, ‘related and supporting industries’ and ‘firm strategy, 
structure and rivalry’. He also included two contextual factors that work 
indirectly through the main determinants: the role of chance and, finally 
and with emphasis on indirectly, the role of government. These factors, in 
a dynamic manner, impinged upon the competitive position of businesses 
in a country.
“competitive advantage in advanced industries is increasingly 
determined by differential knowledge, skills and rates of innovation 
which are embodied in skilled people and organisational routines” 
(Porter, 1990, p.158)
Now, the observable result of this dynamic would be that - in an 
essentially unpredictable way - patterns of clusters would emerge, in which 
linkages between related businesses (and organisations) would support 
competitive advantage.
Porter’s work has been widely acclaimed for the way he brought together 
ideas from, in particular, strategic management, industrial organisation, 
innovation theory, and institutional economics. While his earlier work 
focused on business strategies and value chains, with his work on ‘The 
Competitive Advantage of nations’ he adopted a broader view that 
included industrial and national levels. Commentators on Porter’s work 
have shown how Porter has also changed his theoretical position from one 
largely based on a strategic re-interpretation of industrial organisation to 
one following Schumpeterian ideas on innovation (Foss, 1996). That is, he 
shifted the focus of analysis from the positioning of firms in market 
structures to the capabilities of firms to develop unique sources of 
competitive advantage, although some of the market positioning aspects 
were retained. This shift reflects in many respects a fundamental change. 
The old model was characterised by a neat separation of firms and 
environment, by the transparent nature of vital information, and by 
profitability levels secured by the evasion of direct competition. The new 
model, in contrast, emphasised complex interaction between firms and 
environment, a vital role for tacit knowledge, and competition as the stick 
forcing firms to innovate and secure their market position (Table 4). The 
most radical change can be found in policy recommendations, which in the 
new model endorsed competition, innovation and a preference for 
demanding customers and strong suppliers.
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Table 4 Interpretation of Porter’s shifting position in the 1980s
Porter early 1980s Porter 1990
Main theoretical angle Industrial organisation 
(structure-conduct- 
performance, equilibrium)
Schumpeter, Austrian School 
(innovation, disequilibrium)
Nature of success factors Observable (separation firm­
environment)
Tacit knowledge (firms and 
environmental factors 
interlocked)
Interpretation of innovation narrow, technological affecting 
the whole business value chain, 
largely external to the analysis
Broadened to ‘better ways of 
doing things’; key to economic 
success
Position of business strategies Fundamental - capable of 
inducing short-term change
More emphasis on core 
competencies and path- 
dependency
Source of competitive 
advantage
Constraining competitive 
pressures through positioning 
strategies
Outcompeting rivals by 
constant upgrading and 
innovation
Unit of analysis Business (linked to products) Impact of national factors on 
the innovative potential of firms 
(resulting in cluster level?)
Recommendations (business 
level)
Avoid competition to prevent 
profit erosion; target average 
consumers and control 
suppliers’ margins
Seek competition as a key to 
learning; seek demanding 
consumers and capable 
suppliers
Policy recommendation Check negative forms of 
competition that threaten 
profitability levels ,
Increase competition, support 
innovation and supplier-buyer 
interaction
Source: based on De Man, 1994.
Whilst ‘the competitive advantage of nations’ has received an enormous 
response, from academics, policy-makers, consultants and others, Porter’s 
shift in position and ideas about competitiveness have incurred 
considerable criticism from academics. Because his shift was in some ways 
partial, his approach has been accused of being too eclectic and based on 
too much ‘ad hoc’ reasoning and evidence (Foss, 1996). Not surprisingly, 
since his approach had absorbed ideas from many disciplines, specialists 
accused him of misrepresenting and twisting complex ideas. Examples are 
the treatment of technological development, the social embedding of 
production, the poor treatment of institutions at the meso (industry) level, 
the ignorance of the role of power and the complexities of inter-firm 
relationships (Marceau, 1994; McKelvey, 1991; Sally, 1994; Beije & 
Nuys, 1995). The last point may well reflect one of the most serious 
criticisms (Foss, 1996). Despite the articulation of the ‘value chain, the 
underlying view of the firm remained close to a functional-technological 
one, which did not chime with the more contractual and network-oriented 
views of the firm which feature in recent literature on innovation. Porter is 
thus able to ‘hide’ the co-operation factor within processes of innovation 
and competitiveness (Cooke, 1995a).
On the other hand, Porter’s overall dynamic framework of the diamond 
was only intended as an explanatory framework, not as a system of causal 
relationships. It leaves many questions open about the relationships 
between the diamonds, clusters and competitiveness. It thus became more
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difficult to extract research models as well as policy recommendations. As 
one reviewer of the 1990 book commented:
“Cause and effect are blurred in this real world, the direction of 
causality shifts over time, and as it does, industry-specific 
competitive advantages evolves” (Jelinek, 1992, p. 508 quoted in de 
De Man, 1994, p. 46).
With respect to the concept of clusters, the debate tried to come to terms 
with the question of the level of analysis. The combination of the word 
national title of the 1990 book, and the line of reasoning from diamond to 
business capabilities, with a strong role for cluster level was a source of 
confusion. De Man’s solution is to emphasise the interaction between the 
national and business level. Other authors argue that, in the end, clusters 
present the basic unit of analysis (Auerbach & Skott, 1995). Perhaps the 
best viewpoint is that no definite answer to this question can be drawn 
from Porter’s work:
“The problem with Porter is that he jumps very easily from the 
macro (national) to the meso (industry) and micro (firm) level and 
the other way around, when it suits him” (Beije & Nuys, 1995 p.21)
However, the issue of the levels of analysis amounts to more than just 
academic irritation and squabble, especially when geography comes into 
the picture. How exactly do clusters fit in the national diamond, and how 
do firms fit into clusters and the diamond? Porter’s answer is simple. The 
national (and in certain cases, the regional) level is that in which the 
diamond evolves and clusters emerge, and which is the home of the 
businesses which shape competitiveness. This weaving of national factors, 
cluster formation and business development has been subject of fierce 
debate. According to Dunning (1992) and O'Donell (1995), Porter draws 
the wrong conclusion here. Both authors argue that multinational firms 
can play an important, and for peripheral countries often indispensable role 
in improving diamond factors, although they can also play a destructive 
role. They thus oppose the notion of Porter and others (Malmberg & 
Maskell, 1997) that multinationals, when it comes down to innovation, act 
largely in the same way as domestic firms. Through the role of inward 
investors, clusters can develop around investment ‘hubs’, in twin 
development with clusters in the inward investors’ home country. In 
addition, there are many other ways in which clusters can be related to 
other areas, for instance through the acquisition of knowledge, alliances 
between firms, and co-operation between research centres. Indeed, some 
authors have argued that it is this capacity to create high quality external 
links and information flows that underpins competitiveness (Gray et al., 
1996; Narula, 1993). While such statements are very difficult to verify in a 
more general way, what is clear is that Porter’s presentation of how the 
different levels of analysis relate seems to be too simplistic.
The conception of clusters, and the first response to it, as briefly sketched, 
may already give indication of why the concept embarked on its 
adventurous route. On the one hand, Porter’s approach had immediate 
great appeal. After a decade or more of talking about and analysing the
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role of innovation, a framework was presented that, although with many 
question marks, offered the perspective of a hands-on approach to 
economic development. As will be shown below, the cluster concept 
played not only in the hands of researchers, but also of policy-makers and 
support organisations, and forged new links and debates between them. 
On the other hand, the open ends and the need to respond to the weaker 
aspects of the approach made the cluster concept relatively malleable. It 
could be applied at different spatial levels, and by responding to the 
criticism about the levels of analysis, even be linked to the role of foreign 
firms. The formulation of the concept also allowed a more spatial notion 
of clusters to be developed, linking it for instance to the literature on 
industrial districts. It could be applied for the devising new approaches to 
innovation and industrial policy, especially by linking it stronger to the 
literature on the role of institutions and networking. Both the more spatial 
notion of clusters and the association with networking paved the way for a 
stronger emphasis on small and medium-sized firms. And through the 
latter, the concept inspired new approaches to business support. The 
following steps will provide more details of how the concept has evolved.
2.2. Step two: what spatial clusters have in common
“The rationale for using the relatively broad term, regional cluster, is 
that all of the terms alluded to describe geographic agglomerations 
of firms in the same or related industries and as such are used to 
describe aspects of the same broad phenomenon” (Enright, 1994a 
p.2)
The previous section has illustrated how the concept of clusters has 
evolved and, in doing so, produced a myriad of definitions and 
approaches. A pressing issue that emerges is thus: what do clusters have in 
common? This section will set out what can be perceived as the main 
common points of analytical cluster approaches. This exercise does not 
present an attempt to ‘box in’ the cluster concept by proposing a universal 
definition. Instead of looking for a definition, the approach followed here 
is to identify a set of common ideas or dimensions which, in the author’s 
view, underpin most of the analytical cluster approaches. The core 
objective is to create some common ground for further discussion of the 
concept as well as give an indication of why, inspired by its analytical 
value, so many policy approaches have adopted a cluster perspective.
So, what characterises cluster approaches? The central idea lying behind 
nearly all cluster thinking is that a group of related economic activities in a 
certain area has increased its performance in the wider market place. 
Hence, on what can be seen as the ‘output’ or ‘identity’ side of clusters, 
three dimensions can be distinguished:
1. competitiveness, seen in a dynamic and global context, i.e. closely 
associated with innovation and the adoption of ‘best practice’
2. economic specialisation, in a certain range of related activities (the 
automotive cluster, cultural cluster, cut flower clusters etc.)
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Figure 1 Common dimensions of cluster approaches
3. spatial identity, relevant both to agents and organisations inside the 
clusters as to the outside world (the Dutch cut flower cluster, the 
Basque machine tool cluster, the London financial services cluster)
On the ‘inside’ of clusters, i.e. what cluster are made of, four common 
elements can be distinguished:
1. emphasis on interaction between businesses
2. the variety of resources and competencies which those organisations/ 
businesses control
3. the interaction of businesses within a wider system of supporting 
institutions
4. spatial concentration
Combining these elements, it is possible to come to a kind of framework 
definition of ‘clusters’ (Figure 1). This may read as follows:
“Clusters consist of a group of businesses with different but related 
competencies co-located in a certain area, which through particular 
forms of interaction and ‘institution building’ among themselves and 
(potentially) with other organisations in the area raise their 
competitiveness, specialisation and identity in the global economy.”
This definition is deliberately vague on how the different dimensions - the 
kind of business competencies, interaction, ‘institution building'; and 
organisations it refers to - and even the concept of ‘competitiveness’ - 
should be understood. Both analytical and policy users combine these 
dimensions according to their own insights and interests to create a 
specific interpretation of clusters. Starting with the ‘inside’ dimension, the 
following views may be expounded:
(1) Interaction between businesses: Interaction between firms within the 
boundaries of a certain territory lies at the heart of the cluster concept; this 
distinguishes the term from a more global concept such as ‘sector’:
“We use the term ‘cluster’ generally when describing locational and 
transactional relationships between firms; ‘sector’ when discussing
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industry-targeted strategies and policies to enhance competitiveness” 
(Rosenfeld, 1995, p.13)
But what kinds of transactions are important? In the first instance, 
clustering was seen in the context of the physical movement of goods and 
the exchange of services between co-located firms. Especially in 
manufacturing, clusters have been interpreted as hub-and-spoke systems of 
supply chains. Clusters have been associated, in particular, with the 
increased significance of Just-in-Time delivery in the automotive industry. 
The evidence on the link between new logistical systems and spatial 
clustering is however far from strong (Sadler, 1994). Just-in-Time, has 
increasingly been shown to be restricted to the bulkier components with 
often low value added. The interest has thus shifted from the physical flow 
dimension to aspects of supply chain management and learning between 
firms, that is, from material to more immaterial linkages.
More recent contributions to cluster analysis and policy formulation tend 
to stress ‘collaboration’ and the creation of trust as key components in 
raising competitiveness. “It is this hidden dimension of co-operation that 
helps give cluster their competitive advantage Cooke, 1995a, p. 10). 
Rather than from large-scale manufacturing, these insights are derived 
from regional success stories such as found in the central (‘Third’) part of 
Italy (industrial districts) and studies on networking for instance in 
Denmark (Ploughmann, 1991). Overcoming ‘petty’ rivalries and finding 
ways to pursue common interest and share resources are generally 
presented as ways to become more innovative and competitive (Best, 
1990). A core idea here is that firms compete as a group. However, not all 
authors cherish the role of collaborative links between firms. Porter’s 
original idea was highly critical of the idea of networking, particularly as 
part of policy support. More recently, several authors have developed a 
more articulated view, in which there is a balance between competition 
and collaboration (Boekholt et al., 1993; Enright, 1994a). While firms may 
co-operate in areas such as innovation, training, the hiring of workers and 
lobbying, this should not result in collusive action in the marketplace.
Different directions of inter-firm relationships can be distinguished 
depending on where firms operate in wider production systems. Horizontal 
links refer to links between firms in similar positions that interact on the 
basis of complementary assets or the opportunity to learn from ‘peer’ 
firms. Vertical links may emerge when firms occupy different positions in a 
supply chain and opportunities exist to develop supplier relations and 
initiatives of inter-firm learning along the supply chain. An issue related to 
the nature of linkages is that of overall profile of the businesses involved. 
Cluster policies emphasising horizontal relationships are often only 
targeted on SMEs. In other projects, large firms are also involved. Large 
firms can play various mentoring or tutoring roles (Morgan, 1996; Jacobs, 
1997). One specific role emerges when the large firm is a (potential) 
customer of the SMEs, in a supply chain context. The aim of the 
mentoring action is to communicate to (potential) suppliers how to 
develop their position in the supply chain. This may cover a large part of 
internal business processes: quality, delivery, customisation, use of EDI,
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service. In addition, more specific knowledge about the procurement and 
contracting practices of potential customers can be disclosed. This may 
help SMEs to develop a more tailored marketing strategy. A supply chain 
context is however only one of the examples in which larger firms can play 
a role. They can also act as mentors, assisting SMEs in improving specific 
business processes.
(2) The variety o f resources and competencies that businesses control: In 
recent literature on business performance, competitiveness has increasingly 
been associated with the creation and mobilisation of resources and the 
development of firm-specific competencies, rather than with issues of 
business size and market positioning. In addition, this resource-based 
interpretation of business success has shifted from ‘basic’ technological 
and organisational capabilities to higher level competencies such as the 
management of processes of learning and continuous improvement.
There are two dimensions to resource development. On the one hand, as 
emphasised throughout Porter’s work, competitive advantages are derived 
from specific resources, that is, assets that are modified or created 
specifically by and for certain users. Increasingly, such resources underpin 
the organisational, technological and management skills of businesses. 
Besides Porter, the notion of specific resources has received much weight 
through the work of Williamson (1985).
On the other hand, authors have emphasised the access to resources, the 
specific way they are applied, and combined with other resources (Powell
& Smith-Doerr, 1994; Storper & Scott, 1995; Hakansson & Johanson, 
1993). The idea of variation in the way resources are applied resonates 
Penrose’s (1959) observation that it is not so much the resources as such 
that count, but the services they render to a particular firm. Both the 
creation and mobilisation of resources are thus increasingly seen in a 
relational context. Firms need to interact with other firms to be able to 
upgrade their internal resources; they also need this interaction to be able 
to integrate a diverse range of technologies and skills controlled by other 
firms. Only by forming such alliances, can firms secure a position in an 
increasingly demanding market place and in a world dominated by 
increasingly complex technology. It is this need to link and develop 
resources between businesses which has raised the significance of supply 
chains, clusters and other ‘system’ concepts (Tushman & Rosenkopf, 
1992).
Moreover, linking different resources, technologies, and organisations 
requires the building of complex interfaces, which places strong demands 
on the management and networking capabilities of the businesses involved. 
It is this capacity that increasingly forms the crux of business performance. 
Accordingly, supply chains and clusters should be perceived more as 
groups of firms which exchange intermediate goods and services to each 
other. Clusters can be perceived as complex organisational environments, 
and it is a major challenge to firms, especially for SMEs, to acquire the 
necessary skills to move around in such environments (Keeble, 1997). 
Supply chains, in particular, have been presented as a highly suitable
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environment for learning, a view strongly supported by Brian Morgan on 
the basis of experiences of the Welsh Development Agency:
The key point to establish is that the integrated supply chain is first 
and foremost an awesomely effective system of interactive learning; 
indeed it has proven to be one of the most important mechanisms for 
generating and disseminating knowledge and problem solving 
capacities way beyond the confines of a single firm” (Interview)
The emphasis on learning in an interactive context is increasingly 
interpreted from an institutional perspective. Not only are businesses and 
their interactions seen as complex forms of social organisation, the 
structures in which they operate are also marked by certain rules and 
routines. In other words, through processes of ‘collective learning’ 
competencies emerge at the level of the ‘system’, additional to firm- 
specific competencies (Lawson, 1997b). Such a view is also expressed in 
Boekholt’s definition of clusters:
“(...) clusters are groups of firms, R&D institutions and other 
intermediary actors, interacting through interdependent linkages and 
exchange of knowledge, when innovating and creating added value. 
Cluster policies are all those initiatives that aim to support this type 
of interactive learning between a number of actors, in particular 
those from industry. This could be a group of firms, or a 
combination of firms and organisations that help to increase 
innovation capabilities such as R&D institutions. In contrast to 
traditional R&D policies where bilateral relations were supported, a 
crucial element of cluster policies is that it encourages a number of 
firms to jointly work towards improving their competitiveness.” 
Definition used in a survey as part of the OECD-NIS (National 
Innovation Systems Project)
This quote also points at another aspect of the resource dimension of 
clusters. Through the clustering process, the skills and resources 
underpinning economic success may become part of the cluster, in such a 
way that they may develop partly independently of the businesses that 
originally shaped and embodied them. Collective learning to a kind of 
collective resource building. The idea of cluster-specific resources being 
developed through the interaction of firms from different industrial 
backgrounds is also espoused by Kantor’s definition of clusters: “clusters 
are concrete manifestations of more generic skills that cut across industries 
but outlast them” (quoted in Rosenfeld, 1997, p.18).
(3) Interaction o f businesses within a wider system o f supporting 
institutions and a tailored infrastructure: Boekholt’s quote not only 
highlights the aspect of collective learning, but also the fact that this 
involves links with organisations. Businesses generally maintain 
relationships with a range of organisations that form part of their business 
environment. Some of these relationships, such as with technology centres 
or marketing bureaux may be of vital importance to business 
competitiveness. The industrial districts in the Third Italy (Emilia- 
Romagna, Prato, Veneto, etc.) present a core case of such an impact 
through the role of the so-called ‘Real Service Centres’ - centres which
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assist particular groups of small firms in improving their performance 
across a wide range of business activities: marketing, technology, human 
resources, etc. Insights into the role of support organisations have also 
been derived from Germany and certain Asian countries, particularly Japan 
(Best, 1990, also mentioned by Porter). Essential in all these cases is that 
support organisations tailor their activities to particular sectors of the 
economy, and offer a wide range of services based on an in-depth 
knowledge of that sector. In addition, by close and continuing interaction 
with their customers, such organisations contribute to the forging of 
relationships between firms. By including such institutional linkages, a 
cluster can be conceived as a particular structure of sectoral governance, 
an issue that will be discussed under step four.
The role of support organisations in clustering is particularly stressed by 
Steiner’s definition of clustering:
“clusters are sets of complementary firms (in production and service 
sectors) as well as public, private and semi-public research and 
development institutions characterised by close interrelations and a 
regional dimension” (Steiner, 1997 p.17).
In addition to the inclusion of the non-business sector, Cooke (1995a, p. 
11) also specifies the nature of the relationships:
Clusters are thus aggregates of firms and non-firm institutions that 
supply external economies of scale through their capacity for 
optimisation of earning practices by co-operative as well as 
competitive economic relations and interactions”
While the institutional dimension has taken a prominent position in recent 
literature on clustering, many analysts start their observations by pointing 
to what are seen as ‘classical’ factors behind clustering: the role of the 
labour market, the proliferation of specialist firms, such as producer 
services and machine tool manufacturers, and spill-overs between firms, 
especially in the area of technology. These factors go back to the original 
ideas about spatial agglomeration and economic clustering formulated by 
Alfred Marshall, which are still considered by many as constituting the 
basic explanation for clustering and agglomeration phenomena (Lawson, 
1997a; Krugman, 1991). This leads to the last factor: spatial 
concentration.
(4) Spatial concentration o f the business/organisations involved: For 
many observers, the crux of clustering lies in spatial concentration:
“A cluster is a loose geographical bounded agglomeration of similar, 
related firms that together are able to achieve synergy” (Rosenfeld,
1995, p.12)
As a reason for the significance of spatial concentration is the fact that all 
the factors mentioned so far, from business interaction, resource 
development and exchange, institutional development and the creation of a 
tailored infrastructure, benefit from spatial proximity. One reason for the 
emphasis on spatial concentration is that the kind of interaction that 
facilitates clustering is not easily done over long distances, despite all the
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spectacular improvements in communication technologies (Morgan, 1997; 
Malmberg, 1996). Creating the right environment for sharing resources, 
for creating trust and ‘institution building’, requires the exchange of ‘tacit 
knowledge’ and hence proximity. Also, the development of the right 
business environment for clusters - with a specific role for technology 
centres, universities etc. -  benefits from co-location. Undoubtedly, new 
technology enables the ‘global’ market reach of today’s business, and 
facilitates global searches for technological and market opportunities. It 
does not undermine the specific kind of dynamics at the local level which 
underpinning innovation and competitiveness.
While the role of proximity in clusters is generally accepted, there is much 
debate on how the different spatial levels should be envisaged. As said 
before, some attach much value to the fact that proximity eases the 
physical exchange of goods (‘just-in-time’) and creates external economies 
in the sphere of production and labour markets. The debate oriented on 
physical linkages tends to present ‘local’ and ‘global’ as substitutes or 
even rivals, as in the confrontation between global and local sourcing. 
Others have emphasised the role of proximity in the exchange of ideas and 
the building of a specific culture of collaboration and innovation. Various 
models of what is termed the ‘local-global’ nexus have been suggested, 
but no consensus on the issue has been reached (Doeringer & Terkla,
1995). Since this is an issue that is of fundamental importance in assessing 
the link between clusters and regional development, it will be discussed in 
more detail below.
On the ‘output’ side of clusters, three common themes can be 
distinguished:
(1) The resulting level o f competitiveness in the wider/global economy: In 
the case of clusters, ‘competitiveness’ may refer to a level higher than that 
of the firm. This interpretation of competitiveness is a ‘structural’ or even 
‘holistic’ one (Sachwald, 1995). The latter leads to a vision of a cluster or 
a region as a competitive unit in the wider economy, in competition with 
other clusters or region. Cluster competitiveness can be assessed in static 
terms, by indications of market share and trade relations or in more 
dynamic terms, by including details of investments and innovation. 
Because it is more difficult to obtain data describing the more dynamic 
dimensions of competitiveness, however, most quantitative approaches are 
based on trade figures, similar to Porter’s cluster charts.
The application of the concept of competitiveness to a system level has 
stirred up some hefty debates. Well-known economists such as Krugman, 
for instance, consider ‘competitiveness’ as a dangerous concept especially 
in the hands of policy makers (Krugman, 1994). His argument, in essence, 
is that nations or regions are not like firms but spaces that embody both 
the supply and demand side of the economy, as expressed in one of his 
famous quotes:
Moreover, countries do not compete with each other the way 
corporations do. Coke and Pepsi are almost purely rivals: only a 
negligible fraction of Coca-Cola's sales go to Pepsi workers, only a
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negligible fraction of the goods Coca-Cola workers buy are Pepsi 
products. So if Pepsi is successful, it tends to be at Coke's expense.
But the major industrial countries, while they sell products that 
compete with each other, are also one another's main export markets 
and each other's main suppliers of useful imports. If the European 
economy does well, it need not be at U.S. expense; indeed, if 
anything a successful European economy is likely to help the U.S. 
economy by providing it with larger markets and selling it goods of 
superior quality at lower prices (Krugman, 1994 p.34)
The upshot of this comment is not that ‘structural’, ‘targeted’ 
competitiveness strategies are likely to be ineffective (as seems to be the 
view of Porter). The argument is rather that while it may work for the area 
involved, at a higher geographical level and in the longer term, it will be 
detrimental for the world economy at large. Humbert (1994), while 
observing a shift from an emphasis on regulating for ‘fair competition’ to 
one where governments increasingly turn into partners with businesses to 
strengthen structural competitiveness, warns for the unsustainability of the 
‘competitiveness’ path in the long run.
If an emphasis on structural competition is to be avoided, this means that 
there is no place for featuring ‘the’ competitiveness of a cluster as if  the 
latter, within the context of the wider market, is perceived as an integrated 
economic actor. Economists such as Krugman and Porter only allow 
competitiveness to be associated with productive units such as firms. 
Clusters then can be seen as the environment in which firms, in various 
ways, can improve their performance through the linkages they build in the 
cluster. Such a view shifts the attention from a vision of a cluster as an 
encompassing chain of producers which is seen as competing ‘as a group’ 
(Gomes-Casseres, 1994) towards one where clusters are associated with 
the framework of production and knowledge flows in which individual 
firms may thrive. Where competitiveness may have some structural 
components, such as derived from Porter’s ‘diamond’ or ‘innovation 
system’ characteristics, that should not be translated into a holistic, 
‘mercantilist’ concept of competitiveness.
The nature and level of competitiveness remains a conundrum, however. 
How can we deal with the observation that, especially in the case of 
agglomerated SME clusters, the competitiveness of firms highly depends 
on their position in a cluster, in terms of division of labour, knowledge 
flows, entrepreneurial attitudes? How can we classify then the synergetic 
effects at the cluster level which form a major contribution to the 
competitiveness of the cluster members? How can we interpret the fact 
that competing in outside markets by cluster members is regarded by 
themselves as a group, and that the ‘cluster competitiveness’ is 
strategically assessed by business associations etc.?. One way out of this is 
to see the cluster not as a competitive unit, but as a shortcut for the 
framework in which a group of strongly interdependent competitive firms 
improves their competitiveness. This question is especially relevant for 
policy-making: should policy be aiming at the building of competitive 
clusters, or at the supporting of business competitiveness through cluster
AL ADAPT report (02/11/99) - 29 -
initiatives? While Krugman and Porter appear to endorse the latter, many 
authors on regional development tend to take a position in between, 
tending more to a ‘mercantilist’ stance. One author who defends such a 
position is Cooke (Cooke, 1995a, p.5) , who, in a paper on restructuring 
of old industrial areas claims that:
“Regional administrations can now have a ‘neo-mercantilist’ remit in
relation to their regions’ economy and society.”
Another fundamental issue is that one should be cautious with policy 
recommendations based on a philosophy of an ‘entrepreneurial state’ in 
which the latter primarily refers to boosting the supply side of the 
economy. This leads to the concern that competitiveness only refers to the 
success of businesses, while it excludes other dimensions of development. 
Indeed, crude definitions of competitiveness thus solely refer to winning 
market share. Suggesting that competitiveness should be distanced from a 
view based on ‘competing market shares’ only, Coriat (1997, p.9) presents 
a more balanced definition of competitiveness. In addition to the 
international dimension, a social criterion is included: “the capacity to 
produce goods and services which respond to the demands of international 
markets, whilst at the same time enabling (...) citizens to enjoy a steadily 
rising standard of living over the long-term”.
From a more methodological point of view, competitiveness has also been 
discredited for being a tautological and hollow concept. An economy was 
seen as competitive if it was able to secure and raise its market share and 
what explained this performance was competitiveness. The link with 
clusters has been crucial in overcoming this problem by offering a 
substantive basis for competitiveness. What is interesting in this context is 
the various ways in which clusters have been associated with various 
models of ‘competitiveness’. Porter, on the one hand, sees productivity as 
the main component of competitiveness. Other authors stress 
technological and organisational innovation as major determinants 
(Morgan, 1996; Boekholt et al., 1993). Rather than being more 
productive, competitiveness is seen as the capability to move into product 
markets with higher levels of value added. According to Reinert (1995), it 
is this ‘quality’ dimension, i.e. the exercise of ‘picking winners’, which 
forms the essence of the ‘competitiveness’ concept (and of its 
predecessors ‘national productive power’ and ‘productive capacity’).
(2) Specialisation. At the level of an economy as a whole, a cluster 
approach refers to particular patterns of specialisation. This is reflected in 
Porter’s quote on clusters at the beginning in the chapter (“a nation’s 
competitive industries are not spread evenly through the economy”). It is 
shown by the many lists coming out of cluster studies, in which a 
distinction is often made between existing clusters and potential or 
emergent clusters (Held, 1996). The latter is also graphically illustrated by 
the many cluster charts and maps which highlight the strong economic 
activities in particular regions and nations.
Specialisation can be seen as a two-edged sort. On the one hand, it is seen 
as a necessary dimension to economic development. Only through building
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a profile of particular strengths can a regional economy expect to sustain 
its competitiveness in a world of ‘global’ competition. Steiner (1997, p.19) 
points to the problem that many peripheral regions suffer from a lack of 
specialisation:
“It is one of the weaknesses of many regions in (especially) small 
open economies that they lack a special profile: they do a lot of 
things without doing anything special. (... ) In terms of economics, 
locational advantages have turned from comparative (being 
relatively cheaper) to competitive advantages relying on quality 
elements. This locational specification is founded on a special profile
- what a region is able to do along specific lines of production”.
Specialisation is thus the only way to overcome the ‘globalisation trap’, 
outrunning the risk of being outcompeted across the board.
On the other hand, both academics and policy-makers have pointed at 
some problematic aspects of specialisation. One reason why policy makers 
have objected to sector-based policies is because they feared that it would 
make the region too much dependent on a limited range of economic 
activities. Rosenfeld (1997) argues that this may be overcome by 
emphasising specialisation as a dynamic process. Specialisation should not 
just entail a focus on certain final markets, but rather be understood as a 
ongoing process of capability building with diverse market applications 
(Langlois & Robertson, 1995). An even more controversial aspect is the 
question of how specialisation should be promoted. It is one thing to 
explain regional competitiveness in terms of the actual patterns of cluster 
specialisation. It is another thing to actually try and (re)shape a regional 
economic profile. This issue, which will be further addressed in the section 
on industrial policy, also introduces the last ‘output’ dimension: identity.
3. Identity. At present there is a tendency for innovative regional policies 
to become a matter less of top-down administration and public control, 
and more of promotion, stimulation and facilitating the restructuring of 
economic activity (Keating, 1997). Both for encouraging and mobilising 
actors within the region and for ‘selling’ the region as an attractive site for 
investment and partner for co-operation to outsider, shaping an identity is 
an essential process. Cluster specialisation can be an important part of 
such an identity. Within the region, the idea of belonging to a competitive 
cluster may help to build trust and to shift the level of competition from 
between local businesses to between the local clusters and the outside 
world (Best, 1990). To the outside world, cluster specialisation may be 
used as a marketing tool to attract inward investments. In recent years, 
with the clusters becoming an established form of regional industrial 
policy, this has become a more important aspect of cluster approaches. An 
illustration of how regions sell themselves through their acclaimed cluster 
strengths can be found on the webpages of many RDAs.
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2.3. Step three: clusters as forms of industrial and innovation 
policy
“In many cases and increasingly in the future, industrial innovation 
requires the intelligent conception of different forms of knowledge, 
technology and skills. A cluster approach provides a relatively new 
basis for the development of effective innovation strategies” (Jacobs,
1997 p.22)
One way to understand the development and impact of the concept, as 
argued before, is to look at the context in which it has emerged. The last 
section has already indicated how clusters fitted in the new ideas about the 
systematic nature of innovation, resource development, and institutional 
linkages. Hence, seen from a policy perspective, clusters reflect a shift in 
objectives from targeting territories and firms to targeting industries 
(Rosenfeld, 1995). In addition to such spatial-economic considerations, 
cluster thinking has been informed by many other fields of socio-economic 
development and policy-making (see for instance the contribution from 
Steiner in the quotation box at the beginning of the chapter).
This section will discuss the development of regional clusters as a specific 
concept of regional industrial policy, and focus on how clusters 
accommodated new ideas about how to support industrial development. 
There are two broad trends that have underpinned recent changes in 
industrial policy. The first is the evolution of industrial policy from post­
war reconstruction to an innovation oriented, strategic approach focused 
on ‘competitiveness’. The second is a change in the geographical scale 
from nation to region. The last decade has witnessed a trend towards 
regionalisation of industrial and innovation policy. The combination of 
these two factors offers one of the explanations for the popularity of the 
regional cluster concept.
Table 5 Périodisation of industrial policy
Main period Policy description Target
late 40s-50s 





Keynesian growth policy 
Defensive industrial policy
(Aggressive) technology policies 
Cluster approach
Technology transfer from USA 
Tackling the business cycle 
Managing decline of industries in crisis 
(steel, ship-building, coal mining): 
“backing losers”
New technology development and 
transfer (IT, biotechnology, new 
materials, environmental technology) 
“picking winners”
Integrated policies along sectoral/value 
chain lines
Source: after Jacobs, 1997
(1) Between industrial and innovation policies
Jacobs (1997) distinguishes five phases in the post-war development of 
industrial policy in the Western World (Table 5). Following the post-war 
reconstruction efforts, industrial policy was either low key or largely 
focused on investments in large-scale, often publicly owned, industries.
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With the stagnation of economic growth in the 1970s, two major shifts can 
be distinguished. First, policy orientation shifted from large scale 
restructuring intended to address the problems of industrial decline to 
more aggressive, technology oriented policies. This shift corresponds to an 
overall change in economic policy from business-cycle focused 
‘Keynesianism’ to a strong supply-side orientation (Humbert, 1994). 
Industrial policy became much more strategic, focusing on the fostering of 
high-tech activities in areas such as IT and new materials, or on the 
application of new management techniques to established sectors such as 
consumer electronics and cars. The success of SE Asian countries in 
shaping new industrial complexes and capturing substantial market shares 
in durable consumer goods presented a major source of inspiration for 
such an ambitious ‘picking winners’ approach. In many of the newly 
industrialising countries in Asia (Taiwan, S Korea, Singapore) and Europe 
(Spain, Portugal, Ireland), as well as some of the ‘older’ industrial 
countries such as the UK and the USA, this shift led to a partial de­
coupling of industrial policy from questions of ownership, and an 
increased emphasis on the industrial ‘supply base’ and the attraction of 
international flagships.
Different models of development emerged. Some Asian countries 
embarked on a ‘high road’ strategy where favourable production 
conditions were combined with a strong effort to encourage technology 
and skill transfer to both domestic firms and the local population; for these 
countries the emphasis in economic policy had radically moved from issues 
of productive or allocative efficiency to the creation of strategic advantage 
(Best, 1990). For the Japanese, the key factor is not productive or 
allocative efficiency, but strategic advantage. Others opted for a general 
‘low road’ with increased flexibility in the labour market to reduce wage 
costs. The UK and US, in particular, the 1980s were characterised by an 
aversion to ‘grand’ industrial policy and emphasis on market flexibility, 
although some of the more strategic policies re-emerged under the banner 
of technology policy.
Not all of the attempts to build more strategic approaches to industrial 
development were successful. On the one hand, some of the ‘Grandes 
Projects’ failed because they were too much technology-led and failed to 
build a bridge with other dimensions of industrial policy, such as 
technology transfer , training, SME support and export promotion. On the 
other hand, while supply side orientation led to a proliferation of business 
support and technology-led initiatives (science parks, technopoles, 
incubator centres), generally geared to the wider business community, 
many lacked the sophistication to genuinely cater for business needs. What 
was required was a framework to combine a strategic supply-side 
orientation with insights into the organisational and technological 
specificities of industrial systems, as implied by models of ‘supply chains’, 
‘filières’ and ‘value chains’. Moreover, the strategic focus has to build on 
a strong international orientation, both in terms of new production 
methods (‘best practices’) and shifts in demand. Humbert (1994 p. 454) 
thus stresses the systematic character of industrial policy: “designing
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industry-specific policies to create resources within the national territory 
and, at the same time, take into account the globalisation issue demands a 
genuinely systematic approach.”
The emphasis on strategic intervention was further nurtured by insights 
coming from economists such as Krugman, Dunning and Porter. Contrary 
to the advocates of ‘free trade’, these authors argue that trade 
specialisation is based on created rather than ‘comparative’ advantages, 
and that small initial advantages may be of great importance for the 
specialisation process. Such advantages may result from chance events but 
may also be created by deliberate policies of technology support and 
market development. The link between a ‘system-oriented’ industrial 
policy and international trade has been one of the main pillars of the 
‘competitiveness’ debate. In the words of Martin and Sunley (1995, p. 
301):
“The unifying theme in newer approaches is their study of the 
interactions between governments and firms and their connection to 
trade and industrial policy within the context of a politically and 
economically competitive world economy, one in which governments 
tend to ‘create; the most advantageous environment for national 
business. Accordingly, approaches re-contextualise comparative 
advantages to include an understanding of developments in the trade- 
industrial arena”.
The shaping of an advantageous environment for business development 
forms the essence of Porter’s cluster approach, which thus can be seen as 
the culmination of the re-shaping of industrial policy along the lines of 
resource creation and system orientation. Porter’s diamond is an attempt 
to capture the main determinants of national or regional business 
competitiveness. Porter himself, however, defined industrial policy 
primarily in terms of support to the national diamond factors, while he saw 
cluster development as something which, given a favourable diamond, was 
not to be targeted directly by the public sector.
In Jacobs’ view, the contribution of the cluster approach is that it supports 
integrated policies along sectoral or value chain lines. Compared with 
direct subsidies to firms, cluster-based initiatives facilitate a more market 
conform way of policy-making. Cluster policies have often evolved out of 
a blending of existing sectoral policies and innovation policies. While in 
some cases the pretension of more ‘integrated’ and market-oriented 
policies is not much more than a dressing up of old sectoral policies under 
a ‘cluster’ disguise, in many cases it reflects a genuine focus on 
differentiation and specialisation along sectoral lines. The result is a 
cluster-specific innovation policy which takes account of the differences in 
the nature and organisation of knowledge creation and application:
“Stimulating innovation in the construction clusters really entails 
other priorities and approaches than in the health cluster” (Jacobs,
1997 p.26).
As a concept of industrial policy, the cluster approach may underpin a 
quality-oriented, integrated approach to improving competitiveness.
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Within a world where tactics of ‘defensive restructuring’ (Lipietz, 1992) 
on the basis of wage competition and various forms of deregulation and 
privatisation abound, cluster reflect an alternative path of upwards 
modernisation and restructuring. The approach chimes with the idea of 
‘picking winners’, but in a more refined way than older innovation 
policies. The cluster approach allows for a differentiated approached 
targeted on a wide range of economic activities, which takes into account 
the variation in industrial structured and business needs. One important 
feature of such a view is that it may involve more than Schumpeter’s ‘New 
Combinations’, i.e. creating new ways of producing goods and services. 
Another dimension of quality improvement is the mastery of existing new 
technological and organisational capabilities, and the creation of cluster- 
level institutional frameworks to facilitate the transfer and absorption of 
so-called ‘best practice’. By facilitating such differentiation, cluster 
policies may not only serve in the strategic support to emergent sectors or 
the strengthening of established sectors, but also provide a basis for the 
‘managed decline’ of mature sectors. Rather than emphasising ‘picking 
winners’, the appropriate phrase should be ‘setting priorities’ within 
cluster-oriented development strategy.
A core issue within the debate on clustering remains the balance between 
policies and support measures which are especially geared to selected 
clusters, and those which are of a more generic nature that may result in 
clustering in a broad range of sectors. In many respects, Porter’s diamond 
falls in the latter category. Porter’s approach is based on the idea that, 
while public intervention provides incentives and catalysts, it is the market 
that determines the direction of economic specialisation. As will be 
discussed in the next section, in reality many initiatives apply some degree 
of targeting, especially at the regional level. What is more, it has become 
increasingly common that the cluster perspective is used to assist just one 
or two sectors, as the case studies will show. The issue of ‘cluster- 
oriented’ vs. more generic forms of support will be further addressed 
below when a distinction will be made between clusters-as-target and 
clusters-as-method.
(2) The resurgence o f the region
The emphasis on the region as an appropriate site of industrial policy­
making stems from the interaction between various economic and political 
developments. Dunford (1992, p.159) illustrates of how new insights into 
regional development in the 1980s, and notably the emergence of regional 
success stories, triggered and justified more interest in regional policy:
“Development is (...) a question of not only resources, but also of the 
ways in which resources are used, and the ways economies and 
societies are organised. The divergent development of regional 
development reflects differences in their patterns of adaptation to the 
technological and social challenges of a new era. These differences 
in the degree of ‘success’ of regional economies offer evidence of the 
types of adjustment and the institutional structures required for a 
more cohesive and balanced development of the regions in Europe,
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and show how essential it is to develop local and regional 
development programmes.
The region is seen as having re-emerged as a fundamental unit of socio­
economic, political and even technological development (Storper, 1995b). 
Against the background of thinking about innovation and industrial policy, 
the discussion has especially focused on the benefits from proximity and 
process taking place in a common environment. A common theme already 
alluded to in the debate on spatial proximity is the idea that, despite the 
‘shrinking’ of the globe through new information technologies, innovation 
remains a localised process. This notion is based primarily on the 
observation that innovation processes rely heavily on particular forms of 
interaction between different businesses and organisations within wider 
industrial and institutional systems. Since this interaction is often of a tacit 
and unplanned nature, space is an important factor:
“Geography plays a fundamental role in the process of innovation 
and learning, since innovations are in most cases less the product of 
individual firms than of the assembled resources, knowledge, and 
other inputs and capabilities that are localised in specific places 
(Malmberg & Maskell, 1997, p.28).
The idea that the region thus presents an important site for innovation 
does not only stem from the mere proximate location of interdependent 
actors. It also stems from the fact that these actors and relationships are 
embedded in a local socio-economic environment, in which collective 
conventions and routines develop which underpin the building of trust, the 
sharing of information and processes of collective learning. Storper 
(1995b) captures these aspects under the terms of “conventions” and 
“untraded interdependencies” . Developing a relational perspective based 
on ideas of collective learning and collective reflexivity, Storper (1997a, p. 
256) links conventions and untraded interdependencies with notions of 
regional identity, resource (asset) building, specialisation, and 
agglomeration. In his view, the understanding of why territories and 
regions develop in unique ways can be explained by focusing on the 
following issues:
“( ...) the role of territorial proximity in the formation of 
conventions; the role of conventions in defining the ‘action 
specificities’ of economic agents, and hence the economic identities 
of territories and regions; the economic status of regional 
conventions of production as a type of regionally specific collective 
asset of the economy; the status of conventions as untraded 
interdependencies; why it is so difficult for some places to imitate or 
borrow conventions from other places; why agglomerated economic 
activity comes into being and why it persists even if when the costs 
of covering distance are of relatively little importance to the 
activities at hand (...)”.
The concept of local embedding of processes of innovation and industrial 
development however remains a highly controversial issue. The crucial 
question is, where exactly do the collective resources, whether they are 
tangible or intangible assets, reside? Authors who stress the social nature
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of economic processes tend to present embedding as a kind of elusive 
process which is captured by concepts such as ‘industrial agglomerations’, 
‘innovative milieux’ and ‘industrial districts’. Other authors however have 
opposed such ‘organic’ views of regional economies by putting forward a 
more industrial-systemic view. Porter for instance sees the cluster system 
as the main level where external advantages are created (Porter, 1996). So 
external advantages are embedded within the system of linked industries 
and the support organisations, and less through the wider environment, 
although the latter may be important through the provision of generic 
skills and infrastructure. Accordingly, in Porter’s view, it is “time to shed 
'agglomeration economies'” (Porter, 1996, p.87).
A similar point is made by Sternberg (1991), who claims that regional 
studies have tended to confound broad territorial complexes with sector- 
specific complexes, ignoring critical questions about the dominant 
relationships between sector-specific complexes operating in the region. 
An alternative view has been developed by Markusen. Also disagreeing 
with the prevalent conception of industrial districts, she distinguishes 
between levels of networks interlocked at different spatial levels ( 
Markusen, 1996). On the one hand, businesses are part of global networks 
in which goods, services, knowledge, etc, are exchanged. On the other 
hand, they participate in local networks that present other forms of 
exchange. This double embedding - local and global - however also implies 
that agglomerated industrial networks cannot be regarded as a kind of 
integral unit at the regional level. In the words of Amin and Thrift (1993, 
p.414): “industrial agglomerations [...] should be thought in terms of 
loosely connected arrays, rather than organic wholes” (see also Oinas & 
Malecki, 1999).
The second explanation for the ‘resurgence’ of the region in industrial 
policy is of a more political nature, and is linked to recent processes of 
decentralisation in public administration (Schmidt, 1996). Many national 
governments have devolved some part of the responsibility of industrial 
policy to regional levels, notably supply-side instruments such as 
infrastructural development, business support and employment 
programmes. This devolution has been justified generally on the basis that 
regional authorities would be better able to create the right policy 
packages catering for the needs of local firms, and that it would allow for 
the shaping of regional innovative networks. However, a more cynical 
view is that regionalisation of innovation and industrial policy also suited 
the move of national governments from a redistribution to a supply-side 
model in which responsibility for local economic development is devolved 
to the regional level (Sabel, 1995). Devolution and the emphasis on local 
supply-side policies is thus interpreted as “smokescreens for effective 
withdrawal by the state from regional policy” (Fagan, 1996, p. 11). The 
greatest fear is that full devolution of responsibility, rather than creating 
harmonic trajectories of indigenous regional growth, may induce 
interregional competition for external investments and further undermining 
of solidarity between regions. This argument is in line with the critique on 
the ‘competitiveness’ concept presented earlier.
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Although regional cluster policies in themselves are no substitute for 
policies that address regional differences at a supra-regional level, they 
may offer an alternative development strategy that avoids the worst effects 
of interregional competition. Indeed, some authors have argued that, in 
contrast to the negative sum games resulting from bidding for inward 
investments, or the hollow initiatives of place marketing, cluster policies 
can be genuinely growth creating (Sternberg, 1991). However, to fulfil 
this promise, what counts is the way clusters policies are designed and 
initiated. Certain essential conditions have been flagged up in this section. 
To be a truly ‘quality’ oriented approach, cluster policies need to be of an 
inclusive rather than an isolated policy of ‘picking winners’. The 
approaches also need to reflect a genuine attempt to integrate different 
strands of industrial policy. A pressing question is at what level processes 
of collective learning and collective resource building take place - region 
at large, specific industrial clusters, inter-firm networks - and how they are 
governed. A further issue is how local cluster policies relate to industrial 
and regional policies at higher spatial levels, and how negative aspects of 
interregional competition are monitored and addressed. Many of these 
issues will depend on the way the policy is implemented and embedded in 
the institutional framework. This will be discussed in the next section.
The question of ‘inclusion’ not only relates to the involvement of 
businesses and other social partners in a region, and the way an integrated 
policy is designed. It also involves an issue that lies at the heart of the 
cluster approach: targeting. The essence of targeting is that policy-makers 
select certain activities or sectors ex-ante as the main objects of cluster 
policies. Particularly in academic thinking on the use of clusters 
approaches in industrial policy literature, targeting features as a highly 
controversial point. Porter’s seminal work on clusters, for instance, is 
vehemently opposed to identifying sectors or clusters for targeting because 
he alleges governments are not capable of understanding future economic 
developments in sufficient detail: “governments have a poor track record 
in selecting sectors where the subtle conditions for (...) advantages are 
present” (1990, p. 656). Policies should be facilitating and complementary 
to market-led process of specialisation, rather than intervening in the 
economic structure. Through ex-ante targeting, cluster approaches largely 
entail a kind of return to an interventionist, selective, top-down approach 
in regional policy similar to the 1980s (Table 5). The fear of taking the 
wrong direction by targeting has also been the reason for government 
officials to refrain from following top-down clustering models (Rosenfeld, 
1997).
Other authors have used recent examples from for instance Asia to argue 
that authorities have been successful in creating new sources of economic 
strength. In Best’s view, one dimension of the strategic concept of 
competitive advantage which underpinned Japanese industrial policy was a 
‘navigated sector composition’, based on developing organisational 
superiority even in sectors regarded ‘mature’ in the West. Similar views 
have been espoused in the context of regional development. Sternberg 
(1991), for instance, argues that regional cluster initiatives should not
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simply advocate targeting, but be geared to changing the relationships 
between firms and local institutions, that is, to provide an environment and 
incentives through which local agents learn to improve collective 
efficiency and innovative capacity. One of the consequences of this view is 
that, in many regions, the most interesting sectors will not be the well- 
established ones, but rather clusters of firms whose incipient and emerging 
interrelationships can be strengthened through policy initiatives 
(Sternberg, 1991). A more sophisticated approach can thus be developed 
which squares a bottom-up approach with a ‘top-down’ monitoring and 
steering of cluster. Rosenfeld (1997) indeed sees most of the objections 
against interventionist, ‘top-down’ approaches as undue. Clusters should 
involve a dynamic process of competence building, and not result in 
patterns of static specialisation. By following a dynamic approach, policy­
makers may also be able to address one of the other strongest arguments 
against cluster approaches: the fact that targeting implies an unequal 
treatment of firms in different business areas (Rosenfeld, 1995).
Despite some of the reservations against top-down approaches, other 
authors have argued that cluster-based policy will always require strategic 
choices involving some degree of targeting (Nooteboom, 1993; Beije et 
al., 1993). In practice, the process of identifying and auditing ‘clusters’ has 
become a major theme in the development of cluster policies and a major 
source of business for consultancy providers. Such studies generally 
combine established statistical methods, such as employment and 
production data analysis, ‘shift and share’, input-output analysis, and the 
use of technology indicators, with the capturing of qualitative information 
from industry representatives and experts about perceived strengths an 
weaknesses. The results are generally summarised in the form of target 
sectors and imaginative cluster maps, which often turn out to be important 
elements in local discourses on regional industrial policy. One of the major 
commercial providers of this type of knowledge is, perhaps ironically, 
Porter’s own consultancy Monitor. A clear difference can be observed 
between Porter’s academic concerns about sector targeting and the ‘social 
engineering’ of networking on the one hand, and the more pragmatic 
policy recommendations produced by Monitor. Although Monitor’s 
conclusions tend to be presented with some degree of moderation, 
recording stronger and weaker clusters, as well as more and less promising 
clusters remains an essential part of the consultancy’s product in regional 
industrial policy.
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Chapter Three. The cluster concept in seven 
steps: towards regional initiatives
Chapter Two focused on clustering as a more analytical concept, exploring 
the link to space, industrial development and innovation, and giving a first 
indication of the particular relevance of the concept at the regional level. 
The present chapter will continue the discussion highlighting those 
dimensions that have especially contributed to the application of the 
cluster concept at the regional level, making clustering part of policy 
strategies geared to regional development. The first section will explore 
the role of collaboration and the ‘associational turn’ in regional 
development, followed by a section on how the focus on SMEs has 
informed thinking about clusters. It will be shown that, by associating with 
these new ideas, how the concept of clusters has moved further away from 
its original connotation as given by Porter. The last section will highlight 
issues that stand out in the present debate on clustering and cluster 
initiatives.
3.1. Step four: clusters within an ‘associative model’ of regional 
development
“Interestingly, there are pronounced signs (....) that associative 
thinking, partnership building and encouragement of policy networks 
to facilitate the emergence of new industrial clusters are developing” 
(Cooke, 1995a p.12).
Policies and strategies of regional development have increasingly been 
geared towards what can be called the ‘soft’ dimension of the economy. 
The soft dimension includes the more social and communicative 
dimensions of economic development, and is particularly associated with 
the performance of an economy in terms of innovation and the adaptability 
to external pressures, that is, with a dynamic interpretation of 
competitiveness. Key elements of the soft dimension are processes of 
networking, partnerships, and the creation of norms and values that guide 
the behaviour of agents in a regional economy. Recently authors have 
captured these ideas by developing an ‘associative model’ of regional 
development (Amin & Thrift, 1995; Cooke & Morgan, 1998). The idea 
underlying an ‘associative model’ is that there is ‘third way’ of economic 
governance, which sits between a system of top-down ‘dirigiste’ 
management and full decentralised market control, which is generally 
associated with a neo-liberal points of view . Such a third way is 
accomplished by processes of networking and ‘institution building’ which
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bring together local agents from different social backgrounds and raise the 
collective capacity for action and strategy development. An associative 
model thus underpins the idea of ‘endowing the region with agency’ 
(Amin & Thrift, 1995), that is, the development of regional governance 
structures with a capacity to influence the development of the regional 
economy.
The original formulation of clusters - with a strong emphasis on industrial 
organisation and competition - meant that it disregarded most ideas on 
networking and associational trends. However, increased attention 
particularly for the role of inter-firm and inter-organisational collaboration, 
meant that the more recent approaches to clustering have become a core 
issue in the debate on the ‘associative model’ of regional development. 
What serves the associative model in particular is that the cluster concept 
helps to link two sets of core concepts within regional development 
theory: (1) concepts of networking and associative process at the level of 
firms and organisations and (2) more structural notions of specialisation 
and identity at the regional level. Through bridging these two levels - 
micro/meso and economic structure - , the cluster concept opens a 
strategic window on processes of ‘institution building’ which goes further 
than generic terms such as networking and collaboration. It is this 
structural dimension to clusters which make it a useful concept in the 
design of regional development strategies which are based on associational 
principles, and which aim at addressing the overall economic profile of a 
region. The usefulness of clusters has also been endorsed by empirical 
observations. Cooke’s summing up of work on the development of 
institutional capacity aiming at regenerating old industrial areas, for 
instance, shows that cluster approaches have been more successful than 
innovative networks (Cooke, 1995b). His account thus provides a strong 
support for “associative thinking, partnership building and encouragement 
of policy networks to facilitate the emergence of new industrial clusters” 
(p. 12). One way in which cluster-based associational strategies can be 
effective in supporting businesses is through the establishment of ‘industry 
councils’ which assist in need identification as well as strategy formulation 
(Rosenfeld, 1995).
Another interesting application of clusters within an associational 
approach can be found in the European RIS (Regional Innovation 
Strategies) and RITTS (Regional Innovation and Technology Transfer 
Strategies) programme. Encouraging regional consensus and capacity 
building, the RIS and RITTS initiatives aim at identifying a stock of 
innovative projects. Important attributes of these projects are networking 
and experimentation, and the linking of regional and international 
networking processes. Suggestions for the process towards consensus 
building are presented in a practical handbook (European Commission,
1996). The main process is to form various panels to co-ordinate and 
govern the process of strategy formulation, combining people from 
different backgrounds (managers, economists, technical specialists, public 
sector representatives and planners). A distinction is made between the 
strategic panel with central overview, the international experts ’ panel,
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with an important task in the evaluation procedure, and the sector panels, 
focusing on the support for specific clusters.
The link between an associational approach to regional development and a 
cluster approach can be further clarified by distinguishing three processes 
underpinning the associational model: networking, trust building and the 
shaping of territorial governance structures.
(1) The importance of networking as a way to develop and apply resources 
at the level of a group of related firms or value chain has already been 
presented as one of the cornerstones of the cluster approach. In an 
institutional-associational account, a business sector can be presented as “a 
networked association of producers of complementary products” (Best, 
1990, p. 132). An significant part of the dynamism of an industrial system 
is attributed to the emergence of new forms of industrial governance 
between ‘market’ and ‘hierarchy’ (i.e. firms) and the way these are 
embedded in the wider geographical environment. This approach chimes 
with the organisational ‘resource based’ perspective, which stresses the 
links between different but complementary competencies as a major factor 
in raising competitiveness. Langlois and Robertson (1995) argue that it is 
especially the dynamic aspects of industrial development - the need to 
adapt to changing competitive environments, the pressure to innovate - 
which determine which forms of industrial governance - integrated firms, 
networked firms, organised markets - are most effective. In their view, 
businesses rely on both internal and external capabilities, and the relative 
strengths of these capabilities will have a strong impact on the shape of 
business configurations. At the level of a sector or region, industrial 
development is determined largely by the ‘systematic’ nature of how the 
flow of goods and information and processes of innovation are co­
ordinated. One important ‘systematic’ dimension is the process of 
modularization and standardisation in the wider industrial system, in which 
associational trends are often of vital importance. To understand the 
development of industrial networks, Hákansson and Johanson (1987) see 
them as specific governance structures or modes, which are characterised 
by external and internal forces. External forces relate to economy-wide 
factors (regulatory, macro-economic) as well as industry-specific factors 
(e.g. changing market and technological conditions). Internal factors 
involve the standards, norms and values developed in the system and the 
way the governance structures mediate the interests of the agents 
involved. Also markets themselves have been interpreted in terms of 
specific institutional configurations and evolving governance structures, 
giving rise to more historically and geographically differentiated 
perception of markets (Beije & Groenewegen, 1992).
At the regional level, the link between networking and associational 
tendencies on the one hand and innovation on the other has been captured 
under the label of Regional Innovation Systems, and more recently, also 
under that of the ‘learning region’ (Cooke et al., 1996; Asheim, 1996; 
Howells, 1996). Two basic interpretations of the region as innovation 
system have been put forward. On the one hand, authors have portrayed
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RIS’s as subsystems of national or sector-based systems. Breschi and 
Malerba (1996), for instance, present various clues to how technological 
and sectoral trajectories may develop distinctive spatial features, and when 
they foster the formation of local clusters. Also in line with the subsystem 
view, Howells (1996) argues that, even for regions in the same national 
environment, what counts is how (national) educational and regulatory 
environments are delivered ‘on the ground’, which depends primarily on 
local institutional capacity. Another approach is to see RIS’s as small 
versions of national systems, where innovation is fostered through the 
interaction between business and a variety of knowledge centres 
(universities, business support, research centres etc). Cooke’s (1998) 
description of the origin of the term ‘regional innovation systems’ presents 
an image of the region as a ‘collective order’ characterised by a strong 
interplay between localised systems of territorial governance and business 
innovation.
Developing the idea of ‘technology coalitions’ Storper (1995a, p.908) 
argues that, while the region may be an important level for innovation, 
analysis and policy also need to focus on sectors, and on what are seen as 
genuine opportunities for benefits through co-operation. Hence, referring 
to initiatives to form regional groups of firms to promote innovation he 
makes the following qualification: “Here we do not just mean any group of 
regional firms, but those groups that can legitimately represent the way 
they are tied together into a real or possible technological space via 
synergies, which has demonstrable evolutionary potential, and where 
synergies are regional in nature.” Storper envisages two kinds of 
coalitions: encompassing coalitions and regional technology foundations 
with a more sectoral focus (RTFs). In order to justify support for any form 
of regional coalition or cluster, they need to demonstrate that they are 
sufficiently representative and non-exclusive with respect to a certain 
business activity, and that they exhibit sufficient levels of (potential) 
coherence and synergy.
(2) Supporting collaboration and building trust: To understand the 
development of industrial governance structures, particularly processes of 
networking, and the way they impact upon competitiveness, increased 
attention must be paid to the social aspects of economic development. 
Authors following an associational approach see economic action as 
socially embedded, making the fate of an industrial system dependent on 
the social history of the area in which it is located. However, recent 
literature on collaborative forms of inter-firm relations has claimed that 
collaboration and trust are not the mere consequence of fortuitous social 
developments. Such a historical, even ‘accidental’ view of trust building 
emerged for instance in the literature on ‘social capital’ especially in the 
view of Putnam (1993). Opposing any hint at a “paralysing acceptance of 
history as destiny” Sabel (1992, p. 217) refers to trust as both ‘thick’ - 
through the way it binds parties in patterns of recurrent interaction, - and 
‘thin’, signifying that trust might be re-allocated, that it is makeable and 
breakable. This emphasis on the possibility to shape and manipulate social 
factors presents a cornerstone of the associational approach.
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According to Lorenz (1992), however, social factors can only partly 
explain the emergence of relations of reciprocity and trust. In what is 
called an ‘eclectic’ approach, the author also invokes another, more 
economic reasoning, based on concepts of self-interest and the rational 
prisoners dilemma. As long as agents know that collaboration generates 
collective benefits and they are able to distribute these benefits adequately, 
they will be prepared to invest in networking processes. In time, the 
building of trust can thus be interpreted as a process of the accumulation 
of ‘credit slips outstanding’. This term is used by Coleman (1987) in his 
conceptualisation of ‘social capital’. Coleman also emphasises the role of 
informational channels and behavioural routines in the formation of ‘social
Lorenz mentions two possible causes of a decline in co-operation. First, 
external pressures, such as market threats, or internal friction, such as the 
perception of an unequal distribution of revenues emerging from collective 
action or competition for scarce local resources may reduce the faith in 
potential advantages of mutual co-operation. As examples, he quotes the 
breakdown of trust and co-operation in the Sheffield cutlery and 
Birmingham metalworking districts in the 19th century, and the St Etienne 
ribbon cluster in the inter-war period. Second, collaboration may also be 
weakened as a result of processes of internationalisation, through which 
the development of local plants may become more determined by their 
position in global corporate networks than that in the local economy. The 
latter is also shown in Kantor's recent study of the Boston area, in which 
she focused on the impact of globalisation on business behaviour. Kantor 
found that due to an increased focus of businesses in securing their own 
competitiveness, a process of ‘balkanising’ is effectively breaking down 
the institutional ability to build alliances between businesses, government 
and community organisations. She thus recommends:
“What is needed is a new kind of community-building that will 
develop new leadership and create new mechanisms for linking 
organisations and solving problems. An eternal task therefore seems 
to be the alignment of business interests with that of the local 
community” (Moss Kantor, 1995, p.153).
A recent elaboration of such a combination of a ‘prisoners dilemma’ 
perspective on business interaction with an institutional perspective is 
offered by Oughton and Whittam (1997). The authors present a list of 
issues in which collaboration may increase the performance of a group of 
firms (Table 6, column 1). They also list for each area the threats of 
defection (column 2) and the possible ways for the network to address 
these problems and to govern the development of the network (column 3). 
The benefits stem from the fact that collaboration facilitates investments 
that are not possible by stand-alone firms, thus encouraging a high quality, 
high value added strategy, while a certain degree of rivalry is maintained. 
Opportunism and defection by individual firms are constrained by the 
development of an associative culture in the form of a shared identity and 
belief system, and the existence of a hub or institutional layer with the 
power to impose sanctions on bad behaviour. Power, such as residing in a
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large core firm, can play an important role in supporting network 
development, although this depends highly on the particular strategies of 




defection threats remedies and sanctions 
(governance solutions)
innovation cost sharing; avoidance 




to partners; outsiders 
appropriating ideas
shared identity and belief 
system; specific 
institution capable of 
penalising defectors
finance collective collateral, 
improving information 
provision on financial 
position for vetting of 
applications (co­
operation itself seen as an 
asset)







en bloc marketing and 
advertising
free riders institutionalisation at a 
regional/network level 
(origin marketing)
training joint investment in 
training




responsive to SMEs, non­
poaching agreements
Table 6 Collaboration benefits and instruments (Source: based on Oughton & Whittam, 
1997)
(3) The shaping o f territorial governance. The associational perspective 
not only stresses the development of particular social patterns of behaviour 
within industrial systems, but also the way this intersects with the shaping 
of forms of territorial governance. In the words of Rhodes, governance 
“(...) means there is no centre but multiple centres; there is no sovereign 
authority because networks have significant autonomy. The distinction 
between the public, private and voluntary sectors becomes meaningless. 
All play the game of ‘grantmanship’. These game-like interactions are 
caused by the need to exchange resources and negotiate shared purposes” 
(Rhodes, 1997, p.109). In the practical context of territorial development, 
governance can be understood as: “local government (elected agencies) 
and other agencies (non-elected agencies or 'quangos') responsible for 
delivery and management of services at the local level, and the 
relationships between them.” (Wood & Ache, 1999). Governance 
capabilities are thus a reflection of institutional development and 
networking.
Best is one of the authors who explains in much detail how specific 
institutional developments contribute to the competitive strength of certain 
territories. The success of some Asian countries in seizing substantial
isa
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market shares in certain sectors is attributed to an “extraordinary creativity 
in institution building” (Best, 1990 p.199). Institution building is also a key 
factor in the success of regions in the Third Italy, where the effectiveness 
of the institutions is related to the fact that most were established as quasi­
public organisations accountable to public officials but not managed by 
civil servants. At the national level, other authors have pointed out the role 
of corporatism in the regulation of wages, public investments, education 
and other factors underpinning ‘competitiveness’ (Beije & Nuys, 1995).
While endorsing the concept of local institutional capacity, Best’s account 
also reveals many of the complexities surrounding the issue of local 
governance structures. It is not just ‘institution building’ which will create 
effective forms of economic support; the effectiveness of governance 
structures will depend on the specific ways interests are mediated, agendas 
are set and collective strategies are developed. For instance in the case of 
the Third Italy, Best observes that: “Local government has been able to 
pursue an aggressive economic program and retain a degree of insulation 
from interest group politics by creating a range of extra and inter-firm 
institutions. Their purpose is to promote the development of small firms 
within a democratically accountable political environment” (Best, 1990, 
p.209). However, while territorial governance structures should thus 
somehow be protected from strong political interference, it should not turn 
into “just listening to firms” (Sabel, 1995, p. 23), not just the static 
provision of services demanded by individual firms without a collective 
sense of direction (Cooke, 1995a). So, the emphasis should not be on the 
mere presence of institutions, but the processes that define how 
institutions affect the relationships within and between businesses and 
other local organisations:
"what is of significance here is not only the presence of a network of 
institutions per se, but rather the processes of institutionalisation (...) 
that both underpin and stimulate a diffused entrepreneurship - a 
recognised set of codes of conduct, supports and practices which 
individuals in institutions can dip into with relative ease (Amin &
Thrift, 1993, p.417).
A similar message can be found in Cooke’s discussion of how institutional 
capacity, geared to innovation, should be configured. What is essential, in 
his view, is a network architecture of support organisations based on 
“flow-processes (...) rather than on the prosaic basic-specific 
competencies of administrative institutions. It goes beyond the static 
supply of services to individual firms and implies a collective setting of 
direction (Cooke, 1995a, p. 14). An associational structure may thus imply 
a shift from a system which is primarily geared to offering solutions to 
perceived problems to one which brings various stakeholders together in 
the development of a coherent and intelligent set of regional development 
strategies.
How then should such an economic governance structure be developed 
within the context of a wider socio-political system? Amin and Thomas 
emphasise the fact that economic strategies should be based on what they
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call a ‘negotiated economic governance’. Looking at evidence from 
Denmark, the authors explain Denmark’s economic success in terms of the 
way it has followed “a 'third way' beyond market and plan, involving the 
democratisation and decentralisation of decision making, the preservation 
of collective solidarities, emphasis on inter-institutional dialogue, and the 
shift of the state towards relations of reciprocity and trust with other 
governance institutions” Amin & Thomas, 1996, p. 255). Especially in the 
case of Denmark, economic governance and the emphasis on networking 
should be seen in the context of an attempt to strengthen the position of 
(associated) small firms versus that of large corporations.
An ‘associative model’ of regional development, therefore, should not 
only be seen as a way to improve the interaction between regional 
businesses, but also to secure that regional communities benefit from the 
economic success of firms established in the region. Business interests are 
of vital importance for regional development, but only as far as they can be 
tailored to regional interests, as already suggested by Kantor’s quote 
above. In a radical view, building local ‘powers of association’ may even a 
process of countering the dominance of large ‘footloose’ firms. In the 
words of Amin and Thrift (1995, p.48):
“an attempt to set up networks of small firms and intermediate 
institutions that can act as a counter to (...) the power of the 
networks of large corporations and dominant institutions (....) to 
'embed' large corporate networks so that they become more 
committed to particular regions”
This quote raises some of the most critical points in the shaping of regional 
governance structures, such as the question of accountability and 
monitoring, and issues of inclusion and exclusion (Enright, 1994a). Whose 
interests are represented in processes of institutionalisation, in strategy 
development, in policy design and implementation? What is the position of 
small firms versus large firms? What is the position of unions, and other 
social and interest groups? Indeed, one of the observations that can be 
made regarding the growth of partnerships and institutional networks is 
that they are generally forged on an alliance between (big) business and the 
state. To some extent, this alliance has been justified on the grounds that 
the interplay between industry and government is the crux to an effective 
industrial policy (Dunning, 1991; Humbert, 1994). Other authors however 
have pointed to the fact that governance structures should be more 
inclusive, for instance by being responsive to the voice of unions and 
representatives of small firms. As part of a more inclusive, alternative 
strategy, Batt (1994) advocates the creation of central organisations, such 
as regional development agencies (RDAs) as the 'institutional expression 
of regional political networks'. As central moderators and facilitator, such 
agencies should act as pivots in regional negotiation and mobilising 
networks to establish a co-operative and consensus based framework for 
industrial policy. Other, mainly Italian authors, furthermore, have 
emphasised the inherently political nature of any more strategic approach 
to business support. Miller and Bianchi (1994) distinguish between 
progressive coalitions, which exploit compatibilities between networks,
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increase specialisation, and foster innovation, and regressive coalitions, 
which protect vested interest. In the organisational embedding of service 
centres, Bellini (1998) makes a distinction between supportive partners, 
‘troublers’ and ‘opponents’, and gives suggestions of how the latter may 
be turned into harmless critics or even converted into supporters.
While theorists have gone a long way in thinking about appropriate 
typologies and trajectories, how representative, progressive forms of 
governance are to be organised in practice remains largely an unresolved 
question. One suggestion is that, as part of a commitment to full 
representation of all social partners, RDAs should organise 'round tables' 
and regional ‘summits’ to secure democratic control and address problems 
of inclusion and exclusion (Ache, 1997; Rosenfeld, 1995). An ideal image 
of an RDA is thus a strategic organisation which, as a spider in a complex 
web of institutional formation and linkages, facilitates consensus building, 
institutional change and learning, while, on the other hand, ensuring the 
effectiveness and democratic control of the local institutional process. 
RDAs can thus be presented as the ‘animateur’ and central broker in the 
processes of networking and ‘institution building’ (Morgan, 1995). As 
central hub in a wider and evolving institutional structure, moreover, a 
development agency should have a two-edged supervisory and ‘reflexive’ 
role. On the one hand, there is a need for keeping track, including some 
steering, of the regional industrial trajectory. On the other hand, central 
organisations should nurture a climate of learning, experimentation and 
diversity. The local governance structure should thus be geared, to use the 
words of Sabel (1994), to a process of ‘learning-by-monitoring’, which 
combines a top-down framework of assessment and strategy development 
with a strong support for bottom-up initiatives. With respect to the latter, 
the process of ‘institution building’ should allow for variation, encourage 
experimentation, tolerate reform, re-negotiation, and even failure and 
assume a capacity to learn from failure (Garmise et al., 1995).
Withn such a two-way model of regional associationalism, clusters play a 
double role. On the one hand, clusters may represent bottom-up 
organisational frameworks through which sector-specific interest are 
mediated, institutionalised and translated into cluster initiatives. A 
condition for such a development is that there is already some kind of 
‘associative culture’, some level of networking, collaboration and trust 
among businesses and related organisations. One of the messages coming 
out of associational thinking is that is not so much the status of support 
providers that matters (in the sense of being public or private), but the way 
providers are embedded in an organisational structure representative of 
local business as well as other local community sectors. On the other hand, 
clusters may reflect part of a larger governance structure, and subject of 
strategy development which addresses the ‘cluster map’ at the regional 
level. The end result of such a double vision can be seen as a ‘cluster of 
clusters’ (cf. Rosenfeld, 1995, p.41), an overarching regional governance 
structure that forms an alliance between ‘bottom up’ oriented cluster- 
based alliances.
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A final reason why a two-way model may be advocated is because of the 
fact that ‘bottom-up’ approaches, generally favoured in the association- 
oriented literature, also have certain caveats. Bottom-up approaches will 
benefit from the fact that, because they are initiated by agents directly 
involved in certain business activities, they can be expected to bring with 
them certain levels of membership support, commitment, leadership and, 
last but not least, resources for matched funding (Rosenfeld, 1995). 
However, by solely responding to bottom-up initiatives, regions will 
clearly run the risk that only business groups will receive support which 
already have certain levels of associational capabilities, organisational and 
financial leeway and political clout. Other activities may have clustering 
potential but lack such a starting point. Top-down intervention, as part of 
a region-wide governance structure, may thus offer special assistance to 
‘association-weak’ sectors in the economy. One sector, to which the 
discussion will turn now, is that of small and medium sized firms.
3.2. Step five: clusters and business support to SMEs
“The requirements of small and medium-sized business seldom are 
simple or one-dimensional. Needs for new technology, for example, 
are linked to needs for capital, training and reorganisation and 
markets (...). Providing specific services organised by specific 
clusters is another service option. Such services can be provided by 
agency staff drawn from, and therefore able to understand the 
industries served, or can allow current staff the opportunity to learn 
a particular industry in-depth.” (Rosenfeld, 1995, p.37)
A final area that has given a major impetus to policy application of the 
cluster approach at the regional level is that of support to small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Recent decades have seen an 
impressive growth in policy initiatives targeted at SMEs, with increased 
emphasis on the improvement of innovative performance and management 
capabilities. Recent trends also show a growing interest in issues of 
networking, ‘institution building’ and clustering, both in the delivery of 
support and the objective of support. This last trend also underpins the 
two fundamental ways in which the cluster approach has played a role in 
shaping policy initiatives. First, clusters have become a model to nurture 
processes of collaboration and networking among small firms. This has 
induced a whole range of initiatives from brokering and facilitated focus 
groups to assistance for the creation of joint business ventures. Second, 
clusters have inspired new ways of policy development and delivery, as 
part of a move towards more integrated, more effective and cheaper forms 
of business support. Both aspects will now be discussed in turn.
3.2.1. Clusters and networking as target of business support
To understand the present debate on the position of SMEs in business 
support, a few notes on the historical context will be helpful. Until the 
1970s, SMEs were largely ignored in industrial policy and support. Like 
bicycles in transport or organic farming in food production, small firms 
were considered as the heritage of a past age, which hardly suited the
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model of large-scale, centrally planned modernisation of Western 
economies. The turn-around happened in the 1970s and 1980s, when 
SMEs were claimed to be important contributors to employment and 
innovation. While the evidence on SME development remains to be 
subject of fierce debate (see Birch, 1987; Karlsson et al., 1993; Acs, 1995; 
Harrison, 1994 for some salient aspects of this debate), the claims had 
enough power to trigger the development of a burgeoning support 
industry focused on SME development. In many countries, the emphasis 
shifted from giving subsidies to large companies to fostering an ‘enterprise 
culture’. With respect to innovation, a parallel shift occurred from 
supporting primarily scientific research to creating schemes of technology 
transfer and building learning environments. This shift was accompanied 
by an adoption of a more interactive, and organisation-focused perspective 
on innovation in which management and skill development emerged as 
important issues.
Networking in space
The focus on networking was inspired by observations that the emergence 
and growth of innovative SMEs showed particular geographical features. 
In both more traditional and ‘high-tech’ economic activities, patterns of 
spatial agglomeration or clustering became the basis of a new model of 
economic development. Examples are regions in Mid-Italy (specialising in 
more traditional sectors such as clothing, footwear and ceramics), hi-tech 
districts such as Silicon Valley and the M4 core corridor west of London, 
innovative manufacturing regions such as Baden Württemberg and service 
centres such as London and Paris. Initially, ideas on networking and 
collaboration were especially derived from the concept of ‘industrial 
districts’ and ‘innovative milieus’ (Lagendijk, 1997a), in which the 
dynamics between small firms and the creation of a favourable local 
economic environment were seen as the main drivers behind regional 
competitiveness. Inter-firm dynamics were interpreted in terms of 
pervasive flexibility, far-reaching specialisation and the development of 
market structures that favoured the right balance between competition and 
collaboration. This chemistry produced two vital ingredients of 
competitiveness: collective efficiency “derived from the advantages that 
clustering bestows upon individual small firms’ efficiency” (Sengenberger 
& Pyke, 1992, p.15), and collective learning. The latter may be described 
as follows: “the whole idea of collective learning is to identify and 
understand the processes by which locally based factors act to facilitate 
learning amongst the whole ensemble of local firms and organisations(...)” 
(Lawson, 1997a, p.3). Putting these together, industrial districts can be 
seen as one type of effective organisational arrangements for the 
generation of innovation and quality-based growth (Langlois & Robertson, 
1995).
Especially in the 1970s and 1980s, the ‘small firms’ success stories led to a 
pervasive ‘small is beautiful’ account of regional development. Not only 
were SMEs seen as sources of innovation and growth, they were also 
preferred to the inflexible, ponderous large corporation. Moreover, in
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addition to their role as cradles of entrepreneurship and flexibility, SMEs 
were also regarded as more socially responsible within the community. 
The latter aspect was seen as a two-way process. While the revenues from 
innovation and growth accrued to the local community, the community - 
by a process of ‘institution building’ - fostered an enterprise culture 
favourable to SME development. A romantic idea of competitive regional 
development thus emerged, which can described with the Gramsci’s term 
of an ‘integral economy’. The basis for an integral economy is a 
community “in which people are linked by the bonds of a shared history 
and values, where specific institutions work to the benefit of people and 
where codes of behaviour, lifestyles, employment patterns and 
expectations are inextricably implicated in productive activity" (Brusco, 
1995, p.6). Apart from supporting a high degree of flexibility and 
creativity, and hence success in the global economy such institutions and 
codes ensure that everybody will be able to participate in the integral 
economy. It also ensures, through the way firms are embedded in the local 
economy, that economic benefits derived from the regions competitive 
position will be spread throughout the community.
While industrial districts have had a strong impact on the development of 
network-based support initiatives, the romantic ideas of an integral 
economy had to be toned down. Some concepts have found their way in 
circles of policy makers and support organisations, notably ‘embedding’ 
and the idea of a favourable ‘milieu’ or culture for innovative activities, 
and more recently the emphasis on community development. In practice, 
however, measures had to be more ‘down to earth’. Two broad categories 
of investment can be distinguished. On the one hand, special spatial 
investment zones were established, in which the co-location of specific 
types of firms was expected to trigger interaction and the shaping of a 
local ‘innovative milieu’. A second, non-spatial set of initiatives focused 
on promoting networking and ‘institution building’ through bringing firms 
together in groups and the formation of associations (for an overview of 
major categories of organisations of SME support, see Table 7 below).
The results of the spatial zoning initiatives are visible in almost any city or 
region in the Western world: business parks, incubator centres, science 
parks, technopoles. Most of these sites are dedicated to SME 
development, with emphasis on hi-tech development, although some also 
include subsidiaries of larger companies and research centres (especially in 
the city-based technopoles). In terms of fostering local dynamics and 
innovation, however, most of these initiatives have been somewhat 
disappointing. While there are cases of spectacular success, such as the 
Stanford and Cambridge science parks, most initiatives did not show the 
expected level of internal ‘chemistry’ in terms of knowledge exchange and 
commercial interaction. One core reason for this failure seems to lie in the 
fact that it was assumed that co-location of firms, often combined with the 
presence of a key technology source such as a university, would trigger 
such interaction. In the classical science park, clustering technology 
sources and users was originally seen as an adequate ‘connection policy’ 
towards SMEs. Critics in the 1980s however already pointed out that this
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was far from being the case, and that it was important for science park 
mangers to look beyond technology and offer different types of support 
(Monck et al., 1988). In their study of technopole development, Longhi 
and Quere point at the fact that external linkages seem to be more 
important than internal networking, which they also attribute to the lack of 
institutional support. In the case of the Sophia-Antipolis technopole, the 
author state: “it has taken a long time for a local organisation to have 
sufficient trust in the other components of the project to be interested in 
developing local collaborative processes” (Longhi & Quere, 1997, p. 236). 
With clusters of high-tech firms, the scope for internal linkages appears to 
be limited because of the highly specialised nature of input requirements. 
Even if internal linkages developed, another common problem was that, 
apart from the employment effects, few benefits spilled over to the local 
economy. Many science parks and technopoles thus evolved as a kind of 
hi-tech enclave in low-tech environments (Massey et al., 1992) (see also 
Table 7 below).
Behavioural approaches
Partly as response to these unsatisfactory outcomes, attention and 
resources have shifted to non-spatial measures. New policies shifted to 
what may be labelled as the development of a ‘soft infrastructure’, of a 
support system facilitating technology transfer and business development 
programmes for SMEs, skill development and the building of ‘social 
capital’. In line with the institutional and associational literature, increased 
attention was paid to the behavioural aspects of business development, 
which inspired attempts to foster an entrepreneurial spirit in the business 
community, and to support various forms of networking activities and 
‘institution building’. To some extent, this turned out to be even more of 
an uphill exercise. Initiatives such as science parks could at least start with 
the planning of some hard infrastructure and the design of an investment 
strategy. Network and institutions-based initiatives however, while rich in 
sources of inspiration, high-level theory and alleged success, lack such a 
tangible starting point. On the contrary, the theory and discussion of 
success models revealed one major dilemma: the interest in and the 
success of collaborative and associative ventures are highly dependent of 
the local business culture, notably attitudes towards co-operation, the 
inclination to participate in associations, etc. (Gertler, 1996; Malecki & 
Tootle, 1996; Lipparini & Sobrero, 1994; Todtling, 1994). Explaining the 
success of a few innovative regions in the world in terms of networking, 
collaboration and institutions is one thing; translating this into a 
development formula for laggard regions is obviously a different matter.
As part of the creation of strategies geared towards the development of 
laggard regions, researchers drew on evidence from studies on the 
behaviour of SMEs outside the ‘success model’ regions. A general 
observation made in lagging regions was that local businesses are behind in 
the adoption of new technology. As a first step to closing the gap with 
more competitive regions, firms need to address their information and 
innovation deficits. So, to what extent could networking strategies help to
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upgrade firms in this respect? One of the conclusions drawn from research 
on where SMEs obtain information is that key sources are neither found in 
the general technology infrastructure nor the wider market or sector in 
which they operate. Instead, surveys show that information is obtained 
primarily from what may called the actual network of firms and 
organisations with which firms are dealing on a daily basis (White et al., 
1988; Hassink, 1996). The actual network represents a subset of the 
market environment of the firm, and consists of the suppliers, buyers and 
other related companies with which firms are trading and communicating. 
SMEs, in particular, seem to be reluctant to look beyond the established 
boundaries of their actual networks (Scott, P. et al., 1996). The reasons 
for this selective approach must be sought in practical constraints for 
instance time and resource limitations, as well as in cultural factors. A 
general observation is that SME owner-managers are unwilling to 
compromise their independence, in the sense that they co-ordinate their 
contacts according their own practical needs. This is not to say that SMEs 
aim for isolation, but that many do not tend to open up for looser types of 
contacts which might broaden their horizon of knowledge acquisition.
So how can firms be convinced that opening their ‘fortress enterprises’ to 
more collaborative links may be helpful, that other access to the 
knowledge of firms may present a major source of learning? While authors 
have given indications of how a basis for shaping such attitudes can be 
developed - as indicated by Sabel’s (1992) concept of ‘studied trust’, and 
learning-based strategies (Storper, 1997b) - the question remains how to 
translate such ideas into effective policies. When a culture of co-operation 
is lacking, how can initiatives be built up based on a philosophy of 
networking and institution building? Rosenfeld (1996) suggests that, 
depending on the context, two basic approaches can be distinguished. 
Where traditions of networking are absent and levels of trust and 
collaboration are low, a good approach may be to launch a networking 
programme through the mediation of well-trained brokers. The best 
known example of such a policy is the Danish Networking Programme. 
This programme was aimed essentially at changing the attitudes and habits 
in firms, to convey the benefits of collaboration, both at a local and at a 
wider scale, to develop the ‘relational capabilities’ of SMEs, and to 
overcome resistance to technological change and other innovations. When 
a certain ‘associative culture’ exists, on the other hand, there is scope for 
network-based strategies that may involve
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Table 7 Major institutional forms of technology support to SMEs.
Category: Technopoles (incl. Science Parks) RTACs (Regional Technology Advisory Real Service Centres
Centres)
Description land/ property-based form of technology policy, geared 
towards the establishment of a spatial agglomeration 
of hi-tech businesses and organisations
regional organisations providing information, 
advice and assistance on technical matters to 
business enterprises, sometimes linked to 
property development, often offering referral 
to technology sources.
regional organisations that combine 
collaborative R&D, technical services 
such as testing, specialist information 
services and training, with a focus on a 
specific sector or technology areas
Policy setting spatial planning;; ‘key role of park/pole managers’ demand-led innovation policy sector/cluster-based development often 
following an associational perspective
Technology management no explicit mechanism of technology transfer offering integrated support packages; 
sometimes co-ordinating regional support 
structures
centres as ‘technology watch’ and 
‘marketing watch’ for regional SMEs; 
function as catalyst
Variations 1. large urban technopoles (France, Japan)
2. Science parks (university-linked/ stand-alone) (US, 
UK, etc)
3. incubator centres (UK, Germany, ....)
European network of Innovation centres (often
with property development)
national networks of advisory centres
(Denmark, Netherlands)
regional networks (Steinbeis, ICT Catalonia)
stand-alone centres
Prototype: Real Service Centres in Emilia 
Romagna
Close follower: IMPIVA network in 
Valencia
Small follower: North Tyneside Real 
Service Centre (North East of England)
Evaluation Some university-linked science parks are highly 
successful; many technopoles fail to create internal 
linkages and often remain élitist enclaves in regional 
economy
generally successful in quantitative terms 
(number of firms reached etc) but genuine 
contribution to technology transfer and 
innovation difficult to assess 
remain highly subsidy dependent
offering more specialised and tailored 
services
higher levels of self-financing 
targeting dilemma
Source: Lagendijk & Charles, 1998
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bottom-up ‘institution building’ and a more strategic role of industry 
associations.
SMEs vs. large firms
Even when SMEs are successfully engaged, the question remains as to 
what extent network-based strategies should be focused exclusively on 
SMEs. One of the objectives of the Danish networking programme, for 
instance, was to raise the competitiveness of SMEs versus that of large 
firms (Huggins, 1996). This objective was justified with the perception 
that the Danish economy is dominated by SMEs, and that many sectors are 
threatened by competition from large firms outside Denmark. In many 
other cases, however, such an exclusive focus of SMEs may be called into 
question. From an academic perspective, various authors have pointed at 
the large variety in successful institutional structures underpinning 
competitiveness, opposing the bifurcation in regional development models 
into a small firm and large firm variant (Dicken & Thrift, 1992; Langlois & 
Robertson, 1995). In the context of business support, SME support has 
been linked to initiatives geared to the development of supply chains 
around large firms. Even when no commercial links were at stake, large 
firms have also been employed as mentors for SME development. From a 
political perspective the exclusive focus on SMEs may also reflect an 
opposition by local leaders to an ‘invasion’ and growing dominance of 
foreign capital in a region (Bellini, 1998).
It is especially in the area of linking inward investment and SMEs that the 
concept of ‘clusters’ has been influential. The idea that clusters can foster 
links between different segments of a local economy has appealed to 
regions with a strong tradition in attracting foreign investors. While such 
‘exogenous’ strategies have yielded highly positive results in terms of 
importing growth and jobs, as shown for instance in peripheral UK 
regions, less attention has been paid to the process of embedding 
externally owned plants in the local economy. Increasingly the need was 
seen for fostering inter-firm supplies, creating mechanisms for inter-firm 
learning, and encouraging the involvement of management of externally 
owned plants in local industry associations etc. (Young et al., 1994; 
Lagendijk et al., 1996). Cluster strategies have thus been introduced as a 
follow-up of investment attraction policies, and as a way to integrating 
policies especially targeted on SMEs. One example of such integration is 
when, through the role model and even active mentoring of foreign firms, 
small firms are better able to identify their needs for improvement and 
support. This may then translate into strategies of inter-firm learning, as 
well as a reconsideration of the role and form of other policies in the area 
of skill development, technology support, marketing etc.
3.2.2. Clusters as design and delivery model of business support
Continued disillusion about the effectiveness of business support to SMEs 
has not only changed the nature of its services but also the nature of the 
support sector itself. Despite the proliferation of initiatives, the variation in 
the organisation and financing of support, and accumulation of knowledge
AL ADAPT report (02/11/99) - 55 -
stemming from research and evaluation, the effectiveness of most business 
support is still called into question. Various authors have pointed at a 
continuous mismatch between the providers and clients of business 
support. What has incurred much criticism is standard, non-customised 
nature of much support, the lack of sophistication and credibility among 
providers, the emphasis on ‘quick fixes’, the bias towards technical 
solutions rather than towards addressing organisational and managerial 
deficits, and the risk-averse attitudes of most service providers (Morgan, 
1996; Shapira et al., 1995; Hutchinson et al., 1996; Burgess, 1997). Even 
worse, in countries with a long history of support measures, such as the 
UK and Germany, increasing disillusion with the support sector among 
SMEs has led to a kind of support fatigue (Hassink, 1996). Increasingly, 
support agencies were facing the fact that somehow they had to sell their 
service, not in the sense of commercial sales but merely finding clients 
showing at least initial interest in their services. Responding to such 
persistent failures, various governments have undertaken the first steps 
towards reshaping and even rationalisation of the business support sector 
(which happened recently in the case of the Dutch Business Innovation 
Centres).
A history o f ineffective business support
Why has it been so difficult to increase the effectiveness of business 
support? An important factor has been the initial organisation of the 
support sector and the kind of philosophy employed. The provision of 
support started with a strong emphasis on technology transfer and 
demonstration, following a ‘technology push’ model. These support 
measures suffered from two handicaps: a lack of understanding of SMEs 
as business organisations and a lack of proper demand identification.
The first handicap can be attributed to a general lack of insight into the 
organisational and management capacities of SMEs and the problems they 
may face in adapting to the requirements of new technology. While the 
innovation deficit was acknowledged, the specific behavioural context of 
SMEs tended to be overlooked (OECD, 1993; Monck et al., 1988). The 
idea thus emerged that technology transfer should be part of an integral 
strategy of business modernisation, which includes management, 
organisational change, skills upgrading etc. The first initiatives which tried 
to follow such an approach involved the deployment of innovation 
consultants in programmes such as the UK Enterprise Consultancy 
Initiative, the French Aides au Projet d ’Innovation and the German 
Unternehmensberatungen für KMU. While these initiatives took a more 
managerial view of the innovation process, they failed to tailor support to 
the organisation of the SME, and they tended not to offer much more than 
‘quick fixes’ (Burgess, 1997). In particular, these initiatives continued to 
be grafted on ‘large firm’ models and strategies.
A specific problem with the technology-led approaches was that they 
failed to give small firms a sense of direction. Rather than focusing on 
business development as the bottom-line of support provision, each agency 
narrowly focused on its own specific mission: technology transfer, skill
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development, innovation support etc. Whereas large firms have the 
capacities to assess their market position, to develop a growth strategy 
and accommodate their innovation strategy accordingly, SMEs often lack 
such strategic capabilities. A key problem with SMEs is that they are not 
able to articulate what their needs are for long-term survival and growth 
(Brusco, 1992), although they may be able to express some immediate 
wants. Without a strategic concept of business development, the 
inclination to see technology and innovation as universal solutions to the 
problems of SMEs may even be harmful:
“Innovation, broadly perceived, is not the sole preserve of 
successful, growing firms. Not is it necessarily good in itself. It can 
either open doors into new areas of the market-place or help firms to 
lock themselves in. It can be linked with an outward-looking, 
diversifying approach to market development, but it can also 
represent the struggles of firms to keep alive an enclosed and 
shrinking market. In the latter case, it can be argued that innovation 
merely stretches the period of decline and the market adaptation 
which is required. (...) What matters is not so much innovation itself, 
but where it leads. Unless these small firms can connect their 
innovative efforts to wider markets beyond their depressed region, or 
to new technology, these efforts may lead nowhere” (White et al.,
1988 p.108/9)
In a more general context, some serious claims have been made that 
Europe, apart from clinging on to a technology-push approach, suffers 
from a ‘productivity cult’ while it lacks a strategic approach to innovation 
(European Commission, 1995). The ‘productivity cult’ referred to the fact 
that much energy appeared to have been devoted to improving activities 
and technologies that, however successful these improvements had turned 
out to be, were fundamentally obsolete and only applicable in mature 
markets. What was needed, accordingly, was a support sector with proper 
diagnostic skills and the provision of ‘economic intelligence’, at the level 
of both the firm and the wider economy. In terms of the contents of 
service provision, this meant that there is not only a need for shifting from 
routine to more specialised services, but also to provide a more 
organisational and managerial orientation. In the European Green Paper 
on innovation, the seriousness of the situation was expressed as follows:
(...) one of the weaknesses of European innovation systems is the 
inadequate level of organisational innovation. This serious 
shortcoming makes it impossible to renovate models which are now 
inefficient and which are unfortunately still being applied in a large 
number of businesses. The same applies to effective innovation- 
oriented formulae for business management. (European Commission,
1995, p.19)
The poor attention to behavioural and strategic issues not only affected the 
content of support, but also the way it was delivered. In the case of the 
subsidised innovation management consultancy, for instance, one of the 
aims of the initiative was to have a demonstration effect. It was expected 
that the first confrontation with such services would trigger more interest
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and lay the foundation for a commercially viable consultancy sector 
tailored to SMEs. This expectation was not met at all (Burgess, 1997). 
The problem was that support agencies and policy-makers seemed to miss 
a proper understanding of the cognitive and communicative routines of 
SMEs, and the same could be said of most of the academic approaches 
(Gertler, 1996). Scott et al. (1996, p.95) found evidence for the 
communicational gap in their study of UK small and medium sized 
manufacturing firms (SMMEs):
“even where SMMEs actively identify deficiencies in their in-house 
technical capabilities, there is often - particularly in owner-managed 
firms - uncertainty about, or resistance to, outside help. This 
problem is compounded by a lack of adequate communication 
channels for the transmission of aid”.
To add to this picture, Curran and Blackburn (1994) observed that owner- 
managers tended to rely more on ‘word of mouth’ as a source for 
knowledge about business improvement rather formalised information 
structures. To reach firms, their communicational routines and patterns 
should clearly be taken into account.
Problems of lacking integration have been further compounded by the way 
support has been organised and financed. Over the last decades, the 
business support sector has shown a strong growth and proliferation. In 
Europe, programmes have been initiated at three or more spatial levels: 
local/provincial, regional, Länder (in the case of Germany), states and the 
Community level. Many highly focused and complex programmes have 
developed, each with their own rules, regulations and specific funding 
regimes. In addition, funding was increasingly supplied via rounds of 
project-based competitive bidding rather than block grants. Support 
agencies must thus grapple with an increasingly differentiated and 
competitive funding environment, and cope with an administrative 
complexity (especially in the case of European programming) which is 
more than daunting. The need to show results on often short-term scales 
has also forced the agencies to opt for less risky, i.e. less innovative forms 
of support. In the words of Bellini (1998, p.24): “Evaluation ‘imposed’ on 
service providers triggers defensive and instrumental attitudes: complying 
with formal requirements is often more important than exploitation of the 
learning potential of the evaluation procedures”.
Towards integral support structures
The need for a more strategically informed and tailored mode of support 
to SMEs, for improving the communication between service providers and 
their clients and for organisational and financial streamlining, inspired ideas 
about moving to more integrated support structures. An integrated 
approach should go beyond the mere transfer of technology and emphasise 
the upgrading, or modernisation of the business as a whole, and take 
account of the specific business culture and management style. In their 
study on modernisation programmes focused on SMEs, Shapira et al. 
(1995, p.78) indicate what kind of strategy is most appropriate and how 
this should be organised:
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“From the perspective of a small or midsized customer, 
modernisation programmes should be ‘seamless’, offering a full 
range of expertise and resources. Modernisation programmes can 
seek to do this by providing a range of different kinds of expertise or 
services themselves, or -perhaps more feasibly - developing strong 
linkages and co-ordination with other service providers.”
Different models have been developed to accommodate the call for 
improved business support. One development with a strong technological 
focus has been the development of RTACS (Regional Technology 
Advisory Centres) (Charles, 1997). Although RTACs appear in many 
different forms and approaches, the common parameter is that they act as 
an intermediary organisation between SMEs and technology providers. 
Their emergence can be seen in the light of the shift towards more 
demand-led innovation policies for SMEs. Advice on technology transfer 
thus comes with a package of auditing, diagnosing and support for other 
areas such as funding and assistance with organisational change. Some 
RTACs (for instance in certain French and Spanish regions) perform a role 
as ‘one-stop-shops’, as points of referral to other forms of business 
support; some even act as strategic co-ordinators within the wider regional 
network of business support. In this way, RTACs seem to support 
integration at two levels: at the client level by offering access to an integral 
support package and at the regional level by improving the integration and 
supervision of the regional support structure.
The performance of RTACs varies widely. Some have been able to 
develop services on a more commercial basis but most activities depend on 
public subsidy. One problem RTACs face is that while having become 
more demand-led many of their services tend to be highly generic. Once 
SMEs have embarked on a process of upgrading, their demands quickly 
shift from generic support to special needs that are more sector-specific. 
They also shift from overcoming immediate technological and 
organisational problems to becoming more linked to marketing issues 
(Devins, 1996). In particular, helping SMEs with finding a sense of long­
term direction requires a basis of intelligence gathering, of ‘technology 
watch’ and ‘marketing watch’. Particularly when firms successfully adopt 
measures of modernisation and upgrading, they will need more 
sophisticated, i.e. less generic forms of support. This insight forms the 
basis for a more sector/cluster-based approach to business support, linked 
to the idea that, at a regional level, a certain degree of targeting may be 
pursued. Smallbone’s (1997 p. 133) study on SME support gives an 
illustration of some of the benefits as well as caveats of sectoral 
differentiation:
“a policy of targeting at the levels of sectors to support growth is not 
recommended if this means focusing on firms in some sectors to the 
exclusion of firms in others (... ) At the same time, there may be a 
case for prioritising certain types of activity over others because 
there are a priori reasons for suggesting there is greater public 
benefit in terms of contribution to economic development [for 
instance, if strong market growth is expected] (...) Nevertheless,
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some of the support that firms need requires sectoral differentiation 
and agencies must build up locally relevant expertise, not least to 
establish a basis of credibility with client firms” (Smallbone, 1997 
p.133
How could such a differentiated approach be organised in practice? While 
the general parameters of a sector or cluster-based are generally accepted, 
authorities themselves often lack the knowledge and organisational 
capabilities to pursue such a policy. Totterdill’s (1995) analysis of the 
development of local industrial policy in the UK, for instance, concludes: 
The “relative sophistication of sectoral strategies, needing specialising 
knowledge and vocabulary, presents a real obstacle for many local 
authorities”. A key problem is thus a quality mismatch between much 
service provision and business needs (North et al., 1997).
Rather than following a conventional support model, sector and cluster- 
based approaches for SME support are interpreted along associational 
lines (Devins, 1996). The role of the government thus becomes one of 
facilitating and part-financing the set-up of specific knowledge-oriented 
service centres, often in collaboration with other organisations such as 
Chambers of Commerce and business associations. According to the 
European Commission, however, such associational trends are still hard to 
find.
“Determined collection, sharing (co-operation between firms, 
pooling of resources with public authorities) and protection of 
strategic information are still too rare in Europe. Social and 
professional divides, fear of competition and deliberate secrecy make 
collaboration between firms and authorities a difficult matter. 
Individual and collective attitudes therefore need to change if 
economic intelligence is to gain a foothold”. (European Commission,
1995, p. 30)
A model o f ‘economic intelligence’ provision: the Real Service Centres
A prime example of an approach fitting the sector-oriented intelligence 
model is offered by the so-called ‘real service centres’ in Emilia Romagna, 
established under the supervision of the regional development agency 
ERVET. The ERVET network consists of eight sectoral and theme- 
oriented centres. Their core objective is to disseminate information in the 
areas of market development, marketing and technology, tailored to their 
client group. The idea of ‘real’ services does not reflect an opposition to 
‘financial’, but reflects the strategic and structural nature of the service 
provision, and a strong orientation towards the development of business 
capabilities in a network context. The centres play a strong role in the 
creation of economic ‘intelligence’ through the work of industry experts 
and the maintenance of databases and libraries.
A key issue concerning the management of technology is the role of the 
centres as ‘catalyst’ and as identifier of strategic needs. The latter is 
illustrated by the evaluation by Rush et al (1996, p. 167) of CITER, the 
textiles centre state: “[CITER] develops its specialism in relation to the 
strategic needs of the sector, and only through working with the firms in
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the sector it is able to identify which of the generic functions to develop”. 
They authors add to this: “This does not mean that CITER merely reflect 
what its members want. They have always been in the business of 
pioneering new services - of the need for which their members may not be 
fully aware. It was one of the early principles of the Centre that the 
services provided should arise out of a process of strategic research and 
discussion, not simply a poll of prospective members” (171). The success 
of CITER is attributed to the quality of the leadership, which has been 
very strong in ‘animating’ the industry, and successful in building links 
with external sponsors and other bodies, and the fact that the centre itself 
originated from business consortia. Finally, while they are part-funded by 
local government and organisations such as Chambers of Commerce and 
business associations, most real service centres secure more than half of 
their revenue from their client contributions and fees.
While Italian real service centres may be considered the apex of cluster- 
based support in an associational setting, with Emilia-Romagna as the 
paradigmatic example, other configurations are also possible. One such 
example is offered by the Basque Country, where the cluster approach 
primarily served to institutionalise the demand side for local technology 
support, while the supply side is embodied in the local technology 
network. In other regions, examples of sector-specific RTACs can be 
distinguished which have developed a more proactive role in sector and 
cluster development (Charles, 1996). Recent years have seen a strong 
interest in all forms of service centres and cluster-oriented technology 
centres.
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Table 8 Constitutive analytical dimensions of clusters
dimension description examples supported policies
1 geographical spatial clustering varying from ‘local’ to from ‘industrial districts’ to world spanning 
clusters such as aerospace
regional cluster mapping linked to SME 
support; supporting of global nodes (e.g. 
technopoles)
2 horizontal relationships between different 
industries/sectors (Porterian clusters)
Dutch ‘mega clusters’ with specific innovation 
styles
‘cross-industry’ innovation policy
3 vertical joining sequential phases in the production 
process
value chains, filières, supply chains supply chain initiatives
4 lateral sharing a diverse set of capabilities 
underpinning economies of scope
multi-media clusters; ICT clusters integrated industrial policy focused on 
emergent cluster
5 technological sharing common basic and evolving technology bio-technology cluster cluster-differentiated technology policy 
(innovation and learning)
6 focal hub-and-spoke model around a central actor business network around a core assembler, 
university, research centre
supply-based ‘after-care’ inward investment 
policies
7 quality of the 
network
emphasising the social interaction between 
actors, and to what extent this underpins 
progressive, innovation oriented behaviour
progressive versus regressive networks network and ‘institution building’ oriented 
policies
Source. Column 1 and 2 based on: Jacobs, 1997
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3.3. Step six: towards a typology of cluster policies
“In this way the different possible cluster dimensions can be seen as 
a menu, out of which these business strategists and public policy­
makers can choose, according to the specific situation they are 
confronted with.” (Jacobs, 1997, p.24)
The previous three sections have highlighted three areas in which the 
cluster concepts has been influential, but which have also led to further 
modifications and variations of the cluster concept. As a way of synthesis, 
two readings of the evolution of the cluster concept are possible. The first 
reading is that clusters, through the way they have been associated with 
very different models and levels of industrial development now can be seen 
best as a menu of policy options. The second reading is that the cluster 
concept has gone through a set of stages, and although in practice policy 
continued to be based on lessons from all stages, this upholds somehow 
the idea of a ‘nucleus’ cluster concept with high degree of variation in 
practical applications. As will be shown in this section, the latter reading 
may form the basis of a cluster typology.
3.3.1. What’s on the cluster menu?
The idea that clusters can best be seen in a pragmatic context has been 
promoted by a group of Dutch writers on clusters (Jacobs & De Man, 
1995; Roelandt et al., 1997). By considering the diversity in approaches 
and aspirations in cluster concepts as a benefit rather than a weakness, this 
has inspired the idea of a ‘menu’ perspective. In Jacobs’ summary of 
cluster approaches in industrial and innovation policy, he distinguishes 
between seven dimensions of clusters (see Table 8), which form the basis 
for a variety of cluster strategies and policies:
“In this way the different possible cluster dimensions can be seen as 
a menu, out of which these business strategists and public policy­
makers can choose, according to the specific situation they are 
confronted with (...). By making the dimensions of clustering 
explicit, a basis upon which tailor made strategies and policies can 
be developed has been provided” (Jacobs, 1997, p.24)
Table 8 also gives an indication of what kind of policies and initiatives may 
be developed on the basis of the menu. What is essential is that policies 
and initiatives will generally draw upon various dimensions. Typical cluster 
initiatives could be, for example, regional supply chain initiatives targeted 
on supporting SMEs which are (potential) suppliers to a hub firm, a 
national innovation policy which focuses on supporting cross-cluster 
interaction around an emergent technology, or an ‘institution building’ and 
networking oriented policy which aims at improving the interaction 
between firms in a certain sector and the wider knowledge infrastructure. 
This approach chimes with Storper and Scott’s (1995) observation that 
industrial policies are increasingly developed within the ambit of heterodox 
policy frameworks, which are strongly context-sensitive, oriented toward
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production systems and aimed at the ongoing adjustment of productive 
and innovative capacities.
A menu approach is one way to cope with the fact that the concept of 
clusters itself has become a cluster of concepts and approaches, which has 
been linked, as shown in previous steps, to vary different agendas and 
policy interests. Table 8 shows the main categories of the cluster typology 
as developed by Jacobs; some references to SME policies, inward 
investment policy, technology policy, and industrial policy have been 
added as examples in column four. One may question, however, whether a 
menu approach does not lead to a too disparate and fragmented 
understanding and application of clustering. Against the background of an 
increasingly heterodox, strategic and dynamic environment of policy 
making, one of the core demands of policy-makers is the development and 
understanding of integrative concepts and guidelines. A menu, as every 
regular restaurant guest will know, might not be very helpful in this 
respect. While, at first glance, a menu may pretend to provide an overview 
as well as a toolkit for cluster initiatives, it may well obscure rather than 
clarify the critical issues surrounding the approach.
3.3.2. A hub-and spoke concept of clusters?
A major drawback of a menu approach is that it draws the focus away 
from what may be seen as the major strength of the cluster approach. As 
epitomised by Porter’s work, clusters facilitate an encompassing view 
which integrates a bird’s eye view of an economy (cluster maps) with 
more detailed insight into the specific interaction between and within 
industries and with the wider economic environment. In doing so, Porter 
inspired a policy approach which could strike a balance between generic 
policies which targeted overall framework conditions and specific policies 
which focused on the shaping of relations within certain industries, 
although the latter was less emphasised in Porter’s own work. Through 
falling more in tune with network approaches and concepts of targeting, 
moreover, cluster approaches could take the middle ground between 
bottom-up micro approaches aiming at networking in and around small 
business groups, and top-down approaches geared to securing and 
adjusting the overall economic structure.
Without having produced common guidelines of how cluster policies are 
to be pursued (although see Rosenfeld, 1995), the approach somehow 
appears to offer some answers to problems which had emerged 
particularly in the field of industrial and technology policies:
• how to shift technology policies from a ‘technology-push’ to a more 
demand-led, customer-tailored model;
• how to create more integrated forms of industrial policy which go 
beyond simple ‘technical fixes’;
• how to develop an industrial policy which builds on existing strengths 
without ‘picking winners’ and which also supports business 
development in what are seen as promising growth sectors;
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• how to overcome the bifurcation of technology and industrial policy 
into sme and large firm-oriented initiatives; how to address structural 
economic problems (industries in decline, poor representation of 
growth sectors), while shifting to more facilitative, business-led 
initiatives;
• how to embed initiatives which focus on ‘institution building’ and 
networking in a framework which facilitates both guidance and 
monitoring by the public sector, avoiding top-down social engineering?
The fact that the cluster concept offer responses to such diverse questions 
and interests, thus playing into the hands of policy-makers and business 
support agents, explains why the concept has become so popular and why 
there are so many different interpretations. So, is there still a core to 
clusters?
The suggestion for a ‘core’ is the following. Cluster approaches, through 
invoking recent insight into the relationship between innovation and 
relational aspects of the economy, and ideas about the role of spatial and 
sectoral dimensions of economic development, are able to bring together a 
notion of economic restructuring at the macro economic level with 
concepts of networks, ‘governance’ and systems of knowledge 
accumulation at the micro/meso level. Restructuring refers here to the 
notion of (re)shaping the regional specialisation within a relational 
perspective, that is, with emphasis on the role of linkages between 
businesses and with the wider regional support infrastructure.
It is this marriage between the structural level, as depicted by appealing 
cluster maps, and the relational and institutional aspects at the lower level, 
as captured by the rich vocabulary on networking, associations, 
governance structures etc, which has made the concept so influential. 
Within this broad context, more specific definitions have put emphasis on 
different elements and relations, in different sequences. Jacobs and his 
colleagues stress the link between innovation and sectoral specificity with 
a strong orientation to framework conditions, while the spatial dimension 
is seen as contingent on sectoral specifities. Authors like Rosenfeld and 
Enright start their cluster conceptualisation from the observation that 
proximity delivers specific benefits to firms, which is then worked out at a 
sectoral level. Critical writers have taken a more political view, stressing 
the need for institutions to ‘pin down’ benefits from sector-specific 
innovation processes at the local level. This can also be associated with the 
issue of regional identity (see Figure 1 above)
This study focuses on cluster initiatives as part of regional development 
policies and the development of business support. Drawing on the 
discussion in the preceding sections, four broad instrumental 
interpretations of cluster initiatives can be distinguished:
- framework-oriented policies, which address the broader industrial, 
institutional and regulatory conditions in which regional clusters operate; 
this involves a focus on the links between regional and industrial 
governance at a regional macro level, as well as on the most prominent 
meso links between regional organisations and businesses;
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- institutional approaches, in which the capability development and 
alignment at the business and cluster levels are emphasised, at a micro- 
meso level; this focuses in particular on the role of service and knowledge 
centres and combines a view of clusters-as-target with clusters-as-method 
of support delivery and technology policy;
- a networking focus, in which the brokering of business clusters, and the 
joint development of business capabilities within the groups is emphasised;
- a learning orientation: emphasis on learning through facilitated clusters 
rather learning to cluster - business support; this approach sits between the 
two above, but is more flexible in the sense that it does not have such a 
strong objective neither in terms of ‘institution building’ nor group 
formation. This may involve supply chain or networks built around hub 
firms for instance as part of after-care policy.
Table 9 Four instrumental cluster perspectives
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3.4. Step seven: the present debate
“(...) criteria for clusters have proven exceedingly difficult to pin 
down, and there are as many definitions as there are types of 
organisations using the term” (Rosenfeld, 1997 p.8)
“It [the cluster concept] stands at the cross-roads between regional 
action, industrial and labour market policy, education and research 
policy, urbanism and town planning, and perhaps also opinion 
forming and political leadership - no mans land astride the 
conventional organisation of administration and public life” (1997, 
p. 16)
How useful is the cluster approach for supporting SME development at a 
regional level? The previous sections have introduced various significant 
images and associations linked to cluster approach. This included the link 
with innovation, the salience of the region as an economic and political 
site, the associative approach in business support, the role of networking 
in SME development. The discussion has also revealed however that there 
is no consensus about the more detailed analytical value and applicability 
of the cluster concept. In the words of Rosenfeld (1997, p8) it has proven 
exceedingly difficult to ‘pin down’ the details and criteria for cluster 
developments. Unresolved issues abound. For policy-making, the concept 
can thus be interpreted as a menu of opportunities, or as label for the 
common denominator within a collection of related, but still diverse ideas 
on regional economic development, by inducing communication, and 
interaction between different domains and underpinning more integral 
forms of regional policy. Fuzziness is thus also a consequence of the fact 
that the cluster concept lacks its own organisational domain. It acts, to 
reiterate Steiner’s (1997, p. 16) words, in a kind of “no man’s land”, in 
which the analytical and policy dimensions are often blurred.
Should one aim for a more coherent and less disparate concept? Given its 
heterogeneous background, the answer should perhaps be no. Indeed, as 
argued before, the concept derives much of its popularity and impact from 
its capacity to integrate, in an associative and discursive manner, various 
prominent ideas in current thinking on economic development. The fuzzy 
nature allows the concept to move between different domains - various 
scientific disciplines, various strands of policy making and business 
support, consultancies, etc. - facilitating inter-domain communication and 
joint action. In this way, clusters play the role of a ‘boundary object’ 
underpinning the translation of ideas between different communities 
(Fujimura, 1992).
On the other hand, one may argue that not all aspects of fuzziness are 
worthwhile. While fuzziness is partly the result of its inter-disciplinary 
character, it also stems from insufficient articulation of basic definitions 
and viewpoints. It is a frustrating experience for both practitioners and 
researchers that much time in sessions on clusters has to be devoted to the 
very basic question of ‘what are clusters?’. While no simple, uniform 
answers are possible for complex issues of spatial-economic development,
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and while many issues will remain controversial, there is scope for 
providing more clarity and structuring the debate. This should allow 
researchers and practitioners to take the discussion a step further and build 
a common platform for the exchange of ideas and experiences.
This chapter has introduced many unresolved issues that may benefit from 
a more structured discussion. Six issues will be further discussed here, 
covering a range of themes that will be addressed in the following 
chapters.
3.4.1. Networks within clusters; clusters within networks?
One theme that has actually seen increased confusion is the definition of 
clusters compared with the concept of networks, particularly in policy 
applications. Initially clusters were closely associated with sectors and 
industries. Networks, as far as they played a role, were seen as part of 
clusters, underpinning the relational character of clusters and their 
competitiveness. More recent literature features the role of co-operative 
networks as part of cluster development (Jacobs, 1997). Rosenfeld (1997) 
makes a distinction between clusters, which derive their strength from 
collective visions and the shaping of social values, and networks, which, as 
‘closed’ organisational configuration, develop on the basis of common 
business goals and agreed collaboration. Clusters, in this interpretation, 
have ‘open’ membership, involve both collaboration and competition.
However, another trend is the shift in the conceptualisation of clusters 
from the industrial level to the micro/meso level. The final outcome of this 
evolution is the definition of clusters as closed groups of proximate firms 
with similar or related businesses that raise their competitiveness through 
collaboration. This approach has been adopted by local business 
organisations that target SMEs. Now the relationship between clusters and 
networks is reversed. Clusters are nodes of closed business groups taking 
positions in wider networks. As will be shown below in the presentation of 
business clusters, this scale jump is still justified on similar grounds to the 
industrial clusters: synergy resulting from linking complementary activities, 
the role of proximity, the notion of competitiveness, and the emphasis on 
industrial dynamics and innovation. Moreover, the previous section has 
introduced other notions of clustering, related to institution building and 
learning, in which the relationship between clusters and networks becomes 
more complex.
The use of clusters at the more localised, micro level poses a fundamental 
dilemma for the definition of the concept. One way out of the dilemma is 
to make definitions only for more precise concepts (industrial clusters, 
business clusters), similar to what seems to be the case with the very open 
concept of 'networks'. The question of how networks relate to clusters 
may then be answered for couple of more specific definitions of 'clusters' 
and 'networks'.
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3.4.2. Learning to cluster, learning through clusters?
With an increased orientation towards networking and learning, and the 
move to more localised, facilitated clusters, another issue emerges. What 
is the purpose of clustering? And how should the success of clustering be 
assessed? The discussion identified two typical views. On the one hand, 
clusters can be regarded as the aim of an initiative, in line with the notion 
of ‘institution building’. The endurance of a cluster formation then 
becomes a crucial issue. Endurance is interpreted as proof of the 
competitive success of the cluster. Moreover, survival of the institutional 
manifestation of clustering - such as a real service centre - offers scope for 
a sustainable provision of 'economic intelligence' and joint lobbying 
capacity of the represented business activities. On the other hand, 
clustering is seen more as a means to an end, as a way to facilitate the 
exchange of ideas and a culture of learning. Clustering is then interpreted 
more in social than institutional terms. The vital residual is not a certain 
institutional configuration, but the stock of 'social capital' accumulated in 
the process. Particular manifestations of clusters and institutional 
configurations may play an essential role in the build-up and use of social 
capital, but their endurance is not fundamental.
While they clearly reflect different points of emphasis, these two views 
should not be seen too much in contrary terms. In general, institutional 
and social developments present two related dimensions of processes 
through which economic capabilities and interaction are improved. What 
this discussion points at though is the need to be clear about the means 
and ends of cluster initiatives. In particular, a sensitive issue in the context 
of policy-making is the endurance of clusters. An endurance condition is 
attractive for policy-makers because of its simplicity in application and its 
persuasive nature. The problem however is that survival becomes a 
dominating factor in policy implementation, while the real objectives 
(raising innovative potential through facilitating collaboration) are side­
tracked. The inclination to secure survival may easily evoke a strategy of 
supporting survivors, that is, of 'picking winners'. While 'winners' may, and 
often should play an essential role in cluster initiatives, as hubs, tutors, 
etc., the right balance between such actors and weaker organisations 
should be established. Like 'clustering', winners should be more part of the 
means than the ends.
“Competition reflects the idea that government should identify 
general priorities but not pick winners; cost sharing is based on the 
notion that if an idea is sufficiently good, proposes should be willing 
to sacrifice their own resources for it.” (Storper, 1995a, p.905)
This issue will be further explored in the next chapter.
3.4.3. Commercial versus non-commercial linkages?
While the exchange of tacit knowledge and other untraded factors have 
become catchwords in the debate on inter-organisational relationships, the 
role of commercial relationships (as measured by input-output tables) 
cannot be ignored. One reason for focusing on both is the importance of
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commercial relationships in facilitating other forms of exchange. As argued 
before, this applies especially to SMEs, which tend to rely heavily on their 
'active network'. The work of Lundvall on innovation (Lundvall, 1996) 
and Porter on value chains has vindicated the same process with other 
firms, notably in the context of supply chains. Another reason is that 
commercial relationships, particularly supply chains, provide an attractive 
starting point for policy initiatives. Especially in peripheral regions, 
commercial links, often with emphasis on material links, have provided the 
main focus for clustering and networking initiatives. Reaching higher 
levels of local integration of productive links ('local content') is often a 
major objective of regional policy (at least implicitly).
While commercial relationships may thus provide a substantial 
contribution to improving regional interaction between firms, there is also 
an important caveat. Too much focus on productive linkages can lead to 
an ignorance of less tangible goals, such as improving the exchange of 
knowledge, cultural change and institutional developments. Even worse, it 
can have an adverse effect when it makes local firms too dependent on 
local markets. Business failure or withdrawal, especially of larger 'hub' 
firms, may then cause serious knock-on effects. In the view of Andersen 
(1992, p.70), high rates of input-output relationships are not necessarily a 
reflection of dynamic growth centres: The tight linking of industries 
revealed by the input-output tables of the most advanced countries has no 
connection to growth poles. (...) it probably indicate a ‘mature’ situation 
with routine deliveries and few possibilities of change and development” 
What may be potentially highly risky is a strong emphasis on filling 
'missing links' as part of clustering. The ambition to create 'complete' 
clusters often tends to be supported by a strong orientation towards 
specific 'hub' firms such as final producers and their supply links. Apart 
from the practical problem of how ‘missing links’ are assessed in a 
complex value chain, the global nature of many intermediate markets is 
easily overlooked. Moreover, even when captured locally, many supply 
links will hardly contribute to improving regional innovative capabilities or 
change business behaviour.
3.4.4. Existing versus new strengths? Issues of selection, targeting and 
facilitating
The latter dilemma points at an issue already raised several times, but 
which is of such importance that it is reiterated here: that of targeting. Can 
clustering be used to nurture new activities and induce a change of the 
regional economic profile? The discussion before already presented the 
strong doubts expressed particularly by academic observers. Nelson, in his 
conclusion on national innovation systems, reiterates that clusters can 
never be created from scratch (Nelson, 1993). Also Jacobs’ comments, 
despite his open ‘menu’ approach to clustering, fall in line with this critical 
stance:
“The point of departure for cluster-based policy is the existing
strength in an economy (...) The scope for starting a new cluster is,
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however, restricted: the costs are very high and the chances of 
success limited” (Jacobs, 1997 p.23).
The message is to avoid ‘wish-driven’ policies, not to embark on fantasies, 
but to facilitate processes of which the seeds are already sown. Likewise, 
Storper (1995a, p. 907) argues that technology policy should nourish firms 
already showing existing and potential synergies: “(...) the task of a 
technology policy would be to encourage these groups to transform their 
natural interests in acting collectively into reality, by providing then 
incentives to forms synergy-based technological coalitions for high risk 
development activities” . He then goes on to assert that the region is a 
highly appropriate level for such interventions: “Regions (....) do have 
certain pressures for the formation of encompassing or wide coalitions” 
(p.907).
The academic arguments are simple and convincing. Governments should 
not try to sow and nurture seeds themselves. Put more strongly, every 
region to its trade. For policy makers, especially those in weaker regions, 
this does not solve the issue. Many regions face Steiner’s dilemma: they 
are not doing anything special, and may thus face strong competition 
across the board. What is especially enticing is the notion that emerging 
sectors (multimedia, micro-electronics, theme parks) may temporarily 
provide ‘windows of opportunities’ that will close once a sector becomes 
established (and clustered) in a certain area. Particularly for regions 
without an obvious strength, or with strengths only in declining sectors, 
the temptation to grasp such alleged opportunities are often irresistible. 
How could one “miss the boat” by not having tried? There is a need 
accordingly, for a more sophisticated approach to targeting, based on 
detailed insight on how new activities emerge and where they offer scope 
for facilitation and nurturing.
3.4.5. Business interest versus regional interests
Much of the literature on regional development policy and business 
support stresses the point that interventions should be tailored to business 
interests. Obviously, there is some truth in this. It is pointless to provide 
support that is not appreciated by its target group. The section on SMEs 
has revealed how insights on this point have changed the organisation and 
focus of business support.
However, tailoring does not imply that support should simply serve 
business interests. What is good for a firm is not necessarily good for a 
region. The crucial variable is the way a firm is embedded in the regional 
economy. If the benefits to a firm accrue to the wider regional economy, 
through local business expansion, and commercial and non-commercial 
linkage, this may strengthen local economic development. If local benefits 
are minimal, and business expansion takes place elsewhere, regional 
interests are served less. In a more proactive approach, as hinted at in the 
section on associational approaches above, embedding may involve a 
strong commitment of firms to the local community. Regional interests are
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then not only a part of policy formulation, but also inform business 
strategies.
Defining regional interests, and aligning business interests to it, however, 
are far from easy tasks. Policy-makers and business support staff need to 
find the right balance between offering attractive services to firms and 
aligning their developments with appropriate regional development 
objectives. In essence, this requires a strategic coaching of local firms. 
Cluster strategies offer an opportunity for coaching since they provide the 
basis for the embedding of business development in local economic and 
institutional networks. By creating specific assets, anchored to the regional 
economy while serving the needs of particular groups of related firms, 
cluster developments may thus bridge business and regional interests.
3.4.6. Competition vs. collaboration?
The emphasis on networking and embedding introduces another major 
issue in the clustering debate: the role of competition versus that of 
collaboration. The history of the cluster concept has shown a shift in 
emphasis from competition as part of the framework conditions, to 
collaboration as part of the network- and institution-oriented approaches. 
Recent literature has further explored the ‘co-operation versus 
competition’ quandary. Rather than adhering to a simple opposition 
between competition and co-operation, new ideas have emerged which 
stress the social embedding of inter-firm interaction, and the fact that co­
operation and competition can co-exist even within one relationship or 
network (Lorenz, 1992; Enright, 1994a). The essential factors are the 
‘rules of the game’, or the norms and values that define the areas and 
methods of competition and co-operation. Such rules define for instance 
the nature of commitment of firms to each other, how the costs and 
rewards for collective actions are distributed, and how sanctions are 
imposed on firms which do not comply with the rules agreed. Developing, 
and controlling, the rules of the game is seen as an essential dimension of 
network formation, and is an important outcome of the governance of the 
network. The question of the extent to which rivalry is part of the rules of 
the game remains a critical issue. On the one hand, authors such as 
Boekholt et al (1993) recommend “to have dynamic networks in which 
firms co-operate in rivalry”. Networks or clusters should not represent 
‘safe havens’ but ‘stepping stones’ to improve competitiveness. Also 
Enright, in his work on regional clusters, suggested that rivalry should 
permeate clusters (Enright, 1994b). In similar vein, Storper relates the 
concept of competition to that of supporting ‘winners’:
“Competition reflects the idea that government should identify 
general priorities but not pick winners; cost sharing is based on the 
notion that if an idea is sufficiently good, proposers should be 
willing to sacrifice their own resources for it.” (Storper, 1995a, p.
905).
On the other hand, collaboration appears to be the catchword in much of 
the literature of regional development. Particularly in the discussion on
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regional ‘competitiveness’, competition is generally perceived as an 
‘external’ factor, as something encroaching upon regional economies 
rather than being part of it. How far ‘rivalry’ should be policy objective at 
the regional level remains a tricky issue.
3.4.7. Local - global nexus: scale divisions of labour
Behind many of the issues presented so far, and particularly the previous 
one (competition versus co-operation), lies one fundamental perspective: 
the local-global nexus. As stressed throughout this chapter, the renewed 
interest in the region has revolved around one dominant image. Through 
internal dynamics, sustained by clustering, regions acquire a competitive 
position in the global economy, broadly denoted as its ‘competitiveness’. 
Regional action is thus defined largely in terms of influencing this 
competitive position, as a response to perceived growth and changing 
nature of competitive pressure, to ‘opportunities’ and ‘threats’ etc. The 
regional level, and more specifically the level of regional clusters, thus 
becomes the basic frame of reference for economic action and policy 
intervention. To sustain this view, various authors have played down the 
role of international firms, arguing that, for innovative activities, they 
behave largely like regional firms (Malmberg & Maskell, 1997). The 
picture thus emerges of a global mosaic of regional economies, 
specialising through clustering and competing against each other.
There are various authors who have developed more sophisticated 
accounts of the local-global nexus, for instance by invoking more 
articulated views of globalisation and inter-regional interaction (e.g. 
Storper, 1997b; Scott, A.J., 1998). These authors and others (e.g. Jacobs,
1997) also concede that while some economic activities show pervasive 
regional clustering, others are strongly integrated at national or 
international levels (for instance much of aerospace, automotive, micro­
electronic, certain professional services). Much of the literature, however, 
especially those on regional innovation systems and clustering, tends to 
reify the regional level. Much is made of intra-regional interaction and 
dynamics, while external linkages receive scant attention.
The point made here is that ‘local’ and ‘global’ should not be seen as 
substitutes, but as interwoven dimensions of industrial dynamics and 
learning processes. This requires a more subtle approach to understanding 
how ‘the region’ is positioned in ‘the global’, with as much attention given 
to the role of and variety in external linkages as for internal linkages. In 
particular, what needs to be clarified is to what extent regional action 
should be seen from an economic or a political perspective. While the first 
is based on the notion of changing industrial dynamics, through an alleged 
growing importance of proximity, the second refers to political ambition of 
embedding and anchoring, of ‘pinning down’ the global into a regional 
institutional setting, to use the image of Amin and Thrift (Amin & Thrift,
1993). In such a perspective, ‘regional competitiveness’ becomes more a 
concept of political mobilisation than of economic assessment. The case
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studies below will shed more light on the intricate interaction between the 
economic and political level.
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Chapter Four. Clusters in practice: from 
initiation to evaluation
Over the last decade, regional authorities in many parts of the word have 
implemented some kind of cluster policies. These initiatives draw on 
different aspects of the clustering debate, have been developed in different 
contexts and at different levels (local, regional, national), and thus vary 
widely in scope and depth of objectives and instruments. Nevertheless, by 
focusing on the common elements in cluster approaches identified so far, 
an attempt may be made to create of a common analytical framework to 
study policy initiatives. Building such a framework is the task of the 
present chapter. Drawing largely on the discussion and issues presented 
before, a set of themes and questions will be brought together which, in 
broad lines, reflect the development of cluster initiatives from initiation to 
evaluation. At the end of the chapter, a summary of the core themes and 
questions will be presented, which forms the backbone of the empirical 
studies to follow.
The building of the analytical framework is divided here into three blocks. 
The first block covers the main themes describing the steps from initiation 
to evaluation, based on a modified version of the policy cycle. The second 
and third blocks are based on the distinction made in the previous chapter 
between business and regional interests. The second block takes the 
perspective of the businesses involved as its starting point, looking at 
expectations and outcomes from their side. The third block expands on the 
regional perspective. The aim is, by comparing these two dimensions, to 
clarify two core issues.
• first, the extent to which, in the view of firms, cluster policies manage 
to be business-oriented, and to what extent cluster initiatives increase 
businesses commitment to regional development;
• second, the extent to which regional policy makers have managed to 
attune cluster policies to regional interests.
4.1. From initiation to evaluation: the ‘cluster’ policy cycle
This first section follows the idea of a ‘policy cycle’, from conception, 
decision making through to implementation. While the policy cycle is used 
to set out the development of cluster initiatives in a historical perspective, 
the cycle categories have been modified to accommodate the insights 
developed in the previous sections. This includes an emphasis on the 
institutional and knowledge dimensions, and specific cluster issues, such as 
the role of audits.
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• From conception to design: the role of the industrial and institutional 
context
• Role of support agencies and funding regimes
• Cluster mapping and audits
• Setting cluster objectives
• Methods: basic approach, role of mediators
• Cluster composition
• Evaluation and monitoring
On each issue, a brief discussion will be presented with references to the 
debate in the previous chapter. This is then followed by a specification of 
research themes and questions.
4.1.1. From conception to design: the role of the institutional and economic 
context
Why do cluster policies emerge in a certain country and region? How 
have, concepts and approaches of clusters been disseminated in the world 
of policy-making and business support? Some of the major context factors 
behind this process have been introduced in the previous chapter: the shift 
from intervention to facilitation, an increased emphasis on networking and 
partnerships, as well as on innovation and competitiveness, issues which 
have been associated with the cluster perspective, and funding conditions 
(Lagendijk & Cornford, 2000). There is one additional factor that should 
be raised here, which is particularly relevant to the regions under study. 
Cluster initiatives have particularly gained popularity in regions facing 
problems of industrial decline and restructuring. These are neither core nor 
peripheral regions, but regions in between, which have enjoyed prosperity 
on the basis of industrial specialisation in the past, but which feel the need 
to build new strengths.
One reason why clusters have been embraced in older industrial areas, 
apart from the general issue of restructuring, can be found in what are seen 
as the causes of lack of industrial viability. Researchers as well as support 
agencies have pointed out that these regions are mostly not endowed with 
a strong tradition in networking, collaboration and ‘institution building’, 
that they are locked in old patterns of behaviour (Grabher, 1991). They 
often tend to suffer from strong competition in more traditional or even 
declining sectors. The double message of clustering - restructuring at the 
macro-level, networking and ‘institution building’ at the meso level, thus 
presents an appealing approach for reshaping industrial policy and business 
support. Nearly all cluster initiatives in this study have been developed 
against such a background.
The present study will focus on the actual translation of ideas and enabling 
factors into initiatives ‘on the ground’. An attempt will made to link this 
practical translation to the broader picture set out in the previous chapter. 
This can only be done in a cursory way, however. A full account of how
The modified cycle contains the following categories:
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innovative policy initiatives are conceived would require a more in-depth 
historical review. Since this study aims at exploring the later stages of the 
policy cycle in more detail (impact on businesses and regions), such a 
project is not part of the research.
A question that needs to be addressed in the first stage is that of the policy 
instruments adopted (Table 8). In the practical context of policy-making, 
the articulation of goals and ends generally go hand-in-hand (Peter & Van 
Nispen, 1998). In most cases, this choice will reflect the source of 
inspiration, funding conditions, institutional conditions and the political 
culture of the policy arena in which initiatives develop. Initial choices may 
be partly made in an implicit way, which only become more transparent 
when explicit objectives are set and methods are developed. Indeed, in 
practice, initiatives may present complex, and often hidden, combinations 
of approaches and philosophies that may change over time. Rather than 
finding an explicit statement, it is thus the task of the researcher to 
‘discover’ the underlying approach while analysing the policy cycle.
4.1.2. Role of support agencies and funding regimes
Once a general idea has been obtained about how regional actors became 
interested in cluster initiatives, a more specific question is how the 
development of cluster policies and initiatives has been structured among 
policy-makers, business support agencies and business representatives. 
Who are the key actors: regional governments, regional development 
agencies, business support agencies, business figureheads? Are they part of 
larger programmes either at the regional or (inter)national level. What is 
the division of labour while the initiative is developed and implemented? 
To understand the specific development of a project, some knowledge 
about the individual agendas and interests of the support agencies can be 
useful, against the background of wider shifts occurring in the arena of 
regional development and business support (partnerships, policy 
integration etc.). (this will be addressed in more detail in the section on 
policy-makers’ expectations below).
One area where interests play a dominant role, and where one may find 
significant differences within the public sector, is that of funding. So far, 
no distinction has been made between the level of policy-making and 
support agencies, but this becomes essential once the role of funding in the 
shaping of support initiatives and even policy development is discussed. 
While it may be in the interest of governments to control, even reduce, 
subsidies to business support, support agencies largely depend on 
subsidies for their existence. Many agencies have tried to raise income by 
moving towards more commercial approaches to service provision, but 
generally private sector contributions have remained low. Combined with 
the fact that many subsidies are provided on a project basis, this has led to 
an uneasy situation in which government felt obliged to continue funding 
agencies longer and at higher levels than intended. Policy-makers thus 
have to strike the right balance between issues of agency survival in the
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short term and addressing the needs of the local economy in the long term 
(Smallbone, 1997).
One way in which agencies in the EU have managed to secure income is 
by drawing on European funding, often with the help (and financial 
leverage) of local and national governments. Particularly for European 
programmes, applications for funding require the formation of partnerships 
in which various public and (semi)private organisations participate, 
bringing in different resources and competencies, sometimes in cross­
border networks. This has led to even more complex organisational and 
financial structures, and to a situation in which agencies have been pushed 
to develop capabilities in the area of funds acquisition, project 
management and the co-ordination of networks and partnerships, 
sometimes at the expense of further developing support capabilities. As 
illustrated by job adverts, it is not uncommon for agencies to look for a 
‘European officer with knowledge of and experience in the acquisition of 
European funding and co-ordination of European programmes’, even with 
a reference to the specific programmes involved (ERDF, ADAPT, ESF. 
etc.). One of the ironies, one could argue, is that here in many cases it has 
been more the funding regime than the ‘associational’ ideas which induced 
a process of ‘institution building’ and partnership formation.
Funding conditions will place specific limits on what can be financed and 
how. In many cases, subsidy only pays for the process of analysis, 
negotiation, brokerage and facilitation. Participants may be asked to 
contribute to the costs, either because matched funding is required, or 
because this is seen as a way to secure commitment. The funding may limit 
the themes on which clustering can be based. For instance, European 
funding generally does not permit support to export or marketing within 
the Community. Funding will often be spatially limited, thus hampering the 
building of links with agents outside the region.
Several issues can be distilled from the debate about the role of funding 
with respect to cluster policies. The overarching theme is how policies are 
conditioned and shaped by the particular funding regime from which they 
emerge. The insistence on partnerships and the prospect of stronger 
interaction with the private sector (including financial) has been an 
important factor in the popularity of cluster approaches. The question is 
what kind of expectations has this raised among policy-makers and 
business support agencies and what kind of organisational and financial 
framework has developed.
4.1.3. Cluster mapping and audits
Once an initiating body or network has embraced the idea of adopting a 
cluster approach and secured a first amount of funding, how is a cluster 
policy planned? At this point, policy-makers are already confronted with 
the complexity and diversity - and fuzziness - of cluster approaches. 
Difficult questions are for instance at what level planning should take 
place, and how ‘top-down’ planning and monitoring will be squared with 
room for and support to ‘bottom-up’ initiatives. This, in turn, raises the
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issues of how the process of cluster targeting is envisaged and what place 
cluster mapping and auditing will have. A distinction can be made here 
between conventional and alternative approaches.
Conventional approaches
Grafted onto more traditional policy models, conventional approaches 
follow a classical sequence of analysis (specifying cluster maps and 
analysing needs), setting objectives (cluster targeting plus cluster specific 
goals), designing and implementing cluster-specific projects, accompanied 
by interim and final evaluations. The analytical phase is a crucial stage that 
precedes policy implementation. Recent literature has produced a series of 
advanced methods for carrying out ex-ante cluster analysis. Table 10 
presents an overview of key dimensions of cluster analysis, taken from 
practical guidelines for cluster planning.
Table 10 Cluster auditing
Objective of analysis Possible methods Results
Determining key sectors and 
identifying core regional assets
Measuring industry concentration
Input-output analysis
Swot analysis (economic foresight)
Expert interviews/ expert panels 
Describing broad value chains; analysis of 
performance indicators (e.g. Trade)






Identifying cluster needs and 
relationships
As above at cluster level 





Analysis of existing support 
services and resources by cluster











Source: inspired by Rosenfeld, 1995
Undoubtedly, any serious attempt to build a cluster approach requires a 
process of analysis incorporating most, if not all, of the dimensions 
included in Table 10. The result of such ‘top down’ cluster mapping and 
auditing should meet the aspiration of policy-makers to address regional 
economic problems at a structural level. Rosenfeld (1997) makes a 
distinction between overachieving clusters which already capture a large 
part of their clustering benefits, latent clusters which underachieve, and 
potential clusters in potential growth industries. Other distinctions can be 
made according to the extent that cluster initiatives are based primarily on 
inter-firm linkages, in horizontal (co-production) or vertical (supply-chain) 
dimensions, or on the use and development of collective resources, 
particularly knowledge centres and the labour market (Held, 1996). 
Besides the economic analysis, a crucial object of auditing is the support 
sector itself. Through making an inventory of all the support agencies and 
services on offer, mapping the position of agencies in the regional support 
structure, and more in-depth analysis of the competencies developed
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within agencies, an idea can be created of how the support sector can be 
lined up with the cluster approach. Bellini (1998) presents an extensive list 
of what kind of competencies should be present in service centres. Besides 
organisational and managerial capacities, these competencies vary from 
‘sophisticated marketing’ skills and problem framing skills to the capacity 
to build links and alliances among businesses, and with sources of financial 
and non-financial support. Such ‘benchmarks’ can serve for auditing 
purposes and to develop strategies to improve support provision.
Alternative approaches
However sophisticated and well-managed cluster analysis may be, the 
question remains what role the outcomes will have for further programme 
design. If a top-down strategy is pursued, the information is expected to 
be used for to develop a strategy for initiating cluster policies which reflect 
the cluster map, addressing the problems and needs identified through 
analysis of the business and support sectors. Planning then includes the 
‘nurturing’ of clusters itself. A problem with such a strategy is that it may 
ignore the value of business actors themselves to instigating cluster 
developments, as a way to foster commitment and bottom-up support. So, 
a less conventional approach may be pursued in which the voluntary 
facilitation of clusters is the main objective, rather than planned 
‘nurturing’. Policy should then be geared to developing a framework of 
cluster support through which cluster initiatives emerge in a bottom up 
way. Yet, a more facilitative approach will still benefit from a thorough 
process of analysis. The information gathered through analysis will help to 
develop the policy framework for cluster facilitation, and for the 
improvement of support sector competencies. It can also be used for a 
process of subtle targeting of sectors where policy makers would like to 
see cluster initiatives to develop, but where ‘associational’ tendencies are 
lacking. It should be realised however that balancing a top-down 
framework with facilitating bottom-up initiatives places high demands on 
programme managers, mediators and support staff. This may perhaps a 
major reason why, in the end, policy makers may prefer to opt for more 
conventional approaches.
Two central issues can be derived from this discussion. The first issue is 
the nature of and methods used for mapping and auditing processes, and 
the way outcomes are presented and interpreted. The second issue 
concerns the way analysis is used in the cluster initiative, and how it 
relates to targeting and facilitation. Moreover, an overarching task is to 
reflect on the contents and use of analysis in terms of its clarity, 
thoroughness, and coherence. Not only are there different ways for 
mapping and auditing, there is also an issue of the actual depth and quality 
of analysis. Indeed, some authors have argued that some specific cluster 
policies have failed or underperformed because of poor analysis and 
preparation. Doeringer (1995), for instance, speaks of 'fuzzy 
implementation' of clustering approaches, and states that many new policy 
efforts lack an understanding of the underlying economics of industrial
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clustering and a methodology for translating the cluster concept into 
concrete growth policies tailored to specific business. Held, in his analysis 
of cluster policy in Hudson Valley, makes a similar comment: "Sadly, in 
the rush by various governments to employ clusters, some fundamental 
issues have been slighted, including appropriate research methods and 
even definition of a cluster itself" (Held, 1996, p.249). While this remains 
an issue difficult to assess, an attempt will be made to draw lessons from 
the position and quality of analysis in the different cluster initiatives.
4.1.4. Setting objectives and methods
Because of the wide scope of the cluster approach, a critical issue in 
cluster initiatives is the formulation of the specific objectives. The previous 
chapter has indicated that clusters may refer to the aims (cluster building) 
as well as to the method (cluster-based support) of initiatives. In addition, 
a broad distinction can be made between an orientation towards 
competitiveness at a cluster level (of a district, supply chain, or business 
group) or competitiveness perceived at business level, in which clusters 
are associated with specific business environments rather than ‘competitive 
units’. However, a deeper understanding of how different cluster 
approaches should be perceived and put into context has only just started 
to emerge. In the practical reality of policy-making and business support, 
actors are trying to make sense of the variation in and complexity of 
cluster concepts, and even to get a grasp of what is actually happening in 
the cluster initiatives they have set in motion.
Against this background, one can understand that many initiatives do not 
go much further than couching their objectives in general terms of 
‘improving regional competitiveness’ and ‘overcoming obstacles to 
networking and co-operation’, combined with some notion of targeting. 
‘Clusters’ are often referred to both as a way to achieve this and an 
outcome of the process. Some authors have pointed at the fact that policy­
makers are often tempted to duplicate initiatives which they observe 
elsewhere, leading to what Storper and Scott (1995) call a proliferation of 
‘boilerplate approaches’. However, against these accusations it could be 
said that, certainly in the case of clustering, policy-makers are not helped 
by the fact that clusters remain a highly elusive concept. Since clusters can 
refer to both means and end of policy initiatives, it comes as no surprise 
that means and ends are often conflated. Of course, much will depend on 
the way projects are prepared, designed and monitored. Where 
preparatory audits are of high quality and serve for more than justification 
and legitimisation reasons only, they might help to draw up more specific 
objectives. A core theme for research, accordingly, is to understand how 
objectives are framed and set, which role they play in the design and 
implementation of cluster initiatives, and how they relate to the methods 
used.
A major reason why the articulation of precise objectives and methods for 
cluster initiatives is such an elaborate issue is because of the far-fetched 
ambitions which often accompany this type of policy. This is a not simple
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packaged business support, or the provision of new infrastructure. This is 
policy with the intention to change behaviour and build ‘learning’ firms 
and institutions, to shape institutions, to facilitate networking and build a 
networking culture, to address framework conditions in an integrated way, 
all this in different permutations. Moreover, most initiatives are expected 
to become (largely) self-financing, self-managing, and self-assessing. There 
are thus different kinds of objectives on varying time horizons. While the 
long term aim may be to instil a networking culture and establish 
autonomous service centres, the practical goals of the moment may 
include capability improvement in IT and the facilitation of pioneer 
business clusters. A more comprehensive cluster programme may thus 
involve a staged sequence of means and ends: using facilitated learning and 
‘mentors’ to make firms listen to each other, the latter helping to broker 
business clusters in order to introduce more elaborate forms of 
networking, followed by an extension of linkages towards knowledge 
centres, leading perhaps to the establishment of a network of service 
centres, etc. Much will depend on how views and ideas change through 
the life of policy approaches, and the flexibility of the initiative and actors 
involved.
4.1.5. Implementation
At a more practical level, what most cluster initiatives share on the 
methodological front is the activity of bringing together of different actors 
and the forging of linkages. To enable this, most initiatives (high-level top- 
down industrial cluster policies may be an exception) employ mediators, 
notably brokers and facilitators to implement the project. Their role is 
crucial (Hassink, 1996): the outcome of initiatives geared towards 
networking and inter-firm learning, but also service centres and policy 
integration critically depends on the versatility and quality of these agents 
(Bellini, 1998). Mediators are the agents who must get the message of 
clustering across. They are instrumental in the build-up of commitment 
and trust between the participating firms and organisations. They are often 
responsible for identifying needs, and linking this to other forms of 
(external) expertise.
A core question is thus: who selects, trains and monitors the mediators? 
From which backgrounds should mediators be drawn? Agents from 
business agencies often lack the expertise and persuasiveness necessary to 
bring actors together. An often preferred source is the sector in which 
participating firms operate. A mediator can be a figurehead in an industry, 
or a retired person, with a good reputation and an in-depth knowledge of 
the business. This approach is often seen as the most preferred. However, 
it critically depends on whether the right person can be found. Not every 
experienced person from within a certain trade will have the necessary 
capabilities to run a cluster initiative. There may be a need for the training 
of such mediators. Another possibility is to use professional mediators. 
While there is a price tag associated to such an approach, it may be easier 
to manage and control. A problem is that support agencies often 
underestimate the problems professional mediators have in gaining the
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trust and commitment from businesses. Professional consultants may be 
seen as too glib and too much driven by money, and they may lack the 
political and social competencies required to work in the context of 
strategically oriented support provision. After knowing and understanding 
cluster objectives, finding the right mediators poses one of the most 
difficult tasks in cluster-type policies that involve networking and 
collaboration..
4.1.6. Cluster composition
If there is one topic which shows the evolution of the cluster concept, it is 
the nature of cluster composition. Who had expected that Porter’s 
interpretation of clustering as a term for the significance of cross-industry 
linkages would lead to items in business newsletters with headings such as 
“new firm accepted to the local offshore cluster” . Indeed, cluster 
composition is an area where highly varying positions can be found among 
the different cluster approaches. The following point will be taken into 
account in the cluster analysis:
1. industrial clusters are defined in terms of core linkages between 
industries, which is often translated in broad groups of activities (as in 
Porter’s approach). A good example here is the Dutch notion of mega­
clusters (Jacobs, 1997), or Enright’s notion of regional clusters 
(Enright, 1994a);
2. business cluster initiatives lead to closed networks, in which entry and 
exit is a central management issue; this raises the sensitive issue of 
inclusion and exclusion;
3. in facilitated micro-clusters, interested businesses can join in to share 
experiences and learn from peers or a more experienced ‘mentor’; the 
only restriction that may apply is that, for practical reasons, the total 
number of participants is limited;
4. cluster-oriented institutions (service centres, associations) are 
dependent on members, and are generally open to all firms willing to 
join and pay, although some are more selective.
In addition to the issue of openness, there is also the geographical 
dimension. In all cases, cluster composition is defined by the area in which 
the initiative is developed and set to be destined for. This may hamper, 
although does not exclude, the building of linkages with actors (just) 
outside the regional boundaries.
4.1.7. Evaluation and monitoring
In a world where one policy initiative follows the other, and where 
justification of funding is an essential part of the policy process, evaluation 
is seen as a crucial activity. Evaluation activities can take place at different 
levels (within initiatives; within programmes, at the regional and higher 
spatial level), and serve various interests. For instance, at project and 
programme levels, monitoring may be closely related to intelligence 
gathering and the auditing process, representing a core activity in cluster
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development through constant feedback, but may also underpin project 
legitimisation. At the regional level, the purpose may be to follow and 
compare different initiatives and to set out future direction for cluster 
development. At the national level, the main interest may be to exercise 
financial control and provide proper regulation for business support 
subsidies Finally, at international levels there might be an interest in 
providing platforms for exchange of experiences and initiating new policy 
developments.
Given the nature of cluster initiatives, evaluation whether of single projects 
or programmes, is fraught with difficulties, some of which have already 
been mentioned in the context of funding. While it is generally easy to find 
some activity indicators, such as numbers of firms involved, of services 
provided, of networks facilitated, of fees, contracts and matched funding 
acquired, etc., there are no sound measures at hand to assess the impact of 
such activities on business performance and the regional economy. One 
problem is that, especially when initiatives aim at facilitating networking 
and capability improvement, the impact may be slow, diffused and 
‘diluted’ by many other factors which impinge on business performance. 
Another problem is that, with the survival of support agencies and 
programmes depending on evaluation outcomes, evaluations may become 
‘self-fulfilling’ with undesirable effects on the contents and delivery of 
business support. To boost performance, agencies might target firms 
expected to perform relatively well thus bypassing the ones most in need. 
They may shift to activities that have been proven to be viable and thus 
reduce the scope for innovative, but also riskier approaches. The 
organisation of support agencies may become increasingly evaluation- 
driven, shifting the organisational culture from a developmental orientation 
to a focus on short-term (survival) calculations.
These criticisms do not imply that evaluation should be dropped all 
together. Rather than using simple performance indicators, evaluation 
might aim at observing and recording particular methods and practices 
followed in well-defined problem areas, and use these for the exchange of 
‘good practice’ between agents, as well as for the correction of what can 
be labelled as inferior performance. Another point is that evaluation should 
take into account the position of projects and agencies in the wider 
support system. Referring to technology services, for instance, Lagendijk 
and Charles (1997, p.24) argue that:
“In general however RTAC services are difficult to assess in terms 
of the real net effect they have on the firms in a region, and perhaps 
they must be considered more as a set of underpinning actions that 
build relationships and lubricate the wheels of the support system 
rather than have a considerable direct impact in their own right”
From a similar associational perspective, Sabel (1994) has argued that 
monitoring should be seen as an intrinsic component of a process of 
continuous learning by regional development institutions. Following 
Sabel’s idea of ‘learning-by-monitoring’, regional institutions may learn 
from previous actions and experiments and thus enhance collective
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institutional competencies. The idea is that such learning supports a system 
of self-regulation, guiding the development of regional governance 
structures. Learning is part of the ongoing adaptation and improvement of 
existing programmes. It underpins strategic action, which may lead to new 
directions and support institutional changes.
An emphasis on a wider perspective of ‘learning-by-monitoring’ at a 
regional development level is not to suggest that evaluation of single 
initiatives would be pointless. On the contrary, one of the interesting 
questions is how various forms of evaluation and monitoring can intersect. 
Yet what is clear is that the issues of evaluation should not be isolated 
from wider questions of how regional development strategies are set, to 
what extent organisational context of support is geared towards learning, 
and how, at a more practical level, programmes are designed, objectives 
articulated and feedback mechanisms created.
This makes the policy cycle complete. The next two sections will present 
the issues while looking at clusters from two perspectives, that of the firms 
and of the region.
4.2. Expectations and outcomes for business development
What do clusters mean to firms? Cluster policies are essentially geared to 
regional development, but the level of action is that of businesses. Hence, 
business engagement is crucial for all cluster initiatives. Without tailoring 
support to business needs, it will stand little chance of success. So what 
are the issues when addressing the business perspective on clustering?
As an introductory note, it may already be observed that fostering 
engagement has been a difficult issue. In effect, for most entrepreneurs and 
business managers, the first confrontation with the concept has not been 
an enthusiastic one. Used to simple subsidy schemes, which were territory 
based and directly feeding into individual business development, the 
cluster concept seemed far from appealing. In particular, there was little 
appreciation for the fact that subsidies were to be spent on facilitation and 
administration rather than direct subsidies; and that cluster initiatives 
aimed at building linkages with other firms and organisations, rather than 
at directly supporting business capabilities. Especially for small firms, 
which generally treasure their independence, this poses a far from 
attractive prospect. Network developments are often antithetical to 
owner-manager cultures that prevail among SMEs (Curran & Blackburn,
1994). Indeed, from the perspective of the support sector (see below), 
convincing firms of the possible benefits of clustering has proven to be an 
important bottleneck in project development. Another negative factor has 
been that for many firms the concept reeked of academic pedantry.
Why would businesses participate in cluster initiatives and what would 
they expect to get out of it? This obviously depends on the local context 
and on the type of initiative, i.e. on what ‘participation’ entails in practice. 
When cluster policies are introduced against the background of industrial 
crisis the simple answer may be: survival, whatever it takes. In less
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dramatic situations, the recognition of increased market pressure may 
make firms willing to share some of their experiences with peers. 
Moreover, businesses may feel that cluster-based industrial policy 
processes of ‘institution building’ may help them in furthering their interest 
and providing better tailored support without affecting their independence. 
Once cluster policies are set in train and demonstrate some success, finally, 
they may trigger interest from non-participating firms and firms in other 
industries.
4.2.1. Direct benefits: improving business capabilities through clustering
As indicated before, what businesses tend to appreciate most is customised 
support that helps them directly with improving their performance. In 
addition, they will generally be in favour of support that is well packaged 
and is linked to some notion of where businesses are heading. In the past, 
however, much support has been lacking both in a practical and strategic 
sense, and cluster initiatives have been presented as a way to improve the 
delivery of support as well as offering new contexts and directions of 
support.
Table 11 gives an illustration of how cluster initiatives may contribute to 
the development of business capabilities. Neither the list of capabilities nor 
the descriptions are exhaustive. What the table shows nevertheless is the 
variation between the different approaches, not only in the items addressed 
but also the process of support provision. For instance, the most ‘hands 
on’ approach with respect to capability development is the institutional 
one. Service centres have specific functions and assets developed at a 
collective level (market watch, library) which may have a direct impact on 
their members’ performance. Learning-oriented initiatives are less focused 
on such provisions, but they may help firms especially in the first phase of 
creating awareness, identifying needs and exchanging experiences with 
other firms. In focusing on business capabilities at the level of single firms, 
these examples endorse the view of clusters-as-method to improve 
individual business performance. In addition, the sharing of learning 
experiences among firms and in the use of collective services may facilitate 
networking and the linking of capabilities between firms.
The notion of linkages and the alignment of capabilities between firms is 
displayed by the network-building approach. Here businesses are expected 
to benefit from a more articulated division of labour and the development 
of a collective ‘mass’ to improve the joint position in the market, vis-à-vis 
banks, suppliers etc. The alignment of capabilities should however also be 
seen in a dynamic context (Langlois & Robertson, 1995). In particular, 
through clustering businesses may start to co-ordinate new investments in 
skills and equipment, as well as activities in the area of research and 
development. To facilitate such processes of capability alignment at an 
inter-firm level, businesses will need to go through a
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(peer or mentor groups)
Finance Financial regulation; 
support to venture capital
Facilitating bank access, 
co-operative schemes, 
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process of increased awareness of existing capabilities in the cluster and of 
trust building.
The basic theme arising from this overview is to map out the links between 
cluster initiatives and the development of business capabilities. In addition, 
there are a number of other issues stemming directly from this practical 
side of cluster support: What do the firms contribute in terms of time and 
financial donations? Who is involved from businesses - managers, 
marketing staff, technical staff, shopfloor workers etc.? The latter 
questions may also reveal the kind of commitments firms have towards 
cluster initiatives.
4.2.2. Business networking: obtaining benefits from collaborating with 
other firms
Since cluster policies rely on the shaping of linkages of one sort or 
another, on a longer-term scale, trust is an important factor. Once first 
contacts have been facilitated, regular contacts and joint activities should 
contribute to the creation of trust as well as of certain routines of 
behaviour. As argued above, these processes are also essential for shifting 
from an interest in capability development at the single-firm level to the 
inter-firm level, thus facilitating clustering benefits.
Yet, moving to more collaborative attitudes, a highly complex issue 
emerges, the building of trust (see previous chapter). One interpretation of 
trust particularly relevant to businesses is as an asset derived from the 
investments of partners in collaborative activities, and the creation of 
information channels, behavioural routines, and corrective mechanisms to 
prevent the erosion of co-operative behaviour. For firms operating in 
networks, trust is built on the accumulation of ‘credit slips outstanding’ 
and a confidence in the ability of the network to respond to defection and 
opportunistic behaviour. One of the characteristics of this perspective is 
that trust can be accumulated as well as destroyed through ongoing social 
interaction. Many network and cluster members tell stories of how trust 
can wax and wane. In the context of cluster initiatives, moreover, it is not 
only trust between firms that counts, but also the trust and confidence in 
the mediator. The latter is crucial especially in the initial phases of a 
project, and is closely linked to the mediator’s competence and power to 
create confidence. The aim of a mediator, especially in small business 
clusters and in processes of ‘institution building’, is then to transform a 
radial pattern of trust (between the mediator and cluster members) into a 
criss-cross and denser pattern, which becomes the basis for a more 
enduring stock of social capital. The latter may also be facilitated by 
institutional developments (formation of associations), or through linking 
with existing institutions (such as Chambers of Commerce). When such 
processes take place at the regional level, they may also create a higher 
level of business commitment towards local development issues.
The issue of collaboration is further compounded by the role of power 
relations. In the literature, there has been a trend to associate networking 
and co-operation with a kind of egalitarian and democratic perception of
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business interaction, notably in the context of the idea of an ‘integral 
economy’. This idea has been challenged by authors such as Harrison 
(1992) and Herrigel (1993). Harrison’s considers business networks from 
a ‘core-ring’ perspective, in which power plays an important role in 
shaping behaviour and strategies (see also Eccles & Nohria, 1992). The 
core in such networks consists of market and technology gatekeepers, 
such as large firms or firms with unique capabilities. In the context of 
clusters, the role of power is an obvious issue in the case of supply chain 
development around large firms as market ‘gatekeepers’. However, also 
when only SMEs are involved question of domination and control can be 
crucial. The way firms and agents respond to problems related to power 
often presents one of the best indicators of the strength of a network and 
the ‘social capital’ accumulated. While the building up of trust takes time, 
it can be rapidly undermined by sudden incidents induced by power 
struggles, causing major shifts in relational patterns and the stock of 
‘social capital’.
A theme for research therefore is how cluster initiatives, from the 
perspective of the targeted businesses, contributed to the formation of 
trust, in its various dimensions of behavioural routines, the accumulation 
of mutual expectations and the corrective capacity of the network. 
Questions of power and domination are especially interesting when 
clusters involve firms of different sizes and with different positions in 
production chains. The question is then how clusters cope with such 
differences. With clusters largely dominated by SMEs, power issues may 
be invoked when relating the ‘story’ of clusters, notably with changes in 
cluster composition, shifts in direction, and the development of the co­
ordination of resource sharing.
4.2.3. Institutional networking: obtaining benefits from local institutions
Another area in which firms will have certain expectations when they 
engage with cluster initiatives is the quality of contacts with regional 
organisations, such as business support organisations, representatives of 
regional development agencies, Chambers of Commerce, etc. Clusters 
generally lead to a different, more elaborate kind of interface with the 
public sector. Rather than filling in an application form to acquire a grant 
or visiting a business support ‘shop’, businesses are now confronted with 
mediators (brokers, facilitators) and institutions which sit between the 
public and private sector. This often implies a more intensive, and longer 
term engagement. The discussion above has already pointed out some of 
the advantages such an engagement may have: better articulation and 
matching of business needs and support, more emphasis on interaction and 
learning, the facilitation of self-managed support systems. However, it has 
also highlighted some important caveats. Long term engagement and 
commitment requires high-quality mediators that are knowledgeable of 
both the business and policy area. When these requirements are not met, 
firms might easily become disillusioned with the attempt of policy-makers 
to develop more durable, and more ‘associational’ forms of business 
support.
AL ADAPT report (02/11/99) - 89 -
To what extent can clustering overcome the often poor image the public 
sector has in the eyes of business? The role of mediators and members of 
business associations or Chambers of Commerce may actually be of help 
here. Mediators, especially when drawn from industry, will generally not 
suffer from the ‘nine-to-five’ image associated with civil servants. 
Moreover, mediators and service centres, through intensive contact with 
client firms, may offer a better point of access to support than so-called 
‘one-stop-shops’ (such as Business Link in the UK). The latter, while 
established in an attempt to address fragmentation and poor take-up of 
support, still tends to be too generic and lacking the sectoral insights 
which business require (Curran & Blackburn, 1994). Moreover, it is often 
not the fragmentation per se which poses a problem to firms, but the 
overall low quality of support, a lack of diagnostic skills, and lacking of 
specialised knowledge. Even worse, firms are confronted with 
incompetence, rivalry, and situations in which business support appears to 
serve the interests of the support agencies (funding, legitimacy) more than 
those of the firms. Similar experiences occur with business associations 
and Chambers. A crucial question is thus to what extent cluster initiatives 
have managed to overcome these problems and have managed to improve 
the image of the support sector in the eyes of their clients.
4.3. Expectation and outcomes for regional policy-making
As related above, policy-makers have shown an interest in cluster 
approaches for a variety of reasons, linked to both the objectives and 
methods of regional development policy. Cluster approaches, through the 
association with innovation and networking, respond to a shift to ‘supply 
side’ oriented development objectives and to the notion that 
competitiveness results from a process of interaction. In this context, the 
crux of clusters seems to be that such approaches marry a notion of 
economic restructuring (promoting new activities, protecting maturing 
sectors), with a more bottom-up, integrative, and facilitative approach at 
the micro and meso level of the regional economy. The latter responds to 
the ideas about the benefits that may be derived from collaboration, 
networking and ‘institution building’. At the same time, cluster approaches 
promise better tailored, cheaper, and more endurable methods of business 
support. The allure of cost-effectiveness, and even the prospect of self- 
sustaining support systems, has undoubtedly appealed to many policy­
makers facing difficult decisions on budget cuts. To present the interests 
of the public sector in more detail, four issues will be highlighted here: the 
way clusters might contribute to regional capability building, defined as 
‘club goods’, the role of funding, the demonstration effects from cluster 
approaches and the embedding of cluster initiatives in regional 
development strategies.
4.3.1. Anchoring cluster benefits into the regional economy: shaping ‘club
One crucial dimension of cluster support is capacity building. While this 
applies to both businesses and the support sector, the interests in capacity





Figure 2 Club goods underpinning cluster competitiveness
building are different. For firms, capacity building primarily means the 
acquisition of the skills, knowledge and assets to survive and develop in 
the market place, as depicted in Table 11. For SMEs, survival and 
continuing the business in its actual state is often more important than the 
ambition to grow. When growth takes place, larger firms may aspire to 
commercial and geographical expansion, spreading their wings to other 
regions and countries, becoming part of (inter)national circuits of trade, 
capital, marketing, technology, etc. For governments, on the other hand, 
capacity building is generally seen in the context of the creation of 
employment, increase of wealth and the support to innovation, with the 
benefits accruing to the regional community. Business capability building 
should thus be somehow spatially rooted, or ‘pinned down’, and linked to 
a regional ‘quality-oriented’ competitiveness strategy. Hence, policy-
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makers want more than to secure SME survival, however important as a 
first step. SMEs are seen as playing an important role in the creation of 
innovative and flexible clusters of competitive advantage, and through 
that, of employment and wealth for the local community. Likewise, for 
large firms the embedding of and spin-off from their capabilities in the 
local economy is seen as vital. While firms are encouraged to spread their 
wings and embark on internationalisation strategies, and foreign firms are 
attracted to invest, the bottom line is to derive local benefits from such 
expansionary business activities. Local benefits are counted in terms of 
traded linkages and impact on the labour market; increasingly, however, 
they are seen in the context of creating ‘untraded interdependencies’ and 
learning effects between inward investments and local firms and 
organisations.
The term that will be used here for capabilities that are somehow spatially 
rooted or ‘pinned down’ is ‘club goods’. ‘Club goods’ are cluster-specific 
assets, which develop through and between firms as well as through the 
interaction with local organisations (cf. Bellini, 1998). ‘Club goods’ thus 
sit between the industrial cluster, consisting of interrelated firms as part of 
wider value chains, and the local institutional structure (Figure 2). These 
cluster assets evolve at what has been depicted as the interface between, 
on the one hand, industrial networks and chains, and, on the other, 
territorial governance structures. The accumulation of ‘club goods’ can 
take many forms, from ‘classical’ factors such as a labour pool, a common 
knowledge base and even ‘hard’ infrastructure, to institutional factors 
ranging from cluster-specific organisations (service centres, industry 
associations, training organisations, specialised knowledge centres or 
university departments) and more hidden assets. The latter includes 
cluster-specific knowledge diffused in the region, regional conventions and 
routines supporting cluster activities, and contributions to the regional 
identity (but not so much trust, since that is more tied to specific business 
networks).
The latter point bears directly on another issue where a difference can be 
noted between the perspectives of businesses and regional policy-makers, 
that is, trust. For businesses, as claimed before, what is most essential is 
the ‘social capital’ accumulated in the networks in which they participate. 
However, trust is not only related to development of collaboration 
between actors, but also to the wider environment and the issue of co­
operation. Taking a regional perspective, this view of trust refers to the 
ingrained conventions, norms and values which have developed over time, 
and which have become part of the culture and tacit knowledge in the 
region (Storper, 1995b). Cluster policies are often part of the wider 
ambition to unlock entrenched forms of behaviour, to modify the culture, 
that is, to shape new conventions and behavioural routines. Like network 
programmes, cluster initiatives are often presented as attempts to 
overcome antipathies to networking and joint activities, that is, to instil a 
more co-operative culture. The resulting notion of trust goes beyond the 
idea of ‘credits slips outstanding’ and reflects socially embedded, rather 
than accumulated, patterns of behaviour (cf. Putnam, 1993). In the context
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of regional development, the shaping of conventions is also related to the 
role of regional identity and the shaping of a common agenda geared to 
improving regional competitiveness and specialisation. This presents 
another level where cluster initiatives (particularly in a ‘top down’ fashion) 
may contribute to shaping ‘club goods’. The emphasis on conventions and 
trust means that ‘club goods’ do not only refer to economic externalities 
that, in one form or another, are shared between cluster members as 
common assets, but also to the more social and political aspects of 
business development.
As illustrated in figure 2, clubs goods play different role in policy-making. 
They not only reflect objects of cluster policy, but also instruments for 
cluster development by using the them for branding, as leverage for the 
search of funding, etc. Regions sell themselves by highlighting the 
presence of specialised knowledge and training centres, a high skilled 
labour pool etc. Moreover, the fact that ‘club goods’ are closely 
associated with, but do not match business capabilities offers a further 
qualification of the position of business support, and particularly of the 
notion of ‘tailoring’ support to businesses. Rather than seeing tailoring as 
merely responding more adequately to business needs, it should reflect the 
attempt of support agencies to shape business behaviour in such a way that 
they suit the wider aims of regional modernisation and development. That 
is, ‘club goods’ serve regional interests, not the interests of firms in the 
region. In order to maximise local benefits, regional institutions should 
monitor and facilitate the interaction between the development of business 
capabilities and regional ‘club goods’.
The ‘test’ suggested here for the empirical analysis is to see to what extent 
cluster policies and initiatives reflect an ambition for creating ‘club goods’. 
The core question is whether ‘club goods’ can actually be traced in the 
varied practice of cluster policy making and implementation, and how they 
related to the capability interests at the level of the firms.
4.3.2. Improved (cost)effectiveness of regional business support
Do cluster approaches reflect a more effective way to support business 
growth and regional development? Different ideas can be presented 
endorsing such a view. Because cluster initiatives are expected to involve 
longer-term relationships between different organisation in both the private 
and public sector, they lend themselves to the use of matched funding, and 
to a process in which public subsidy is gradually replaced by other streams 
of income. Cluster approaches thus meet the desire to make economic 
development less dependent on public funding. In reality, however, the 
issues of funding seems to reflect an often deceptive and even 
contradictory issue, related to the attitudes of policy-makers as well as the 
elusive nature of cluster approaches themselves.
While public sector actors often revere success cluster models (Italy, 
Silicon Valley, etc., they do not always realise under which specific 
conditions, and on which time scale these have evolved. Especially funding 
organisations tend to be impatient (Rosenfeld, 1996). Whereas expenses
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are largely confined to administrative costs, project preparation, business 
auditing and mediating, the social complexity of networking and clustering 
is not always understood, or is at least found difficult to handle.
Here the basic distinction between cluster-as-target and clusters-as- 
method should be reiterated. A core issue accompanying cluster-as-targets 
is the issue of durability. Particularly in the case of small business clusters, 
much value has been attached to the continuation of the networks after 
funding ceases as a token of success and a justification of public support. 
This has had substantial impact on the role and aims of mediating. Rather 
than helping firms to appreciate the values of networking in a more general 
and flexible sense, mediators were inclined to create high levels of lasting 
business commitment to the projects and even to form tightly knit business 
groups. Even when it was acknowledged that networking was not 
intended to lead to mergers, as in the Danish Networking Programme 
(Ploughmann, 1991), policy-makers have been tempted to count a 
programme’s success in terms of ‘enduring’ networks, and the numbers of 
jobs ‘secured’ or, even better, ‘created’.
In the case of clusters-as-method, as instrument to improve support 
provision along cluster lines, the interest of policy-makers will largely 
correspond to those of the businesses involved: better engagement, more 
quality, more foresight and better integration of support packages. Cost- 
effectiveness may be increased by aiming at higher fees and tighter 
monitoring. As indicated before, however, such pressures should be used 
with caution, since they may induce behaviour averse to risk-taking and 
therefore to experimentation and innovation.
In summary, core issues related to cost-effectiveness are: In what form are 
clusters expected to ‘endure’ after funding is withdrawn, and what type of 
self-support is envisaged? How does the funding position in which support 
agencies find themselves affect the initiatives and the ‘survival’ of cluster 
development? What kinds of time horizons are adopted for reducing 
subsidies and increasing fee? What has been realised of these expectations? 
How has clustering improved the access of firms to, and the value of 
business support? The answers of course will obviously differ between the 
types of cluster initiative employed. Nevertheless, specific answers to 
these questions may help to understand the role and management of 
funding and to develop new strategies towards the framework, nature and 
time span of subsidy provision.
4.3.3. Demonstration effects: spreading benefits to other businesses and 
sectors
Concerns about cost-effectiveness and durability bear directly on the issue 
of demonstration effects. Particularly, in the cultural and ‘learning’ 
perspectives of network and cluster-oriented policies, much value is 
attached to the dissemination of the ‘message’ of co-operation, 
networking and clustering, to instil behavioural change. The Danish 
Networking Programme, for instance, was intended to “not to subsidise 
collaboration but to demonstrate its value” (Rosenfeld, 1996, p.249).
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Demonstration effects are supposed to work in several ways. First, it is 
expected that businesses and organisations participating in cluster 
initiatives will learn from the experience and embed these lessons in 
routines and attitudes which will outlast the project’s life span and the 
project’s client base. Demonstration effects may thus contribute to the 
shaping of regional ‘club goods’. Second, the experiences are hoped to 
trigger interest and awareness among other firms and organisations, which 
may thus engage with existing initiatives or trigger new ones, with or 
without public support. Third, cluster developments in one area of 
economic development may spin off to other areas. This may then trigger 
a ‘bottom-up’ initiative led by businesses and/or related institutions to start 
their own cluster initiative. Finally, especially relevant to national and 
international organisations, cluster policies in one region may lead to an 
interest in replication in other regions. While the latter level is beyond the 
scope of discussion here, it should be taken into account when thinking 
about the question of how policies are developed at supra-regional levels 
and how experiences are exchanged between regions.
At the regional level, how are these ambitions translated into practical 
measures? Like building trust and changing organisational behaviour and 
culture, demonstration effects are difficult to envisage, facilitate, or 
monitor. Practical measures often come down to attempts to broadcast 
regular updates on the progress of initiatives, or to involve other actors by 
dissemination seminars and other events. PR has become an increasingly 
important dimension in cluster initiatives. Another method to arouse 
interest is by involving high-profile firms, such as leading larger firms in 
the region, in the launch and presentation of a project. SMEs may be 
interested by strategies which target the more informal routes of exchange 
between business through ‘word of mouth’. The latter may be supported 
by a kind of associational strategy. For instance, by building links between 
cluster initiatives and existing business groups, Chambers of Commerce, 
or popular business support programmes, firms may gradually be enrolled. 
A core theme here is thus how cluster initiatives, with respect to 
dissemination and promotion, are embedded in the business community 
and support structures.
The message behind demonstration effects may be seen as self-evident, 
and its translation in promotion activities as relatively straightforward. In 
other respects, however, the pursuing of spin-off within the daily practice 
of cluster development may pose some serious dilemmas. The most 
obvious dilemma stems from the inclination to secure the survival of 
supported networks. On the one hand, survival is seen as an important part 
of the message: ‘look it works, the networks are still there and they are 
thriving’. On the other hand, the need for survival may induce processes of 
strong bonding between agencies and their targeted firms. Support 
programmes may thus run the risk of creating a closely knitted group 
without any benefits for the wider business community. Indeed, once 
targeted, firms tend to become the ‘babies’ of support agencies. With their 
interests increasingly intertwined, they may become the envy rather than 
role model of other firms. The result may be a catch-22: while the idea of
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creating demonstration models justifies ‘pilot’ funding, the need to have 
successful - rather than explorative, experimental - models may turn the 
pilots into little well-nurtured stable enclaves, as an extreme form of 
‘picking winners’.
The question of durability differs obviously according to specific 
objectives set and methods chosen. In the case of ‘institution building’, for 
instance, there may be strong reasons why a certain service centre should 
continue to receive a high level of subsidy. In the case of ‘mentoring’, on 
the other hand, the continuation of the relationship will often be 
considered as an unintended but welcomed consequence of the initiative. 
Nevertheless, the issue of demonstration effects seems to be relevant to a 
majority of cluster initiatives. A key question is thus how these effects are 
facilitated and evaluated. Related themes of interest are the procedures 
behind the selection of ‘pilots’, if  this method is used, and how questions 
of inclusion and exclusion are addressed.
4.3.4. Embedding of clustering in regional economic policies
The ambition to have demonstration effects from cluster initiatives leads to 
the last theme: the way initiatives, while evolving, are embedded in the 
arena of regional development policy. What lessons are learnt by the wider 
policy community? To some extent, this is a functional question that could 
be assessed in the context of how initiatives emerged in the wider area of 
regional development policies, and how they are monitored and evaluated. 
The discussion so far has mainly focused on initiatives that were conceived 
in a kind of ‘top-down’ way. Cluster initiatives emerged from a new phase 
of regional strategic policy, or from a change in direction in the activities 
of core organisations such as RDAs. The initiatives themselves are then 
generally framed in a wider context of cluster targeting. Questions of 
embedding can then be seen at two levels: between the cluster initiatives 
and the overall cluster strategy, and between the overall cluster strategy 
and the whole package of regional policy.
It has also been recognised, however, that some initiatives are developed 
in a full bottom-up way, as a stand-alone project initiated by a single 
business support agency or business associations or business groups 
themselves (Rosenfeld, 1995). In that case, the project does not form part 
of a wider strategy, and embedding also needs to occur in a bottom-up 
way. To what extent lessons are learnt in the region, will depend on how 
receptive other regional agents are for new approaches in business 
support. It will also depend on the success of the cluster project, and the 
capacities and willingness of the project participants to communicate the 
project and its outcomes.
Embedding also involves a question of accountability. This brings back 
some of the critical points made in the debate on associational tendencies: 
who is included and excluded in the decision-making process, in what 
manner; how does this relate to the businesses and organisations targeted 
by cluster policies? Embedding in this sense refers to the role and
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evolution of particular governance structures in an area, and the lines of 
responsibility and accountability developed in those structures.
Embedding, finally, facilitates the bridging of the two essential dimensions 
of cluster policies, the micro/meso level of business development and 
networking, and the regional economic structure. For broad ‘top-down’ 
approaches, embedding is facilitated by cluster maps and the way the 
cluster initiatives intersects with other areas of regional policy. However, 
also for stand-alone initiatives, developed in a bottom up way, the link 
with the regional economic structure may be crucial. It is important for the 
success and follow-up of the initiative that the targeted economic activities 
are presented as a (potential) growth sector for the region. In both cases, 
developing the interface between micro/meso and the regional economic 
structure is a vital instrument in the aligning of business interests with 
regional interests. Examining the articulation of this interface, and the 
development of knowledge and governance infrastructure associated with 
it, will thus form an important part of the analysis.
4.3.5. The learning dimension of clusters: towards ‘cluster intelligence’ or
Different images have been presented here about the role of knowledge in 
cluster facilitation. On the one hand, the policy cycle tends to suggest that 
cluster facilitation is preceded by an initial stage of analysis and auditing. 
Such a phase may even be a demarcated activity carried out externally by 
consultancies, which lay down lists of clusters-to-target in glossy reports 
with titles like ‘regional competitiveness through clustering’. On the other 
hand, a more integral approach can be envisaged, in which auditing and 
monitoring is part of the cluster initiative itself. That is, rather than 
building a stock of ‘cluster intelligence’, the aim could be to build 
‘intelligent clusters’ that are largely self-governing, self-evolving and, in 
the end, also largely self-analysing and self-reflecting. Such an outcome 
could be a major contribution to the development of ‘learning regions’.
One argument in favour of the idea that analysis should be part and parcel 
of cluster initiatives is that the process, more than the outcome of 
knowledge acquisition contributes significantly to the shaping of the 
cluster. This also bears on the issue of embedding, since a more integrated 
approach to learning affects the relationship between support providers 
and their clients. ‘Getting to know’ possible clients of support is not just 
the recording of business needs; it is also a social process which brings 
agencies closer to their clients. In the words of Rosenfeld (1995, p. 134):
“An institution or hub must be sufficiently familiar with the industry 
it serves to earn the confidence and trust of that industry’s leaders.
Local organisations can get to know firms offering programmes of 
interest or collective services, by conducting surveys - or simply by 
knocking on doors”
‘Getting to know’ is thus part of an associational process, and closely 
linked to processes of interactive learning, the building of trust and the 
creation of ‘tacit’ rather than codified knowledge. Industry councils,
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service centres and mediators may be seen as core agents in managing 
knowledge flows and the creation of ‘intelligent clusters’. In an ideal 
situation, cluster institutions act as a ‘sensing mechanism’ with various 
scanning functions (technology, business processes, marketing, 
regulatory).
In such a perspective, learning processes lie at the heart of ‘institution 
building’ and institutional development, and analysis has become a 
continuous, self-inflicted, self-correcting process of knowledge 
acquisition. This is not to deny that, on occasions, analysis may involve the 
commissioning of research from an independent research centre or 
consultancy. The latter however is not part of a conventional policy cycle 
in which policy design is informed by analysis, but is triggered by a specific 
knowledge demand arising from the clusters itself.
The deeper issue which this debate touches upon is that of the role of 
knowledge, and especially ‘reflexive’ knowledge, i.e. knowledge about the 
development and position of regional business systems (Storper, 1997a; 
Gibbons et al., 1994). Within the wider debate on the position of 
knowledge in the economy, ‘cluster intelligence’ depicts a conventional 
image of the use of knowledge, as the application of the results of research 
and analysis to the solving of well-defined problems. Businesses then play 
the role of informers and advisors of policy-relevant information. 
‘Intelligent clusters’, on the other hand, reflect a more interactive model, 
in which the processing reflexive knowledge is an intrinsic component of 
the cluster capabilities themselves. In line with associational thinking, 
businesses now perform a role as full partners in more strategic process of 
knowledge acquisition and application. From such a perspective, 
institutional developments, both at the inter-firm level and those affecting 
the relationships between business centres, knowledge centres and 
associations, are increasingly geared towards the support of a knowledge 
infrastructure and the dynamics of knowledge creation and learning. 
Clusters can thus be seen as a cornerstone of a ‘learning region’.
The fundamental question arising from this debate is how knowledge flows 
at the level of cluster development are organised and how they affect the 
shaping of cluster relations. Yet, however interesting, the search for 
knowledge flows goes beyond the scope of the present study. This heading 
therefore serves mainly to put the role of analysis and the use of policy 
models further into perspective. In particular in more alternative policy 
approaches to clustering, an interesting question is to see to what extent 
they show capabilities of self-monitoring and self-reflection.
4.4. The research Pro Forma
The themes and issues presented in this chapter are summarised in Table 
12 below. This will serve as the basic template for research in the next 
chapter.
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Table 12 The research pro-forma
Themes Questions
Policy cycle
Conception and launching Where did policy-makers find  the inspiration for the cluster initiative? 
What was the economic-regional background? What cluster approach 
is pursued (framework conditions, network building, etc)?
Role of support agencies 
and funding regimes
What are the funding conditions for clustering initiatives? What kind 
o f  institutional arrangements (partnerships, networks) underpin 
cluster initiatives?
Cluster mapping and audits How were targeted clusters selected? What was the quality and depth 
o f  the analysis? To what extent do business actors participate in the 
cluster analysis?
Setting objectives Given the policy context and problem analysis, how are objectives 
and methods developed? What are the possibilities for changing the 
objectives and methods?
Implementation How has the implementation succeeded in practice? What is the role 
o f  mediators?
Cluster composition To what extent are the clusters ‘open’ versus ‘closed’? Are there 
geographical constraints to business participation?
Evaluation and monitoring How are clusters evaluated and monitored? How is the data used?
Business development 
perspective
How do firm s see their benefits from  clustering?
Direct benefits: improving 
business capabilities 
through clustering
To what extent do firms see improvement o f  business capabilities due 
to clustering? To what extent are these individual benefits; to what 
extent are they part o f  network building? Which resources have 
businesses spent on cluster initiatives?
Business networking: 
obtaining benefits from 
collaborating with other 
firms
What are the practical and cultural obstacles to collaboration? How 
can ‘social capital’ be built up among firms? What kind o f  corrective 
institutional capacity would assist this process?
Institutional networking: 
obtaining benefits from 
local institutions
To what extent has policy-induced clustering improved the image o f  




How should cluster initiatives be arranged to optimise regional 
benefits?
Anchoring cluster benefits 
into the regional economy: 
shaping ‘club goods’
Which regional assets are developed through clustering (partially) 
independent from the business firms involved? To what extent are the 
assets o f  a ’ classical’ (labour, knowledge centres, infrastructure) or a 
more intangible nature (knowledge, ‘conventions’, identity)
Effectiveness of regional 
business support
To what extent has the cluster approach contributed to more 
(cost)effective ways o f  regional business support?
Demonstration effects How have clustering benefits accrued to the wider regional economy, 
i.e. other firms in similar sectors, or in other sectors? How have 
policy-makers addressed pilots and the issue o f  sustainability?
Embedding of cluster 
initiatives in regional 
specialisation strategies
Have cluster initiatives been part o f  integrated programmes or do 
they present ‘stand alone’ cluster initiatives? How do the initiatives 
contribute to regional specialisation?
The learning dimension of 
clusters
What has been the knowledge orientation o f clustering: creating 
‘cluster intelligence’ or to ‘intelligent clusters’? What have been the 
wider learning implications at the regional level?
Conclusion: aligning 
business and regional 
interests
To what extent have actors in the policy/support domain been able 
to attune initiatives to regional interest?
To what extent have businesses become committed to the regional 
cause?
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Chapter Five. Introduction to the CORE 
regions.
The remainder of this study is devoted to the presentation of the results 
from the case studies. The present chapter will introduce the regions. The 
next chapter will deal with cluster initiatives at an (inter)sectoral level. The 
last chapter before the conclusion will address the SME-oriented 
initiatives. An overview of the regions and cluster cases, with an indication 
of core issues, is given in Table 13. The discussion of the case studies will 
generally follow the issues listed in the ‘pro-forma’ above. Depending on 
the specific cluster focus and level detail, in some cases issues have been 
joined or omitted. For the introduction of the regions here, the discussion 
has been structured under five headings:
- the general background for regional policy making
- the institutional context
- regional policies and accountability,
- SME orientation,
- and the recent shaping of cluster strategies.
The chapter will first discuss the two more peripheral regions, North East 
of England and Aragon, followed by the German areas.
Table 13 Case study overview
region targeted sectors cluster type(s) cluster aims section
NE of England automotive networking embedding of foreign 0
(Tyneside) institution building investors
Hessen, NRW automotive networking/ learning securing/anchoring of 0
(networking) oriented established activities
NE of England marine offshore institution building revitalisation of marine 
industries
0
Aragón wine institution building modernisation of the wine 
sector
0
NRW (Bergisches Land) chemical industry learning oriented/ 
networking
focus groups for collective 
strategies
0
NE of England various sectors network oriented joint marketing and other 
activities
0
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5.1. North East England (Tyneside) and Aragón
Aragón and the North East of England occupy peripheral positions in the 
European economy. Both have gone through a period of industrial crisis 
and decline, although they still display above average shares of industrial 
production. The North East of England was once one of the most 
industrialised and innovative regions in Europe, with a strong 
specialisation in metal construction, shipbuilding and mining, with 
Tyneside as one of the major concentration areas (which will receive most 
attention here). In the post-war period, however, the region has lost a 
large part of its industrial strength. Aragón, in Northeast Spain, has had a 
modest industrial development, with a specialisation in metal production, 
which lost most of its dynamism during 1960s and 1970s. While there are 
many differences between the two regions in their social, political and 
economic features, various other similarities can be mentioned. Both areas 
display some degree of regional identity. Moreover, Tyneside and Aragón 
are of a comparable size in population (over 1 million), and they have both 
recently gone through a process of strengthening the role of local 
institutions, in a rather convoluted and often uncoordinated way. As a 
result, both regions show an abundance of organisations, with many 
functions overlapping and some lacking, and with little coherence at the 
regional level. These similarities give grounds for a joint introduction.
5.1.1. Regional policy background
In the North East and Aragón, the development of regional industrial 
policy and business support has evolved along similar paths: (1) attracting 
foreign investments, and (2) the development of indigenous firms, notably 
SMEs. The first strategy has been prominent in the North East since the 
mid-1970s, and has resulted in a strong inflow of foreign investors, with as 
the latest (although short-lived) triumph the establishment of a state-of- 
the-art microchip factory by Siemens. In Aragón, the foreign investment 
strategy has been historically weak but recently obtained major priority. 
The presence of major firms such as Samsung, Siemens and Nissan in the 
North East, and Opel, Siemens (Balay) and Schindler in Aragón played an 
important role in shaping local agencies' perception of the role foreign 
investment in improving the regional economy, although detailed 
institutional responses have been very different. What both regions share is 
the view that foreign investments, apart from direct and indirect job and 
wealth creation, serve for further external promotion of the region, as 
examples of best business practices, and for the development of supply 
chains. In particular in the North East, this view endorses the dominant 
perception that, given the low competencies of indigenous firms, the only 
way to spark off economic growth is through ‘external dynamics’ based on 
foreign investments, as illustrated by the following quote from the leading 
development organisation:
(...) internal dynamic was at best weak and probably almost absent.
(...) An alternative strategy would be to rely on an external dynamic,
the infusion of investment from outside the Region and/or the use of
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government expenditure to stimulate economic growth. (NDC 
Memorandum to the House of Commons’ Employment Committee,
18 January 1994)
Specific interests in the development of SMEs, on the other hand, stem 
from the perception that the indigenous sectors are presently 
underperforming and may be contain vital growth potentials once certain 
hurdles are overcome. In both regions, the poor performance of 
indigenous firms is attributed to two core factors. First, the lack of 
entrepreneurial spirit causing a low level of business start-ups and a low 
propensity to pick up and develop new technologies. In the North East, 
for instance, this translates in a relatively low number of registered firms 
(per inhabitant, almost 40% lower than in Wales, Hall Aitken Ass., 1996); 
in Aragón a major concern is the low valued added in indigenous resource- 
based industries (notably food and drinks, but also mining). The second 
factor in the absence of a culture of trust and collaboration, combined with 
a serious lack of interest in exporting, quality improvement, investment in 
new processes etc. This awareness has encouraged business support 
agencies to develop different agendas to assist local firms, varying from 
direct support to start-ups, improvement of skills, management, marketing, 
etc. to more elaborate attempts to encourage inter-firm networking.
While most actual concerns about SME development and the nurturing of 
indigenous sectors are similar, the interests stem from different 
backgrounds. In Aragón, there has been a long-standing debate about the 
role of external vs. indigenous sector, especially when large investments in 
the automotive production were announced (Opel in the early eighties, 
followed by suppliers). A prominent local economist, Biescas Ferrer, for 
instance, preferred more support to indigenous sectors - especially linked 
to agriculture - to increased foreign investments. Commenting on the 
impact of Opel in the late 1980s and early 1990s, he wrote:
“it does not seem recommendable to us to stimulate in excess, as has 
happened in the last years, the automobile sector which, in addition 
to a minimal linkage capacity [...], could provoke an excessive 
dependency involving a new risk factor for our economy" (Biescas 
Ferrer, 1993, p.87, translated by the author).
In the North East, the idea of a trade-off between external and indigenous 
has not been such a major issue in the past. Only recently, the recognition 
has grown that a sole emphasis on foreign investment will not solve 
unemployment and other structural economic problems. Not only has the 
total balance of jobs created been modest compared with the employment 
needs of the local economy (although estimations vary widely in this 
respect), even the organisations attracting foreign investors generally 
admit that large international firms are not longer the main sources of job 
creation. In strategy documents as well as the actions in the local support 
sector, emphasis has thus shifted from solely attraction to forging 
relationships between foreign and local plants, as well as measures 
targeting local SMEs. Although capturing foreign investments still is a 
major priority, the discourse on development now includes concepts of 
extracting more ‘value added’ from investments, on quality aspects, and,
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increasingly, on the need for learning, not only in firms but also in the 
wider regional economy, notably the labour force:
If we are to become a genuinely world class region we have to learn 
and learn quickly - we need better skills and better processes. What’s 
more we have to make sure that once our finest minds are 
contributing to the growth of the region they aren’t lured away by 
other regions (Susan Johnson, Chief Executive Northern Business 
Forum, The Journal, May 22, 1997.)
In the summer of 1998, the Siemens and Fujitsu plants, as well as some 
other externally owned plants, were closed. In the case of Siemens, this 
only happened two years after the plant opening. This has further 
contributed to the debate on the prominence of foreign investment in 
regional development policies.
Quality and learning have also become major themes in Aragón, and 
several quality organisations and programmes have been established over 
the last decade. In one of the most prominent quality programmes, 
PRIMA, foreign firms act as role models and mentors for indigenous 
firms.
5.1.2. The institutional context
While the major themes and objectives of regional industrial policy are 
broadly similar, the institutional setting in which policies and initiatives 
develop varies widely between the two regions. In Aragón, industrial 
policy is primarily a responsibility of the regional government (DGA), 
although many programmes are duplicated at other spatial levels (councils, 
districts, and provinces). The DGA acquired basic competencies from 
Madrid in 1984 (health, education, environment, housing, industry, and 
agricultural reform), and became more focused on economic support in 
1988. The recent territorial reform (1997) in Spain has completed the 
devolution process, with a greater local responsibility for economic affairs. 
The DGA forms a spider in a web of regional agencies, in which the other 
main centres of control are the local banks, the University, the local 
Business Federation (CREA), the Chamber of Commerce and the banks 
(Figure 3).
The North East, on the other hand, lacks a regional government, and has 
even gone through a period in which the position of local government has 
weakened. The main trend since the early 80s has been to transfer 
responsibilities from local authorities to semi-private organisations that 
operate as little ‘platoons’ from central government (Hay, 1994), 
although, more than other regions in England, the North East has retained 
a regional identity and strength in its institutional fabric. The result has 
been a complex map of institutional linkages, in which the key role is 
played by the local offices of central government (GONE), the Training 
and Enterprise Councils (TECs) and the Northern Development Company 
(NDC). While the Local Authorities are represented in the latter, their role 
has generally been weakened through national measures by the 
Conservative government in the 1980s. The impression is, however, that
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Figure 3 Institutional mapping o f Aragón
North East Local Authorities have suffered less than in other parts of the 
country, due to the strong regional identity and tendency to collective 
action.
Apart from the politics of devolution and central control, a second factor 
that has driven institutional developments is the availability of funds. 
Aragón was unfortunate to have its 1988 regional product just above the 
eligibility limit for Objective One, which some commentators attribute to 
the presence of Opel. Only some parts of Zaragoza can claim Objective 
Two funding, while most rural areas are eligible under 5b. More dramatic 
is the fact that due to overspending and a persistent economic crisis in the 
late 80s-early 90s, accumulating debts forced the DGA to reduce its 
support to regional development (Bandres, 1994; Mené Marcén, 1994). 
One of the consequences was a cut in the budgets for regional technology 
centres. Together with the political turmoil that followed the budget crisis, 
the regional capacity to develop and implement a coherent and effective 
form of regional industrial policy was thwarted. General poor economic 
performance, moreover, undermined the position of support organisations 
issuing soft loans (such as ARAVAL). Only organisations with a wider 
funding basis and a strong business support, such as the organisations in 
the agricultural sector (e.g., DAYSA), could sustain their level of service.
In contrast, the North East has been able to draw from a variety of funds, 
due to its eligibility for various regeneration programmes of the central 
government, and, most importantly, for Objective Two funding from the 
EU. The latter has facilitated the establishment of a whole range of 
regional agencies focused on technology transfer (e.g. RTC North, the 
local Innovation Relay Centre), informatics, technological support for 
specific sectors and business support. EU Objective Two funding has also 
obliged the region to establish a central co-ordinating mechanism, the
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Figure 4 Institutional mapping of Tyneside
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Programme Monitoring Committee (PMC), with a regional representation 
(Figure 4). As part of the application procedure, the PMC commissions 
research on regional development, and lays down its priorities and 
justification for funding in a Single Programming Document (SPD), which 
is produced for each programming period (three years).
A third factor affecting local ‘institution building’ has been the need to 
respond to industrial crisis. A long history of industrial decline and rising 
chronic unemployment (coal mining, shipbuilding and steel production 
reduced their employment share between '75 and '92 from 12 to 3%, 
largely resulting in job losses) triggered the establishment of the North 
East Development Council by local authorities, which became the first 
regional organisation successful in attracting foreign investments. NEDC 
was converted into the Northern Development Company (NDC) in 1987, 
with less dependence on local authorities. Inspired by the successes of the 
Welsh Development Agency and Scottish Enterprise in attracting foreign 
investments, NDC’s mandate was to promote the region as an attractive 
location for foreign investors. With the help of NDC’s promotional 
activities, the North East, with less than 5% of the national GDP, managed 
to attract more than 10% of total foreign investments into the UK between 
1990 and 1993. Over the last five years, activities have shifted from purely 
attraction, and site and grant provision to a more long term engagement 
focusing on generating more ‘value added’ from the investment for the 
regional economy. In 1994, the phrase ‘adding value’ was also included in
AL ADAPT report (02/11/99) - 105 -
“Creating prosperity in the North of England by delivering 
continuous regional investment and adding value to it.”
The calling of the organisation widened accordingly from site promotion 
to the task “to make the business case for investing in the region” (The 
Journal, May 22, 1997). In practical terms, NDC has broadened its 
activities towards ‘after-care’ services, primarily in the areas of business 
expansion, and supply chain development, based on a careful process of 
“client expectation management” . To improve trade links within the 
regional economy, NDC has also supported the local establishment of a 
Regional Procurement Office (a national initiative). The office is staffed 
with sector specialists, and provides access to a database with 8000 
companies, as well as to NDC’s own database (‘Northern Business 
Dataline’). NDC also quotes an additional reason for why it should assist 
larger indigenous firms. Increasingly, according to NDC Programme 
1996/97, such firms fall also prey to inward investment agencies from 
other parts of the world, and thus need, like foreign branches, to be 
anchored strongly within the local economy. This comment clearly 
illustrates how the competitive environment in which this kind of 
organisation works evolves, as well as the kind of mindset with which 
these problems are approached.
In Aragón, the awareness of crisis and structural economic problems is of 
a more recent date. Looking in particular at experiences in Catalonia, the 
DGA established a regional development agency, the Instituto Aragonés 
de Fomento (IAF) (1990) with the mandate to develop and implement a 
strategic plan for the region. Apart from its strategic function, IAF has 
initiated several programmes, such as EXPORTA, an export-promoting 
programme aimed at SMEs, and PRIMA, a quality awareness and 
enhancement programme. Compared with its peers in Spain, however, IAF 
is strongly limited in staff and other resources it can draw on.
A crucial factor in explaining the different paths of institutional 
developments is the difference in the attitudes and perceptions in the 
economic development and support sector in the two regions. This is 
partly the result of different histories of institutional development, but also 
because of different administrative cultures. In Aragón, the operations of 
the DGA and related organisations are very much based on a traditional 
civil service routine and mentality. The territorial dimension, i.e. questions 
of the spatial distribution of resources and income, plays an important role 
in general thinking about regional economic development. The information 
strategy in Aragón relies heavily on formal analysis based on statistical 
data and strategic input from consultancies (see for instance Instituto 
Aragonés de Fomento, 1992), resulting in an voluminous amount of 
reports, studies and planning documents. This culture translates into a 
orientation towards thoroughly planned and phased initiatives, which are 
limited in scope and size, and are not always seen as adequately targeted 
on meeting the needs of the local economy (Serrano Sanz & Bandres 
Moline, 1992). In response, the business federation has made a case for a 
better co-ordination of regional industrial policy, by strengthening the role 
of IAF and by a stronger orientation towards business needs. According to
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Hidalgo Arribas (1995), the region should ‘get its act together’ in 
attracting foreign investments, in which it has been lagging behind most 
other Spanish and European regions (Gil & Suarez, 1995). There has also 
been a call for aligning the educational system more to the needs of 
business by raising the level of vocational training and apprenticeships 
(CREA, 1994).
The behaviour of NDC and other development corporations contrast 
sharply with the Aragonese case. The working culture in NDC, for 
instance, reflects the fact that most of its staff have a background in 
industry, or in the academic field of applied economics. The organisation 
focuses on acquiring strategic insight into the investment plans and 
possibilities of firms outside and, since the mid-1990s, inside the region. 
This information is used to manipulate investment behaviour, to broker 
between firms inside and outside the region, and to influence local decision 
making processes that may affect business investments. The process of 
information gathering and application are ‘hands on’, and forms part of the 
daily routine of the so-called Business Development Managers (BDMs) 
and foreign representatives of the organisation. Besides the company 
databases developed and used by NDC, most ‘intelligence’ is thus of 
transient, strategic, sensitive and often even secretive nature, which is 
largely stored in the heads of staff rather than in codified forms. While this 
type of knowledge acquisition suits the investment promotion activities of 
NDC, the corollary of this practice is that there little exchange of 
information with other organisations. Not much work is commissioned 
from research organisations or consultants, nor is there much exchange of 
knowledge with other stakeholders in regional development activities, 
except when it required for activities such as drawing up the SPD.
However, the working culture of NDC does not prevent it from working 
with other organisations. NDC endorses a partnership or team approach, 
through which it engages, in particular, with Local Authorities and TECs. 
With larger projects, NDC also assists in the appointment of specific 
project managers and project teams within the areas in which new 
investments are anticipated. All these contacts, and the partnership 
approach in general, should be seen as an extension of the organisation’s 
main interest in ‘making the business case for investment’. Networking 
and partnering is for NDC primarily an operational instrument to pursue 
its own goals more effectively; it is not a way to engage in a debate with 
other regional actors on the broader parameters and objectives of regional 
development initiatives. While the success of NDC in attracting foreign 
investments is highly appreciated, its insular and secretive behaviour is 
often resented by other local organisation.
From a governance perspective, one of the strengths of the North East is 
indeed its proven capacity to create partnerships, not only around NDC 
but also TECs, Local Authorities and other organisations, allowing the 
region to respond quickly and effectively to new opportunities in 
investments, funding, etc. Over the last decade, the North East has built up 
a ‘partnership’ reputation not only in England but also among potential
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investors abroad. Moreover, through its partnership capacity, the regional 
has been able to extract a rather effective level of institutional capacity out 
of a highly convoluted governance structure. It should also be said 
however that partnerships do not solve problems of organisational 
complexity and incoherence. On the contrary, while they may temporarily 
solve governance problems, in the end they add another organisational 
layer. Partnerships are not likely do not present a step towards a 
structurally simpler and more coherent governance system. Perhaps the 
establishment of a Regional Development Agency, as foreseen and 
prepared at the moment, will help to bring some structural changes to the 
governance structure. In particular, it may be hoped that future changes 
may increase the regional capacity for consultation and collective agenda- 
setting, something that at the moment is only undertaken to some degree 
in the context of the Structural Funds.
In Aragón partnership tendencies have only emerged recently, and so far 
have had a limited effect. Opel and a groups of other foreign investors 
have been involved in the development and running of the IAF Quality 
programme (PRIMA), in which they act as levers to bring local firms on 
board. Opel has triggered various forms of collaboration, within the 
private sector as well as with the public sector, but these are confined 
largely to the municipalities around Figuerueles, where the Opel plant is 
located. Opel has also been a founder of a national training centre in the 
region, to meet training needs in the automotive and wider manufacturing 
sector (Serrano Sanz & Bandres Moline, 1992). However, with the 
exception of the role as a mentor, the institutional response to the 
presence of Opel in the region has been rather low, a far cry from the 
eagerness with which a wide variety of organisations in the North East 
have welcomed and approached major investors such as Nissan and (as it 
first seemed) Siemens.
5.1.3. Regional policy development and accountability
There is no doubt that the institutional development in both regions has 
provided an environment for new initiatives, supported by a variety of 
organisations and funding sources. At a strategic level, a core question is 
how regional policies are accounted for, how is it monitored? At this 
point, the two regions differ considerably. In Aragón, the fact that IAF and 
other organisations depend on an elected regional government provides a 
formal base of democratic control. Little has been done, however, in the 
planning and implementation of regional strategies to involve the social 
partners on a more direct basis. Aragón has a regional platform with 
representatives from the government, business federations, and unions 
(Consejo Económico y  Social de Aragón), which regularly produces a 
comprehensive, but non-binding three-party document on local economic 
development (see Gobierno de Aragón et al., 1996). Ironically, IAF 
commissioned Anderson Consultants to produce, with help of foreign 
agencies such as Scottish Enterprise and NOMISMA, its own strategy 
document (Instituto Aragonés de Fomento, 1992). However impressive 
this effort has been, the lack of embedding of the plan in regional socio­
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economic circuits has, in the view of other social partners, resulted in a 
poor follow-up in terms of implementation and assessment. Not 
unsurprisingly, one of the core recommendations in the three-party 
document is a stronger representation of business and labour in regional 
policy. In the end, these unrelated lines of strategic planning have resulted 
in a strategic and even institutional vacuum.
The North East lacks a democratically elected regional government. It 
even lacks a central body that is in charge of developing a regional 
development strategy. In the future, this might change with the expected 
founding of a Regional Development Agency and the possible creation of 
a Regional Assembly. At present, however, control and monitoring reside, 
largely in an ad-hoc manner, in a peculiar combination of the localised 
control of the central state (notably through Government Office North 
East and the TECs), the funding regime imposed by ERDF (see Figure 4) 
and the various platforms where different organisations and social partners 
meet. Business interests are in general well presented, although often more 
through direct contact than through representative organisations.
As part of the development of a regional economic strategy in the context 
of wider structure of territorial governance, therefore, one of the key tasks 
of a future RDA will be to develop a proper way of assessing, and to some 
extent guiding, projects, partnerships and new institutional ventures. The 
challenge will be to impose some kind of democratic control and 
monitoring while keeping open the possibilities for agencies to be engaged 
in different types of networks and projects. For both the regions discussed, 
this presents a considerable challenge.
5.1.4. SME orientation
Attracting and embedding foreign investors in the regional economy can 
offer an important basis for developing an entrepreneurial approach in 
regional development, and for developing thinking in terms of supply 
chains and networking. Because of the nature of the targets involved, i.e. 
large powerful firms, there is a strong incentive to mobilise resources 
around one focal organisation, such as IAF or NDC, although these 
(especially the latter) may then engage other local organisations. Looking 
at the support to SMEs, a much more diffuse pattern emerges. Support to 
SMEs has been an area where national and European programmes and 
funding opportunities have proliferated over the last twenty or so years. 
On the whole, the initiatives developed show little cohesion; they strongly 
differ in objectives, approaches, target groups, life span etc. In the UK, 
moreover, many initiatives have been organised at the national level with 
little attention for specific regional context. In Spain, initiatives have 
erupted at all levels of government: local, regional and national level. An 
internal survey of the National Institute for SME Support (IMPI) in the 
early 90s came to an estimation of around 1000 initiatives, most of which 
had very limited resources.
Within this context, it does not come as a surprise that observers see the 
support to SMEs in Aragón and the North East as fragmented and
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unstable. In Aragón, support to SMEs is seen as strongly deficient 
(Hidalgo Arribas, 1995). There have been some successful ventures, such 
as the establishment of the CEEIA, the European Business and Innovation 
Centre in Aragón. The CEEIA is a business centre for business start-up 
environment, offering a wide range of on-site business services, and 
limited business venture capital, to firms located on the site. In general, 
however, business support initiatives seem to be to limited in scope and 
not be able to reach firms effectively.
In the North East, one of the problems is that, due to a proliferation of 
initiatives and an increased competition between agencies to acquire 
funding and find ‘customers’ to sign up for new projects, businesses are at 
least confused or even show signs of ‘support fatigue’. The theme of 
enterprise support, in particular, has been dispersed among a patchwork of 
organisations. Although the Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) 
were established to play a leading role in enterprise development, so far 
they have been strongly oriented towards co-ordinating and implementing 
training activities. Also, support for innovation has been fragmented, 
organisationally and financially, between various organisations (Charles, 
1996). Moreover, the funding regime has created an environment that 
cultivates short-term initiatives, and a tendency for organisations and 
individuals in the system to invent constantly new initiatives for which they 
can take credit. A recent report by the local CBI division thus calls for 
more stable streams of funding especially to TECs. Summarising the 
results from an extensive survey among local businesses, the CBI report 
also revealed that regional bodies were perceived as working well 
together, something which is recognised and used as an example in other 
English regions (CBI, 1996). Despite this praise for the support 
environment, the report concluded:
“[Northern] Companies wished to see a simplified support structure 
with much more focus towards its customers. Businesses were 
confused about which organisation to approach for help on specific 
topics and perceived an overlap in the services provided. They were 
critical of the bureaucracy they faced and felt agencies should 
communicate their series more effectively (...) Business would like 
to see a more coherent structure, providing a more focused, customer 
oriented and efficient service from easily identifiable services” (CBI,
1996, p.27).
Taking a similar position, the latest PMC research consultation valued the 
regional technology infrastructure as extensive but complex, which 
historically has been poorly co-ordinated. It is also recognised however 
that awareness of these problems and business perceptions has grown and 
some successful attempts to streamlining support have been undertaken, 
although much remains to be done in the area of strategic and cohesive 
action. According to the PMC document, support needs to be repackaged 
on the basis of closer interaction between providers and business clients 
and a better and more straightforward funding basis needs to be 
developed.
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One example of co-ordination is offered by the impact of EU programmes 
such as STRIDE. Under the supervision of the local DTI office, STRIDE 
was used to pull together various strands of technology support within a 
common framework, North East Technology Support (NETS) (Charles,
1996). NETS provided a platform for a more strategic approach for 
technology support to SMEs, and played an integrative role in the 
applications for ERDF funding in the early 90s. Other bottom-up attempts 
to develop more co-ordinated approaches in technology support have led 
to the establishment of various sector-oriented organisations funded under 
ERDF.
In Aragón, calls for more focus on SME support stem from the local 
business federation (Hidalgo Arribas, 1995). During the 1990s, CREA has 
repeatedly urged the local government to pay much more attention to local 
firms. It is hoped that, with the budget crisis under control and a trend 
towards more co-operation between IAF, sector organisations and the 
local and regional business federations, a more effective economic strategy 
will emerge.
5.1.5. Cluster strategies
Sector and cluster oriented initiatives have become more important in both 
regions. In both areas there is a strong awareness of the need to develop a 
strategic vision of future economic specialisation based on cluster or 
cluster-type approaches. It is the North East that provides the most 
advanced policies. In Aragón, agencies such as IAF have learnt about 
clustering especially from the Basque Country and Catalonia, but this has 
not been captured in its own initiatives. Sectoral approaches are followed 
in the more conventional sense of supporting selected sectors, such as 
mechanical engineering, and local agricultural produce (wine, olive, 
cereals). In the late 80s, three sectoral technology support organisations 
were established, for wood, metal, and agro-industrial production, but lack 
of funding has meant that these have not got off the ground. Academic 
research has pointed to the emergence of manufacturing clusters along the 
Ebro upstream from Zaragoza, notably in automotive production and 
electronics (Serrano Sanz & Bandres Moline, 1992). The latter authors 
even interpreted this clustering as resonating with the developments of 
industrial districts.
In the case of the North East, sector and cluster ideas were taken up along 
various routes. An influential document introducing the concept of 
clustering was the regional economic analysis produced by the Centre for 
Urban and Regional Development at Newcastle University (CURDS) as 
part of the PMC documentation. In this analysis, clusters were presented 
as an opportunity to target firms more effectively, and to exploit the 
strengths of the higher education system, and hence as a vehicle for the 
public sector to induce diversification of sectors and the regional economy 
at large. Although no thorough ‘cluster mapping’ was undertaken, a list of 
clusters was proposed which deserved targeting in the authors’ view: 
energy engineering, environmental goods and services, medical and
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healthcare, and marine engineering and services. Only the last cluster 
presented a long established specialisation in the region, although in need 
of revival. The other were seen as being able to exploiting existing 
strengths (engineering), the existence of hub firms (Procter and Gamble, 
Nissan), or rising market opportunities (environmental demands).
In follow-up briefings, the cluster or sector approaches were seen to play 
four major roles: (1) the closer involvement of business support in service 
provision, (2) the selective targeting of support which could therefore be 
more effective; (3) as a vehicle for collective learning, and as (4) a way to 
improve networking among local firms. Sector and cluster approaches 
were thus seen as a means to tailor support packages to the needs of 
groups of related businesses and the support infrastructure. Such tailoring 
includes specific start-up assistance, improving access to finance, skill 
development, provision of common commercial and technical information, 
networking and associational developments and the creation of awareness 
among the wider public about the importance of a sector. Finally, at the 
regional level, CURDS advocated the need for gathering in-depth 
information on sectoral developments to support targeting of services and 
economic strategies focused on regional economic specialisation.
As a result of this analysis, clusters (primarily in the sense of clusters-as- 
targets) became part of the Single Programming Documents as part of the 
application for EU Objective Two funding in 1992. In a more recent PMC 
document, sectors were prioritised according to their growth potential 
(Table 14). Again, this was not based on an in-depth analysis, but reflected 
general views and assessment by the consultants.
Table 14 Consultants assessment of sectoral prospects in the North East until 2000
Potential high growth Potential moderate 
growth
Potential low growth Potential decline
















metal processing etc. textiles & clothing
Source: Hall Aitken Ass., 1996.
Another route to clustering is presented by recent changes in NDC. For 
NDC, the extension of its mission with a ‘adding value’ dimension was 
accompanied with a stronger sectoral focus. This shift was inspired by 
trends in its sister organisations in the UK, notably Scottish Enterprise and 
the Welsh Development Organisation, which had reorganised part of their 
activities along sectoral lines. Also in England, cities like Leeds and 
Sheffield presented cases of sectoral approaches (Lagendijk & Charles,
1997). NDC used the sector approach to streamline its own organisation 
(Table 15). From a task-based organisation broadly divided into ‘business 
services’ and ‘operations’, an integrated structure is being built in which a
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central role is played by business investment managers (BIMs), project 
teams and the building of sectoral knowledge bases.
Table 15 NDC’s shift to a sector-oriented organisation
Old structure
Business services
supply chain development 
opportunity brokering 
procurement
business development managers 




FDI (Triad organisation) 
Aftercare (5 persons)
new integrated structure
sector based -around investment 
managers
market intelligence units
project team (with key players) 
sector knowledge base
Source: NDC
Unlike the strategy documents presented before, NDC’s sector approach 
is not based on any predefined selection or idea of targeting. In effect, the 
organisation follows a highly pragmatic approach, developing expertise 
where and when opportunities (or threats) are perceived. The organisation 
generally advocates a strategy of diversification rather than specialisation, 
although services receive little priority. The first sectoral initiatives where 
developed in those sectors with a strong presence and/or growth in the 
region: automotive, offshore, food and drink, and electronics. Already in 
1987, a joint NDC-DTI initiative led to the establishment of the Northern 
Offshore Federation (NOF). With 240 members, and a wide range of 
support and lobby activities, the NOF has become a model sector 
organisation in the UK. At present, NDC is in the process of setting up a 
new sectoral organisation targeted on the food and drink industry along 
the lines of the NOF. In the mid-1990s, also a series of briefs was 
produced including SWOT-type assessments of the region’s ‘clusters of 
competitive advantage’, written by internal sector specialists.
For NDC, the business of ‘adding value’ along sector lines is based on one 
principle: developing supply chains at business level. Supply chains are 
seen as a major objective of ‘after-care’, as well as the way to create 
demand for local firms, notably SMEs. Supply chains are thus presented as 
an answer to the limited results in job direct creation by foreign investors 
and as a way to anchor foreign firms deeper to the local economy. The 
organisation acknowledges the fact that, specially in more mature sectors 
such as automotive and offshore, a process of rationalisation is leading to 
a reduction and globalisation of supplier links. However, it sees itself in a 
position where it can offset the negative consequences of these processes 
through brokering higher levels of local content and by establishing 
partnership sourcing, thus boosting the position of the region’s indigenous 
firms. In its own words:
“The overall number is suppliers is likely to be reduced but those
that survive are likely to have much greater growth potential. There
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is no reason why the region should not benefit from this process as 
NDC’s research on supply-chains shows that 80% of major 
company purchasing is done outside the Region. So, internalising a 
proportion of this expenditure will more than compensate for any 
reduction in the total number of suppliers. (....) In crude terms, large 
firms create output and small firms create jobs. This relationship is 
reconciled through the supply-chain. (...) a healthy and growing and 
large-firm sector is essential to the growth of SMEs, from where the 
bulk of new jobs will come in the future” (NDC, 1997, Pt. 1.3.6-7)
The adoption of sector and cluster concepts by NDC should be seen as an 
extension and support of, rather than divergence from, its main activity of 
promoting business investments. Even with a focus on supply chains and 
more sector-oriented organisations, NDC remains geared towards single 
firms. Supply chains are developed around the procurement divisions of 
major companies. Sectoral knowledge is used to acquire more detailed 
insight into investment opportunities and business developments, and to 
undertake some 'gap analysis' to support supply chain development. 
Promotional material from NDC features success stories about business 
investments and business supply chains. As far as regional and sectoral 
issues are addressed, NDC endorses the view that competitiveness is 
achieved by partnerships and co-operation, but its own activities remain 
restricted to initiatives around supply chains and partnership sourcing. 
Even in these areas, a narrow interpretation model is adopted. Most of its 
material produced around the cluster theme closely follows the pyramidal 
structure of the automotive supply chains, for which a broad distinction is 
used between low volume, high volume and process industries, and 
services, rather than more detailed sectoral assessment and foresight.
The message about clustering conveyed as part of the PMC 
documentation has also been absorbed by business support organisations 
in the region. Several organisations (Tyneside TEC, ENTRUST, North 
Tyneside Council) have developed business clustering projects, in which 
firms form associations to undertake collective marketing and develop 
other joint strategies. Besides the cluster concept, the inspiration for these 
initiatives stemmed from ideas on networking and industrial districts. The 
North Tyneside Real Service Centre, established by the local council, has 
been particularly successful in bringing SMEs together and in setting an 
example for other organisations in the region and beyond. Through the 
‘clusters’, in particular, SMEs have been able to explore new markets and 
to acquire a better position in international markets.
In the cluster case studies to follow in the next chapters, three cases will 
be further explored: two sector-oriented cases, dealing with the 
automotive and off-shore sectors, and one discussion of the business 
cluster initiatives, in which the focus will be on the Real Service Centre.
5.2. NRW and Hessen
Clustering in German regions has developed against a different 
background, and based on different incentives and logics compared with 
Aragón and the North East. In contrast to the rather chaotic British
AL ADAPT report (02/11/99) - 114 -
picture, and the over-articulated Spanish system, Germany consists of a 
three-tier administrative system (Federal State, Land, communes). These 
three layers display a relatively coherent and well-structured legislative 
basis and functional division, based on principles of high levels of 
autonomy, self-financing and subsidiarity. In larger Länder, such as NRW, 
co-ordination between the Land and communes is provided by the 
intermediate level of Regierungsbezirke. The administrative context is not 
the only reason to discuss these two areas jointly, however. Both areas 
also share the fact that the position of regions, such as the specific regions 
to be discussed later in the cluster cases (Bergisches Land, Rhein-Main), is 
rather ambiguous. Unlike Aragón and the North East, these areas do not 
have strong regional agencies or exhibit strong regional identities, 
although regional structures do play a role. Hence, in both cases, the 
development of regional policies and cluster initiatives has to be 
understood against the background of the emergence of regionalisation 
processes in a well-established and tiered administrative system.
5.2.1. Regional policy background
A feature shared by both regions is the profundity of the debate on 
economic development, not only in academic circles but also among 
policy-makers, consultants, etc. This debate has been triggered by the 
common idea that Germany as a whole needs to find new responses to 
what are perceived as a major ‘global’ threats to its competitiveness and 
capacity to create wealth and employment. In particular, there is a concern 
that the economy has got stuck in old routines and activities. So, the 
search has been on for new, innovative ways of reshaping economic 
routines and diversifying the economic basis. More than in regions 
discussed before, the debate has been inspired by ideas on Fordism and 
flexible specialisation; many authors quote the work of Piore and Sabel as 
starting point for the discussion on innovation and institutional change 
(Fürst, 1994; Heinze et al., 1995; Rehfeld, 1995). A core aspect of the 
debate is the relationship between economic and social-cultural-political 
developments. One aspect of this relationship involves the question of how 
social-cultural-political factors play a role in shaping more innovative 
forms of economic behaviour, which follows from the work of Piore and 
Sabel as well as thinking on ‘industrial districts’ and ‘innovative milieus’. 
Another aspect is more ethical: it involves questions of social acceptance 
of both old (e.g. heavy resource-based production) and new (bio­
technology, ICT) activities, which meet high levels of public resistance. 
The major implication of these concerns is a strong focus on 
environmental protection and investment in environmental industries.
The debate on innovation and social engagement has been fundamental for 
stimulating interest and new initiatives in regional industrial policy. 
Following on the seminal work of Piore and Sabel, as well as other 
literature on innovative networks and ‘milieus’ (Läpple, 1996; Camagni, 
1991), attention has focused on the role of co-operative networks at the 
regional level. Co-operation between firms (notably SMEs), as well as 
with public, semi-public and other social actors is seen as the way forward
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to raise innovative capacity as well as broad social consensus and hence 
regional competitiveness (Heinze et al., 1997; Grabher, 1991). 
Networking, in particular, has been associated with the nurturing of 
endogenous potential in a ‘bottom-up’ fashion, contrasting with a 
traditional ‘top-down’ approach of a more ‘dirigiste’ nature. In a more 
pragmatic way, the combination of networking and regional embedding (in 
German referred to with one word: Regionale Verflechtung) are also 
introduced as a response to the perceived threat of relocation, especially 
by firms in mature sectors such as automotive production (Doleschal, 
1991; Born & Rehfeld, 1996). Such threats were fed by revelations by 
core organisations such as the German automobile producers association 
VDA. On the basis of a survey among primary suppliers in 1996, VDA 
forecasted that between 1995 and 2000, 66000 jobs would be shed in 
Germany while the same firms would create 35000 jobs abroad (Koch & 
Strutynski, 1996)
In developing these ideas, however, authors have moved away from the 
original social, some would say ‘romantic’, interpretation central to the 
work of Piore and Sable, and adopted a more strategic view (Knuth & 
Latniak, 1991). Exploring the role of strategic factors at the level of firms 
as well as the region, regional industrial policy was to be based on the co­
determined and co-ordinated management of public and private investment 
to maximise local networking benefits. Other authors have added a more 
political view, pointing to the rigidities of the political-institutional milieus 
underpinning regional development, and argued that initiatives should 
facilitate genuine institutional change and innovation:
[Regional development] is not in the first instance a question of 
technological improvement. The crux is that organisational, 
institutional and social innovations support the development and 
strengthening of regional innovation, supply and marketing networks 
and the innovation-oriented reorganisation of internal business 
structures (Lâpple, 1996, p.48, my translation)
From advocating regional networking following a more strategic 
perspective, it was a small step to thinking in terms of production chains 
and clusters (Rehfeld, 1994a; Heinze et al., 1997; Lâpple, 1996). There 
are some interesting differences to distinguish in the paths towards cluster 
initiatives between the two areas, which will be further discussed in the 
next sections.
5.2.2. The institutional context
NRW
Like in the case of the North East, the broad economic situation of NRW, 
notably the Ruhr area, should be understood against the background of its 
historic industrialisation process. Before the 19th century, the Ruhr had 
developed as a well-balanced city system, which was part of the European 
trade network of Hanson cities. The present economic, as well as basic 
social and political, structure of the region took shape, to a large extent, in
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the second half of the 19th century with the rapid development of coal and 
steel production. The unprecedented economic expansion manifested by 
the Ruhr and surrounding areas was secured by growth coalitions 
consisting of representatives from the large corporations, Chambers of 
Commerce, the local state and (after recognition of the right of co­
determination) unions (Hennings & Kunzmann, 1993; Rehfeld, 1994b). 
This created a highly effective ‘integrated machine’ for the production and 
shipping of coal and steel. In technological terms, this ‘machine’ was so 
successful because of its capacity to transform new technology (initially 
most coming from England) into high-volume, highly efficient and rational 
extracting and manufacturing processes. An effective system of 
technological absorption and development thus supported the growth of 
the coal-steel cluster. Around this main resource-based cluster, however, 
also other cluster developed, such as in chemical production, and machine 
tools and electrical goods.
The 20th century has seen strong growth in the region until the 1960s. 
Since then, the area has been suffering from what increasingly appeared to 
be an incurable crisis. What had once been the engine of economic growth, 
the coal-steel cluster, became a major cause of stagnation when market 
opportunities declined. Repeated attempts of diversification did not 
compensate for the losses in the coal-steel sector, although some new 
activities emerged (Hesse, 1988). The perception of crisis thus became a 
dominant factor in the development of industrial policies and the shaping 
of support activities. While other regions had suffered from industrial 
decline (e.g. the North East), the Ruhrgebiet became the prototype of an 
‘old industrial area’. In particular, it was this notion that underpinned the 
massive inflow of support devoted to combating the area’s economic 
problems. In many respects, indeed, the Ruhrgebiet, and the Land in 
general, have become a field of experimentation for policy development. 
Since the 1960s, NRW shows a impressive sequence of programmes, 
accompanied with an increasing capacity to learn from failures and to try 
new directions (Cooke, 1995b).
In the context of this study, the most interesting steps have been the 
process of regionalisation, the emphasis on networking and the 
development of targeted regional industrial policy. These themes have only 
emerged from the mid-80s onwards. Before that, two other phases of 
economic policy can be distinguished (Table 16)
• The 60s and 70s were characterised by support to the dominant 
industries, based on the belief that they suffered from cyclical, not 
structural, problems. The aim was re-industrialisation (Ache, 1996).
• The 1980s brought a shift to more comprehensive approaches aiming 
at industrial diversification (neo-industrialisation), with increased 
emphasis on technology development, SMEs and environmental 
protection.
While the latter phase presented a substantial move away from the 
tradition of supporting and protecting the ‘losers’, and managed to induce 
some further diversification, it did not seem to reach the heart of the
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economic stagnation in the area. One problem was that policy-makers 
preferred routine solutions, neglecting the specific circumstances in which 
policies had to be implemented. Moreover, a large amount of resources 
was spent on direct subsidies to firms. According to some observers, this 
primarily resulted in an increased dependence of firms on subsidy 
provision (Hesse, 1988).
More fundamentally, policies were based essentially on the assumption 
that the crisis in the area stemmed from the dominance of mature 
industries, and that a solution had to be found in reducing this dominance 
by managing industrial diversification combined with rationalisation of the 
large businesses under threat. One way restructuring was managed was by 
aligning, as far as possible, the diversification strategies of the major 
corporations. While some modest success was made in creating a more 
diversified economy in this way, critical observers such as Lapple and 
Grabher argue that the area’s principal problem has been not so much the 
industrial structure but the nature of networks and ‘milieu’. In Grabher’s 
view, economic development has been blocked by the nature of inter-firm 
relationships. The Ruhr suffers from rigid specialisation based on rigid 
hierarchical firm relationships, which impede change and stifle the 
development of supply chains (Grabher, 1991). Lapple describes the area’s 
production milieu as pre-Fordist, which can be characterised as follows:
“economic as well as non-economic dominance of vertically 
integrated large businesses, which maintain almost feudal 
dependency relations with suppliers, a technical culture oriented to 
mass technology, a spatial and locational structure geared towards 
the functions of the established mass-technological production and 
transport system (...), as well as a ‘cartel mentality’ evolving into a 
regular corporatism (...)” (Lapple, 1996, p. 46, my translation).
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Table 16 M ajor post-war industrial policy programmes in NRW
Time Programme DM Description Brief perspective and outcome
68- Ruhr Develop- 3.7
73 ment Program- Bn 
me (EPR)
70- North Rhine 31.0
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Regions (ZIM)
Future Initia­
















Support to existing indus­
tries and general infrastruc­
ture (‘re-industrialisation’)
Land-wide co-ordinative 
programme as follow-up of 
Ruhr programme; additional 
‘growth pole’ initiatives
Aimed at structural diversi­
fication (‘Neo-industrialisa­
tion’) through labour market 
programme, promotion in­
novation and technology 
transfer (particularly to 
SMEs), urban development, 
environmental protection, 
cultural activities and local 
infrastructure investments.
Stocktaking initiative to 
develop new technologies 





- social acceptance 
(SoTech)
- technology transfer 
(favouring SMEs)
- top-level research (notably 
engineering)
Initiative to co-ordinate and 
facilitate ‘bottom-up’ re­
gional development pro­
grammes in designated 
Ruhr areas, impacting upon 
the ’soft’ dimensions of re­
gional development.
Land-wide application of 
ZIN in 15 regions
Sectoral, technological, edu­
cational and social renewal 
in a framework of industrial 
land regeneration using 
similar collaborative 
approach as ZIN
Conceived economic problems as 
largely cyclical not structural
Successful and innovative in de­
veloping and implementing existing 
policies; but did not abate the eco­
nomic crisis
Most objectives realised; spectacular 
success in acquisition of research 
institutes; but did not rally avoid 
massive assistance to large firms 
and tackle the problem of ‘subsidy 
dependence’; some resistance to 
stricter environmental regulation; 
complexities of programme imple­
mentation not always recognised.
Launching of various successful 
initiative and partnerships to pro­
mote new technology and create a 
social dialogue; but some disillusion 
in technology transfer due to diffi­
culties with reaching SMEs; univer­
sity slow in moving away from 
traditional focus on basic research; 
more generally: programmes ham­
pered by administrative fragmenta­
tion and lack of customisation to 
specific regional/social circum­
stances
Seen as an effective approach by the 
Land, more time required for effects 
to be fully realised; followed up by 
ZIN (expenses cover co-ordination 
only; project finance draw from 
separate budgets via the Land)
Few cases of successful co-operation 
and strategy formulation (e.g. 
Dortmund, Bergisches Land) re­
sulting in various cluster initiatives; 
but no genuine devolution of com­
petencies and resources, artificial 
spatial demarcations.
Innovative and successful in realis­
ing its practical and developmental 
objectives, due to concrete nature of 
projects and relative independence.
Source: Hesse & Schlieper, 1988; Ache, 1996 and see text.
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According to these accounts, the crux of economic renewal is changing 
perceptions, attitudes, inter-firm networking and power relationships. The 
aim of structural policy should be to shift from a historic constellation to a 
strategic constellation, not only in an economic but also social, cultural 
and political sense. This was not only a message for dominant business 
actors but also for political actors. In their historical analysis of industrial 
policy, Hesse and Schlieper (1988) observe that, ironically, although the 
70s and 80s had seen an adoption of “extremely vigorous ideologies of 
innovation, which seek to transform a traditional industrial area into a hi- 
tech area overnight”, the real practice of policy design and implementation 
was far from innovative (1988, p. 564):
“it is almost indispensable to mention the limited innovation 
potential (innovation stalemate) among those involved. According to 
these arguments, the organisations are too inflexible, the policies too 
routinised, the process of decision-making too entangled” Hesse & 
Schlieper, 1988, p.564.
In the mid-80s a new policy approach emerged which tried to address 
some of these criticism. The ‘Future Initiatives’ such as ZIM and ZIN (see 
Table 16) did not present new top-down programmes, but new approaches 
to the co-ordination and implementation of existing policies. The new aims 
were to mobilise local actors in the design of economic development 
strategies and in the design of policy packages on a consensus and ‘self­
help’ basis, to promote ‘bottom-up’ innovative approaches exploiting 
indigenous potential, and to increase the role of public-private 
partnerships. Against what was seen as the former paternalistic approach 
to structural policy, the new initiatives were based on the principles of 
regionalisation and decentralisation, grafted strongly on ideas about 
regional networking and associational trends. Besides academic debate, a 
major advocate of the regionalisation approach had been the trade unions, 
particularly the union-supported consultancy ISA, which had found 
inspiration in similar approaches in Baden-Württemberg (developed by the 
sister organisation IMU; see Iwer & Rehberg, 1994). The unions saw 
cluster strategies as a suitable way to secure jobs.
To facilitate networking and consensus building, the Future Initiatives 
created Regional Conferences in which representatives from regional 
organisations engaged in strategy formulation and the prioritising of 
projects. In essence, the aim of these conferences was “to institute new 
procedures. In the course of a long term process, arrangements resembling 
networks which transcend hierarchies and formal departments are to 
remove institutional as well as mental barriers of social change.” (Fürst & 
Kilper, 1995, p.288). The Conferences are prepared by a Steering group, 
with chief representatives from towns and districts, directors of Chambers 
of Commerce and other dominant regional organisations, and supported 
by working groups. In the early 1990s, when the funding to ZIN stopped 
(partly because resources were shifted to East Germany), support was 
given to the development of Regional Development Concepts (REKs), 
which laid down the ideas and suggestions resulting from the Regional 
Conferences.
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The Future Initiatives are important since they reflect a genuine re­
orientation of policy making using new insights into the role of networking 
at the regional level (and as will be shown later, for the development of 
cluster projects). They are not only based on a philosophy of innovation 
and economic change, but also embody innovation and institutional change 
themselves. Instituting these steps has been an achievement in itself:
“(...) the [ZIM] initiative may be said to be a success since it has 
stimulated tow significant and promising institutional changes. First, 
it has made public-sector led private-public partnerships acceptable 
where they previously were rejected, especially by local 
governments. Second, it has produced new growth coalitions centred 
on small- and medium-sized high firms, regional universities and the 
more dynamic local government managers. Both innovations stand in 
stark contrast to the previous efforts to conserve the traditional coal 
and steel industries.” (Hennings & Kunzmann, 1993, p.48)
Because of their (presumed) innovative character, the Future Initiatives 
have been subject to various inquiries and debates. Some observers share 
the positive tone of the conclusion above, and see them as models for 
other regions (see for instance Cooke, 1995b). Others have pointed at the 
weaker points of the approach, arguing that, in the end, the Initiatives have 
not managed to meet their objectives. Fürst and Kilper (1995), using a 
policy network perspective in analysing Regional Conferences, found that 
the conferences did not really manage to instil new forms of co-operation 
between local actors. On the position of two key public actors, the Land 
and Local Authorities, for instance, they conclude:
”As far as local authorities are represented institutionally in the 
Regional Conferences (. ), they pursue institutional self-interests 
rather than collective goods of the region. In spite of the internal co­
ordination arrangements, the Land administration is not very open to 
‘co-ordination from below’ through the regional consensus. Rather, 
the land administrations still performs through traditional procedures 
of appropriations” (p. 296)
The authors also point out several other weaknesses. In as much as the 
Initiatives create innovative impulses, this appears to be a matter of chance 
rather than being structurally embedded in the overall approach. There are 
no systematic approaches or financial support for creating awareness and 
co-operation. Finally, no proper thought is given as to how to move from 
an experimental phase, in which the governance of the initiatives is based 
on occasional Conferences, to a more permanent structure, in which a 
statutory regional body may be required.
Other authors have even been more critical, challenging the presumed 
innovative character of the initiatives and the impact of regionalisation. 
One problem is that, although the Conferences bring together 
representatives from many organisations (summoned by the Regional 
Commissioner in consultation with key regional actors), the influence of 
different actors may vary widely. In the end, many Conferences tended to 
be dominated by the most established, powerful organisations. Waniek 
(1993, p.472) thus questions the innovative potential of the ZINs: “Instead
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of working out innovative development approaches, the regional 
conferences may be in danger of preserving existing economic and political 
structures at the expense of future economic development” . Another issue 
is the regional structure. Being based largely on the administrative 
Chambers of Commerce areas, the regions do not present ‘natural’ regions 
(Huggins & Thomalla, 1995). According to Wanniek this has many 
negative consequences: it may give rise to unwanted inter-regional 
interference; it makes it more difficult to find a coherent and committed 
group of network partners, and may impede genuine tailoring of policies 
to local problems. These points of doubt were, to a certain extent, proven 
right during the formulation of the Regional Development Concepts in the 
first half of the 1990s. Some of the Regional Development Concepts were 
of high quality and offered a good basis for further co-operative work 
(such as in the Bergisches Land - to be discussed later); others failed both 
in presentation and follow-up (this happened for instance in Bochum, 
Duisburg, Dortmund, Mühlheim-Essen, and Düsseldorf).
Nevertheless, although their direct impact has clearly been of a varying, 
and perhaps sometimes disappointing, nature, the Future Initiatives have 
been important channels through which messages of regionalisation and 
networking have been conveyed throughout the Land. Besides the Future 
Initiatives, the Land government has initiated other programmes oriented 
on networking, at different spatial levels, as part of its recent ‘Impulse of
). Examples are the networking 
initiative in the automotive industry (VIA) and ICT sector (MEDIA) 
(Ache, 1996). For research as well as the management and implementation 
of projects, the Land government makes more and more use of 
consultants. This is expected to increase efficiency and promotion of the 
projects, and has been a major factor in the growth of professional services 
in the regional development business.
Hessen
Hessen has followed a different development path. Before 
industrialisation, the southern part of the Land, notably the Rhein-Main 
area had already become an important transport and trade hub, providing 
the basis for the present dominance of Frankfurt in fairs, finance and 
business services. The industrialisation process was partly initiated from 
the craft-based Chambers of Industry and Commerce, which became 
influential in the last century (Dünzl, 1995). Moreover, a rapid and 
extensive development of a comprehensive educational system in the area 
led to a strong improvement in the quality of labour supply, as well as to 
enhanced innovative capacity. While English inventions, notably the steam 
engine, triggered the first steps to industrialisation, it was a generation of 
local scientists-entrepreneurs who laid the foundation for the growth of 
local expertise in metal engineering (notably machine tools and transport 
goods), chemical production and electrical goods. Particularly in chemical 
production, a close integration of science, industrial technical development 
and commerce emerged. While these sectors were initially characterised by 
small, entrepreneurial firms, consolidation through mergers and
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acquisitions led to the rise and increased dominance of large firms such as 
Hoechst and Opel.
The 20th century has been a period primarily of diversification into non­
industrial sectors. In fact, the industrial profile of Rhein-Main has not 
undergone much change since 1914, keeping its orientation towards metal, 
chemical production and electrical goods. In the last decade, some sectors, 
especially in automotive production and bulk chemical products, have 
faced difficulties and induced a process of rationalisation, notably through 
shedding and moving out of employment. The main non-industrial growth 
sectors have been finance and producer services, with a strong 
concentration in Frankfurt and surrounding business parks (particularly 
around the airport). This trend towards centralisation has forced industrial 
activities further out of the region’s economic core areas.
The success of the region’s service sector, however, does not receive an 
unqualified applause. On the contrary, a major issue in the economic 
development is the overall economic profile of the region. Should Rhein­
Main concentrate on strengthening its function as global hub of business 
services, or should it try to keep a balance between industry and services? 
In effect, many regional development agents and observes advocate the 
latter. Kruger-Roth and Kania (1995), representing two leading 
development organisations in the region (Umlandverband - the regional 
co-operative body in economic development established in 1974, and the 
Frankfurt Development Agency), consider the relationships between 
industry and services as an essential component of the region’s 
competitiveness. They fear that the present industrial downturn, small as it 
may be, may induce an unravelling of the region’s vital economic networks 
and induce more re-location. It is this perception, shared among many 
local policy-makers and researchers, that has supported the promotion of 
ideas on regional networking and specific initiatives promoting industrial 
development, from mature sectors to new hi-tech growth sectors. The 
latter has been strongly endorsed by Kruger-Roth and Kania, especially at 
the level of the region:
To remain competitive amongst Europe’s regions, the Rhein-Main 
region needs to act-as-one and market its locational advantages 
attractively (...). Due to the increased necessity to co-operate closely 
with service providers, suppliers and science institutions, spatial 
requirements can hardly be met at a communal level (Kruger-Roth &
Kania, 1995, p.469, my translation).
The recommendations to secure the role of cross-sectoral networking and 
promote the region-wide locational advantages are supported by a study 
carried out by ISI (Koschatzky et al., 1996), commissioned by the 
Umlandverband. The study explored the supply linkages among and 
between a selected group of industrial and service companies. Not 
unexpectedly, the findings indicated that sourcing patterns tended to 
become more global, although growth in the total volume of increased 
outsourcing by larger firms meant that demand for local supplies was not 
diminishing in absolute terms. Nevertheless, there was a growing fear that
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the region was threatened by a decline in local economic embedding. This 
led to calls for more co-operation between businesses and with local 
organisations.
In its search for opportunities for co-operation, the Fraunhofer-Institut 
study pointed at the differences between industrial and service sectors. In 
most industrial sectors, many firms, especially older, established ones with 
local decision-making capacity, maintained relatively high levels of local 
sourcing. However, local sourcing often did not mean local production, 
but only that the purchasing and service provision went through a local 
firm or branch. In services, in contrast, local subcontracting and 
networking were becoming more important as means to compose more 
complex products by combining the core competencies of a range of 
businesses. The market for these products was largely extra-regional. 
Finally, on industry-service linkages, a rather ambiguous picture emerged. 
On the one hand, the study confirmed the region’s leading role in business 
services, and its strong position in service export. On the other hand, 
further reduction in industrial production is seen as a threat especially for 
the suppliers of more standardised services. The recommendations thus 
included the set-up of regional exchange systems for physical goods, e.g. 
in the waste sector, accompanied by resource management services. In a 
broader sense, more attention to ‘after-care’ for established firms was 
endorsed combined with a coherent spatial planning policy (notably in 
transport and site provision). The environmental sector was suggested as a 
first angle to create a regional network-based development strategy geared 
towards hi-tech ‘value added’ production.
The authors stress that their recommendations bring two new dimensions 
to economic policy in the area:
New is that the region-as-one articulates, more than in the past, its 
competitive strengths, and transforms them into concrete ideas of its 
position in the international division of labour. These strengths 
involve transport logistics, service provision (not only banking), 
technological competencies and the future orientation resulting from 
these locational conditions. Also new is that this strategy should 
encourage industrial and service companies to extent their co­
operative links to other forms, to acquire more qualifications, to 
expand their competencies and to increase the synergy between 
different fields of technology more than done so far. (Koschatzky et 
al., 1996).
While this study (and other related material) presents an impressive 
account of support and suggestions for a regional networking approach, in 
one respect the approach differs markedly from recent developments in 
NRW. Apart from a reference to the need to act-as-one, and, indeed, on 
the last page a one-line suggestion to establish something like “Future 
Dialogue Rhein Main”, little is said, as yet, about institutional change and 
innovation. This should not so much be perceived as a point of weakness, 
however, but as reflecting the specific stage of development in which 
regional policy finds itself here. The dominant objective so far has been to
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demonstrate the value of regional strategies, while institutional change and 
developments will have to follow.
5.2.3. Regional policy development and accountability
Where substantial parts of the implementation of public policy in Britain is 
undertaken by semi-private organisations with low levels of accountability, 
in Germany accountability, both operational and financial, is a highly 
sensitive policy issue. Historically, industrial policy has been developed 
and controlled in a strongly regulated tri-partite corporatist governance 
framework, with representatives from the state, labour and business. The 
80s brought the first sign of change, brought about by an emerging neo­
liberal thinking and, more important, a political swing to the right. A major 
result was the development of what Heinze and Schmid (1994) call new 
forms of ‘meso-corporatism’. These institutional forms consist of weak 
(facilitating, supportive) regulatory instruments oriented to improving the 
supply side of the economy. They are often developed and managed by 
customised governance structures, of a ‘self-help’ nature and often 
involving professional organisations such as consultancies. These shifts are 
generally justified on grounds of greater local fitness and efficiency 
(Waniek, 1993). In broad political terms, meso-corporatism presents a 
break with the traditional tri-partite model. New policies are increasingly 
forged on a alliance between business and the state, and while the role of 
unions and other social interest group tends to be more marginalised.
At the regional level, the tendency towards meso-corporatism was linked 
to new ideas about networking and collaboration, and with the wish to be 
more innovative and flexible in policy design and implementation. New 
initiatives thus grew out of alliances between business associations and 
public authorities, with little or no say for the unions. It became 
commonplace to contract out to consultancies the implementation of new 
initiatives, and sometimes even major parts of policy design. A more 
complex world thus emerged, with a stronger impact of the private 
business sector. Over the last decade, however, unions have also tried to 
regain some of the lost ground by launching their own initiatives, often 
through establishing union-controlled private consultancies (such as ISA 
and IMU). In some Länder, such as NRW, this has even led to new 
alliances between public authorities and unions. As will be shown in the 
case studies, the result has been that in some policy areas, including that of 
clusters, parallel initiatives have emerged, with one strand more business- 
oriented, and another strand based on union involvement.
Increased emphasis on experimentation, networking, and involvement of 
third parties in policy implementation, has triggered questions about policy 
monitoring and accountability. Formally, the division of responsibilities has 
been clearly articulated, and final control remains in the hands of the public 
sector. It is clear, nevertheless, that much of the daily monitoring takes 
place at the level of policy networks and third parties, generating higher 
levels of self-monitoring. Under what conditions does such a governance 
structure facilitate genuine innovation and improved effectiveness? To
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address this issue, Heinze and Schmid (1994) relate the concept of meso- 
corporatism to Sabel's idea of ‘learning by monitoring’. From Sabel’s 
conceptualisation, the authors conclude that that effective process of self­
monitoring require strong commitment and flexibility:
(...) ‘learning by monitoring’ involves a complex process of learning, 
a highly appealing discursive approach, which not only presumes 
intensive commitment from all participants, but for its realisation 
also needs to overcome extremely high barriers of individual 
interests (Heinze et al., 1997, p. 261, my translation).
Without such commitment, decision-making within network-based 
governance forms runs the risk of reflecting vested interests, and may 
even, because of less external control, reinforce parochial attitudes (Knuth 
& Latniak, 1991). Conservative, and non-innovative approaches may thus 
persevere, protecting the status quo and preventing the establishment of 
new forms of learning and reflexivity.
Developments in industrial policy in NRW actually illustrate some of these 
caveats. Already in the early 1990s, Hennings and Kunzmann claimed that, 
in effect, not much has changed since the 1980s despite Conservative rule 
and erosion of Keynesian thinking:
Although the change from a Keynesian to a more free market- 
oriented economic policy made slogans like ‘market orientation’, 
deregulation’, ‘flexibility’, or ‘privatisation’ more popular, the local 
level was hardly touched by this change. Despite some efforts to 
introduce entrepreneurial zones, to promote the entrepreneurial city, 
and to deregulate the comprehensive planning and environmental 
legislation, little changed (Hennings & Kunzmann, 1993, p.40).
More specifically, ZIN was criticised for lacking an appropriate 
governance structure, and especially for the ambivalent way different 
aspects of the Initiatives have been managed. While the phase of strategy 
formulation and project planning was decentralised, the application for 
funding and the implementation process were still centrally controlled. In 
essence, ZIN funding works via a complex cascade model of applications 
and selection through various Land ministries, which thus retain full 
financial control. In the words of Waniek:
“ZIN contains a fundamental contradiction: on the one hand, 
Government wants to reduce its responsibilities for regional 
development on efficiency grounds, whilst, on the other, retaining its 
right to take the final decision about regional projects and their 
funding.” (Waniek, 1993, p.470)
It should be added however that these comments, however useful, reflect 
the observations of what can be seen as critical insiders. Relative to other 
areas, NRW has manifested an unparalleled level of progressiveness and 
resilience in its policy development. To quote a British observer:
“To the extent NRW regional industrial policy can be said to have 
shown success, it can be traced to a, perhaps 20 year, period of 
learning by doing, seeking ways forward from within the framework 
of innovative opportunities offered within the declining industries
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themselves. This demands a tremendous capacity for association, 
consultation, discourse, and willingness to engage with other 
interests. It is slow, painstaking but inclusive thus less likely to 
generate opposition from ‘excluded others’” (Cooke, 1995b, p.239)
In this respect, regional ventures in Hessen show a different pattern. Many 
initiatives have been launched by a patchwork of organisations in the area 
of business support, technology and networking, between which co­
ordination is often lacking. Despite efforts to strengthen unitary 
governance at the regional level, especially in Rhein-Main, the plea to ‘act- 
as-one’ has met stiff resistance from local actors. A fall in interest from the 
more suburban areas in the Rhein Main region has even threatened the 
survival of the Umlandverband. In this sense, the area differs sharply from 
NRW, where, despite all the difficulties, networking initiatives and 
regionalisation have received considerable support and commitment. It 
also contrasts with other more similar areas, such as Hanover and 
Stuttgart, where statutory regional structures (and governing bodies) have 
been established.
5.2.4. Orientation to SMEs
As in other areas, support for SMEs has grown rapidly both in Hessen and 
NRW. Besides general issues of start-ups and business development, two 
themes are prominent in the attention for SMEs: technology and co­
operation. The first interest in these themes stemmed from the debate on 
flexible specialisation. In particular the work of Piore and Sabel, with their 
emphasis on the emergence of flexible, small firms’ networks, was seen as 
bringing the ’most promising model for sustainable regional development’ 
even for areas such as NRW. Against the background of an alleged demise 
of ‘Fordist’ style production and consumption, SMEs were seen as 
superior in innovation and flexibility, and thus the new pillars of 
competitiveness. In the German context, evidence for this thesis was found 
in those areas where the typical ‘Mittelstand’ was seen as most innovative 
and interactive, such as Baden-Württemberg (Gertler, 1996).
Unlike Baden-Württemberg, the economy of NRW has traditionally been 
dominated by large firms. According to Grabher (1991), this should be 
attributed to long-lasting social and cultural factors. Even before the large- 
scale coal and steel became dominant, the area lacked a proper 
environment for SME development and networking. Grabher thus sees the 
high level of vertical integration and domination by the large corporation a 
result from, as much as cause of, the weakness of SMEs. In Hessen, SMEs 
have traditionally had a stronger role in the economy, although waves of 
mergers and consolidation meant that many parts of the economy have 
also become dominated by large firms. In the core area of Rhein-Main, it is 
especially the business service sector in which the strongest SMEs have 
emerged.
Initial SME support was focused largely on technology transfer in 
deprived areas such as the Ruhr. Through the 1980s, due to the early and 
massive financial support, NRW developed one of the densest networks of
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technology support in Germany and beyond. In 1993, the Land housed 
around 40% of the technology development and transfer institutions 
(Rehfeld, 1994b). In the same period, an attempt was made to make the 
support system more coherent and transparent, through the establishment 
of the Network Technology Infrastructure.
Hessen has a much weaker support system, which is partly due to its past 
economic growth and its service-oriented economy. Unlike NRW, the 
Land has no tradition of subsidy provision and has not launched any 
comprehensive technology programme. Nevertheless, in the 1990s, major 
support organisations such as the Umlandverband have launched a 
campaign for the strengthening of the technological profile of Rhein-Main 
region, based on various studies on the technological potential of the 
region (for summary see Koschatzky & Breiner, 1993). It was 
recommended the region should become a major centre for hi-tech 
activities, with emphasis on four sectors: ICT (with strong links to the 
service sector); robotics and other product/process techniques; 
measurement equipment and instruments; and the environmental sector 
(Krüger-Röth & Kania, 1995).
To what extent have SMEs benefited from technology support? As 
indicated before, the general evidence on this issue is not very positive. 
Most significantly, the ‘technology push’ model underpinning the 
traditional technology transfer policies did not suit the reality of most 
SMEs. This picture is corroborated by the German areas. In NRW, 
Rehfeld observes, firms tend to stick to the practices learnt largely ‘by
Small and medium sized firms hesitate to give up their long practice 
of muddling through which is based on an organisation of production 
and work that was successful in the past (Rehfeld, 1994b, p.235)
Although there are various success stories of technology centres with 
strong links with small firms - often institutionalised in the form of public- 
private partnerships - the overall reach of the support system has been 
feeble and take-up low. Summarising various studies and evaluations, 
Davis (1993) thus concludes that the investments in technological support 
have resulted largely in upgrading the regional scientific base rather than 
improving business performance. Other authors, moreover, argue that 
despite the variety of organisations, levels of specialisation are still 
inadequate (Rehfeld, 1994b; Ache, 1996). This presents, in a way, a more 
serious problem than the problems of co-ordination and transparency.
Although with less history and intensity, Hessen shows similar problems. 
Technology evaluations have demonstrated the large potential of the 
region, through the presence of many hi-tech SMEs, a highly qualified 
science sector, and an extensive technology transfer capacity. However, 
they also reveal very low and poor levels of interaction (Krüger-Röth & 
Kania, 1995). Some attempts have been made to create an overarching 
structure of technology support, initiated by the Land Technology Institute 
(Hessische Technologiestiftung) and inspired by the Steinbeis organisation 
in Baden-Württemberg. Establishing real integration however has proven
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to be extremely difficult, since it meets stiff resistance from organisation 
not prepared to give up (part of) their own identity (iv1).
Where technology support was inspired by the concepts of ‘flexible 
specialisation’, ‘innovation networks’ and/or ‘innovative milieus’, new 
initiatives also stressed the importance of nurturing co-operation between 
firms (Semlinger, 1998). Co-operation is interpreted in rather different 
ways, however. Closest to the Piore and Sabel approach are the ideas on 
changing the business culture, bringing small firms together to overcome 
petty rivalry and destructive forms of competition (Grabher, 1991; 
Rehfeld, 1994b). Co-operation is also linked to supply chains and other 
industrial configurations involving large(r) firms. Rather than emphasising 
the small-large firm divide, these approaches acknowledged the continuing 
role of large firms as market and technology ‘gatekeepers’ and as 
subcontracting hubs. With less emphasis on technology, co-operation is 
also interpreted as facilitating the meeting of (excess) supply and 
(unsatisfied) through a kind of exchange point. The latter has been 
developed by Chambers of Commerce, at federal as well as regional levels 
through ‘Co-operation Exchanges’. Also in a more pragmatic sense, co­
operation is associated with inducing processes of inter-firm learning. In 
the case of Hessen technology support, inter-firm learning was seen as 
most effective when it involved more secondary, less strategic aspects of 
business development, such as certification and quality management. 
Innovation was seen as a more difficult object because of the sensitivities 
involved (iv).
5.2.5. Cluster strategies
From the discussion so far it will not come as a surprise that the concept 
of clusters has received much interest among policy-makers as well as 
academics in both NRW and Hessen. In NRW, thinking in terms of 
clusters has been propagated by the Institut Arbeit und Technik, 
particularly by Dieter Rehfeld. The Institut Arbeit und Technik is a Land- 
funded research organisation with a mandate to improve the application of 
academic knowledge in areas of technological development and 
employment at a strategic level. Since its establishment in 1988 (as part of 
the wider Science Centrum in Gelsenkirchen), it has become a major driver 
behind innovative approaches to economic development, including various 
cluster projects.
Rehfeld’s interpretation of clusters is based on the production chain: 
clusters are based on ‘spatial thickening’ of production relations (Rehfeld, 
1994a). He thus endorses a view in which, although production chains 
may continue to exist, their spatial integration may unravel. Disintegration 
can be caused by various factors: technical shifts, organisational shifts in 
supply relations or a more ‘global’ orientation of regional firms. The Ruhr 
is presented as an area where a dominant cluster (steel-coal) disintegrated 
by a combination of these factors. What the area requires is a process in
1 Interview communication; see Table 2
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which new activities are created by anchoring growth and employment- 
generating production chains into the area. In such a structural 
perspective, clusters thus have two faces:
“Production clusters point at two directions. On the one hand, they 
contribute to regional growth through their dynamism, while, on the 
other hand, when the production chain loses its integrated economic 
structure, they may induce a crisis with widespread social and 
political consequences.” (Rehfeld, 1994a, p.198)
Supporting new clusters is not the only response to structural difficulties, 
however. Cluster strategies can also be used to give new directions and 
counter processes of disintegration in ‘old’ clusters. An example is the 
automotive sector, and a case where such a strategy has been successful is 
in Südostniedersachsen, where much support was received from 
Volkswagen. Resonating the socio-political discourse on the development 
of the Ruhr area, Rehfeld also stresses that economic restructuring 
strategies not only pose an economic problem, but raise fundamental 
questions about the fitness of political and socio-cultural routines and 
strategies.
Following a similar line of thought is Dieter Läpple who, already in the 
1980s, advocated the cluster concept in his thinking on the ‘local-global’ 
nexus (see Läpple, 1991). Läpple sees a close association between the 
cluster concept and the notion of a regional milieu.
A highly useful chain between branch and milieu is the concept of 
regional clusters (...). The cluster concepts leads to a replacement of 
the traditional ‘top-down’ approach based on macro-economic 
branches and sectors (...) by a ‘bottom-up’ approach. The latter 
recognises the specific, historically grown production and value- 
added structures in the region, inter-firm linkages and contacts and 
the dominant business strategies and concepts. (...) Regional 
clusters are, in a sense, the interface between the macroscopic, and 
hence ultimately global, branches and the regional milieu (Läpple,
1996, p.44, my translation).
All authors invoke Porter in their explanation of clusters. It is clear, 
nevertheless, that a much more social interpretation of clusters is given, 
with a particular focus on the link between innovation and co-operation. 
This specific (re)interpretation of Porter’s original concept is illustrated by 
the following quote:
In this comparative studies, Porter (... ) developed a model that 
comes very close to this understanding of modern and co-operative 
innovation processes (. ) For regional innovative capacity is the 
economic dynamic, encompassed by such clusters, of crucial 
importance. Competitive branches can pull related or supporting 
branches, sustaining the operation of the clusters through external 
effects, infrastructure etc, and thus creating links for other 
competitive sectors. (Heinze et al., 1997, p.258, my translation)
In the Rhein-Main area, the concept of cluster has been invoked primarily 
in the context of the debate on the position of industry in this service-rich
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area. Clusters are used to endorse the idea that, through supporting 
industry-service linkages, core economic activities will be tied more 
strongly to the region. This again corresponds to the notion that 
businesses forming part of regional clusters will be less tempted to relocate 
and take employment away:
“On the basis of the present state of knowledge, we believe that, 
despite increased business mobility and development in ICT, the 
spatial relationships between firms play a significant role. Also in 
the future many orders for industrial supplies and services will be 
placed locally. Hence, the regional network is at risk when one 
sector moves out, as manufacturing at present. Yet, following 
Michael Porter, such ‘production clusters’ present a critical factor in 
the regional competitive position. There is, likewise, a close 
relationship between the employment dynamics in industry and 
services.” (Kruger-Roth & Kania, 1995, p. 467-8)
As in previous cases, the main perspective presented here is that of 
clusters-as-targets, although with a strong variation in coverage and 
approach. As will be shown below, some cluster initiatives involve linking 
firms within single sectors or improving links between two industries (such 
as the chemical industry and waste disposal), others involve more 
encompassing approaches based on regional cluster maps. Some 
references can also be found to clusters-as-method, for instance in the call 
for more specialisation in the technology support infrastructure in NRW. 
In addition, sectoral organisations have been developed in both regions, 
which may turn into genuine ‘real service’ centres. In the mid-1990s, 
sectoral support institutions have been established (ZIUs) which have 
received five years subsidy. The intention is that they become self­
financing after this period.
To illustrate the variation in cluster initiatives, the remainder of this will 
give a brief overview of cluster initiatives in the two areas.
Clustering in environmental production: in both NRW and Hessen the 
environmental sector is presented as an activity with major opportunities, 
which may benefit in particular from linkages with chemical industry and 
heavy engineering but also the transport sector, consumer goods, etc. 
Moreover, besides a strong social and political acceptance, this presents a 
sector with a high level of complexity, heterogeneity, and technology 
intensity which combines both industrial and service activities. It is also a 
sector in which, due to the importance of regulation as well as the public 
procurement, the relations between the private and public sector play a 
crucial role.
Since the first developments in the 1960s, NRW, and the Ruhr in 
particular, has become a major concentration of environmental production. 
In 1994, NRW contained about one-third of all environmental businesses 
in Germany (Rehfeld, 1995). This specialisation may be attributed to 
several reasons. First, the high level of public support to the sector, e.g. 
subsidies, technology support, procurement. In effect, more than half of 
investments in environment protection has been made directly by the
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public sector, primarily by Local Authorities. Second, the concentration of 
heavy industry, which enabled ‘problem-makers’ to become ‘problem- 
solvers’. Third, the acceptance by firms - although only after a period of 
resistance - to face stricter environmental regulation to build up 
competencies pre-empting regulatory changes elsewhere. Finally, the 
tradition of co-operation between the public and private sector in the area 
(especially the Ruhr), which facilitated the necessary interaction between 
the two sectors, as well as with other organisations such as universities 
(Davis, 1993).
The growth of the environmental sector has created new opportunities 
especially for SMEs, for instance by creating a market for consultants and 
providing clients for the innovation agencies (Van Essen, 1997). The 
sector requires a wide variety of capabilities, which are not likely to be 
integrated by larger companies. Nevertheless, the large firms remain vital 
as lead users and core lobbyists. The issue of dependency between small 
and large firms, and the culture in which supplier relations develop, 
continues to warrant attention. A related issue is the still poor level of 
innovation and management capacities in the SME sector (Rehfeld, 1995). 
An initiative that has tried to address these issues is the Projekt Chemische 
Industrie im Bergischen Land, which will be further explored in the case 
studies below.
Clustering in the automotive sector: The fate of the automotive sector 
presents in both regions (as in many German regions) a very sensitive 
issue. Both regions have concentrations of automotive producers, notably 
smaller suppliers. In both regions, these firms have gone through a period 
of rationalisation and still face a difficult future. NRW, in particular, is an 
area with a traditional specialisation in producing relatively standard 
automotive components (Doleschal, 1991). This is one of the reasons why 
the area has incurred considerably more losses than for instance Bayern 
and Baden-Württemberg. The typical NRW supplier is second-tier or 
marginal first-tier, more a technological follower than protagonist, and 
wary of co-operation. According to Doleschal, they tend respond to new 
circumstances individually rather than collectively, and chose to relocate 
rather than explore local solutions. Together with technological weakness, 
this point has inspired various initiatives such as VIA-NRW.
Clustering in the ICT and media sector: Considered as global growth 
sectors, and as activities underpinning the competitiveness of other 
sectors, media and ICT have received much attention. In NRW, several 
reports have been produced on the media sector, with the specific aim to 
show the opportunities and overcome the image as media only presenting 
a ‘cost’ factor. Policy-makers and other actors often have a poor image of 
the media sector, while they are slow in understanding the significance of 
ICT. Media was also presented as an activity range dominated by small 
creative firms, which operate in locally rooted networks, thus reviving the 
idea of small firm districts. In NRW, where the Land government has been 
especially interested in developing media clusters, various initiatives have 
been developed. While ambitions have run high, not all of these have been
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successful; the most prominent case with a considerable level of success is 
the Cologne Media Park (e.g. see Huggins & Thomalla, 1995).
Traditional industrial sectors in NRW: A range of initiatives has been 
developed by the union-related consultancy ISA in the context of 
ZIN/REK. Since the early 1990s ISA has advocated branch-specific 
polices as part of regional structural policies, in which it pursued a strong 
involvement of employees. The projects start with research and the writing 
of branch reports, followed by the phase of consultation and strategy 
development geared towards promoting co-operation. Examples of ISA 
projects are: wood and furniture in Ost-Westfalen, cement industry in 
Münster; pulp-paper industry in Aachen; door and window furniture 
industry in Mettmann. A specific supply chain approach is followed in the 
case of lock/fastener automotive suppliers in Velbert (Bergisches Land) as 
past of the trend towards electronic systems. A co-operation project in 
textiles in Mönchen Gladbach failed because of resistance from the firms, 
which is attributed to cultural obstacles to co-operative behaviour.
The union initiative should be seen as a response to the break-up of the 
traditional corporatist approach, in which labour was secured a say in most 
forms of policy-making. Many new approaches, such as VIA-NRW, 
however, are based on partnerships in which only business and the public 
sector participate, in a ‘meso corporatist’ fashion. Although the union 
initiatives have received some support, particularly from the Land 
government, developing its own regional strategies has not turned out to 
be an easy affair for ISA. Not surprisingly, businesses have responded with 
scepticism because of the affiliation to the union and the strong emphasis 
on job protection. However, in the unions the initiatives have also met 
with resistance because the strategic nature and contents of the projects 
were not understood. In a sense, these projects not only required the 
building of a co-operative culture between firms, they also called for 
cultural change within the union (iv).
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Chapter Six. Regional cluster cases
Having introduced the regions, the various cluster initiatives and strategies 
will now be further explored. The present chapter will focus on initiatives 
developed from a spatial-sectoral perspective. For an overview of the 
various cases to be examined and the contents of the chapter, see the 
introduction of the previous chapter (Table 13). The fact that the sector, 
rather than the small firm forms the starting point does not mean that 
SMEs do not take part in the initiatives. On the contrary, all initiatives 
take account of SME development, although with strong variation in 
position, approach and depth. The conclusions in the chapter will pay 
specific attention to the SME issue.
6.1. The automotive clusters in the North East of England and 
Germany
The automotive industry presents various interesting contrasting cases. On 
the one hand, German regions have a long-standing tradition of 
automotive production, which has recently come under threat. On the 
other, in the North East of England the automotive industry presents a 
new emerging sector triggered by the establishment of Nissan and the 
following influx of foreign investments in component production. A similar 
observation can be made in the case of Aragon. With exception of the 
latter, all regions display substantial institutional response to recent 
industrial developments. These responses all include some kind of 
location-oriented strategy to attract or secure automotive business. In 
addition, they reflect, at least partially, new ideas about networking and 
co-operation along sector/cluster lines. After introducing the specific 
regional settings, the following initiatives will be discussed:
- ASSA (=Automotive Sector Strategic Alliance): an initiative to promote 
skill development in the North East of England, developed by the TEC and 
business representatives.
- MOBIL: an initiative run by the Land-division of the federal organisation 
RKW to promote co-operation and learning among automotive suppliers 
SMEs in Hessen.
- VIA-NRW - a Land initiative in NRW to encourage co-operation and 
joint projects among automotive suppliers in the region.
- Perspektiven der Automobilzulieferindustrie im Bergisches Land, an 
initiative from the Land-funded Institute Arbeit und Technik, and ISA 
Consult to promote co-operation between automotive suppliers in 
Bergisches Land.
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6.1.1. Cluster context and models in Germany
The German initiatives are based primarily on the notion that business 
performance is heavily reliant on the business environment. The latter is 
conceptualised along various dimensions: the business chain, the socio­
cultural setting and the regional environment (Doleschal, 1991). Of much 
interest here is the emphasis on the geographical dimension. The regional 
environment is seen as important because historically the automotive 
industry has evolved in various spatial clusters, each with their own 
specialisation and internal structure (Table 17). This thus justifies a 
regional clustering approach, although it is regarded essential that the 
other two dimensions, the business chain and socio-economic 
environment, are also taken into account.
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Source: Rehfeld, 1996 and Strutynski, 1995
The support initiatives for the automotive industry have been triggered by 
the dramatic development in the industry in the late 80s and early 90s. 
Whereas until the mid-1980s the industry had been thriving on the basis of 
its internal technological excellence and external reputation, now the 
industry seemed to be loosing its competitive advantage and suffering 
from market saturation as well as globalisation tendencies in the larger 
companies. Suppliers suffered, in particular, from various pressures on the 
supply chain, described by Koch and Strutynski (Koch & Strutynski, 1996, 
p.111) as the ‘millstone syndrome’. On one side, suppliers were forced by 
the their customers to lower prices while improving quality, delivery, 
flexibility, communications etc. From the other side, suppliers were 
confronted with strong price fluctuations, longer delivery times and market 
concentration in the supply of raw materials (steel as well as synthetic 
materials). The squeeze on suppliers reached its apex in the early 1990s 
when the car producers passed on their losses in the market to their
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suppliers, and when they started to increase purchases from outside 
Germany. This process, sometimes referred to as the ‘Lopez-effect’ after 
the highly exigent (and controversial) VW procurement manager, 
undermined the position many firms had traditionally had in the supply 
chain. Perhaps more importantly, it caused a fundamental break in the 
relationships between suppliers and OEMs in Germany, which had 
traditionally been stable and co-operative. In particular, the suppliers 
resented the fact that, while employing a rhetoric of new-style co­
operative relationships based on Japanese management approaches, in 
reality car makers recurrently broke their promises (including legal 
contracts) and abused their power as large buyers (Lagendijk, 1997b).
The first response of suppliers to the various threats has been one of 
isolated rationalisation, of ad-hoc measures primarily aimed at survival in 
the short term. It was soon realised, however, that more comprehensive 
management approaches were required, which were geared to a strategic 
re-positioning of firms in the supply chain (Strutynski, 1995). It was 
neither sufficient to attribute the crisis solely to unfair treatment by the 
main customers, nor to see the crisis as part of a cyclical phenomenon. 
Various business surveys indicated that many suppliers, especially the 
‘Mittelstand’ (SMEs), traditionally the backbone of German 
manufacturing, had not kept up with foreign competitors especially in 
implementing modern management techniques dealing with marketing, 
quality control, team working, skill development, and customer services 
(Waas, 1994; Friedrich, 1994). So rather than basic technological and 
innovative capabilities, the strategic position in the supply chain is 
regarded as the critical issue for business development. To remain 
competitive, firms need to link their core competencies to a ‘unique selling
A supplier performs strategically in the right way, when it acquires a 
Unique Selling Position with its core customers and gains particular 
market access through its innovative solutions. Focusing on core 
competencies also calls for a continuous development of superiority 
in certain fields of competence (product and process-development, 
tooling, capacity for system production, logistics) and their 
protection against competitors (Fieten, 1995, p. 51, my translation).
Koch and Strutynski (1996), who also find a weak link between R&D and 
company strength, mark the change from a technological to a management 
focus as a ‘paradigm shift’ in thinking on business development. 
According to the authors, the notion of strategic (re)positioning includes a 
complex mix of steps and changes. On the one hand, it entails a process of 
modernisation through adopting various forms of ‘best practice’ in the 
areas mentioned before, notably quality management and workers’ 
participation (Waas, 1994). While workers have traditionally been 
involved through unions at an industrial level, at the business level 
participation has been lacking or even absent (Doleschal et al., 1993). On 
the other hand, a careful assessment of the future business direction was 
required, to underpin the positioning strategy. At this level, no simple 
answers should be expected: not just ‘focus on core competencies’ and
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increased outsourcing. For automotive suppliers, a careful balance 
between core and peripheral activities, and between automotive and non­
automotive activities often sustains the best chances for survival and 
development. Moreover, (re)positioning should not be equated with a 
fixation on becoming or remaining a 1st tier supplier, according to Koch 
and Strutynski (1996, p.134, my translation):
Market power and competitive strength do not depend on the tier of 
the supply chain an entrepreneur is operating in. More important is 
the competence and value represented by the supplier’s product.
Similarly, modernisation should not automatically include enhanced 
technological capabilities. On the contrary, for many German firms the key 
issue is to simplify and streamline the process of technological 
developments and investment rather than to seek further advancements. In 
a survey among 150 suppliers, Doleschal et al. (1993) even found a 
negative relationship between R&D expenditures and profit rates. While 
they acknowledged that this could be due to the fact that it takes time 
before R&D investment pay off, they also pointed at the problem of 
‘innovation trap’. The latter occurs when the efforts of the suppliers are 
not well attuned to the market and demands of their customers:
The global procurement strategies can easily lead to an ‘innovation 
trap’, when the worldwide tendencies in products, processes and 
materials are not closely observed or when the communication with 
customer does not function optimally (Doleschal et al., 1993, p.11, 
my translation).
In the German context, networking is generally considered as an important 
approach to support the development of SMEs. Some initiatives have 
developed along the supply chain, resonating the idea of a regional cluster 
model supported by flexible inter-firm trade linkages. Doleschal et al. 
(1993, p.20, my translation) give the following recommendation:
The model for the modern automotive supplier should not be any 
more the ‘individual fighter in a Schumpeterian sense’; the changing 
economic conditions demand co-operation driven and led production 
of automotive systems and parts in an associational context.
The emphasis on linkages is found for instance in the projects developed 
by IAT in Gelsenkirchen. Other approaches see the role of networking and 
co-operation primarily in the context of inter-firm learning and business 
development. Fieten (1995), for instance, stresses three related themes in 
business modernisation: re-positioning, comprehensive business 
development (with emphasis on teamwork and continuous improvement), 
and self-improvement. Co-operation, facilitated by external moderators 
and complemented by external advice, is advocated as a way to inspire 
firms and to enable ‘self-help’ at an industrial level. In Fieten’s expression, 
support initiatives should unleash the ‘virus of self-improvement’ within 
the industry. Co-operation is also seen as a step to develop joint lobbying 
power of suppliers, for instance to improve industry-wide training or to 
strengthen its position vis-à-vis the OEMs (Strutynski, 1995). Concerning 
the latter, an interesting phenomenon has been the foundation (1993) of
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the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Zulieferindustrie (Working Group Supplier 
Industry), a federal body aimed at re-establishing co-operative 
relationships between suppliers and their customers.
6.1.2. Cluster context and models in the North East of England
The English case differs from the German one since the growth of the 
automotive industry is largely based on foreign investments. The main 
response to the establishment of Nissan (1983) was to attract suppliers to 
Nissan with the aspiration to build an ‘automotive hub’ in the North East, 
that is, to build a regional identity around the automotive sector. Over the 
last 15 years, NDC, but also local authorities such as Sunderland, have 
pursued a traditional approach to rokering linkages and attracting external 
investors. This has contributed to the establishment of around 30 
companies in the region. Most of these came to supply Nissan, as part of 
the latter’s ambition to establish JIT supply of more bulkier components; 
some suppliers located in the North East because of attractive location 
decisions (especially cheap labour) and the expectation that proximity 
would make it easier to become Nissan supplier. Nissan’s commitment to 
supplier development - referred to by all suppliers consulted as exceeding 
that of all other car producers - has been important for the industry’s 
development. Supplier development has also helped firms to diversify their 
customer basis, something supported by Nissan itself. Local managers 
illustrated the role of Nissan as follows:
“Nissan is very supportive but very hard” (....) “Nissan has a 
reputation for screwing suppliers but they have supplier development 
activities” (....) “If you supply Nissan, you can supply to everyone 
and for all demands.” (....) “Nissan shows a ‘genuine intent’ to get 
into partnership, “they mean what they say about partnership”, by 
disclosing its planning and costing schemes.” (Interviews with 
suppliers to Nissan in the North East of England, 1997)
For advocates of the ‘automotive hub’ idea, however, Nissan’s impact on 
the region might have been less significant than expected. In addition to 
limited local procurement, Nissan established a sophisticated ‘milk-round’ 
logistical chain from the Midlands to acquire the more advanced metal 
components (Charles & Feng, 1994). Over the last six years, Nissan has 
worked towards a more integrated production and supply chain at a 
European level. Regarding its suppliers, Nissan has moved its focus from 
quality management to cost reduction, which will be the central goal with 
the launching of the new model after the Primera. Suppliers, in turn, have 
become more global in orientation, responding to the ongoing trends of 
concentration and globalisation of production and supply chains in the 
industry.
As a result of these tendencies, the main local interest of the automotive 
businesses in the North East seems to have shifted from linkages to the 
wider business environment. Nissan, in particular, has been very keen on 
shaping its own labour force through intensive selection and training, and 
it maintains a variety of relationships with colleges, universities and
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support organisations (such as the TECs) to underpin this. Suppliers have 
followed Nissan in developing stringent recruitment strategies and have 
even copied some of Nissan’s methods of skill development and training. 
A tightening of the labour market in recent years, in which especially 
skilled workers have been in short supply, has caused Nissan as well as 
suppliers to step up action in the area of training. Business has also been 
leading in setting up initiatives because core regional institutions remained 
oriented to the themes of linkages and acquisition. In Nissan’s own view, 
the shift from supplier to labour market issues should be interpreted as a 
natural process, even as a shift to more mature phase of embedding in the 
region. As a result, the agenda has become more institutional.
6.1.3. Cluster initiatives
ASSA: In the North East, several institutional linkages have emerged, 
especially around Nissan. An industrial initiative was the supplier club, 
which has played an important role in Nissan’s strategy of supplier 
development. The first regional initiatives were also geared towards 
improving the technological and organisational capabilities, as part of the 
improvement of supplier basis and skill development. Nissan has been keen 
on assisting in raising ‘awareness’ for business and technology at schools, 
where the firm saw a ‘missionary’ role. Nissan staff also became involved 
in the University of Sunderland, in courses as well as at Board level. The 
firm also assisted in development of new institutes such as the Centre of 
Advanced Manufacturing and Management (CAMM) in Sunderland. The 
latter presents an attempt to build university-business links through a 
stand-alone research and education centre. CAMM plays a role in supplier 
development using Nissan practices; the centre helps with student 
placements in the automotive sector. However, the centre has not really 
become the centre of technological expertise some had initially expected. 
At present, a new research centre is being planned, with help from 
American car producers that may fulfil this role.
For Nissan, the most significant development appears to be the initiative 
geared to skill development and training, through the so-called ‘A19 
initiative’ and ASSA (Automotive Sector Strategic Alliance). These 
initiatives have been designed by senior staff from Nissan (partly on 
secondment) and Sunderland TEC, and are also linked to other automotive 
projects, such as the national SMMT Forum. ASSA was established to 
channel ESF money to an apprenticeship scheme and graduate placement 
in the automotive sector. The objective is to take the responsibility of 
managing training off the firms. The project has a double structure. On the 
one hand, there is the ASSA Forum with a board and subscribing 
members; on the other, ASSA Training and Development Ltd delivering 
the services. The participation of Sunderland City TEC is crucial for 
bringing in external funding and the building of partnerships for funding 
applications and acquiring regional support. The presence of Nissan has 
been essential for getting industrial acceptance for the scheme, although 
some would also argue that ASSA is part of a strategy to offload 
development responsibilities to suppliers and regional institutions. Firms
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have been approached through a process of cascading, starting with the 
first and second tier suppliers down the supply chain, with the aim to reach 
3rd and 4th tier supplier. For ASSA staff, the intention is to go beyond 
training. The ambition is to transform ASSA into a broader ‘self- 
sustaining’ industry association, which may serve as a ‘marketing tool’ for 
the region.
MOBIL: The Hessen support programme for the automotive industry, 
MOBIL, was initiated in 1994 by the Land government. The programme is 
run by the public economic support organisation RKW Hessen. MOBIL 
started with a phase of analysis carried out by academics in the regions, to 
reveal details about the significance of the automotive sector for the local 
economy, and its actual development (Koch & Strutynski, 1996). Based 
on aggregated figures as well as a business survey, the researchers found 
that in 1995 many workers in Hessen were employed in automotive 
suppliers (102.500, 18% of all industrial employment), while a more 
limited share is taken by car assembly (30.000, 5%). The business survey 
also showed that the sector was bound to undergo further rationalisation. 
Between 1995 and 2000, an overall reduction of 15% was expected in 
employment, led by the larger component producers (-24%), while the 
local OEMs (VW Kassel, Mercedez-Benz Kassel, Opel Rüsselheim) were 
expected to shed 7% of their workforce. SMEs (less than 500 employees) 
were expected to shrink by 16%. However, in the case of the latter little 
interest was found in shifting production to foreign locations, or even in 
exporting.
MOBIL was designed to make firms more aware of the importance of new 
management practices, notably those oriented to quality improvement and 
workers’ participation. Perhaps not unexpectedly given the severe crisis 
faced especially by smaller firms, the new ideas were generally well 
received. Indeed, a substantial share of companies examined had already 
taken some steps in the areas of teamwork, process-oriented management 
and continuous improvement, although most were still fixed on traditional 
methods. Less than half of the firms appeared to have sought co-operation 
with other companies, most horizontally with other suppliers, some also in 
a vertical direction (primarily with customers). In sum, the analysis 
resulted in the following list of priority needs that could be met by external 
advice:
1. business organisation and strategy development
2. quality management (including certification)
3. marketing (customer and product-oriented)
4. logistical chain (from manufacturing to delivery)
5. workforce (qualification, motivation, teamwork, remuneration 
systems)
6. Accounting
7. Manufacturing (optimisation, process-orientation)
However, MOBIL was considered as more than just a business support 
programme, but a step forward in developing regional industrial policy 
(Koch & Strutynski, 1996).
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MOBIL intended to encourage a model of inter-business co-operation 
between SMEs (<1000 employees), within a strong modernisation and 
learning perspective. One of the core components of MOBIL is the 
‘Verbundsprojekt’ in which firms jointly work on the themes listed above. 
The co-operative work (2 months) was followed by a phase in which firms 
implement new ideas at an individual level (3 months), followed by a phase 
of joint presentation and discussion of results (1 month). Other MOBIL 
components were dedicated to worker participation and the provision and 
exchange of information through publications and conferences. MOBIL 
was supported by an Advisory Committee, with representatives from the 
Land government, businesses, business associations, Chambers of 
Commerce, unions, universities and economic development organisations. 
Certain MOBIL components were continued in a new programme 
financed under the ADAPT-CORE project: business strategy, TQM/CIM, 
teamwork, project management.
VIA: VIA-NRW presents a framework for channelling funding from the 
Land government to business groups. The initiative is part of the 
Programm für Industrieregionen im Strukturwandel (Programme for 
Industrial Regions in Structural Change), a programme focused on 
industrial restructuring through business co-operation and technological 
development. VIA-NRW is run by a consultancy organisation Agiplan 
based in Mülheim, and is supported, like MOBIL, by an Advisory 
Committee consisting of representatives from public authorities, business 
associations, unions, banks, and the scientific community. The aim of this 
involvement is to embed VIA in a wider co-operation network in NRW. 
The initiative is project-based; most projects are submitted from outside, 
by groups of firms, or Chambers of Commerce, while in a later phase a 
small number of complementary projects has been initiated from within 
VIA. Between 1993 and 1996 there were 169 applications (representing 
630 firms with 135000 employees) of which 42 were approved (317 firms 
with 77600 employees). The projects can have a horizontal (inter-firm), 
vertical (along supply chain) or regional (service provision) ambit; they 
thus vary from specific joint business improvements (quality management, 
certification, R&D, etc.) to the establishment of service centres (such as 
the measurement technique centre in Velbert).
Another, small-scale initiative is the ADAPT-funded project launched by 
IAT to improve supplier-buyer relationships in NRW (Optimierung der 
Produktions- und Lief er be Ziehungen zwischen Zulieferern und 
Hersteller). This initiative is aimed primarily at improving the co­
ordination in the areas of innovation, quality improvement and logistics 
between firms along the supply chain in the region. The project partners 
are Opel and six suppliers to the Opel-Astra line in Bochum (between 150 
and 1500 employees, total 4110 employees). By including a large 
carmaker, the project also tried to respond to the growing distrust arising 
between suppliers and car producers. The project has been developing at 
three levels: individual businesses (direct support), inter-firm (horizontal 
exchange of experiences) and OEM-suppliers (vertical partnership-based 
learning).
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Perspektiven der Automobilzulieferindustrie im Bergisches Land: VIA 
covers the whole Land, and primarily provides a framework to reward 
submitted co-operative project arising out of the industry. In contrast, the 
IAT-ISA initiative for Bergisches Land specifically targeted one region, 
and adopted explicitly an approach of spatial clustering. In certain 
respects, this initiative presents the best case for a study on regional 
networking and association strategies. Not only is this an ambitious 
project focusing on both the business and regional level; it also shows 
what kind of problems can occur when more proactive strategies are 
followed.
Perspektiven was preceded by a detailed study and dialogue between 
academics and policy-makers on the automotive industry in Bergisches 
Land. The results of the study and policy debates were discussed at a 
special conference held just before the start of the project (Kraus et al., 
1993). The research concluded that automotive production covered an 
important share of industrial production (25% of industrial employment), 
but faced a difficult future because of the low level of technological 
sophistication and lack of larger local players. In addition, the sector was 
fragmented and atomised, displaying poor local integration but also 
lacking export potential, and was not recognised as a key sector in the 
area (compared with textiles and metal production, notably Solinger 
knifes). Rather than benefiting from support, local firms appeared to be 
confused by the manifold support programmes, including those on co­
operation. VIA, for instance, had made relatively little impact on regional 
businesses since VIA primarily rewarded co-operative initiatives, while it 
did not show the route to co-operation (neither partner search nor initial 
trust building). A major goal of Perspektiven thus was to create clarity and 
induce co-operative behaviour (Rotha et al., 1995). Enrolment in the 
programme was free.
Business development was co-ordinated by ISA, and aimed at elaborating 
a systematic strategy of supplier development in a supply chain context 
(embracing teamwork, CIM, certification etc.). The core objective of 
supplier development reflected the main interest of ISA as union-based 
consultancy: to secure regional employment. The project acknowledged a 
difference between business and regional interests, and gave priority to the 
latter. This difference is most pronounced in choosing a positioning 
strategy. For individual businesses it may be most appealing to aim for a 
first tier position as system supplier. A possible route is to become a multi­
national company that relocates major segments of production and 
marketing to other countries. For the region, according to the study, it 
may be more useful to nurture second and third-tier position when this 
may prevent relocation, and presents a more realistic strategy to the firm. 
The idea was to coach firms in finding the right strategy, and in securing 
their local ties, by improving inter-firm co-operation as well as enhancing 
workers’ involvement. Both objectives, however, could not be fulfilled. 
While firms showed interest in co-operation, they were generally not 
prepared to go as far as the project facilitators were aiming. To increase 
workers’ involvement, an attempt was made to establish company councils
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with workers’ representation. This was met by stiff resistance from the 
management side and could not be accomplished during the project.
The regional strategy was based on a cluster assessment, which aimed at 
developing structural policies at a cluster level to assist firms with strategic 
reorientation. The regional analysis disclosed that the co-location of 
automotive businesses and the wider regional environment played a minor 
role in strategic business development, and that firms were unspecific 
(although not disinterested) in their articulation of regional needs and 
orientation. Structural policies should thus support the development of a 
regional innovation infrastructure, through increased specialisation and 
alignment of the existing Technology Centres in Bergisches Land. These 
centres are seen as active, especially in the areas of start-ups, spin-off and 
collaboration, although the overall system of technology support is 
fragmented (Fürst & Kilper, 1995). In addition, a proper regional response 
to increased rationalisation was to be devised through an integrated 
business support strategy. This involved workshops in which firms and 
support agencies co-operated to develop certain themes (quality, logistics, 
export, etc.). Both elements, the regional innovation and business support 
strategy, were to be based on associative principles, i.e. through a 
‘regional dialogue’. The whole strategy was seen as a “counter-strategy 
against business closures and relocation” (Rotha et al., 1995, p. 133).
The results from the regional project showed no unqualified success. Both 
regional organisations and businesses displayed reservations about the 
initiatives. One problem for the Technology Centres was that, because of 
their dependency on external funding and contributions, they could not 
risk too high levels of specialisation. Certain public authorities, moreover, 
were not really prepared to support a broader associative strategy. Among 
businesses, finally, levels of motivation and participation were often low, 
so that some workshop plans had to be dropped (e.g. logistics, component 
standardisation). The project mainly led to the consolidation of existing 
networking, rather than nurturing new relationships. One reason for this 
was that business felt that crucial players, such as carmakers in the case of 
logistics, were missing. A core lesson drawn from the project was that 
more organisational knowledge was required about how to facilitate a 
regional dialogue and co-operation, and what flagships should be used - 
such as major customers - to enthuse participants. This insight was used in 
a later project targeting the chemical sector, which will be discussed 
below.
6.1.4. Conclusion
Because of its economic and political significance, the automotive sector 
has featured prominently among cluster initiatives. This is also due to the 
specific industrial-organisational nature of the industry at present. To a 
large extent, the industrial chain is organised at a global level, from design 
and production to marketing. Yet there are many specific areas, such as in 
supply links of bulky components, in subassembly and labour market 
relations, where the industry, particularly small firms, is dependent on
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relations of proximity and on regional embedding. The local-global nexus 
thus permeates many dimensions of cluster development. Much of the 
regional cluster action can be interpreted as the regional ‘response’ to 
global threats and opportunities. In the German regions, the perception of 
threats present the dominant drivers, notably that of relocation and 
marginalisation of SMEs. On the contrary, on Tyneside, where no 
automotive industry pre-existed, actions are more geared to grasping 
opportunities and ‘institution building’.
A general observation is that the articulation of cluster initiatives in both 
cases shows how regional linkages are mediated by businesses and local 
institutions. Only through examining the way the social interaction 
between the actors in the region evolves, can one understand the shaping 
of the local linkages. In this context, businesses are generally driven by 
strategic consideration defined by their position in global chains. In 
addition, they pursue specific regional objectives particularly in the domain 
of the labour market and infrastructure development.
Regional actors pursue regional interests, and have the difficult job of 
aligning the interests of what are increasingly ‘global players’. Their 
strategic power lies in exploiting the business dependencies of the region, 
and in capitalising on those aspects of the global value chain which allow 
benefits from local clustering (such as supply chain development). In the 
case of SMEs, support is devoted to upgrading and modernisation, 
preferably in such a way that the firms keep their positions in the supply 
chain but also remain embedded in the regional economy. The case of 
Automobilzulieferindustrie im Bergisches Land showed that this actually 
led to a kind of trade-off between business-oriented strategies and region- 
oriented strategies. As businesses, suppliers may benefit most from aiming 
for strong positions in the value chain through outward-oriented 
investment strategies. The region may benefit more when firms aim for less 
ambitious strategies retaining a stronger local orientation.
In the German case, creating a kind of regional orientation appeared to be 
difficult. For certain regional interests, notably employment related, 
business commitment was difficult to obtain. On the other hand, the North 
East case gave a good example of the creation of ‘club goods’ through 
institution building in the context of foreign investments. To what extent 
this will become a catalyst for further growth and clustering, as aspired, 
remains to be seen. What is interesting at this point is to compare the 
growth and relational development in a sector dominated by foreign 
investment, with that of the restructuring of a long-established sector in 
the same region which has gone through a long period of decline: the 
marine offshore cluster.
6.2. The offshore cluster on Tyneside
The offshore industry on Tyneside provides an interesting case of 
industrial revival and potential cluster building. The development of this 
sector can be regarded as a manifestation of industrial restructuring at the 
regional level, and business revival at the firm level. As indicated in the
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regional introductions, the offshore industry presents a core economic 
activity in the North East, and particularly on Tyneside. The industry 
features in the various lists of prioritised activities for cluster initiatives. 
Moreover, unlike the automotive industry this is a sector with a long and 
deep history. The core issue is thus not the regional embedding of recently 
developed economic activities, but a process of restructuring and revival. 
Offshore production, to be more precise, presents an opportunity to 
counter the decline of manufacturing in the region, notably in the areas of 
shipbuilding and construction. The case under study here is primarily one 
of ‘institution building’ around issues of supply chain development and 
common resources. The section will show how associational strategies 
geared to the shaping of common institutions and ‘club goods’ represent 
attempts to improve the competitiveness of a specific regional cluster.
While the regional industrial context is different from the automotive case
- actually more akin to the automotive case in the German regions - what 
the two sectors share is the significance of the local-global nexus. The 
regional developments in the offshore sector can only be understood by 
highlighting the position of the industry global networks of production, 
trade and knowledge flows. The analysis then needs to be confronted with 
an assessment of regional networks. Taking the cluster aspects identified 
before, this will start with the business system: How are supply chains 
organised at a local level, and how does this relate to a perspective of 
‘institution building’? What kind of competitiveness-enhancing business 
capabilities are rooted in the local business system? What kind of identity 
has the industry acquired in the global economy based on its business 
performance? Extending this picture, a third theme is the presence of local 
agglomerative assets and institutions, which may be labelled as ‘club 
goods’ and help the industry to improve its global position as well as 
internal coherence. Finally, a last theme is the role of regional local 
institutions in shaping the support system and modernisation agenda. To 
what extent are these strategies informed by a clustering perspective? 
These four themes will be addressed in the next four sections.
The information for the offshore study has been obtained primarily 
through interviews with representatives from the largest companies in the 
region, and with all association with major involvement in the industry. 
Additional information on SMEs was been derived from secondary 
sources, notably surveys carried out in the mid-1990s, plus a limited 
number of interviews. More details on sources and methodology can be 
found in Vollaard, 1997.
Historical development and positioning of the industry
The background for the development of offshore production on Tyneside 
is one of industrial crisis and survival, notably in shipbuilding and 
structural engineering. Much has been written about the causes of the 
decline of shipbuilding in Britain. While the fate of the industry was sealed 
by the rise of Asian producers in the 70s and 80s, the industry had already
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faced difficult periods before. The roots of decline are not so much sought 
in the aggressive entry of producers from the Far East, but the fact that 
Britain had already missed the transition from craft to mass production 
(Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). In the 1920s and 1930s, continental 
producers shifted to new management models, to large-scale production 
based on mechanisation and more standardisation of output, while at 
national level systemic support for R&D and training were created. In 
Britain, in contrast, the industry remained committed to a craft model, as 
can be derived from observations by the Board of Trade in 1932:
[the survival of the industry] “will depend very largely on the extent 
to which the industry is able to reduce its costs by the closing down 
of redundant yards, by a greater degree of standardisation or 
specialisation of output, and by a degree of co-operation between all 
those engaged in the industry (....) We cannot help but feel that the 
provision for research in shipbuilding in this country is inadequate to 
our needs; and that the attitude of the industry towards research is 
not as favourable as it should be” (quoted in Vollaard, 1997, p. 26).
The discovery of the oil fields from the mid-60s onwards offered new 
opportunities for industrial growth, which was initially largely taken up by 
firms with a background in structural engineering. The latter were 
confronted with a stagnating market, due to the end of the post-war 
reconstruction and building boom. The marine offshore market, in 
contrast, presented a related activity with opportunities, and thus became a 
lifeline for the companies. After conversion, firms became part of the 
supply base for topside production, and developed their own specialisation 
in steel fabrication, the development of particular systems and 
subassemblies primarily for topsides. For shipbuilders, despite the need for 
new outlets, the transition turned out to be more difficult. This can be 
partly explained in terms of the lock-in of their assets, partly in terms of 
technological requirements. Shipbuilders were often reluctant to replace 
shipbuilding related assets with offshore-specific assets, thus tying the 
firms in an irreversible way to the offshore market. In addition, 
technological demands are much higher in offshore production, and many 
shipbuilders lacked the expertise (and the willingness to acquire this) to 
meet these needs.
Besides basic competencies, the way the industry positioned itself should 
be explained primarily in terms of inter-firm relationships. While the 
offshore industry evolved, a new production hierarchy developed, with 
lead contractors at the top and several levels of suppliers below that. At a 
first glance, the offshore production line is often compared with that of 
automotive production. A key role is played by the large firms that design 
and assemble the offshore platforms. The main components are bought in 
from the system suppliers, which contribute between 25 to 60% of the 
total value. Main categories of supplies are
1. structural metal components, and pipework;
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2. specialised equipment, such as pneumatic devices, seals, winches, 
electrical goods, IT installations and so-called ‘HVACs’ (heating, 
ventilating and air conditioning systems).
3. specialist services: this involves companies offering on-site metal 
treatment, electrical wiring and installation of instruments, design 
services, environmental services, training and various professional 
business services.
There is a great variation in dependency on the offshore chain. While firms 
in metal-related production or services, as well as design firms, often 
derive a large share of their income from the offshore sector (sometimes 
shared with shipbuilding), the reverse is true for pipework manufacturers 
and most other service providers. The first-tier suppliers of manufactures, 
notably in metal, in turn, purchase more standardised parts and 
components from smaller firms specialised in ‘metal-bashing’.
Compared with automotive production, the production chain appears to 
have fewer tiers, and differs especially in the downstream section. Where 
car producers dominated both upstream (towards suppliers) and 
downstream (towards distributors), offshore lead contractors are 
dependent on a small number of extremely powerful clients, the oil 
companies. The tender and purchasing strategies of the oil companies have 
a great impact on the relational patterns through the entire offshore design 
and production chain. Industrial development is highly dominated by the 
tender cycles, which determine the amount of work allocated to lead 
contractors.
One of the results of the decreasing oil price over the last decade has been 
the launching of various cost reduction initiatives imposed upon the 
offshore production chain by the oil companies. In Britain, oil companies 
together with the DTI launched CRINE (1993), which stands for the 
eloquent phrase ‘Cost Reduction Initiative for the New Era’. CRINE, 
aimed at deriving more efficiency by streamlining the contractual process. 
Through the work of various committees and workgroups (the CRINE 
Network), the initiative has contributed to the standardisation of the main 
terms and conditions in major areas of offshore work and to the creation 
of a suite of contracts, removing the need for parties to carry out a full 
contractual review on each and every tender. While CRINE was presented 
as a way to create a greater sense of partnership between oil companies 
and contractors, the initial response of the latter was far from co­
operative. Most contractors saw CRINE as an instrument to squeeze 
constructors’ profits and increase customer control under the heading of 
standardisation. This idea was triggered especially by the oil companies’ 
claim that the project was justified on the grounds that British contractors 
were a third more expensive than others (iv). The initial resistance to the 
initiative forced the oil companies to review their approach and launch 
CRINE II, which was more modest in aims and participation.
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So, to what extent have these historical and global factors facilitated the 
growth of an offshore cluster in the North of England? What is important 
for the area is the presence of a high number of lead contractors (AMEC, 
A&P Tyne. Aker McNulty, Tyne-Tees Dockyard). Two kinds of linkages 
can be distinguished with their own specific impact on cluster 
development: trade and non-trade linkages.
Trade linkages are characterised by a high level of local purchasing. The 
lowest figure was quoted by Swan Hunters (40%), while other companies 
even reached levels of 90% (35). Swan Hunter’s low figure was seen as 
exceptional moreover, a result from the fact that their actual main job 
involved the finishing of the pipeline laying ship ‘the Solitaire’ with a high 
level of input obtained via the customer. What these high levels of local 
content disguise however is that most high value added activities, notably 
design and special consultancy, are not included in the contract. These 
phases have traditionally been arranged by the customer, and are 
concentrated around the main locations of the oil companies HQs, such as 
London or Houston. In addition, it should be said that offshore production 
in the North East is dominated by externally controlled firms, which have 
most of their core administrative and decision-making power outside the 
region. Indeed, the main capabilities in the region are found at the 
operational level: ‘metal-bashing’, and assembly. There are some smaller 
clusters of technologically advanced companies, such as in marine design 
and pipeline consultancy (see Chapter 7), but these have only a limited 
impact on the overall shape and development of the industry. Hence, the 
regional industry in the industry is shaped largely around the construction 
of top-side modules, and the notions of clustering converge on the 
development of supply chains around the lead contractors specialising in 
construction and reconversion activities.
For non-trade linkages, a significant development is the growth of 
horizontal exchanges between the lead contractors. The last decade, in 
particular, has seen a growing trend to co-operation, partly as result of the 
need to share resources in order to fulfil more complex demands from 
customers. This varies from using specific facilities such as dry-docks to 
outsourcing specific tasks of offshore fabrication or ship conversion. 
However, there are still major obstacles to co-operation, stemming from 
different bidding strategies and different management styles and 
competition on the labour market (see below). The largest company on the 
Tyne (AMEC), for instance, has the tendency to quote low prices and tries 
to seek extra revenues through later adaptations, while other companies 
tend to take less risky routes. The strongest difference in management 
styles can be found between the indigenous companies such as Tyne-Tees 
Dockyard, and foreign owned companies such as Swan Hunters and Aker 
McNulty. At a more strategic level, however, exchange remains limited. 
Given its position as merely a ‘construction platform’, the region remains 
dependent on more strategic functions and decision-making elsewhere.
6.2.1. Local nexus of related industries: the emergence of a cluster?
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Specialisation is not only dependent on the articulation of internal linkages, 
but also on the local assets and support mechanisms available to the 
industry. When these assets are rooted in the local economy, generally
available to the industry and partly independent from the performance of 
individual firms, they are defined as ‘club goods’. In the case of the NE 
offshore sector, two such goods are important: the labour market and the 
activities of the regional industry association, the NOF. What stands out 
less is the role of the technology infrastructure. Besides the general 
emphasis on production, what seems to support the weak technological 
basis is the observation by business representatives that the links with 
universities and research centres are poorly developed. Since this is more 
an issue of strategy development, it will be further addressed in the next 
section. The present section will explore the labour market and 
associational dimensions.
The labour market is a sensitive issue in the offshore sector. As a result of 
the strong variation in production volume, most employment contracts are 
short-term. Workmen are taken on when a job is secured, and they leave 
when work is running out. While this has the short-term benefit of 
maximum flexibility, it has also a number of disadvantages. The hire-and- 
fire context induces workers to behave in the interest of their own income 
security only. Especially over recent years, when contract lengths were 
reduced (down to only one month!), companies in the North East have 
been confronted with an opportunistic workforce which showed 
decreasing levels of loyalty to their employer. This became especially acute 
when order books were full, and workers switched to better paying 
companies, sometimes even outside the region. Workerve has developed 
strong associational networks with rapid exchange of information on 
future employment contracts. Such networking is much better amongst 
craft workers than among management staff.
The companies have tried to counter what they see as opportunistic 
behaviour by improving their human resource management, notably 
through personal databases. However, they can continue to expect such 
behaviour as long as contracts remain short term:
“Loyalty can only flourish where workers are convinced they have a 
long-term future. They have to make as much money as they can, 
because it might be the last contract” (Tom Brennan, chairman of 
the Tyne and Blyth Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering 
Unions, quoted in the Financial Times, 25 Nov 1996)
Some local observers see the high level of flexibility in the labour market 
as damaging for the industry in the long run (iv). One key problem is the 
lack of collective co-ordination in the way workers are employed and 
trained. In time of labour shortages, for instance, lead contractors tend to 
poach people from the first-tier suppliers, sometimes leading to supply 
shortages or quality problems. With high labour mobility, there are few 
incentives for firms to invest in training. Moreover, industrial relations are 
highly traditional, based on hierarchical and authoritarian management 
styles. The lead contractors regularly suffer from spontaneous ‘walk-outs’ 
caused by collective dissatisfaction among the workforce, often related to 
issues of safety or working conditions.
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Tensions in the labour market are also caused by different pay rates. 
Traditionally, workers in the offshore sector have received substantially 
higher wages than workers in shipbuilding. With the growth of ship 
conversion towards offshore platforms, however, the division between the 
two sectors has become blurred. While some companies with a 
specialisation in conversion, such as Swan Hunters and A&P Tyne, pay 
shipbuilding rates, companies with a background in offshore fabrication, 
pay higher rates.
While the contractual side of the labour market is one factor with a 
negative impact on skill development, a more structural factor is the 
insufficient inflow of young workers. Partly due to a negative image of the 
industry caused by years of decline and closures, partly resulting from cuts 
in formal training (notably the abandonment of apprenticeships in the 
1980s), the workforce is ageing rapidly. This is seen as a major problem by 
the industry. There is an acute lack of good technicians and operators, 
even more than of academically trained engineers. A recent response to 
this lack has been the gradual re-introduction of apprenticeships, partly by 
private initiative (Swan Hunters and A&P Tyne), partly through 
established training organisations. The role of the latter has been 
streamlined, moreover. From a fragmented and uncoordinated situation in 
which training was provided by 13 organisations, there are only a few left. 
The major winner of this concentration process is South Tyneside College, 
which, from a long-standing tradition in merchant officer training, has 
expanded its curriculum with more technical subjects.
Another important ‘club good’ is the Northern Offshore Federation 
(NOF), a regional membership-based industrial association established in 
1988. The launching of the NOF was motivated by a study commissioned 
by the DTI Regional Office (Department of Trade and Industry) which 
revealed the poor communicative linkages within the industry and the 
potential for collaboration. The study recommended, in particular, the 
founding of an organisation representing the interests of smaller firms in 
the North of England. The NOF started as a spin-off from NDC, and was 
backed by the Tyne and Wear Development Corporation. It evolved as a 
membership based organisation. Since its launch, the NOF has been 
essential in bringing local firms together and providing a range of support 
services for its members (with a peak around 280 in the mid-1990s, now 
around 240, including research and education institutions). Through its 
international presentation, the organisation has contributed substantially to 
the identity of the North East as an offshore production area.
The NOF gives small firms the opportunity to meet customers in ‘Meet the 
Buyer’ sessions and customer-specific workshops. Recently new initiatives 
have been developed to promote IT developments among SMEs, 
nurturing the development of local business networks, which are able to 
bid for larger projects. The NOF has played an important facilitative and 
co-ordinating role in the rationalisation and strengthening of training. The 
organisation has also forged new links between the sector and universities,
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for instance in the context of the national Technology Foresight 
Programme (1994-1996). The NOF is also active in export promotion and 
marketing through the organisation of trade missions and exhibitions. The 
organisation also carries out regular audits. An in-depth analysis of the 
local offshore supply chain has been carried out in 1998. Part of the NOF 
work is paid out of ERDF funding.
The NOF is considered as a model organisation for private membership- 
based business support, especially in Britain as this type of organisation is 
not widespread. The organisation receives numerous requests for visits, 
interviews and lectures to explain its development and success. However, 
as a ‘club good’ the organisation seems to be primarily important for the 
larger firms in the region, despite its initial emphasis on smaller firms. For 
the latter, the NOF still seems distant, although improvements have been 
made. A study on small suppliers on Walker Riverside, North of the Tyne, 
included the following summary about the firms’ experience with the 
NOF:
“Their experience seemed to be mixed, but as much as anything this 
appeared to reflect their level of involvement in NOF activities and 
their awareness of NOF services. The NOF has come a long way 
since it was established (. ) some of its members, particularly 
longer-standing members, seem to be unaware of the full range of 
services it now offers” (Economic Research Services, 1997, p.27)
The strong position of large firms should not be read as purely a matter of 
political and economic dominance. Since small firms largely depend on 
large firms for their business, they are primarily interested in opportunities 
to contact and learn from their main customers. Nevertheless, there is 
some resentment among SMEs about the dominant role of large 
companies. In particular, it is felt that the NOF does not make sufficient 
efforts to gear its services to SMEs, for instance by organising events 
close to the sites where SMEs supplying to the offshore sector are 
clustered (such as Walker Riverside). Also on the side of the lead 
contractors some doubts about the effectiveness of the NOF can be heard, 
although they are more of a pragmatic nature. Some firms have developed 
their own initiatives bypassing the NOF framework. As a result, the NOF 
lacks the power and mandate to play a more strategic role in the region, 
which could for instance include an ability to launch its own initiatives to 
set industry standards and co-ordinate R&D. In its present form, the NOF 
is representative body which is confined in its action to the shared interests 
of its members. Despite these limitations, it is an organisation unique in its 
kind in this part of the industrial world, providing an invaluable link 
between different actors in the regional economy.
6.2.3. Embedding: The role of regional local institutions in shaping the 
support system and modernisation agenda.
Although things may change in the future, at present there is no concerted 
strategic action to drive industrial development on Tyneside or the North
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East. There are many organisations, each with their own agendas and 
interests, although ad-hoc alignments take place when organisations 
develop joint project applications (for more details on the regional 
governance structure, see previous chapter). Since the early 1990s, 
regional initiatives have been framed in one setting as part of the 
application for European structural funds, and this has incited some more 
fundamental debates about the economic future of the region.
Despite its historical roots in the region, offshore production does not 
feature prominently in the agenda of core organisations such as NDC, the 
TECs, the Development Corporations and the local authorities. The main 
reason for this is continued association with an industry in decline, rather 
than a sector with renewed growth potential. The poor faith in harbour- 
related activities has been demonstrated, in particular, by the conversion of 
many sites for other functions. This even included the decision by the Tyne 
and Wear Development Corporation to dismantle the only deep-water 
berth with 24 hours access in the region. It is only recently, with the 
success of the offshore activities, that the sector receives more attention 
and interest, notably from technical colleges and training organisations 
(e.g. TECs). Marine related activities have thus regained their position in 
the cluster specialisation map of the region and in the reshaping of its 
regional economic identity.
As a result of renewed interests in the sector, the first turn-around in 
attitudes has taken place in training. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the 
decline in shipbuilding as well as the central government’s general policy 
to abandon apprenticeship schemes, had led to a massive trimming down 
of educational and training capacity for marine industrial activities. 
Confronted with an increasing skills gap, the regional institutions are 
focused on restoring and improving training capacity. The consolidation of 
the training infrastructure by the NOF, as discussed in the last section, has 
provided an important step in this direction. Together with the firms, 
TECs and technical colleges, opportunities are sought to develop new 
proposals which may draw upon European funding.
Another area of strategic interest is improving the quality and use of the 
technological infrastructure. A major initiative has been the Three Rivers 
Project, which consists of three academic-industry collaborative ventures 
located along the three rivers. Two of these ventures, a process industry 
centre based in Teesside University (EPICC), and a high volume 
engineering oriented centre on the Wear in Sunderland (CAMM) bear little 
relevance to the offshore sector. The third venture, however, the European 
Centre for Advanced Industries (ECAI) on the Tyne is geared towards 
marine industries, offshore and energy sectors. ECAI was meant to be 
related to the department of Marine Engineering at Newcastle University, 
and its research centre EDC (Engineering Design Centre). It should be 
noted however that, while the EDC has been very successful in acquiring a 
wide range of research-related activities, ECAI, as the business oriented 
venture, acquired a different mission.. One problem has been that while
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ECAI was in development, and a special building was erected for its 
location on the Northern Tyne bank (Royal Quays), a part of its activities 
as well as dedicated space was reallocated to micro-electronics activities 
triggered by the Siemens investment. One of the complaints from the side 
of offshore companies is that, overall, university departments have shown 
little interest in the development of the local marine industries, with the 
exception of the most advanced activities such as marine design and 
consultancy.
Within the overall framing of regional development initiatives, ECAI is 
part of the ‘low volume’ sectoral strand as perceived by NDC, 
distinguished from three other strands: ‘high volume’, ‘process’ and 
‘services’. As explained before, this is a conception grafted onto a 
pyramidal supply chain model, which stresses the role of large businesses 
as core buyers. The strands are to be developed through the creation of 
‘clusters of common interest’ and regional partnerships. Most of NDC’s 
strategic action as well as practical work are focused on the ‘high volume 
sector’, where more opportunities are found for investment acquisition and 
linkage brokering.
A different form of support comes from a local business support agency 
that is geared towards promoting networking among SMEs. While this 
organisation, the North Tyneside Real Service Centre, now covers a wide 
range of activities, it initially started with two offshore-related groups of 
firms. The first group, Argonautics, specialises in design and consultancy 
in marine engineering; the second group, Pegasus, provides services in the 
area of pipeline construction and testing. The facilitation of and support to 
‘business clusters’ was triggered by a crisis situation in which the North 
Tyneside Council was confronted with an acute closure and threat of 
further loss of innovative expertise. Argonautics emerged after the 
collapse of the last shipyard (Swan Hunters) in 1994 (Swan Hunters was 
later reopened under the same name as a foreign owned ship conversion 
and offshore fabrication yard. Pegasus was developed after the closure of 
the British Gas Engineering Research Station at Killingworth which 
employed around 500 people, some of whom set up their own business. 
The Pegasus cluster has been particularly successful in supporting new 
business by preserving some regional expertise in the area of pipeline 
design and maintenance. Over the last two years, its six member firms have 
been able to develop new expertise (notably in pipeline rehabilitation) and 
to access new markets abroad through an aggressive cluster marketing 
strategy (for more on the role of the North Tyneside Real Service Centre, 
see below). It should be added, however, that these business clusters are 
not firmly integrated in the local offshore industry, but are more geared 
towards the national and international markets.
6.2.4. Conclusion
Since the offshore industry shares some characteristics with automotive 
production, there are some similarities with the previous cases. Most 
significantly, the offshore case endorses the notion of the co-articulation of
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global production chains and local networks of production. Again, ‘local’ 
and ‘global’ should not been seen as primarily contrasting spatial 
outcomes, but as part of a process of mutual influence. Many forms of 
interaction are shaped and put into context by global factors. Local supply 
chain initiatives reflect the way companies draft contracts and interact at a 
global level. Likewise, through observing global developments, local 
actors obtain ideas about which core factors underpin ‘regional 
competitiveness’. This informs regional associational strategies targeted on 
collaboration, institutionalisation (e.g. , the NOF) and the shaping of a 
regional identity and ‘club goods’ (e.g., training programmes). Evidently, 
all these processes are mediated by local factors, such as the collective 
view on modernisation and factors of competitiveness (e.g., supply chain 
focus), and the cultural obstacles to collaboration. ‘Global’ conditions and 
impulses are thus translated into local action and agendas.
Obviously, there are areas where ‘local’ and ‘global’ present opposite 
spatial outcomes, for instance in business procurement decisions. If a firms 
decides to seek supplies from outside a region, this will reduce the sales 
opportunities for local suppliers, at least in the short term. However, for 
other dimensions, notably the development of institutional linkages, and 
various forms of business interaction, a picture of co-articulations appears 
to be more appropriate. Clustering, in this view, is not so much an issue of 
geographical concentration of production that stands in marked contrast 
with tendencies to globalisation and ‘footlessness’. Rather, it reflects a 
process of creating a active regional response, based on relational 
principles, to global developments, which includes certain forms of 
regional networking and embedding.
In the latter processes, SMEs play a specific role. In the offshore case, the 
role of SMEs in the regional clusters could be addressed primarily through 
the supply chain perspective. The findings reveal that the position of SMEs 
is relatively weak both economically and institutionally. This is also due to 
the specific nature of the offshore industry and the business environment. 
SMEs appear to be hit, for instance, by the increased poaching in the 
labour market due to a growing skills shortage. It will be difficult, 
however, to check such tendencies as long as the skills problem remains, 
since large firms will generally be the stronger and more preferred party in 
the labour market. The main opportunities thus lie in improving the 
training and technology infrastructure and gearing this specifically to the 
needs of SMEs.
The next case will show a very different economic activity, to see to what 
extent these conclusions hold when sectors with very different 
characteristics are examined.
6.3. The wine cluster in Aragón
Only three decades ago, the grapes from Cariñena, used for producing 
strong, dark wine, were more expensive the those in La Rioja. Since then, 
La Rioja has become a symbol of a wine region that has gained 
international reputation and become highly competitive in the international
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market. At present, Aragonese wines are marketed internationally as 
originating from just ‘east from La Rioja’. Like many other wine- 
producing regions, Aragón appears to suffer from the fact that, to use the 
words of a famous wine expert:
“If anything, Rioja was too successful and the Spanish are now 
desperately trying to convince consumers that the country has other 
wine regions” (Stevenson, 1991, p. 269).
Despite this obstacle, Aragón can now be included in a group of regions 
that, through a combination of business and institutional factors, has 
achieved an impressive growth in wine quality as well as sales, notably in 
foreign markets. Other regions are Navarra, Catalonia, Valencia, and La 
Mancha. Compared with these regions, Aragón is still lagging behind in its 
institutional developments as well as in the acquiring of international 
reputation. Yet, as an influential Spanish newspaper concluded, Aragón 
may still be neglected wine region but it should be praised for its recent 
innovation (cf. El Mundo, Suplemento, 28 Sept. 1997).
Aragón has four wine regions, all of which have experienced growth and 
increased competitiveness. In addition to Cariñena, a major winemaking 
area is Campo de Borja, West of Zaragoza, which is traditionally known 
for its quality wine (Borsau). Two smaller areas are Somontano in Huesca 
towards the French border, which was in decline until its re-emergence as 
a high quality wine area in the 90s, and Calatayud (towards Madrid). The 
recent successes of the Aragonese wine can be attributed to the specific 
initiatives developed in these four regions, as well as the interactions 
between them. Moreover, economic improvements have not only 
strengthened the Aragonese economy as a whole, but also provided some 
grains of hope for areas that for decades have suffered from economic and 
demographic decline. The regional public sector has played a major, 
although also contested, role in the various local initiatives. More than in 
previous cases, the emphasis is on ‘institution building’, which now also 
includes institutional change at the business level itself.
The findings are presented here following closely the pro-forma 
introduced earlier (See Table 12). Besides documentation, the results are 
based on a series of interviews with local experts from the University (2), 
Regional Department of Agriculture (1), Regional Development Agency 
(2), representatives of the wine producers (four larger companies), 
representatives of the business association (3), and representative from the 
local wine retail sector (2). Interviews were held in October 1997 and May 
1998.
6.3.1. The policy cycle
In the Aragonese case, the concept of clusters has not featured explicitly in 
the initiative except for the most recent period. Nevertheless, especially 
recent policy developments in the Basque Country and Catalonia have 
inspired Aragonese policy-makers to explore the possibilities of a local 
cluster initiative. In the Basque Country, in particular, the cluster approach 
has been fundamental in the development of industrial policy since 1991.
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In the first cluster analysis, Rioja wine (which partly stems from the South 
of the Basque Country) was even included as one of the potential targets 
(Monitor Company, 1991). The key elements Aragón absorbed from the 
neighbouring regions were the relational and associative approach to 
sector targeting, and the emphasis on the role of ‘leading’ firms to spark 
off new forms of co-operative behaviour and business change. For this 
reason, the initiative has been included as a case, with as interesting 
dimensions the emphasis on a traditional endogenous sector. Recently, the 
label of clusters has been linked to sectoral initiatives in Aragón, and at 
present the IAF is exploring further applications of the cluster approach.
Initiation
It is common knowledge that Aragón’s endogenous economic sectors, 
notably agriculture, show poor performance. Using a production function 
model, Feijoo Bello and Pérez y Pérez estimated that in most agricultural 
sectors productivity only reaches 40% to 60% of the optimal technical 
efficiency rate (based on optimal use of available production factors) 
(Table 18). Research by the regional employers’ federation revealed that, 
on average, co-operatives showed low profits, poor use of capital and 
labour (also finding overcapacity rates of over 100%, although the 
equipment on which this was based was also typified as largely obsolete), 
and lacked proper marketing policies (similar conclusions have also been 
drawn for co-operatives in other Spanish regions).
Table 18 Estimation of technical efficiency in Aragonese food sectors, 1992 (1 =
optimal^





Fruit and vegetables 0.33
Total 0.39
Source: Feijoo Bello & Pérez y Pérez, 1994
On the market side, a double problem is observed. Not only have export 
figures been generally low, agricultural products also suffered from a low 
esteem in the local market. This is considered a major obstacle to further 
product development and market expansion. Public support to the wine 
sector in Aragón is thus part of a wider ambition to improve both the 
supply and demand side of the Aragonese agricultural sector. Wine is not 
the only product that has been targeted, but so far has been the most 
important one. Other products are cereals, ham, fruit and vegetables, and 
olive oil (supported by ADABA Asociación para la Defensa y Promoción 
del Aceite de Oliva del Bajo Aragón, see www.iaf.es/adaba/index.htm)
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Role o f support agencies and funding regimes
The initiatives have been developed through the Regional Government, 
notably the Department of Agriculture and the Regional Development 
Agency (IAF). While the Department focused on technological assistance 
and attendance at specialised fairs, IAF directly intervened in business 
development and assisted in export promotion. In general, the 
Department’s role is more supportive, and that of IAF is more strategic. 
The initiative discussed here has been largely facilitated by IAF, and took 
shape in the early 1990s. There are also other organisations that actively 
promote agricultural development, such as the business federation CREA. 
As indicated before, CREA acts largely independently from the local 
authorities.
IAF is the semi-private arm of the regional government in charge of more 
strategic forms of intervention. In supporting the wine sector, IAF has 
been the leading organisation. It has used its own resources plus European 
Structural Funds to finance the intervention. Since a part of the finance 
was spent on direct participation in capital shares, it is expected that this 
will be regained once IAF pulls out. Other public organisations have also 
been involved, particularly for technology transfer. This includes a general 
supportive role by the Department of Agriculture and an operational role 
by the Station for Viticulture, which has a special role in sustaining and 
improving local vine varieties. Also banks have collaborated in the sectoral 
initiative alongside the public sector, which at least for this sector is quite 
a unique phenomenon. They have made a substantial financial 
contribution, especially through shareholding(see below).
Cluster mapping and audits
Two kinds of local information have informed the public interventions. 
First, more general knowledge about the state of the agricultural and wine 
sector; second, a specific audit of the sector issued by the regional 
development agency.
General sectoral knowledge is widely available. Much more than the 
industrial and service sector, the agricultural sector is subject of a constant 
research effort. This is due, to a large extent, to the fact that agriculture 
has traditionally been the only significant indigenous sector in the region, 
and that much of the applied research in the university and research 
centres has been geared towards the agricultural sector. Most of the 
research is technological, but some research is devoted to the 
organisational structure of the sector, notably the role of the co­
operatives. As in most areas of Spain, co-operatives have dominated 
agricultural production in Aragón since the 1960s. One of the key 
questions that has occupied researchers is to what extent have co­
operatives a suitable organisation to meet today’s competitive challenges, 
in terms of both productivity and marketing. While it is generally 
acknowledged that co-operatives have played an indispensable role in the 
modernisation of agricultural production in the past decades, they are now 
increasingly perceived as inflexible and rigid. A major problem is that the
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farmers, as vine cultivators, tend to resist tighter quality conditions and 
vine selection. Because they own the winemaking co-operatives, they can 
thus frustrate any attempt to upgrade product quality through demanding 
improvement of the raw material.
More specific knowledge was obtained through commissioned research. 
The main conclusion drawn from general observations was that the 
indigenous wine sector faced the challenge of transforming a low-quality, 
production-based system into a high-quality, marketing oriented sector. 
Within this context, IAF asked a consultancy firm to examine the business 
side of the sector (1991). Finding especially the quality and marketing 
sides wanting, the report produced the following recommendations:
1. to draft a strict quality plan covering the whole chain from field to 
marketing, which would improve competitiveness against other 
Spanish quality wines
2. to develop homogeneous product characteristic for each of the 
Aragonese wine regions, facilitating differentiation and hence the 
creation of ‘exclusive’ identities for each region.
3. designing and implementing plans for marketing, and promoting 
‘wines from Aragón’ as quality products closely associated with 
the process of wine certification.
4. development of commercial structures to acquire and consolidate 
substantial local market shares, also exploring the (inter)national 
market perspective.
The support model that was advocated was one in which ‘leader firms’ 
were created in each of the four wine areas in Aragón. These leader firms 
should then acts as local disseminators of new business cultures, new 
working practices, new technologies, and, most significantly, 
organisational change. The latter was achieved by the fact that the ‘leader 
firms’ were supposed to be private companies, substituting for co­
operative forms of marketing and preferably also of production. Leader 
firms were thus seen as vehicles to move wine production from the era of 
co-operativism to the era of capitalism. However, transformation towards 
increased commercialisation and professionalisation was combined with a 
notion of local associationalism (‘gluing’ is the term used by the 
government agency and local wine experts). Such associationalism was 
supposed to include a trend towards collaboration as well as of 
concentration: “The realisation of these points requires a close 
collaboration between the Bodegas, based on the assumption that the 
strengthening of the DO demands a leader Bodega and a brand name 
acting as growth engines, pulling the other firms” (comment from IAF, 
1998)
It was through demonstration and collaboration that good practices were 
expected to spill over from ‘leader firms’ to followers in the area. This 
also demanded a change in basic attitudes and behaviour. Despite the 
dominance of co-operative organisational forms, co-operation between 
organisations was largely lacking. Competition within the wine areas, 
particularly between villages, was rife, and seen as impeding wider
AL ADAPT report (02/11/99) - 159 -
modernisation. ‘Leader firms’ were thus expected to give an example at a 
subregional and regional level. The strategy was also supposed to 
contribute to concentration by merger of local companies.
Subsequent follow-op research was commissioned from another 
consultancy to look in more detail at one area, that of Somontano, and to 
develop a strategy to revive the wine sector there. Wine production in 
Somontano had reached crisis point. In the case of two large co­
operatives, farmers had not been paid for their crop for a year or more. 
Somontano, accordingly, became the initial focal point of support.
Setting objectives and methods
The main goal of public interventions was to facilitate the transformation 
of the wine sector from a backward, fragmented industry to a modern, 
quality oriented sector with increased local and external market share. 
Especially in the wine sector, quality improvement is seen as the only way 
to survive in a market in which customers are increasingly demanding and 
which, despite existing overcapacity, is constantly challenged by new 
entrants, notably from the New World but also from new Old World areas 
(e.g. East Europe). In effect, from an international perspective, Aragón 
can be considered as a new entrant itself. Public intervention was not only 
geared to foreign markets, but to also to address poor reputation and 
increase market share at the local and national level.
To translate the general goal into more specific objectives, much was 
learnt from other successful wine regions in Spain. Success, particularly 
towards international markets, was attributed to two factors:
1. improving quality on a continual basis (following notably Rioja and 
Penedés, Catalonia)
2. marketing through accessing the retail chains in the Western 
markets (supermarkets and wine shop chains).
Two regions which are seen regarded as particularly successful in 
marketing are Catalonia, which is characterised by its commercial spirit, 
and Valencia, which was able to benefit from its marketing knowledge and 
established retail chains for fruit. Much marketing in Valencia is carried 
out on a collective basis, whereas in Aragón firms have traditionally 
worked on an individual, hence fragmented basis. Other regions, such as 
Galicia, and Andalucía have led in public support strategies to improve 
marketing and promotion, while others have led in technological 
developments (such as through the viticultural and oenological research 
station in Navarra, EVENSA).
To this double aim, improving quality and marketing, another dimension 
should be added, that of institution building. To compete on a quality basis 
in the wine sector, production areas need to be recognised as controlled 
quality wine zones, and the need to have the systems in place to meet the 
European standards for quality wines. These standards, largely grafted 
onto the French model of origin control (Appelation Controlé), demand 
exact spatial demarcation, prescribe traditional use of vine varieties and 
cultivation methods (which means: no or little irrigation), compel local
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bottling, set maximum ceilings for grape yields per hectare, and demand 
the implementation of wine testing systems. In Spain, origin control is 
regulated through the label of ‘Denominación de Origen' (DO), the 
Spanish equivalent of ‘Appellation Controlé’. A key role in arranging the 
institutional aspects of the DOs and in co-ordinating the original control is 
played by the local regulators of each DO (Consejadores). Over 60% of 
the Spanish area under vine enjoys a DO status; ironically, while the EU 
thus protects most wine names, this excludes the name of Sherry, 
something which was opposed by Britain and Ireland when Spain entered 
the Common Market in 1986.
For Aragón, then, this meant that the four wine regions had to comply 
with the conditions to become an area of Denominación de Origen, and 
that the amount of wine bottled with under the DO label had to be 
increased. The Reguladores and ‘leader firms’ were to play a major role to 
achieve these objectives.
Implementation
As followed from the audit process, establishing leader firms was the main 
method for sectoral development. This process took several shapes. In 
Somontano, a new firm was mounted (COVISA, selling under the name 
Viñas del Vero), on the basis of public and commercial bank investments. 
COVISA controls the full chain of production (cultivation, fermentation, 
bottling, and marketing). The company even has its own R&D department. 
Also in Somontano, another limited company (Bodegas Pirineos) was 
established with the help of public funding and other investors (banks and 
wine companies) to revive and modernise two co-operatives by providing 
a commercial marketing outlet. A third Bodega also emerged, without 
public support but which has benefited from the rising reputation of the 
DO (Enate Viñedos y Crianzas del Alto Aragón, regarded by experts as 
one of the best winemakers of Aragón). Additionally, in two other areas 
(Campo de Borja and Cariñena), concentration of the wine production and 
marketing phase was desired. After initial attempts to transform co­
operatives into single commercial companies had failed, IAF took a stake 
in two companies. First, Bodegas Aragonesas in Campo de Borja, which 
in addition to its traditional link with one co-operative, incorporated a new 
link with (as well as capital of) the co-operative Santo Cristo de Magallón. 
Second, Grandes Vinos and Viñedos in Cariñena which, through the 
agreement, has been linked to three local co-operatives: San José de 
Aguarón, San Roque de Alfamén, San Barnabé de Cosuenda). In the latter 
region, IAF faced strong resistance from the largest Bodega of Aragón, 
San Valero; an agreement was only reached last year. In Calatayud, finally, 
IAF has not yet been able to achieve results, despite some initiatives and 
much pressure.
Cluster composition
Given the emphasis on leader firms and concentration of 
production/marketing functions, the selection of firms was to a certain
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extent straightforward. The initiative targeted the largest wine producers 
in each region, and aimed at concentration of production and sales through 
a limited company (Bodega). There was a tendency in this strategy, 
however, towards a more inclusive approach. The initiative to support the 
creation of Bodegas Pirineos, for instance, was partly triggered by the fact 
that the first action in Somontano, the creation of COVISA (initial project 
1986, established between 1990-92), had bypassed the established growers 
and producers. “We are the local producers, and we are not receiving any 
support”, was the comment of a local wine producer at their initial 
response. Intervention thus shifted from focusing on one ‘leader’ as model 
firms to a broader intervention to prevent a major economic collapse in the 
area. Equally, the support to the other regions was in part triggered by the 
feeling of an unfair favouring of Somontano. Similar feelings of resentment 
emerged: “We are the established wine regions, so why is Somontano 
receiving so much public support?” . More specifically, one representative 
of an established Bodega claimed: “we would be light years from here if 
we had received the subsidies given to CO VIS A”. While concentration 
and creating leader models had been part of the strategy from the outset, 
these reactions led to direct public interventions in each region (Table 19). 
At the bottom line, hence, the cluster composition is not confined to firms, 
but to geographical borders. It is the full four DOs at which the initiative is 
aiming, and it is only those wine producers that are not located within the 
DOs that are really excluded.
Table 19 Direct participation of IAF and other regional bodies in the wine sector, 
1997
Firm Region IAF participation (%) Other investors
A Somontano 28.5 Dept. of Agriculture, 3 banks
B Somontano 20.8 Banks, 2 Bodegas, 1 Co-operative
C Borja 40.19 2 Co-operatives
D Cariñena 26.6 3 Co-operatives, 2 banks, local society for 
transformation of the wine sector
E Calatayud 0 (still under negotiation)
Source: Bodegas (presented anonymously) and IAF
Evaluation and monitoring.
Since this initiative is more a sequence of actions within a larger than the 
unfolding of one programme one cannot speak of a proper evaluation 
framework. The interventions are justified largely on the basis of the 
commercial success the targeted firms have shown in recent years. 
Obviously, parts of the activities funded under the Structural Funds are 
subject to evaluation, but this is only confined to the particular investment 
undertaken (largely in infrastructure).
6.3.2. Business development perspective
Direct benefits: improving business capabilities through clustering
This initiative was directly targeted on business development, against the 
background of considerable modernisation potential and with substantial
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(direct) financial support. It may come as no surprise, therefore, that 
business development has been very successful. In practical terms, new 
state-of-the-art equipment was installed in all Bodegas for pressing, 
fermenting, blending and bottling. Most machinery was bought in Italy and 
France, with only simple equipment procured domestically. Additionaly, 
more professional oenologists have been employed, and their task has 
become more important in the overall production process and marketing 
strategy. Old practices based on tradition have thus been replaced by 
technological methods of selecting and blending. All companies have 
advanced towards a more sophisticated marketing strategy through 
improving access to, and knowledge of, export channels to other Spanish 
regions and abroad in conjunction with the development of regional brand 
names (DOs). Marketing entails an in-depth knowledge of the specific 
retail inlets in major consumer markets as well as the demonstration that a 
reliable product can be delivered year after year. In most cases, major 
customers only offer contracts after Bodegas have given proof of quality 
and quantity for three years while little or nothing is actually bought; a 
major problem is thus how to bridge this period without sales contracts. 
Public assistance has helped to overcome that problem.
An important achievement has been the improvement of the raw input, the 
grapes. Most striking is the transformation in Somontano. The old co­
operatives processed all input regardless of their quality, converting most 
into cheap table wine, although some high quality wine had been produced 
since 1988 (Señorio de Lazan Tinto). The co-operatives were led by 
technical staff, with a strong devotion to the land rather than the 
commercial side (“le gusta más la tierra”.) The new Bodega Pirineos, 
directed by a high qualified team including an economist and chemist, 
initially created goodwill by buying (and, most significantly) also paying
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for all produce, informing the growers however that it would reduce its 
number of suppliers and would be increasingly selective with the grapes 
procured. As a result, what has been improved most significantly, is the 
management of quality and the capacity to exploit this attribute 
commercially. Due to quality control and rationalisation, the number of 
suppliers thus decreased from 280 in 1993 to 210 in 1997, while for 2005 
90% of the input is expected to come from not more than 50 firms.
The overall result of business modernisation and the quality strategy can 
be clearly observed when comparing various indicators of business 
performance. Figure 5 shows the growth in sales of the largest Bodegas. 
Three of these have been part of public support to the wine sector, while 
two others (San Valero and Enate) have not. Figure 6 shows the rising 
share of quality wines and exports at the DO level. Almost all export 
consists of quality wine, with the exception of Calatayud, which also 
exports a substantial, although decreasing share of table wine. It is difficult 
to assess the employment implications of this development. In 1993, it was 
estimated that permanent employment in the sector amounted to 475 in the 
region, with around 10.000 seasonal workers (Albisu et al., 1997).
Business networking: obtaining benefits from collaborating with other 
firms
Atomisation is regarded is one of the key problems hindering 
modernisation and market orientation of the agricultural sector, despite the 
association of growers in co-operatives. To be able to join forces and 
disseminate good practice, however, it is vital that actors overcome the
AL ADAPT report (02/11/99) - 164 -
many forms of petty rivalry existing between them, notably between 
villages. Obviously, this is not just an economic issue, but one deeply 
embedded in rural communities. Moreover, it is not just joining forces that 
is required, but also the shift from a highly production oriented, technical 
rationality to a market- and management-oriented rationality. It is fair to 
say, in this respect, that it is primarily due to the depth of the crisis that has 
hit the Aragonese rural areas - both economic and demographic - that 
change of attitudes were possible. Yet, it will be a long way before the 
local culture will have adopted a new, more managerial style of rural 
production and marketing.
Business networking is closely linked to institutional embedding in DO 
areas. While the DO system offers considerable benefits to firms, notably 
in marketing, it also gives rise to specific regulatory problems. On the one 
hand, institutionalisation of the DOs provides grounds for collaboration 
and the setting of common strategies. DOs are governed by a Board with 
representatives of all the wine producers. The institution thus represents a 
strong mechanism of self-regulation and control, driven by the incentive to 
improve the DO image and promote local brand names. On the other hand, 
the geographical demarcation of the DO membership incites certain types 
of free-rider behaviour. One aspect of the DO institution, for instance, is 
that the harvest of each DO receives an annual rating. In principle, this 
covers all the firms within the area, although the Regulator will decide 
which parts of the local harvest are good enough to deserve the 
‘denomination of origin’ certification. Through this mechanism, ‘follower’ 
firms thus benefit from the efforts made by ‘leader’ firms in improving 
quality. The possibility of ‘free-rider’ behaviour was indeed mentioned and 
resented by representatives of leader firms. Remarkably, one company that 
had received much public support and benefited strongly from the DO 
institution in its marketing, regarded the presence of the DO regulatory 
system as a nuisance. Networking at a regional level can only be sustained 
if firms remain committed to the DO area of which they are part.
Institutional networking: obtaining benefits from local institutions
Institutional networking generated the largest variation in response. While 
the attitudes of the local authorities were generally seen as rather effective, 
strong contrary views were also expressed. The latter applies in particular 
to those companies that have been successful without public support, and 
were now confronted with highly subsidised entrants into the market. For 
some firms, it was not so much the overall strategy that was disapproved 
of, but the distribution of funding among the firms. For others (particularly 
in Calatayud), public intervention was seen as unwelcome interference in 
general. Other regional actors acknowledged the problems arising from the 
way direct intervention had been used, but praised the way public support 
had helped to put Aragon on the world wine map. One commentator 
indicated that the support should also be seen in the context of subregional 
development. The strong support for Somontano was largely an 
instrument for assisting Huesca, one of the most affected rural areas in 
Spain, rather than an instrument of deliberate sectoral support. It was only
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The main asset that a wine region accumulates is its institutionalisation and 
reputation as a DO, and this can be regarded as the main ‘club good’. The 
DO label gives the region its main identity in the market place. The ‘club’ 
consists of all quality wine producers in an area. The institutional 
dimension involves the role of the regulator in controlling the origin and 
processing of the grapes, in providing the certification, and in facilitating 
decisions on future plantings, infrastructural changes (such as irrigation 
etc.). The overall DO system provides annual ratings based on wine 
testing, which are depicted in Figure 7. This figure compares the 
Aragonese scores with what are generally seen as the Spanish ‘top 
regions’ in wine production (Penedés, Ribera del Duero, Rioja, Rueda, 
Valdepeñas). While in some years Aragón manages to exceed the average 
performance of the top region, a trend towards stabilisation may be 
observed. This is partly due to expansion of the total volume and number 
of DOs, and partly to the use of modern technology. The results of 
Somontano are shown separately, to highlight its recent success.
A more tangible ‘club good’ is the vine variety traditionally grown in the 
region. Formally, the DO system is modelled on the French system and 
prescribes the use of local vine varieties (‘local’ means traditionally used in 
the region, which does not exclude the possibility that similar varieties are 
used in other Spanish regions). However, in most Spanish regions a more 
hybrid system has evolved, in which a combination of local vines and well-
known vines, such as Merlot, Pinot and Cabernet Sauvignon, is planted 
and used to produce exportable quality wines. In this way, a similar 
strategy is followed as in Eastern Europe and New World wine areas 
(although in the case of latter, the regional denomination was dropped all 
together). In the case of Aragón, some companies largely use local 
varieties (e.g., Garnacha, Tempranillo, Moristel), while some are only 
using French varieties. A representative of the latter referred to the state’s 
emphasis on local varieties as a “romantic” vision of DO promotion, which 
was not sustainable in an international competitive market and often 
created an unnecessary regulatory “corset” . To some extent, this tension 
has weakened the ‘club’ nature of the ‘denomination’ asset. The more 
‘global’ companies, that is, firms using international varieties, with capital 
goods procured from abroad, applying international management 
practices, and selling substantial shares outside the region, appeared to feel 
less attached to the DO or even the larger region. Such a ‘global’ 
orientation also implies a lower inclination to work together with other 
regional organisations such as the Station for Viticulture.
While this discrepancy was generally recognised, some observers felt that 
both strategies - local and global orientation in varieties - could, and 
perhaps even should, co-exist. Much depends on future market 
development. While the use of global varieties has clearly allowed some 
firms to grow rapidly, there is a higher risk of losing to other regions than 
when local varieties are promoted through the DO system. A crucial issue 
is what consumers worldwide will buy in the future. A feature article on 
wine in British newspaper The Guardian quoted the following comment 
from a leading wine expert:
“Some wine writers fear the end result [of similar varieties 
everywhere] could be product which is increasingly homogenised 
(...). They fear consumers everywhere soon will have a choice of 
nothing but Chardonnay and Cabernet Sauvignon. (...) the best of 
the flying wine-makers should, rather than trying to introduce the 
same styles wherever they go, take the best local styles and improve 
them. If it helps avoid the quality pitfalls that were there before, then 
that’s good”
In the local context, consumer research validates the importance of DOs as 
marketable ‘club goods’ but also reveals some of the limitations. Even 
among regional consumers, only a few buyers know more than just the 
top-three brands from the three largest DO, while many, at least until 
recently, were not aware of Calatayud as a DO. It is only since the 
emergence of high quality wines in the late 1980s, that consumers have 
started to recognise Aragón as a wine producing area to be proud of, 
which is perceived at DO level. An extensive study on this issue reported 
that
“The primary factor valued by consumers in wine purchasing are the 
origin of the wine, the inclusion in a Denomination of Origin, the 
price and its organoleptic characteristics [i.e., look, smell and taste]”
(Gil Roig & Sanchez García, 1996, p.115).
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The study, using an extensive survey among Aragonese consumers, 
revealed the following ranking of DO reputation: La Rioja - Somontano - 
Cariñena - Borja - Navarrra. For foreign markets, the fact that that there 
are four DOs may be seen as a problem. Rioja clearly benefits from having 
a single DO. The only justification for this differentiation seems to be the 
rather different styles of wine produced in each region, at least in a 
historical perspective.
Effectiveness o f regional business support
Given the fact that the wine initiative could be linked to other subsidies for 
rural areas, partly financed under Structural Funds, and a part of the direct 
investments in business capital are likely to be redeemed, this may turn out 
to be a rather effective approach. However, as some observers note, the 
accumulated investments through subsidies are substantial, particularly in 
Somontano. The state owned company COVISA, for instance, only 
became profitable in 1997 after six years of operation. A question is 
whether the initiative required such a heavy investment in one company, or 
whether a higher subsidy to established companies would have been better.
A more fundamental question is whether an indirect method of support, 
through genuine cluster facilitation via the DO Regulator would have been 
more effective. DO regulators themselves tried to push for such an 
associational approach under the label of ‘inter-professional’ co-operation
- joining production, marketing, management, etc. While in theory such an 
approach might have been preferred (combined for instance with a credit 
scheme for capital investments), the lack of collaborative attitudes might 
have posed a serious obstacle to such an associational approach. Finally, 
there seems to be some evidence, as indicated before, that relationships 
between technical support centres and business have improved, in line with 
the cluster-as-method perspective.
Demonstration effects
Various levels of demonstration effects can be distinguished in this 
initiative. First, the firm-to-firm level. While learning effects have not been 
institutionalised, proximity as well as the ties through the DO have 
facilitated substantial exchange of information and experience. A part of 
this effect has been enforced upon the growers, moreover, by the quality 
conditions introduced by the Bodegas. Second, a subregion-to-subregion 
(DO to DO) effect; this has been triggered partly through contact between 
firms and support organisations (such as the Station of Viticulture), partly 
through the pressure on the authorities to extend the intervention to 
established companies. Third, demonstration to other sectors. After the 
promotion of local wines in the regional markets, the government has 
sought to expand the Denomination of Origin to other products, such as 
Bacon of Teruel, and Lamb of Aragón.
A core issue in the wine sector is the future of co-operatives. An initial 
ambition of the modernisation project was to bring the entire production 
chain of quality wine under the control of one company, since the co-
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operatives were seen primarily as obstacles to change. Observers from the 
business association and Bodegas however do not endorse this view. 
While many co-operatives are indeed opposed to change, there also many 
cases where co-operatives have led in quality improvement and 
commercialisation. Already in the early 1980s co-operatives founded 
commercial Bodegas and committed themselves to a quality enhancement 
programme controlled by the Bodegas. To secure an independent position 
of the Bodegas, some co-operatives only took minority share-holding in 
the Bodegas, thus facilitating the development successful marketing- 
oriented organisations. The problem for the region was that this capacity 
remained confined to particular spots. Until the 1990s, it was not 
translated into a region-wide strategy as in Rioja or Valencia. At present, 
the government acknowledges the benefits of co-operative forms of 
production, while it continues to promote upgrading and new management 
techniques via Bodegas.
Embedding o f cluster initiative in regional specialisation policies
The observations so far have already indicated that the wine initiatives, 
while being targeted as one preferred sector, are intended to have wider 
implications. Beyond doubt, the initiative has contributed to the role of the 
sector in strengthening regional economic specialisation and identity, both 
inside and outside the region. Similar objectives are pursued in other agro­
industrial sectors. In this sense, there appears to be a strong drive to assist 
endogenous sectors in the region.
From a specific spatial policy perspective, a key problems remains the 
ageing of the population. For instance, in all areas most wines growers are 
older than 50, and there are only very few below 30. The population at 
large also suffers from ageing, caused largely by rural-urban migration. It 
is clear that this type of spatial cluster policies is helping to counter these 
tendencies. To what extent the vicious circle of exodus can be arrested, 
however, is still an open question.
The role o f learning
The support to the wine sector can be described as a traditional top-down 
approach with little scope for internal knowledge accumulation. The basic 
model applied is that of modernisation through imposing a capitalist 
business structure, technology transfer and a one-way vision of local 
dissemination of good practice. To some extent, this approach can be 
defended on the grounds that a substantial overhaul of the system was 
required, and that a top-down approach would be most appropriate. 
However, the approach also reflects the culture of the political system and 
support strategies, which is traditionally dirigiste. The policy cycle shows 
that the intervention did not contain mechanisms for participation, 
feedback or adaptation. Learning took place, but through direct 
confrontation with the private sector. At present, there is no embedding of 
the initiatives in a wider regional learning culture. However, a further
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expansion of cluster-oriented initiatives is foreseen, and this may offer 
more scope for facilitating learning processes.
6.4. Conclusion
The Aragonese wine sector initiative is based on a philosophy similar to 
previous cases, that of acquiring ‘global’ competitiveness through 
nurturing collaborative linkages. The method employed however differs in 
that it starts from a top-down modernisation perspective. Support is based 
on intervention rather than facilitation. This choice can be attributed partly 
to the specific problem faced by the wine sector - that of fragmentation 
and backwardness in production and marketing - and partly to the 
dominant political culture. Moreover, there are sector-specific reasons. In 
particular, the initiative has greatly benefited from the existence of an 
institutional ‘obligation’, that of the creation and strengthening of ‘origin 
control’ areas required for the sales of quality wines.
The initiative has been changed during its lifetime to respond more closely 
to the needs of the targeted companies. This resulted in a broader 
intervention in more regions, and a more positive stance towards the role 
of co-operatives. Nevertheless, there still is a certain degree of opposition 
to public intervention among private companies, as well as feelings of 
animosity between firms. This will make the move towards a more 
associational approach (‘inter-professional’ co-operation), as aspired to 
for instance by regulators, a difficult task. One of the core questions is to 
what extent the ‘leading’ companies - assumed to be regional model 
companies - will act as local hubs. This research has indicated that there is 
a threat that, despite the local support received, firms perceive themselves 
more as global players. The risk is that the emphasis on ‘global’ 
managerial practices will lead to a ‘disembedding’ of local companies that 
were intended to transfer good practice from the international market 
place to local producers.
Formally, all firms included in the Aragonese case are of a small business 
nature. Although no specific conclusions can be drawn about the position 
of SMEs, the case shows the tension between different kinds of business 
institutions operating in the sector. It so not so much ‘small’ versus ‘large’ 
that presents an area of possible friction, but that between ‘capitalist’ and 
‘co-operative’ business modes. Such possibilities in the differentiation 
within the small business realm should be taken into account particularly 
when dealing with cases entirely focused on SMEs, as in the next chapter.
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Chapter Seven. Business cluster cases
This chapter will discuss two cases of cluster initiatives specifically geared 
towards assisting SMEs: the first concerns businesses in the chemical 
industry in Bergisches Land; the second the achievements of the Real 
Service Centre on Tyneside (NE of England). Both cases have a strong 
learning orientation, and both rely strongly on brokering. There are also 
important differences. In the case of Bergisches land, the core aim is 
encouraging the SMEs to join forces and design co-operative solutions on 
specific themes, largely reflecting the ‘clusters-as-method’ approach. The 
Tyneside case, on the other hand, follows more the clusters-as-target 
approach, with more emphasis on facilitating closed networks. The two 
cases will be presented following the pro-forma. The Tyneside case, since 
this presents a much more extended initiative, will be presented in more 
detail.
7.1. The chemical cluster in Bergisches Land (NRW)
Like automotive production, the chemical industry in most areas of 
Germany has gone through a difficult period. A principal reason for this is 
that globalisation not only affects the production of mass chemicals but 
also the production and research related to specialised chemicals. Another 
reason is environmental pressure, which has inflicted higher costs onto the 
industry. The latter however does not just present a disadvantage, since it 
has also forced firms to innovate and be ahead of its competitors. 
Moreover, unlike the automotive industry in which the trend towards 
global sourcing has ruptured existing supply chains, the process nature of 
the chemical industry has generally secured the survival of supply chains 
(that is, except when a whole process relocates). Chemical SMEs are often 
highly specialised firms, and they tend to be less dominated by large 
customers than automotive suppliers.
The main tension in the industry, therefore, is not supplier against 
customer but the sector against authorities. In particular in NRW, with a 
red-green government, employers in the industry lament the often erratic 
proliferation of official regulation and the lack of proper negotiation 
between the industry and the government. A major problem for the 
chemical industry is its reputation as a polluting activity, which also seems 
to reduce the interest among young people for pursuing careers in the 
industry recently. This aspect provided one of the major incentives to the 
project in Bergisches Land: establishing a regional link between chemical 
firms and waste management companies.
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Since early this century, the Bergisches Land has had a strong chemical 
sector, with a large proportion of SMEs. Wuppertal is even the birthplace 
of Bayer. The area has though traditionally exhibited strong individualistic 
attitudes, with little inclination towards co-operation. According to one 
observer, the prevailing attitude in times of crisis has generally been: ‘my 
competitors will go bankrupt before me’. While this stands in contrast with 
the more co-operative spirits found in surrounding areas, such as Köln 
(‘Kölner Klüngel’) and Rheinland, the distinct nature of the Bergisches 
Land have also nurtured a strong local identity, and even a tendency to 
‘protect and cordoning o ff the area against its neighbours. Moreover, the 
region has a history of co-operation in specific sectors, and this provided 
an initial source of inspiration. The most telling case is that of co­
operation in coatings after the Second World War. In the years after 1945, 
when British chemical firms were reluctant to resume trade with German 
firms, local coatings firms were confronted with supply shortages. The 
latter thus established co-operative clubs, so-called ‘ to help
each other, and the present project could build on this memory.
7.1.1. The policy cycle
Conception and launching
The project Chemische Industrie im Bergischen Land was induced by the 
crisis felt among local SMEs, and especially targeted the small-scale 
coatings and waste management sector. It was initiated by IAT and the 
Regionalbüro. The cluster philosophy was partly based on the idea of 
inter-firm linkage-formation and governance, especially around waste 
flows and with emphasis on the role of producer services (notably research 
laboratories). Partly it was inspired by ideas of collective learning, 
focusing around a series of themes. However, in contrast to previous 
projects, the cluster approach had been less articulated before the project 
and thus evolved during its course. While this was unintentional result of a 
lack of detailed knowledge about the sector, this more explorative route 
turned out to be a major advantage. One of the surprises, for instance, for 
some initiators was the strong interest in environmental issues and 
improvements.
Cluster mapping and composition; role of funding
No in-depth analysis was carried about beforehand. This was not a 
deliberate choice, but caused by a shortage of resources. A lot of time and 
energy was devoted to promoting the project, through individual 
interviews, press releases, etc. Often the waste and R&D departments of 
the firms were interested but management was not. Two rounds of 
personal visits to potential businesses were organised to attract firms and 
to identify initial issues as part of the formal ‘package’ offered to firms. 
The industry association also assisted in the enrolment process 
(Chemieverband). The participation of some well-known persons from 
local families worked as a lever to attract others, especially in coatings. 
Several large firms had also been contacted; only one participated in the
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end. Firms had to pay according to their employment level; the remaining 
costs were covered by the Land government. 19 firms participated.
Setting objectives and methods; implementation
After four initial objectives had been articulated following the first round 
of consultation, further adaptations were made during the initial period of 
the project. The initial package contained the following general targets:
1. co-operative use of producer services (laboratories);
2. establishing an inter-firm waste flow system;
3. co-operation between businesses, administration and authorities;
4. regular exchange of experiences and information (learning)
The first consultations with participating firm brought some substantial 
adaptations. While the first two objectives remained, the third objective 
had to be dropped and the fourth had to be made more prominent. The 
initiators were amazed by the eagerness with which firms embraced the 
learning objective.
The project was structured around plenaries and focus groups. The latter 
consisted of an ongoing process of information exchange and collective 
action, punctuated by expert visits. Not only managers participated, but 
also operators and engineers. The latter were invited in consultation with 
the focus group members. The plenaries and expert contributions brought 
in new issues and agendas, which the firms had to consider. The project 
went ahead with five focus groups:
1. Research and material testing (producer service oriented)
2. Work safety
3. Coatings (with increased emphasis on training)
4. establishing an inter-firm waste flow system;
5. information exchange geared to ISO 9000 certification
Evaluation and monitoring
The project will be subject of an extensive evaluation based on firm 
interviews. The two organisations carrying the project, IAT and the 
Regionalburo, both have a keen interest in learning from the project. Like 
this project benefited from the experiences with a previous local cluster 
project, Perspektiven der Automobilzulieferindustrie im Bergisches Land, 
the coming evaluation results will inform the design of future projects.
7.1.2. Business development perspective
Direct benefits: improving business capabilities through clustering
The main benefits in this project are related to the networking dimensions. 
Nevertheless, there are two areas in which the firms have seen direct gains 
to individual business performance. The first is practical knowledge about 
the ISO certification process, through a dedicated focus group in which 
(soon-to-be) certified firms shared their experiences with interested firms, 
an activity that turned out to be of great practical use. The second is the
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development of training capabilities in the coatings focus group. This 
theme created so much enthusiasm and interest, that a group of 
participating businesses took the initiative for a follow-up, in the form of 
an application for a training programme. This was finally organised 
together with the Wuppertal Development Agency, and involved the 
development of new customised training courses by the Technical 
Academy of Wuppertal.
Business networking: obtaining benefits from collaborating with other 
firms
The nurturing of inter-firm linkages depended strongly on the intensity and 
quality of brokering. A crucial advantage for the project was that main 
broker in the project, an IAT staff member, had made a career in the 
chemical sector, which allowed her the same language as business 
participants. The broker’s role, with her business expertise and 
enthusiasm, was regarded as more than invaluable by project members. An 
interesting fact is that, although the broker was invoked because of her 
specialist knowledge, this background was more important for 
communicating trust and confidence than for the application of the 
knowledge itself. Another person who greatly contributed to the project 
was a chemist who represented the unions, and who promoted a 
‘partnership approach’ between businesses and the unions. The regular 
presence of representatives from the employers’ and industry association 
was essential for the supply of additional contacts and motivation. One 
additional issue anticipated by the project organisers was potential 
antipathy between SMEs and large firms and the need for specific forms of 
brokering. Indeed, SMEs acknowledged that initially they feared 
dominating attitudes by the large firms. To the surprise of many, however, 
the larger firms generally adopted open-minded and co-operative attitudes 
and there was no need for any action on this front.
Trust was a major problem in the waste management strand, which aimed 
at forging supply linkages towards chemical recycling firms. To explore 
potential flows, firms had to disclose part of their internal material flow. 
However, this would make it relatively easy for competitors to trace vital 
aspects of their production process. In addition, the interest in forming 
trade linkages turned out to be lower than in non-trade relationships. A 
solution was found, though, by an information detour through IAT, in 
which business names were removed and the data fed back in an 
anonymous form. An additional problem was that during the project 
suddenly the waste management sector faced a situation of overcapacity 
and dramatic price reductions, which further reduced the firms’ motivation 
for this strand of the project, although attendance stayed at a sufficient 
level. Yet, this provides one of the reasons why the ‘learning’ objective 
received most response.
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Like the automotive cluster, an associational embedding of the project in 
the regional political-economic system was established. However, this was 
done in such a way that representatives from business (such as the 
chemical industry association and chemical employers’ federation) were 
more prominent than participating authorities or academics. To ‘hide’ the 
role of public authorities further from business participants, meetings were 
for instance held in the building of the employers’ federation. Much was 
invested to entice the managers of the SMEs, since their individualistic and 
conservative behaviour was seen as the main hurdle to be overcome. The 
interests of the labour force and the unions were considered less of an 
obstacle. Not only has this sector traditionally been characterised by good 
and co-operative industrial relations, the unions as participants in the 
project played an effective role in raising workers’ motivation. The project 
was directed by a Board in which one large chemical firm also 
participated. It should be added, however, that the regional involvement 
was unstructured, and primarily depending on the interests and efforts of 
individuals. The response of some organisations, notably the Chamber of 
Commerce, was close to hostile.
7.1.3. Regional policy perspective
The learning dimension o f clusters
Learning was an important aspect of the project design, and became even 
more important while the project unfolded. In particular, firms were keen 
on establishing inter-firm learning. The nature and intensity of inter-firm 
learning differed between focus groups, but turned out to be generally 
effective. In the most successful focus groups, businesses were especially 
interested in sharing information and experiences regarding the 
implementing of new rules and practices. While the formal knowledge was 
generally available, it was especially the tacit intelligence required for the 
application of the formal knowledge that was missing. This applied in 
particular to environmental legislation, training and ISO certification. In 
addition, the contribution of invited experts helped to shape the focus 
group agendas by adapting and bringing in themes for discussion.
Learning also took place along the supply chain. Several firms were 
‘educated’ by potential customers, for instance in validation management. 
In some cases, these contacts resulted in commercial contracts. Moreover, 
some staff, especially technicians, found a platform in the focus groups 
where they could exchange ideas and knowledge for which there were no 
opportunities within their own companies. The focus group thus facilitated 
the unlocking of unused knowledge already present in the region. What 
remains to be seen is to what extent the project will help to instil a learning 
culture in the region. On the institutional side, the participation of various 
local organisations has helped to demonstrate the value of the approach to 
the wider (semi)public sector. On the business side, the positive attitudes 
towards the project and the enthusiasm of business participants will be of
Institutional networking: obtaining benefits from local institutions
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advantage in bringing about more collaborative, learning-oriented 
attitudes.
Other dimensions
With the learning dimension being so prominent, other aspects of regional 
benefits only require a short discussion.
Club goods: Apart from the change in business attitudes, the project has 
not produced significant ‘club goods’. It was hoped that the waste 
management objective would lead to a kind of regional flow management, 
but this has not materialised.
Cost-effectiveness: since this is a low-cost project, this hardly presents an 
issue.
Demonstration effect: see last section on ‘learning’.
Embedding: Although this is a ‘stand-alone’ project, it is part of stream of 
innovative projects initiated by the Regionalburo. There is no formal 
embedding in regional development strategies, but there is a strong 
intention to learn from the project for future initiatives.
7.1.4. Conclusion
Chemische Industrie im Bergischen Land presents a small-scale innovative 
project of regional support for SMEs. The project followed a clustering 
philosophy, with emphasis on collaboration and collective learning in a 
regional setting. There was also the ambition to forge trade linkages 
between sectors, between chemical production and waste management and 
between chemical production and producer services. Interestingly, the 
interactive learning dimension turned out to be most successful. This 
learning converged around specific themes, many of which had been 
‘discovered’ during the project. A perhaps ironic observation is that the 
project seems to have benefited from an absence of in-depth ex-ante 
industrial knowledge, which allowed participating firms to have a strong 
say in the direction of the focus groups. Balancing the business needs with 
additional expert knowledge, then, provided the right environment for 
learning and knowledge transfer. The project also started with the 
ambition to forge new inter-industry linkages thus shaping an 
environmental-chemical cluster, but this proved to be less successful. 
Hence, although not intentionally, the cluster-as-method dimension, i.e. 
clustering as a way to get firms exchanging their experiences and to act on 
shared interest, turned out to be most significant.
The project illustrates the complex social and institutional dimensions of 
initiatives geared to changing business behaviour. It was part of an 
innovative stream of regional policies in which the public sector played a 
vital role. Nevertheless, it was presented to the firms largely as an initiative 
coming out of their own sector, deliberately hiding the involvement of 
public sectors and research centres. In doing so, the project struck the 
right chords with the firms, since they felt that they were dealing with 
people and issues representing their own trade and issues. A question is to
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what extent such an arrangement can be generalised. In which cases is this 
an appropriate solution to create business commitment? For Bergisches 
Land, representing an institution-rich environment, the joining of industry 
associations and public actors has arguably been the best solution to try 
out new concepts. In environments where there are no active industry- or 
cluster-specific institutions, institution building (the creation of cluster- 
oriented service centres) with explicit public support may also provide an 
effective route to facilitating inter-firm interaction. The next case presents 
an example of such a process.
7.2. Business clusters in the North East of England
The final case to be presented here involves the achievements of an 
organisation in NE England dedicated to ‘cluster’ facilitation among 
SMEs. The case presents an innovative support programme in line with 
the ‘clusters-as-targets’ approach, and covers a wide range of economic 
sectors. Besides providing interesting details about the role of networking 
and learning, the evolution of the support programme illustrates the 
complex interaction between the business and regional development 
perspectives. The core organisation under study here is the North 
Tyneside Real Service Centre (RSC), which has been operational since 
1995. While at present the RSC is involved in more clusters, the 
discussion will focus here on the six clusters initiated before 1998.
The six clusters are:
1. Argonautics (in design and consultancy in marine engineering)
2. Pegasus (services to pipeline construction and testing)
3. Affinitas (marketing design services)
4. Sarius (software technology focusing on public sector applications)
5. S & S (management standards and systems for SMEs)
6. Environmental cluster (environmental standards and accreditation 
for SMEs)
The information for this study is obtained through documentation from the 
RSC and other regional support organisation. A series of interviews has 
been held with representatives from the RSC and the cluster firms (two 
per cluster). The discussion of results will closely follow the pro-forma.
7.2.1. From initiation to evaluation: the unfolding of six clusters
Conception and launching
As in many old industrial areas, many initiatives in the North East are born 
out of a combination of a continual search for ways to improve the local 
economy and acute crisis events. For the RSC, the initiative responded to 
an increased disappointment with the way small firms were assisted by the 
existing support organisation. The first projects were triggered, however, 
by two closures, which had a dramatic impact on the economy of North 
Tyneside: the closure of the Swan Hunters shipyard in 1994, and the
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southbound move of the British Gas Engineering Research Station in 
1995. Apart from the direct loss of employment and income, the area ran 
the risk of out-migration of high-level skills and thus a further 
deterioration of the area’s productive and knowledge base. Such a 
negative spiral had been triggered off before by the closing of shipyards 
nearby in Sunderland. When North Tyneside Council tried to formulate a 
first policy response to these events, the concept of clustering was not 
known. The Council was eager though to find a concept that would help 
to retain skills and anchor business development in the local economy.
The concept of clustering was identified by the European Section staff 
through publications of the Centre for Urban and Regional Development 
Studies (CURDS) at Newcastle University, and through the contact with 
cluster initiatives in Leeds. CURDS had published several papers, one of 
which had special reference to the North Tyneside economy, in which 
Porter’s notion of clusters was seen as a way to nurture forms of 
endogenous development. The ideas were worked through by a team 
within the economic development section of the council. One result of the 
phase of strategy development was a paper presented by Council staff to 
the Europe Workshop organised by the Centre for Local Economic 
Strategies (CLES - a national charitable trust) on 1 November 1995. In a 
paper titled “Public/private sector partnerships - the local development of 
clusters of competitive advantages”, it was not Porter who was referred to 
but authors who had written on networking among SMEs, such as 
Sengenberger and Pyke. In doing so, clusters were reinterpreted in the 
context of small business network development, linked to the notion of 
sectoral specialisation advocated by CURDS documentation. More 
specifically, the CLES paper included the following cluster dimensions:
• Economies of scale
• Business information
• Innovation; collective development of ideas (complementary 
technology and skills, joint financing)
• Sharing of facilities
• Single source servicing (offering one contact point and collective 
identity for customers)
• Increased productive capacity (by taking on board large contracts)
• Interest groups (i.e. lobbing strength in local/regional development 
policy)
• Specialisation - development of areas of expertise (either individually 
or collectively)
These dimensions can be found back in various publications, promotions 
and applications of the RSC. In later publications, the two latter issues 
were omitted.
Subsequently, further inspiration for this networking approach was found 
in Emilia-Romagna, where the label of “Real Service Centre” was found. 
The result was that in 1995 staff from the European Section of the 
Council’s economic development department formed the ‘North Tyneside
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Role o f support agencies and funding regimes
Within the overall context of the project, the RSC has an awkward 
position. It is both cluster facilitator and one of the cluster-based projects. 
Like the six business clusters already introduced, the RSC works on the 
basis of ERDF grant applications. Formal funding for the Centre was 
required from 1 January 1996 onwards, initially just for one year, followed 
by a first extension until December 1998, and a second extension until July 
2000. The RSC was created as a partnership between North Tyneside City 
Challenge, Tyneside TEC and Business Link Tyneside. A key player in 
assessing the various applications and monitoring the projects is the 
Government Office North East (GONE), a local manifestation of various 
central government departments.
The conditions for funding however are set by the ERDF programme. A 
demanding condition is the provision of 50% matched funding.. Matched 
funding is obtained from the local council and from the firms (the latter 
mostly in kind). Moreover, ERDF supported programmes are not allowed 
to pay for direct marketing in other EU countries, although the controlling 
government department at the UK level tends to adopt a rather flexible 
approach in this respect.
To acquire funding, the applications for the cluster applications and RSC 
running costs are all structured and presented as Business Plans. The 
cluster plans generally contain detailed workpackages with as main 
categories:
• cluster facilitation: establishing a formal structure of collaboration and 
communication routines;
• intelligence: addressing the information needs in the cluster (linking to 
a variety of information sources);
• marketing: promotion through brochures and WebPages, media 
advertising, exhibition stands;
• access to risk and venture capital (through a financial consultant);
• Collaborative research and development projects (including product 
development IT, database development).
The S&S plan is substantially different, since the grant is aimed at directly 
subsidising business consultancy for local firms.
While the first RSC application was written as a strategy document, the 
second application was presented as a Business Plan. The following tasks 
are distinguished as Centre activities:
• cluster facilitation and development
• economic and market intelligence: specific sectoral research (maritime 
sector, electronics report on Software applications and development, 
Sept. 1996), business needs (Information Requirements Report, May 
1996), and a business database (OSIRIS)
• marketing and publicity: through the newsletter (400 circulation, 1st 
issue July 1996; 8th issue June 1998), press releases, presentations 
etc.
• management and co-ordination
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• monitoring and evaluation
The RSC team contains one project manager, two local economy 
strategists, one business researcher and a cluster development officer.
Cluster mapping and audits
As can be understood from the way the project was conceived, the cluster 
initiative did not emerge out of a top-down targeting of pre-selected 
clusters. Nevertheless, cluster development was linked to a notion of the 
strengths and potential of the local economy. This was largely based on 
the list presented by CURDS in 1992, which included:
• energy engineering
• environmental goods and services
• medical and healthcare services (including pharmaceuticals and related 
biotechnology)
• marine engineering and services
While this was just a suggestive list, not based on any systematic method 
of prioritising, it nevertheless provided justification for many sector- 
oriented initiatives. Later reports, notably those related to ERDF grants, 
presented additions and modifications to the list, notably in service areas. 
These were used to underpin cluster developments in non-manufacturing 
sectors. Apart from referring to these documents on regional development, 
the RSC itself is rather pragmatic about the issue of targeting. In its own 
publications, the list of sectors reflects the activities the RSC happens to 
be involved in
“The RSC targets SMEs in the marine, pipeline technology, 
environmental, software development, design and marketing and 
standards and system sectors” (newsletter issue 4-5).
At the level of individual clusters, business audits take the shape of needs 
analysis. The latter is based on a straightforward questionnaire that 
addresses the main categories of business development (e.g. cash flow, 
finance, marketing, R&D, training, market development). These surveys 
contribute to the development plan for each cluster.
Setting objectives and method
The overall objectives were developed in several stages, and have 
continued to changes. A distinction should be made between the general 
objectives pursued by the RSC and the specific objectives per cluster 
initiative.
For the RSC, a central point is the link between business development and 
regional development. This can be read from the RSC mission statement:
“To maximise the potential of local SMEs, by seizing the 
opportunities of the emerging global economy. To develop public 
and private interaction by facilitating private sector interests to 
generate wealth for the benefit of the local economy.”
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The way thinking about the objectives and form of cluster has evolved 
over time is illustrated by change in the cluster definitions. The RSC 
newsletter reveals the following alterations:
“A cluster is an organisation comprising non-competing companies 
from the same sector who work together using a collective identity”
(RSC newsletters issues 1-3, July 1996-Oct 1997)
“Developing Clusters of competitive advantages is based on the 
simple concept that small firms in similar or related industries can 
collectively achieve much more than would be possible individually” 
(newsletter issue 4-5, December 1997)
“Clusters are groups of firms in complementary sectors which have 
come together formally in order to access larger market 
opportunities” (newsletter issues 6-9, March-Oct. 1998)
These three definitions show various point of emphasis that are central to 
the RSC’s approach to clustering: (1) the search for an identity among 
collaborating non-rival companies, (2) the search for synergy and (3) the 
search for a formal structure allowing small firms to gain larger market 
opportunities. What is interesting is how these issues have evolved over 
time, something that will be addressed in the sections below. In addition, 
the RSC cluster strategies also contain a spatial dimension. There is a 
general ambition to aim for spatial concentration, not only for individual 
clusters but also the overall project, included the RSC itself. The site 
envisaged for this was the ECAI building at Royal Quays in North Shields, 
a product from the Regional Challenge programme.
While the broad aims of the projects reflect the categories mentioned 
above, differences can be observed between the specific objectives for the 
various clusters. For Argonautics and Pegasus, direct objectives were 
given at birth: retaining valuable expertise and skills by creating new 
market outlets and improving other business capabilities (technology, 
finance). However, also for the other clusters the retention of skills in the 
region is mentioned as one of the objectives, together with the wish to 
increase innovative potential. For the service-oriented clusters, moreover, 
skill retention goes hand-in-hand with the ambition to encourage 
companies in the region, particularly large manufacturing firms, to procure 
services locally. The more detailed objectives reflect the particular context 
in which the clusters emerged, although they share the emphasis on 
business and regional competitiveness, innovation, and the acquisition of 
larger contracts. S&S’s and the Environmental cluster’s contribution to 
regional competitiveness is conceived in an indirect way, that is, through 
improving the business practices and environmental standards of local 
firms in other sectors. In both cases, the marketing of these business 
consultancy activities, as part of awareness creation, is a major aim of the 
clustering activity. One of the objectives in the Environmental cluster 
business plan thus reads:
“As a cluster of competitive advantage the environmental cluster will 
(...) improve the competitiveness of [other] local SMEs by ensuring 
that local firms are encouraged to adopt accredited standards and
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good practice, improving credibility within the business and wider 
community, to meet supply chain requirements, and thereby 
safeguard jobs”
Affinitas has a special position, since its major theme of marketing as part 
of the cluster project has been the cluster approach itself. The brochures 
and website of Affinitas thus present a vivid account of a “creative 
collective with a vision for the future” in which the cluster philosophy is 
promoted.
An interesting theme is how objectives have changed during the project 
lifetime. This question can only be answered for the Argonautics and 
Pegasus. The other clusters are too recent to comment on changing 
objectives. In the case of Argonautics, the original business plan prioritised 
the role of marketing through promotion and intelligence gathering. While 
this remained a vital objective, the review led to a new emphasis on 
training issues. A point of concern remains the issue whether the cluster 
should deliver and market joint products. Presently there is a working 
agreement that, for production and marketing purposes, the cluster will be 
used primarily to establish subcontracting relationships as part of 
individual contracts (‘inter-cluster contracts’) rather than joint ‘cluster 
contracts’. Some cluster members still would like to acquire larger 
contracts on a cluster basis, however. One obstacle to cluster contracts is 
that legal issues have not been resolved; one suggestion has been to 
investigate the development of joint patents. Whatever way it goes, there 
seems to be general consensus that, in the words of one member:
“clustering is essential for meeting the increasingly rigorous 
requirements associated with bidding for contracts, such as 
professional indemnity, quality, certification e.g. ISO 9001 (... ) 
[where] small firms stand no chance”.
Pegasus shows a very different development. Here the members developed 
a cluster marketing strategy in which the identity of the member firms has 
disappeared, a step highly recommended by the RSC. For instance, new 
products are marketed solely with the Pegasus label, not as outcomes of 
the combined competencies of constituent businesses. Since the cluster 
firms have all been relocated to one site, the cluster has become an 
intrinsic part of individual business development. As one cluster member 
revealed, it was often not clear to what extent they were doing things for 
themselves or for the cluster. There was a general expectation in the 
cluster that the time spent on the cluster, estimated on 20% for the past 
period, would rise to 80% in the future. Even the prospect of further 
formal merging of business activities has become a point of discussion.
Regarding the method of clustering, this relies heavily on brokering by the 
RSC. The next section will present an important aspect of this brokering, 
that is, creating a formal structure to underpin the working structure of the 
cluster, to define responsibilities and secure business commitment. A 
further instrument of the RSC is intelligence provision, which also includes 
information about other business support opportunities as well as market 
opportunities emerging through the local public sector and other local
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actors. Indeed, in this respect it should be emphasised that, while the 
formal objectives are couched in terms of competitive advantage in the 
‘global market’, there is also a strong local component to the clustering 
initiatives. While not stated explicitly in the objectives although recognised 
as method, a major clustering activity has been the collaboration and 
trading with other clusters, as well with the public sector, within the 
region. The hub firm of Affinitas, for instance, has designed the corporate 
identity of Pegasus and the RSC itself. Affinitas has collaborated with 
Sarius on an internet-based supplier catalogue for the council, and 
provides marketing skills to S&S. Various other links have been developed 
(Pegasus - Environmental Cluster, Pegasus-Sarius, Environmental Cluster
- S&S), although they have not always resulted in joint projects or 
commercial activities.
While one should be aware of the possibly discriminating nature of such 
links, in general they can be seen as contributing to the forging of inter­
sectoral links and improving local economic cohesiveness. This, in an 
indirect way, is likely to contribute to regional competitiveness. RSC 
members confirm that they have often moved from an initial ‘global’ 
perspective to a more local development perspective, but they see this as a 
step-by-step process that will swing back to issues of ‘global’ 
development.
Implementation
After the cluster approach was triggered by two closure events, the choice 
for cluster development has been driven largely by opportunity. The first 
two clusters were triggered by the departure of two major local economic 
hubs: Swan Hunters, which contained substantial expertise in maritime 
engineering, and the British Gas Engineering Research Station, specialised 
on pipeline servicing. Argonautics grew out of a group of existing firms on 
Davy Bank in Wallsend (1994), later joint with the design department 
which had spun off from the closing shipyard (Armstrong Technology 
Associates). The cluster received an initial financial boost from the Tyne 
and Wear Development Corporation.
Pegasus, on the other hand, grew out of the ashes of the pipeline research 
station, as a group of primarily embryonic firms (only one firm existed 
beforehand). The new entrepreneurs thus had two tasks at hand: setting up 
their own business and creating the cluster. In the view of the RSC, such a 
launch path is seen as exceptional. Normally, the RSC would not 
encourage the inclusion of start-ups in new clusters, since this may add 
substantially to the complexity and risks of cluster development. The 
specific circumstances in which Pegasus evolved however made the 
process work. According to Pegasus members, what contributed to the 
success was that the clustering strategy was preceded by several 
encounters between ex-BG staff and local entrepreneurs. These 
encounters, facilitated by NT council, both helped the start-up and 
clustering process. In addition, the RSC has stipulated that Pegasus could 
not bail out members to protect the cluster from start-up failure.
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Affinitas, originally called the Design Communications Clusters, emerged 
around the same time as Argonautics and Pegasus, but took a longer time 
to materialise. Its conception was different in various respects. The cluster 
was initiated and composed (November 1995) as result of the enthusiasm 
of one entrepreneur, who found the clustering philosophy very appealing. 
This firm had already some experience with regional organisations, notably 
NDC. Furthermore, the cluster operated in a market with a stronger local 
dimension, that of marketing design. To some extent, this cluster followed 
logically from what had happened in the two previous clusters. Both 
Argonautics and Pegasus had shown a strong demand for marketing 
expertise. Affinitas partly benefited from this demand, in addition to a long 
list of customers, including large firms operating in the region, and links 
were foreseen with the public sector (e.g. a private-public partnership to 
design a supply catalogue for the local council). Affinitas was formally 
established early 1997.
While the local service provision is obvious from a clustering perspective, 
it presented a substantial change for the funding bodies and other 
authorities. Could services fit in a model of clustering? Here the RSC 
benefited from the fact that services had been includes in the SPD priority 
on clustering. Nevertheless, to acquire funding for such less appealing 
clusters, it was necessary to make the applications more detailed and 
focused on ‘hard’ output targets (in the form of marketing and research 
output to be achieved, exhibitions to be visited, number of contacts to be 
made, contracts to be expected, etc.). This trend also reflected an 
increased demand from the funding bodies (represented by the 
Government Office North East) for verifiable results.
Where Affinitas can be seen a truly ‘grassroots’ initiative, Sarius (original 
name Polaris), the software cluster, was established in a more top-down 
way. Over the years, electronics and IT have emerged as a key sector of 
interest in the North of England. Before the cluster initiative, a number of 
studies and pamphlets had already been published on this sector claiming 
that it was time for the region to grasp the opportunities arising in the 
electronics sector. An important source of inspiration came from the 
Scottish experiences with supporting electronics and IT, for instance 
through the Software Federation. There was also a practical reason for the 
facilitation of Sarius. The council wanted to support a local firm that has 
just been ousted from a European 4th Framework RTD programme on 
public procurement. Building a cluster would contribute to the survival of 
the firm, notably through the funding of a series of R&D projects linked to 
public procurement and benchmarking programmes for public services. 
More than the previous clusters, therefore, Sarius developed within a 
context of intensive business-local authority interaction. As argued in the 
Business Plan:
“It was felt that the type of co-operation between Local Authority 
and [such] companies (. ), and the passing on of work between 
local companies in the interest of mutual support had very clear 
benefits and was to be encouraged”.
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Again, this point endorses how during implementation and expansion of 
the cluster programme local orientation became more significant.
The S&S group, focused on management practices in the leisure and 
tourism sector, emerged in a bottom-up way, although through a close link 
with an older enterprise agency, ENTRUST. One of the entrepreneurs 
learnt about clustering through his position in a support organisation, and 
an initial three-band cluster with two associate members was founded. 
Through the RSC, the cluster members themselves wrote the application 
for a small grant from NT Council to organise an exhibition. The 
exhibition, which focused on business consultancy for the ‘established’ 
RSC sectors (marine and pipeline), was not very successful. Nevertheless, 
the cluster members decided to press on with a more extensive bid, now 
linking with the leisure and tourism sector. The choice for the latter was 
based on opportunity. The Council had already developed a strategy for 
this sector, which was seen as neglected despite its potential for 
indigenous economic growth. In addition, addressing the lack of 
management support to SMEs was included under the SPD priorities. 
S&S can be considered the most ‘bottom-up’ of the clusters, with a high 
level of commitment and momentum from its conception.
The environmental cluster, finally, developed alongside S&S, as another 
spin-off from ENTRUST. Inspired by the cluster promotion through the 
RSC, an energy management counsellor of ENTRUST developed the idea 
to develop an integrated suite of environmental services through 
clustering, with emphasis on EMAS accreditation. One of the members is 
also part of S&S. After an initial phase of encounters facilitated by 
ENTRUST, the RSC assisted in drafting an ERDF application. Like the 
two previous cases, the environmental sector is considered a potential 
growth area with a strong local market orientation that tends to be 
neglected. The environmental sector itself seems to suffer from a poor 
image and lack of market credibility. This is manifested for instance by the 
fact that there is a serious underspend in the available subsidies for EMAS 
accreditation (SCEMAS), despite widespread initial interest in EMAS 
among SMEs.
Cluster composition
An important aspect of the RSC cluster approach is their emphasis on 
establishing formal structures as part of cluster development. In their own 
view, in addition to developing a working structure, drafting a 
shareholding contract or founding a limited company is essential for 
creating commitment and distributing responsibilities, thus providing a 
certain level of security and protection against opportunistic behaviour. 
There is tendency for more recent clusters to start less formal, in the sense 
that the contracts become simpler or even remain unwritten. Each cluster 
nevertheless seems to undergo a process of increased formalisation. The 
first shareholding agreement, written for Argonautics, was drawn up by a 
large legal firm in Newcastle, with a high initial price (£6000) as well as 
high costs in the case of changing the cluster composition. According to
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one Argonautics member, the contract suffers from over-engineering and 
poses a handicap to future development. The closed nature of the clusters 
is reflected in the fact that the contract distinguishes between three types 
of members: ‘A’ shareholding for full members, ‘B’ shareholding for firms 
on the nomination of becoming full members and associate firms. The 
latter includes firms with a different core activity but which may contribute 
to the cluster in specific areas (e.g. marketing consultancy); this level has 
not been formalised yet.
The idea of an ‘associate’ level has been actively exploited by Affinitas. 
This cluster consists of a core of four firms, embodying the actual cluster, 
and a supply network comprising about 20 firms. For the latter, the same 
benchmark methodology was used as NDC had applied to the hub firm (a 
so-called SCAT test). The benchmark test served a double purpose. It was 
part of the Affinitas project, as an R&D project; and it contributed to the 
formation of the Affinitas supply network. Affinitas has been established as 
a normal limited company rather than with a tailored shareholder 
agreement. In this way, £9000 less was spent than foreseen in the original 
application.
Sarius was conceived, as explained above, in a more top-down way. The 
top-down approach was most manifest in the cluster composition. After 
having decided for public procurement as the main route of development, 
the Council chose five firms, out of a pre-selection of 20, that were added 
to the original hub firm. According to one cluster member, the outcome of 
the selection was probably not the best one, which was also due to the 
pressure exerted by particular individuals. Thus far, no formal structure 
has been established, and the cluster remains a simple marketing front.
S&S emerged out of contacts developed through ENTRUST, established 
a formal structure after acquiring ERDF funding. Associate firms will be 
brought into the cluster for dedicate and time-bound activities only. The 
environmental cluster developed in a similar way, and is waiting for grant 
approval. A limited company has been established to formalise the cluster.
A key issue concerning cluster composition is change. Reshuffling happens 
in all clusters, and - when not caused by personal circumstances - is mainly 
due to different views on the direction and goal of clustering. Argonautics 
has seen three firms leaving (largely for reasons of individual business 
development), while an association of independent consultants (itself 
regarded as a kind of cluster) and another company joined Argonautics in 
late 1997 as ‘B ’ shareholders. Several outside companies have expressed 
interest in joining. It takes however a long time for the established cluster 
to accommodate new members. At present, new admissions are linked to 
the identification of skill gaps in the cluster. Pegasus had originally six 
core cluster members and six associates on board; two core members have 
left (one of which became an associate) and one new firm has joined, while 
the number of associate members is four.
Affinitas also showed substantial change. According to one of the 
remaining members, this was due to the fact that some of the original 
members were disappointed to see that they would not directly benefit
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from the funding acquired. Of the five original applicants, three remain 
(one core firm moved to the supply network), clustered on the same site. 
One new firm has joined Affinitas specialising in the Telesales area; this 
firm however will continue to operate from another location, west of 
Newcastle. Sarius has had one change. One firm, which, according a 
cluster observer, had ‘screamed itself in’ using its political influence, was 
considered a ‘real nuisance’. It left the cluster due to business failure. S&S 
has only undergone one change: the addition of one firm specialising on 
environmental issues.
There appears to be a downward trend in cluster size, something that may 
not be regarded as a favourable development. The optimal size for a 
cluster, according to various respondents, is between seven and ten. More 
than ten is difficult to handle; less than seven however reduces the 
possibilities to integrate a wide assortment of skills and the building of a 
cluster with a strong local/regional identity.
Evaluation and monitoring
Evaluation and monitoring is part of the daily activities of the RSC. The 
centre is engaged in regular reporting to the funding bodies. The 
monitoring activity is facilitated by the fact that the RSC maintains close 
relationships with its client firms. Interim reports on cluster progress 
provide detailed information about cluster development and output figures 
set against targets. These accompany the final claims for grant 
reimbursement. In this respect, the RSC appears to display a high level of 
professionalism. The reports are well documented, detailing achievements 
as well as disappointing outcomes. They include reflections of more 
theoretical and methodological nature. Perhaps the only note of criticism 
could be that, for some of the output figures, one might dispute their 
relevance as indicators of cluster development. However, given the 
general lack of more appropriate quantifiable measures, and given the fact 
that the figures match the categories included in the cluster plans, there 
seems to be little scope for change. Overall, the RSC undertakes a high- 
quality and transparent form of reviewing its activities. Output indicators 
are also set by the Government Office North East (GONE) and relate to 
SDP targets.
Knowledge flows and feedback
Apart from undertaking evaluation as part of external scrutiny and 
accountability, the RSC has also established its own loops of knowledge 
gathering and feedback. In part, this is an intrinsic part of the brokering 
activities, in which RSC staff discuss the progress of cluster development 
in the Board meetings of the cluster. In addition, several one-day planning 
workshops have been organised with cluster members, which have been 
important for reviewing the cluster strategy, reflecting on opportunities 
taken and missed, setting new directions and regaining momentum.
While feedback thus forms an essential dimension of clustering activities, it 
should be stressed that the initiatives show quite a sharp organisational
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divide between the facilitating organisation and targeted businesses. In 
practice, the RSC is the knowledge hub that translates data and 
information into new steps in business cluster development. The 
‘intelligence’ acquired through feedback and contacts with external actors 
is thus accumulated and applied primarily at the level of the support 
organisation. The knowledge flows within the cluster are geared to the 
implementation of the business plans, and to the daily activities of the 
individual businesses. At present, most clusters are not equipped with 
systems to gather a kind of cluster intelligence themselves, which would 
enable them to develop self-sustained learning processes at the cluster 
level. Some of the outcomes of the business survey and the regional 
development analysis, to be discussed below, can be better understood 
against this background of feedback and knowledge application.
7.2.2. The business development perspective
The following sections address the link between clustering and business 
development. Much information for this discussion is derived from the 
interviews with the firms. However, the sources of information (the 
support organisation and other regional actors) have also served to obtain 
a picture of collective business development.
Direct benefits: improving business capabilities through clustering
Improving business capabilities, both at an individual and inter-firm level, 
is the principal goal of most business support activities. Business 
capabilities underpin the competitiveness of the firms and the areas in 
which they are located. The following categories of business capabilities 
have been examined: marketing, quality improvement, R&D, financial, 
resource sharing, and access to venture capital.
For all clusters, marketing has been a primary area of business 
development, although with a large variation in spatial scope. The 
industrial clusters focused on the international arena, while the service 
oriented clusters target the local businesses. For the businesses, the 
marketing strands have not always turned out to be as successful as 
expected. This was partly due to the fact that most clusters lacked a 
proper identity when they developed their marketing projects. Poor results 
were also due to a lack of expertise both on the side of the firms and the 
RSC. For both Argonautics and Pegasus, for instance, expensive media 
advertising has created little response. Argonautics, moreover, has failed 
so far to develop and co-ordinate a more targeted marketing approach, 
although the individual members have gained sufficient experience in 
presenting the cluster when bidding for individual contracts. Lack of 
marketing skills was considered a vital bottleneck in Pegasus, which was 
attributed to the ‘civil service’ type culture in British gas, a recently 
privatised utility from which its founders emerged. To improve its 
presentations at exhibitions, the cluster hired a marketing expert, which 
turned out to be a very fruitful experience. Pegasus, moreover, has 
developed a strong cluster identity, which involves a complete suppression
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of the names of individual firms. To the outside world, Pegasus presents 
itself as a suite of activities rather than a suite of companies, in which the 
word cluster is not used. This shift, as one cluster member commented, 
was caused by the fact that the initial use of the word cluster in marketing 
only created distrust among potential clients: “Some though it was a kind 
of ‘confidence trick’. It had to be a fiddle of some kind (...); [hence] 
clusters are not of much use as a trading vehicle” . In its promotional 
material, Pegasus is presented as “an alliance of top class engineering 
companies who specialise in disciplines relating to pipelines and offshore 
engineering”.
Also for Affinitas, the emphasis on promoting clustering as part of its own 
marketing turned out not to be the most appropriate way to attract 
business clients, despite its attempts to build a close association between 
‘clusters’ and ‘creativity’. An additional problem for Affinitas was that, 
due to the presence of many marketing experts, the marketing strand went 
extremely slow. Nevertheless, a major advantage for the cluster is that 
each individual firm now enjoys the benefits from various sales forces, and 
that firms, by passing on work through the cluster and supply network, 
can go for larger contracts. In output terms, this is the most productive 
cluster. In the first year, 40 contracts were attributed to the cluster.
For the other clusters marketing has taken a more specific shape, and may 
thus turn out to be more effective. For Sarius, the main marketing route is 
through the council, for the environmental cluster via ENTRUST. The 
questions remains there to what extent a more open publicity should be 
aimed for.
Quality improvement and certification is a major issue for firms especially 
in the manufacturing sector. Within the context of the RSC, this has 
largely remained an affair of the individual firms, although it has become 
more of an issue of debate and recording at the clustering level. In the case 
of Argonautics, some support has been offered to ISO 9001 accreditation. 
Only one firm has acquired this label so far. Cluster facilitation is geared to 
exchanging experiences and encourage learning on this front.
Research and Development has not had many commercially viable results 
either. However, it is important to realise that most of these projects were 
a way for firms to come together and to learn to undertake joint projects. 
In the recent strategy review, Argonautics members felt that they still 
lacked an appropriate system for sharing the results and using R&D for 
future development. Pegasus had established a shared laboratory for 
research activities, while one research project on pipeline inspection has 
led to the establishment of a new firm. For Sarius, the research projects 
were part of its deal with the council; from the five projects envisaged, 
three in the end materialised (the public sector tendering system PEARL, 
the public service performance indicator pilot system PI, and the Internet 
procurement system Cybercat). The same applied for projects of Affinitas, 
which on one project collaborated with Sarius, while other projects were 
directly related to the network building (SCAT test) and cluster promotion 
(CD-ROM).
AL ADAPT report (02/11/99) - 189 -
Resource sharing is strongest among those clusters that are spatially 
concentrated, i.e. Pegasus and Affinitas, while it seems to be under-utilised 
in the case of Argonautics. Pegasus’ integration has evolved from a first 
compilation of an ‘asset register’ at the time of application for funding, 
which included both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ assets. Since then, the main task has 
been to “graft skills onto each other”, as expressed by a Pegasus member. 
In Argonautics, the intention exists to provide a common data server at 
Royal Quays, but some doubt whether this will contain any strategic 
information. The most important development for Argonautics is the 
development of training skills, in co-operation with TME. There is a wider 
ambition to work towards ‘a complete suite of skills’ based on an in-depth 
inventory of cluster capabilities. This ambition, which can be found in the 
original business plan, was reiterated in a recent strategy document.
Access to venture capital through the assistance of a financial consultant in 
some clusters has not had direct results. However, over the last year, after 
an initial phase of suspicion, banks have become more aware of the 
clustering approach and seem to be quite positive about its impact on 
business development. One firm reported that being part of a cluster 
helped to acquire finance. Apparently, it will take time for this dimension 
to develop.
Business networking: obtaining benefits from collaborating with other 
firms
Whereas capabilities refer to the resource base of the clusters, networking 
trust and power relations refer to the interaction, what especially counts is 
the ‘chemistry’ of cluster development as a result of networking. For 
cluster facilitators in general, overcoming scepticism and creating trust 
between firms is the main task for the initial process of networking. For 
the RSC this task has not been an easy one, and often involved an uphill 
struggle. In the view of the RSC staff, only one cluster has passed from 
this initial phase to the next one, that of collective resource development, 
and that is Pegasus. In the other clusters there is still considerable tension 
between individual and collective interests and agendas, although this 
differs substantially between single firms.
Besides the role of the RSC as moderator, trust building has also been 
encouraged by the presence of industrial figureheads. This is most manifest 
in the case of Argonautics, where Marshall Meek, a renowned naval 
architect, has acted as a ‘neutral’ outsider, affiliated neither to one of the 
businesses nor the public sector. The other example is Pegasus, where 
Ernest Shannon, former director Special Projects of British Gas, plays a 
role as non-executive chairman.
An essential dimension of networking is the mutual exchange of valuable 
information and practices, the passing on of (sub)contracts, which all can 
be regarded as ‘credit slips outstanding’ between firms. All clusters report 
this type of exchange as a crucial element of trust building. Respondents 
also repeatedly expressed their misgivings about the lack of reciprocity, 
although they also add that in general this is only a temporal phenomenon.
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Nevertheless, Argonautics members pointed at the role of inter-firm 
learning in the cluster. Some of the larger firms are more outward looking 
and thus help smaller members to overcome certain distance barriers. 
There is also exchange of experiences on project planning as well as the 
management of flexibility. Similar benefits from inter-firm learning can be 
observed in other clusters. In Sarius, for instance, firms changed their 
approach to individual marketing inspired by one member firm. Two 
Sarius members initially felt marginalised, which both firms and the RSC 
attribute to way the cluster was initially composed. In the case of the 
environmental cluster, an important dimension of the learning process is 
that between the firms and ENTRUST. The firms present a kind of test 
ground for ENTRUST to experience the value of clustering as part of its 
ambition to deliver holistic services to SMEs. Only in S&S, one of the 
members preferred the notion of ‘skill exchange’ to that of inter-firm 
learning, which was seen a too strong a concept. Skill exchange was also 
seen as contributing to the performance of the cluster.
Serious power struggles have featured in some clusters. In general, the 
problems have been solved by a rather drastic solution: exit of what other 
members seen as the uncooperative firm. In established clusters, firms 
seem to accept that there are differences in influence, but these are 
generally seen as justified on the basis of the individual business 
capabilities and the amount of time and efforts invested in the cluster 
project.
A related point that can be made in this context is the role of intra-firm 
relations. The core participators in the cluster projects are the business 
managers. Since most firms are small, management lines with other staff 
are short and the involvement of employees happens automatically. 
Nevertheless, in the case of Argonautics, with some larger firms, the 
observed deficient level of cluster interaction may be partly attributed to 
the fact that only senior management meet regularly. One respondent said 
that it was perhaps strange that even IT staff in the firms hardly interacted, 
while there was a clear need for aligning knowledge flows. Also, no 
system of exchanging staff between firms was in place.
Finally, in some clusters inter-firm interaction has benefited from spatial 
agglomeration. Here some substantial differences can be observed. All 
Argonautics firms, some of them still dispersed, are in the process of 
moving to Royal Quays. In 1997, the Pegasus core members took up a 
new location on Willington Quay in North Tyneside (in old AMEC 
facilities at Howdon). According to cluster members, physical clustering 
yielded real benefits: “better than e-mail”. The Affinitas core firms are 
located on one site. Nevertheless, despite this and the strong emphasis on 
the cluster culture, organising formal cluster meetings often turned out to 
be difficult. Sarius meets on an occasional basis, and is not spatially 
concentrated. A compensatory factor is that S&S’s favourite meeting 
place is the pub. The environmental cluster, finally, does not intend to 
agglomerate spatially.
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In a world where businesses are continuously approached by a large 
variety of support organisations, managing these relations is increasingly 
part of daily business activities. Clusters are seen as a way to overcome 
some of the problems which have emerged through the proliferation of 
support activities: information overload, support ‘fatigue’ on the side of 
the firms, fragmentation both in support services and time. For this report, 
two issues arise. First, the relationship with the RSC as core support 
organisation. Second, access to, and perception of the wider support 
community and regional policy arena.
Firms express a very positive view about the role of the RSC. Several 
respondents confirmed that the RSC has been able to overcome parochial 
attitudes, that they press to “go out”, that they “channel support very 
effectively”. In this context, one entrepreneur made the remark that many 
firms in the North East are stubbornly inward-looking. Referring to a 
business conversation in which he had suggested supplier names to a local 
firm, he stated that “even Leeds was seen as another planet” . Although 
many firms are still confused about the cluster concept, overcoming 
distance and cultural barriers is seen as a major achievement:
“Clustering helps because it encourages firms to overcome barriers: 
many persons are inclined to stay where they are, not to contact 
other firms except clients, or to go to business clubs etc. You need a 
certain push however to become a cluster.”
The business representative who quoted this also saw inter-firm learning as 
much more useful than learning from business agencies.
Because of their brokering capacities, and capacity to translate policy 
issues for business development, the RSC should not be regarded as an 
extra layer of bureaucracy. Brokering was generally effective, although 
various cluster members revealed that this was based essentially on a “hit 
and miss” approach. The firms had been surprised that a group of people 
with primarily a public sector background could develop such 
competencies. This success was attributed to the knowledge of the public 
sector combined with a preparedness to gain an in-depth knowledge of 
client firms. Another essential factor has been a high dose of enthusiasm 
and strong belief in the project.
A critical note can be made about the social relationship between the RSC 
and the firms, as perceived by some of the firms. In one cluster, the RSC 
was not really seen as a facilitator, but more as a controlling body:
“They [the RSC team] are also the persons with ‘money’; although 
their role is presented as ‘facilitating’ this is not how they are seen 
by businesses: they are seen as financial gatekeepers, they are in 
control”.
More in general, firms do not feel that they are partners in the cluster 
facilitator, although, at the project level, the RSC acts as a public partner 
in the clusters. So while the cluster projects can be regarded as public- 
private partnerships, the RSC itself works at a distance from the business
Institutional networking: obtaining benefits from local institutions
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level. A compounding factor is that the firms, to be able to claim funding, 
need to meticulously monitor their time and financial investments in 
clustering activities. They thus have had to adopt complex recording 
systems that carry a considerable bureaucratic load.
The weakest area of support, across the clusters, has been economic 
intelligence as part of the ‘real service’ package. Most firms confirmed 
that this had not been focused enough. For instance, for Pegasus the 
access to electronic tendering systems turned out not to match the 
“esoteric part” the cluster was working in. In the Sarius cluster, the 
attempt to gain contracts through a systematic ‘cold calling’ of potential 
clients tracked on the basis of market intelligence failed to generate any 
valuable response. Argonautics lacked a system for passing on 
information, and members was felt that opportunities were missed for 
cluster members to join in projects. In these and other clusters, material 
bought as part of intelligence gathering, such as directories, marketing 
guides, etc. had often turned out to be less appropriate and useful as 
initially thought. In the case of Affinitas, some of the resources assigned to 
intelligence were spent on marketing. The weak performance on this front 
should be assessed in the light of the fact that the RSC does not have true 
sector specialists, although staff has worked hard to improve their 
knowledge and build up a sectoral library. The RSC has recognised the 
problem of finding the right approach to intelligence provision in its own 
publication Information Requirement Report (July 1996). The linear 
approach based on developing policies on needs surveys was seen as too 
slow and inflexible. The Centre has thus taken steps to become more 
directly engaged with businesses in accommodating their immediate 
information needs, relying less on surveys and generic services. A recent 
innovation is the pathfinder, a weekly business news update with cuttings 
from newspapers and magazines, geared to the sectors the RSC client 
firms are specialising in. While some of this information is of a ‘global’ 
nature, it also plays an essential role in disseminating local information.
Where economic intelligence has created some degree of disappointment, 
the provision of support intelligence has been highly appreciated. All firms 
indicate that they are more aware of business support in general. 
Obviously, a difference should be made here between those firms with 
hardly any experience with public support, which are concentrated in the 
manufacturing clusters, and those which are were confronted with 
clustering through their established contacts, with, or even role in, 
business support activities, like many of the service firms. Argonautics 
members highlighted the role of both the cluster and the RSC in accessing 
the support sector, although they also pointed out that no follow-up 
application has been successful (such as for the DTI Sector Challenge).
On the position of other support organisations, quite a negative picture 
emerged. Business Link was seen as providing too much of a “boxed” 
approach. In the case of Pegasus, members saw Business Link as generally 
helpful but also felt that the cluster had taken over much of the task 
Business Link should have done. Firms were disturbed about the
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continuing stream of brochures, “glossier than we could ever produce”. A 
real source of irritation and annoyance was the growth of parallel, 
sometimes even rival, support initiatives with similar objectives, including 
clustering. “Should the agencies not join in a cluster themselves?”, a 
Pegasus member thus suggested.
A final business verdict on clustering
So, in the view of the firms, has clustering improved the business capacity 
to compete? Here it should be reiterated that most firms took a rather 
sceptical stance towards the cluster concept, especially at the time of 
joining. As one cluster member commented: “waiting for and receiving 
grant money is for some firms the main issue for joining clusters” . The 
various business interviews indeed reveal that for all firms, with the 
exception of some Affinitas members and the Pegasus start-up firms, 
access to funding has been the main reason for joining. Although funding 
is valued as a “clear carrot” to motivate firms, an RSC representative also 
complained about the perverting impact of ERDF funding: it “distracts 
firms from the real thing, i.e. clustering”. The entry of ERDF has also 
stopped the search for alternative means of financing, including the own 
idea of an ‘iterative revenue loop’. Another comment was that, while the 
firms are generally very cautious when it come down to spending, “money 
astuteness disappears when grant money is involved”.
On the issue of funding, different opinions can be heard. An Affinitas 
member stated that clusters should be able to survive on their own 
contracts. A Sarius member emphasised the experimental nature, and the 
trend towards self-governance, as main aspects of cluster development. In 
contrast, an interviewee of another cluster claimed that clusters should not 
be expected to become self-financing: “charging member firms might 
easily stop the distribution of the cluster philosophy”. At present, there is 
still discussion within the clusters about long-term financing. Creating the 
right approach, system and practices does not appear to be easy.
On the concept of clustering itself, firms had been confronted with an 
identity problem. This may be attributed to the fact that the clusters were 
set up with a strong production orientation, thus creating tensions between 
‘individual’ and ‘collective’ business activities. In presentational and 
marketing terms, for instance, the problem often arose that there were 
“too many badges”, to quote one entrepreneur. What should be done 
exactly under the banner of the firm and the cluster? To what extent 
should the cluster and firms do similar or different things? Some firms still 
saw it as too much an academic concept, while others will still unsure 
about the legal dimension. One member emphasised the dynamic social 
aspect: “essential is the mix of people, (. ) it is like chaos theory”. 
Another member however also stressed the importance of formalisation, 
not so much to facilitate collaboration but to ensure commitment. It was 
also confirmed that the use of cluster in business support would reduce 
selectivity in business targeting. One commentator, finally, saw the value
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The notion of shaping resources that are rooted in the regional economy 
rather than in single firms or clusters finds recognition within the RSC. For 
instance, referring both to Pegasus and Argonautics, the Pegasus Business 
Plan (1996), states:
“The benefits of these new opportunities will generate wealth and 
create employment in the region. They will also ensure that the 
region is able to strengthen its research and development base and 
increase the capacity for small indigenous firms to expand” (p.6)
In a recent strategy document of Argonautics, it was recognised that 
Argonautics should be seen as a small part of the overall training solution 
for the maritime industry in the region. A major recent initiative is the 
establishment of a skill centre. Following on internal training activities 
financed under the UK government Skills Challenge (in AutoCad, specific 
design and analysis programmes such as Tribon and Cosmos, and 
Datamodelling), the Argonautics Skills Training Centre which will be 
developed in a partnership between Argonautics, Tyneside TEC, TME 
apprenticeship scheme, South Tyneside College and the RSC. Assistance 
is obtained from the local Skills Challenge project. The project has also 
attracted ESF funding. Early 1998, a manager was appointed and the 
centre was established at Royal Quays adjacent to the Argonautics firms. 
Although developing a training centre is seen as a vehicle to business 
improvement and potentially income generation, it also includes an 
‘altruistic‘ element of region-wide skill development.
Another potential route for Argonautics to contribute to shaping ‘club 
goods’ is through interacting with the Northern Offshore Federation. 
While some contacts have been made, the outcome so far has been 
disappointing. Although some firms are member of the NOF, the nature of 
the association - closely tied to the development of the larger firms in the 
region - appeared to make it difficult to build a link to an innovative 
approach to the development of SMEs active in the same industry.
Pegasus, in turn, is creating cluster assets through the joint facilities at its 
new location includes a testing laboratory. More significantly, Pegasus
members are actively engaged in the development of the North East 
Pipeline Group. This organisation emerged from an original interest in 
renewable energy as part of the Northern Energy Initiative, and is 
supported by the Technology Centre in Sunderland. The intention is to 
work on skills improvement, to create an own identity outside the region 
as well as provide a platform for internal lobbying. An important task will 
be the forging with links to other agencies, which so far has not been 
adequately exploited. The organisation will be modelled after the NOF. 
The cluster members regard the Group as a kind of cluster development in 
a ‘broader spectrum’.
An important area of ‘clubs goods’ lies in the domain of technological 
developments. Both Argonautics and Pegasus members stressed the role 
of links with regional universities and other centres of expertise. 
Unfortunately, at present links were seen as weak, particularly with 
universities, and with little scope for improvement (specific research 
projects excepted). For the marine sector, universities are seen as “being 
behind”, acting in an “ambivalent” way, as “pursuing their own agenda”, 
and acting primarily in their self-interest (for instance through high 
charges). Pegasus hopes to improve relationships and align interests 
through the new pipeline association. For Argonautics, it is expected more 
effective links can be built up through the Skills Training Centre.
Regional asset development also plays a role for S&S. One member is 
involved in the IT strand of the Sunderland Business Forum, which is 
joined by about twenty fee-paying firms. One activity has been is making a 
presentation of business consultancy to the legal profession. This forum is 
part of the Service Challenge, supposed to provide a service support 
infrastructure for manufacturing. The Challenge identified sectors, 
comparable to clusters, and developed initiatives for the legal, finance, IT 
sector etc.
Affinitas has been involved in a study on the printer industry in the region, 
which started an NDC initiative to compare the Newcastle area to Leeds. 
The study has been taken up by the British Printing Federation. The sector 
is much under threat in Newcastle because of a lack of specialisation and a 
division of labour. Printer companies tend to opt for ‘Jack of all trade’ 
attitudes that seem to induce detrimental forms of competition, in which 
work is increasingly subcontracted to outsiders. The initiative is thought to 
improve the division of labour and internal trading -  with printers focusing 
on printing and specialised firms like Affinitas undertaking the design and 
performing as ‘systems integrators’. The follow-up from this project is still 
to be seen.
For the environmental cluster, the regional dimension turned out to be 
quite problematic. One respondent argued that, in the past, the 
development of an environmental strategy in the region has been “woolly 
and interest-driven”. Through offering free, subsidy-based services, larger 
institutions, particularly universities, have substantially curbed the 
possibilities for small firms to develop commercially viable lines of 
business. Apart from the current emphasis on EMAS, it is hoped regional
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expertise and business can be built up through industrial conversion 
projects (such as in the context of the European Konver programme 
oriented to defence conversion).
The discussion of ‘club goods’ points at an interesting shift, that from 
clustering leading to closed networks to processes of ‘institution building’, 
illustrated by cluster-specific associational forms like the Pipeline Group 
and region-wide software initiative. It will come as no surprise that for the 
firms this shift has contributed to the confusion about what clusters mean. 
While recognising the value of the different forms of networking and 
associating, one respondent blamed the support sector for failing to bring 
more clarity and formalisation. Characterising both the closed RSC 
networks and the open associational forms in cluster terms was seen as 
particularly foggy:
“Support agencies seem to take the concept, bending and twisting it.
They call it all the same thing. Businesses end up totally confused”.
The distinction between network orientation and ‘institution building’, as 
made in this study, may thus help to bring more clarity.
Demonstration effects
The role of demonstrating innovative practices to the region is highly rated 
by the RSC and the firms. Promotion is a core activity of the RSC, 
through its newsletter, the local press, networking at regional and national 
levels, and its website. The RSC also manages a web-based business 
database with information on local SMEs. The RSC benefits from the fact 
that its approach and achievements are well appreciated and recognised by 
important actors within the region and beyond (including the DTI and the 
European Parliament, see below) as well as the wider public. The story 
about the launching of the six clusters above already shows the 
significance of demonstration effects. Various recent clusters developed 
from grassroots emulating the experiences of the first clusters.
Among the local business community, not all response is favourable 
however. The high levels of support that went to the first cluster, 
Argonautics, for instance, were envied by local firms in the same industry. 
The RSC was also confronted with the fact that clusters took the shape of 
“mini-oligopolists”, becoming groups of well-supported and well- 
networked companies with optimal access to funding and local markets. 
While, to some extent, this may be unavoidable, the closed and formal 
nature of the cluster poses a problem. The micro-cluster structure 
facilitates the creation of commitment and the nurturing of collaborative 
attitudes, but it is less clear how it may contribute to the modernisation of 
sectors at large. Each initiative to broaden the cluster development, such 
as through the formation of a wider cluster association should thus be 
welcomed. In principle, the RSC is open to clusters in similar sectors. In 
the pipeline sector, another group of firms was assisted by the Centre, but 
no cluster emerged in the end.
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A related point of discussion when dealing with SME development at large 
is that of ‘picking winners’. Outside observers, confronted with the client 
profile of the RSC, have pointed at the fact that most of the firms are 
operating in hi-tech sectors, and are generally led by well-educated 
entrepreneurs. Why should these firms receive support, while there are so 
many backward firms around? One reason for this strategy, as presented 
by the RSC itself, is the ambition to anchor vital skills and assets to the 
region, and to modify the prevailing business culture. Their activities may 
be associated with the more successful companies and business persons in 
the region, but only in this way a region in decline may hope to regain 
some of its past innovative potential and competitiveness, and to 
overcome a culture dominated by distrust and petty rivalries. This was also 
suggested in the initial formulation of the cluster approach in the CURDS 
documentation, which recommended identifying locally strong companies 
that could act as drivers of the clustering process.
When confronted with the issue of ‘picking winners’, the firms generally 
accepted that, at present, the cluster initiative was serving more advanced 
firms in the region. However, the firms also put forward various reasons 
why this should be regarded as the most appropriate strategy. The RSC 
was seen as being “realistic about picking winners”, working with those 
firms which may benefit from clustering but which have also reached a 
level where they may contribute substantially to regional competitiveness. 
None of the firms can be considered as an outright winner from the start, 
especially when the more recent clusters are taken into account. On the 
other hand, clustering would not work with more marginal firms, some 
respondents claimed, and certainly not with start-ups. One observant 
stated that cluster initiatives should deliberately target ‘winners’, as to 
maximise benefits and demonstration effects. Another argument was that 
cluster initiatives require a certain amount of interest and commitment 
from the firms, and that the RSC did not create any barriers of entry. That 
is, any firm really interested in clustering would receive support. One 
observer nevertheless agreed that some form of ‘low-tech’ strategy might 
be envisaged.
Effectiveness o f regional business support
There is no doubt that the RSC presents an innovative contribution to the 
local network of business support. Because it largely plays the role of a 
broker, the organisation does not compete with other support 
organisations, and even enhances the accessibility and therefore 
effectiveness of business support at large. As revealed in the last section, 
this point is also made by business respondents. At a more strategic level, 
the position of the RSC in the support infrastructure is now part of the 
extension of the centre’s activities from the local to the regional level. This 
will be discussed in more detail in the next section.
From the perspective of using local resources, the RSC is highly cost- 
effective. In 1997, RSC was nominated for the Award for Business 
Partnerships Awards granted by the Local Government Chronicle.
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Although the RSC did not win, the nomination underpinned the national 
recognition of the initiative. In particular, the way the RSC was able to 
leverage local resources to attract various forms of funding for the 
creation of long-lasting relationships between firms was appreciated. 
Besides ERDF, additional funding for training was acquired through the 
DTI Sector Challenge for Pegasus and the NT Skills Challenge for 
Argonautics (with a bid in for ESF). The DTI subsidy for Pegasus was the 
only successful bid for DTI sector challenge in the North East. Table 20 
summarises total funding and cost levels.
Whether the RSC offers ‘value for money’ when total public expenses 
(included leveraged) are counted is more difficult to say. Up to 1998, the 
RSC helped the clusters to create 118 permanent jobs, and 128 temporary 
jobs while the clusters claim that another 256 jobs has been safeguarded 
(based on RSC information). It would not be fair to calculate expenses- 
per-job since this would leave out demonstration and promotion effects, 
and the longer-term impact on regional networking and specialisation. It 
would also negate the innovative and dynamic character of the project, 
which makes a simple judgement on comparative efficiency grounds 
unjust. Compared with many other local support organisations, the RSC 
has a low cost profile, in terms of its office use, staff, additional expenses 
and promotion.
Table 20 Public spending on cluster projects, 1994-1998
Project Element Argonautics Pegasus Sarius Affinitas Environment S&S RSC
Intelligence 4351 24569 4652 17730 4000 0
Marketing 100000 130382 23126 93434 30000 22000
Financial Consultancy 6400 25907 0 3434 0 0
R&D/Product 288057 71179 191865 23802 40000 0
Development
Facilitation 267080 120735 17912 67566 26000 6750
Other 97367 40918 0 0 0 140000
Total subsidy 763255 413690 237555 205966 100000 168750 560801
Local Matched Funding 426431 219545 129325 113014 54000 84375 303954
ERDF Grant 336824 194145 108230 92952 46000 84375 256847
Source: RSC
Embedding o f cluster initiative in regional specialisation strategies
Regional economic specialisation in the North East, as envisaged primarily 
by the Northern Development Company, is developed along three major 
strands: high volume (automotive, microelectronics, textiles, etc.), low 
volume (machine tools, offshore, shipbuilding, etc.) and process industries 
(chemical), with services sometimes added as a fourth segment. The RSC 
primarily targets firms in the latter strand, complemented with service 
activities that can also be regarded as low-volume, within one regional 
area (North Tyneside). The essence of low volume is that is it contract- 
based, and that a large part of the business activities (marketing, 
management, cash flow, employment) revolves around the sequence of
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bidding, tendering, planning, producing and servicing of highly customised 
outputs. Initially, there was the intention to establish a ‘low-volume’ 
engineering centre of excellence on the northern bank of the Tyne (ECAI), 
as part of the ‘Three rivers strategy’, complementing the ‘high volume’ 
centre on the bank of the Wear (CAMM) and the process-oriented centre 
on bank of the Tees (EPICC). ECAI, the European Centre for Advance 
Industries, was initially seen as providing, among other activities 
associated with marine engineering, a new home for the RSC and various 
clusters. ECAI was presented as a flagship regeneration project on the 
north bank of the Tyne symbolising the striving for economic renewal in 
the area. However, when Siemens announced its massive investment in a 
silicon chips factory on Tyneside, ECAI was ‘hijacked’ and renamed as the 
North East Microelectronics Institute - Centre for Advanced Industries 
(NEMI-CAI). Also the initial plan to include workshops in the building, in 
addition to office space, was dropped. An important new lodger was 
Applied Materials, a major supplier to Siemens. While the building still 
provided space for SMEs, its re-profiling, together with relatively high 
rents, impelled several clusters to look for other opportunities.
RSC activities are also embedded in the regional economic policy through 
the SPD (Single Programming Document), the regional strategy document 
to obtain Objective Two funding from the European regional funds. 
Clustering was explicitly part of the SPD 1994-1998. In earlier and current 
SPDs, a sectoral strategy is advocated to which the RSC has frequently 
referred to in its cluster application. It should be noted that the RSC is a 
small agent in the world of economic and business development in the 
North East, something which is also observed by the firms. It has however 
been very keen on exploring and establishing partnerships with other 
organisations. The RSC benefits from its close ties with the local 
authority, although the latter’s capacities in the area of economic 
development are limited. Another important link is that with Tyneside 
TEC. This relationship was troubled somewhat when Tyneside Tec started 
its own overarching cluster programme (Intramesh), which partly 
interfered with the RSC activities. Further links have been developed with 
local enterprise agencies, development corporations etc. One area where 
the RSC has made a significant contribution, as illustrated in the section on 
implementation, is creating increased appreciation for the role of services, 
even if they do not directly add to exporting.
One current issue in the regional role of the RSC is that of a 
transformation from a local into a more regional centre, initially confined 
to the Tyneside area. This ambition existed almost since the first 
conception of the initiative:
“An extension of the Real Service Centre project principle, in 
conjunction with the Business Link networks would be able to 
provide for the information requirements of the development 
clusters. Through a facilitated network with the Regional 
Technology Centre, and further networking with the regions’ 
universities, the potential for small firms to utilise the latest
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technology (through their cluster) and techniques would be greatly 
enhanced.” (Hastie, 1995, p. 7).
Similar comments can also be found in the RSC business plan. Several 
firms also mentioned this extension as a major step forward for the centre, 
also because in practice various clusters already contain firms outside the 
North Tyneside boundaries. With the coming extension of the RSC 
funding, a promotion to the regional level is expected. The linking with 
Business Link (or successor) may involve a closer co-ordination with the 
Business Link Business Development Managers, which may help the RSC 
in assessing and reviewing individual company practices and performance. 
Fundamentally, by strengthening its networks and position in the region, 
the RSC increasingly faces the task of countering the prevailing regional 
focus on large firms, notably foreign investments. Besides the political 
support from North Tyneside Council, it is only thanks to the availability 
of generous funding for SME support from outside that an organisation 
such as the RSC can thrive. The recent succession of large company 
closures, including, most spectacularly, that of Siemens, appears to have 
helped to strengthen the position of SME-oriented strategies.
A final, and highly sensitive point, is the role of the regional political 
culture in the development of the RSC. The North East is generally 
considered as a region with a strong regional identity, and is renowned for 
its strong ties between core business leaders, core political organisations 
and support institutions. The downside of these strong ties is that they 
work in an “Old Boys’ Network” fashion. Many of the acclaimed 
partnerships, to quote one business representative, reflect effective 
“marriages of convenience”. In the case of business support, the 
boundaries between the provider, receiver and assessor of support and 
funding are often blurred. Indeed, some firms pointed out that many of 
these activities could be described as “incestuous”. One observant cited 
the fact that, in the case of another network oriented initiative, the very 
same entrepreneur sat on the Board of the project, while being one of the 
supported firms and having being assigned a contract for the project 
evaluation. Several other instances of manipulation, especially in ERDF- 
funded programmes, were also quoted. The RSC was seen as an 
organisation which, since the centre works at the public-private interface, 
cannot ignore or shut out the impact of such behaviour. However, the 
centre is regarded as being honest in its own development and choices. 
One client firm explicitly recognised and appreciated that the RSC was not 
part of the “Old Boys’ network”. A future problem may that, with the 
extension of its remit to the regional level, and further embedding of 
activities in regional development strategies, the RSC will become more 
implicated in the intricate political development in the region.
7.2.4. Conclusions and recommendations
The RSC has been widely recognised as an innovative and promising 
approach to business support. Besides the CLES nomination already 
mentioned, this includes a recognition as one of the few innovative UK 
projects in a lecture for the European parliament by the MEP Arlene
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McCarthy (Epades report a4-0126, 10-4-1997, together with EMI-CAI, 
the Glasgow Regeneration Fund, the Merseyside Special Investment Fund, 
the Ayrshire three town project, and Eastern Scotland capacity building 
projects), a recognition as a unique project by the former Labour shadow 
minister of science and engineering, and a recognition by the European 
section of the DTI as a good example of a local development project based 
on networking.
On the other hand, the RSC itself recognises its limitations and 
shortcomings, even when it comes down to the crux of its existence: 
clustering. Not only is the concept still an enigma to most of the firms, 
also one RSC representative stated that “the jury is still out on clustering.” 
So, what is the verdict of the present study?
The analysis here has found a dynamic organisation that has evolved 
through learning and feedback. The RSC is highly committed to its 
mission, and genuine interest in and care for business development. While 
it operates in highly competitive funding environment, the organisation 
deserves credit for the way it has continued to follow its own agenda, even 
keeping a long-term view on business development. While it is dealing 
with complex issues, such as trying to change business behaviour, and to 
facilitate new forms of social interaction, much has been done to make 
objectives and activities transparent not only in funding applications, but 
also in other publications. Furthermore, the RSC can be described as 
highly cost-effective, particularly when gauged in terms of what is spent 
from local public funding. The organisation has learnt to cope with the 
dominant political culture in the region. The fact that it links sectoral 
targeting to SME development rather than large firms is a welcome 
alternative in a region where most policy efforts are geared to attracting 
and pleasing foreign investors.
Similarly, establishing longer lasting links with firms, within a medium to 
long term development perspective, provides a promising step in the 
development in business support. In this respect, the RSC should not be 
seen so much as an alternative to existing forms of business support, but as 
performing a brokering role between firms and service providers. The 
clustering activities help firms to articulate their support needs better 
within a longer-term strategic perspective. Support may thus move away 
from the situation where it primarily responds to business wants. Such 
wants often do not reflect real needs but are merely spontaneous reactions 
by entrepreneurs confronted with the question of how they could benefit 
from public support (in many cases just responding to new fads promoted 
in business support brochures).
One of the most positive points is that the RSC, despite the modest reach 
of its activities, has contributed to cultural change in the region. Many 
actors in the region, both within businesses and other institutions, appear 
to have a better understanding of the benefits of collaboration and 
collective action around SMEs. The way the RSC has undertaken its 
brokering activities has received much appreciation, both from firms and 
other regional actors. Within the clusters, the Centre has been able to
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create a level of trust and common direction sufficient to counter most of 
the centrifugal forces that hit each association of businesses. Within the 
area, new inter-sectoral links have been created and public-private 
partnerships established that help to counter fragmentation in the local 
economy. Businesses themselves are keen on investing in region-wide 
associational initiatives thus contributing to regional cluster-oriented 
‘institution building’. A question that remains open is the overall sectoral 
profile of the centre, that is, its scope of sectoral targeting. So far, this has 
been largely driven by local opportunities. The strengthening of the 
regional focus, with a possibly stronger embedding of the Centre within 
regional development strategies and links to the coming RDA, may 
perhaps provide a platform or making a more strategic choice here.
A critical point is that of the RSC in its role of facilitator. The emphasis on 
facilitation, rather than cluster building, is considered part of good 
practices. The idea of facilitation matches a bottom up cluster composition 
and development with a top-down triggering and guidance of the 
clustering process. It is clear that over the past years, the RSC has tried to 
improve its approach to facilitation. Most of the clusters emerged bottom- 
up, responding to local business opportunities. In one instance, where the 
centre it tried to create a cluster itself, by a process of top-down selection, 
it found how difficult it was to nurture inter-firm solidarity and synergy. 
Nevertheless, the top-down facilitating role of the RSC should be put in 
further perspective. The RSC itself emerged in a bottom-up fashion at 
council level, and at a European level it is regarded as a grassroots 
initiative. However, its roots lie in the public sector not in business. 
Despite the good intentions of the RSC, a distance can be noted between 
the Centre and the cluster members. Many firms perceive the Centre as a 
‘gatekeeper’, both in organisational and financial terms. The question thus 
arises to what extent businesses could have more ownership of the 
Centre’s activities, by stronger business involvement at a more strategic 
level.
On the other hand, there is also the issue of how intense the linkages with 
particular groups of firms should be. A general problem with creating 
long-lasting client relationships is that the survival of the firms, rather than 
regional interests, start to dominate support activities. Obviously, many 
factors make an emphasis on survival important, such as the continuation 
of the present projects, the value at demonstration effects, and most 
pragmatically, its translation in positive performance indicators in funding 
assessments. What should be prevented, however, is that clustering 
support turns into a style of nurturing ‘babies’. Over the years, the RSC as 
well as other responsible bodies have become more aware of this issue, 
and this has led to a reduction in direct subsidies per cluster and an on­
going debate about exit strategies. Nevertheless, this is a theme that may 
require more reflection within the RSC and the setting of local/regional 
support development strategies at large.
Intelligence is another issue for debate. Will the RSC really live up to its 
name - a provider of customised services along cluster lines? The
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provision of intelligence as real services should perhaps be a more central 
activity. Of course, a name does not mean everything, but this evaluation 
has confirmed that intelligence has been an area of disappointment. No 
easy solutions can be offered here, since the provision of appropriate 
intelligence is a highly demanding task (changing the name, as admitted by 
the RSC itself, would be a mistake at this stage). It requires a constant 
interaction between firms and the real service provider, as well as a lot of 
sectoral expertise. At present, it is particularly the latter that is missing. A 
suggestion, therefore, is that further links are developed with centres of 
expertise in the region, and to participate, where feasible, in the 
development of sectoral strategies. Regarding the links with client firms, a 
central question is how the Centre can widen its business scope within the 
sectors it is targeting. One idea could be to offer different routes for 
cluster facilitation, some more intense based on funding applications, 
others perhaps in a lighter way through a demonstration process. This 
might also involve a move away from the strongly formalised approach to 
clustering, which at present seems to curb flexibility beyond the formal 
cluster boundaries. Where formal clusters are supported, the downward 
trend in cluster size should be countered. A number of around seven firms 
seems to be an appropriate minimum. A related issue is that more 
engagement could be sought with employees in the firms.
A final point is the intelligence accumulated and employed by the Centre 
itself, related to business clustering. The cluster model has developed 
through initial contact with several publications and ideas, including work 
from CURDS, authors on small business development and various official 
publications. This has led to a particular interpretation of clustering, which 
may be regarded as strong in its orientation towards business collaboration 
and asset development, but weaker in the way it copes with issues of 
flexibility and wider sectoral embedding of the clusters. Obviously, there 
have been good reasons for adopting a particular approach to clustering. 
The local context in which the Centre operates, with its lack of a 
networking culture and absence of entrepreneurial attitudes, required a 
specific translation of clustering concept and the idea of a real service 
centre. Also constraints imposed by funding regimes and other institutional 
factors have had an impact on the kind of approach adopted. Nevertheless, 
it may be useful for the RSC to review how insights into small business 
development are interpreted and applied. In particular, a strategy may be 
required to keep up-to-date with the literature and debate on small 
business development and business support. Only in that way, will the 
Centre be able to maintain its innovative profile. Hopefully, a more stable 
funding stream can be found for the Centre, to allow it to move valuable 
time from frequent re-applications to business support.
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Chapter Eight. Lessons for regional economic 
development and business support
Within the context of the ADAPT-CORE project, this study has focused 
on cluster initiatives geared to the improvement of SMEs as part of 
regional development policies. The core question has been:
How can cluster-oriented forms of business support improve the 
way SMEs contribute to regional employment and wealth?
To answer this question, the project was structured in three stages:
1. the development of the cluster concept
2. the design of a research methodology
3. case study analysis.
In this last chapter, conclusions will be presented along two lines. The first 
section will present the research outcomes in a more academic fashion, 
with specific attention for the list of issues presented in the Pro Forma. 
The second section will contain the more practical recommendations for 
policy-making.
8.1. Research outcomes
8.1.1. The CORE of the ‘cluster’ concept
In many respects, the notion of clusters of competitive advantage 
represents a very open concept. Indeed, one suggestion quoted in Chapter 
Three was to see clusters as a menu of ideas and policy options to deal 
with variation and diversity. The ‘seven steps’ along which the cluster 
concept was presented illustrated how this diversity has come about. 
Being a novel and appealing concept, ‘clusters’ were associated with a 
range of ideas on spatial-economic developments which have pulled the 
cluster concept into different directions. These ideas included the debate 
on innovation systems, on supply chains, on SMEs and the role of 
associations in economic development.
Despite this variation, the present study held on to the idea that there is 
still a ‘core’ to clusters, rejecting the ‘menu’ solution. The ‘core’ of 
clusters, as advocated here, is based on its strong link with the concept of 
‘competitiveness’, as well as with some other generic dimension of 
regional development (specialisation, identity, spatial proximity, see Fig. 2 
on Page 92). More specifically, the cluster concept derives its value from
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the way it links the structural level of regional development with the level 
of business development and networking. In the words of Chapter Three:
It is this marriage between the structural level, as depicted by 
illusive cluster maps, and the relational and institutional aspects at 
the lower level, as captured by the rich vocabulary on networking, 
associations, governance structures etc, which has made the concept 
so influential.
Both the methodology and case study analysis have been heavily 
influenced by this marriage. What has been stressed in particular, however, 
is that the link between the macro of regional development and the 
micro/meso level, while providing distinct advantages in terms of business 
and regional competitiveness, is not necessarily an easy marriage. On the 
contrary, aligning the interests of the region and businesses presents a 
constant challenge. By structuring the methodology around this issue, the 
case studies clarified the tensions arising between business development 
and regional interests. The case studies also pointed at possible ways 
policy-makers can deal with this issue. These two themes will now be 
discussed in more detail.
8 .1 .2 . T h e  r e se a r c h  Pro Forma a n d  m a in  r e su lts  fr o m  th e  c a se  s tu d ie s
The cluster cases under study consisted of policy initiatives as well as 
various associational initiatives developed by business actors with 
substantial public backing. Setting out a methodology for examining 
cluster initiatives, the research Pro Forma, as developed in Chapter Four, 
started with an adapted form of a policy cycle, followed by issues taken 
from the business and regional perspective. This section will present the 
main outcomes per Pro Forma theme.
T h e  p o lic y  c y c le
C o n c e p t io n /la u n c h in g :  While the various case studies showed 
considerable variation in objectives, cluster approaches and 
implementation, most are somehow grafted onto the work of Porter. What 
is interesting is how the general (Porterian) concept of clusters has been 
locally interpreted and translated into practical initiatives. In the Tyneside 
case, for instance, a Porter-based recommendation of cluster-oriented 
approaches, combined with experience gained in ‘Central Italy’ 
(particularly Emilia Romagna), inspired the establishment of an innovative 
organisation geared to the facilitation of business clusters among SMEs 
(RSC = the North Tyneside Real Service Centre). Another application on 
Tyneside was developed with the aim of attracting and servicing foreign 
investors, especially through the regional development agency (NDC = 
Northern Development Company). Here, the cluster concept, particularly 
through its supply chain dimension, underpinned the development of 
‘value added’ embedding strategies. The German case studies 
concentrated on the way clustering could contribute to structural 
improvements in the regional economy through a relational perspective. In 
particular, they endorsed the idea that innovation could be stimulated by
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nurturing collaborative attitudes and collective learning processes. Thus, in 
nearly all cases, a specific threat (relocation, ongoing rationalisation, 
business closures) or clear opportunity (embedding investors, move to 
quality wine) triggered off the cluster initiative.
Support agencies and funding regimes: The agencies that initiated the 
cluster projects vary from ‘pure’ public sector (Aragon), partnership 
arrangements (IAT = Institut Arbeit und Technik in Gelsenkirchen, RSC), 
to business associations with public support (Tyneside offshore). Overall, 
the research confirms the idea that a public/private mix will generally 
provide the best support arrangement. Public sector participation is vital 
for funding, for the embedding in regional policies and facilitating 
demonstration effects, while private sector participation is important for 
creating commitment, encouraging bottom-up initiatives and customisation 
of support. Funding regimes showed a similar degree of variation. Many 
initiatives relied on short-term, project-based funding. While this is 
understandable, given the innovative nature of the cluster approach, not all 
initiatives seem to have had sufficient time to develop and show their 
impact. Viewed from a policy cycle perspective, therefore, cluster 
initiatives suffer from the fact that most results become manifest only in 
the medium to long term, long after the time when new funding has to be 
applied for.
Cluster mapping and audits: Most cluster initiatives were not preceded 
by in-depth regional analysis (comparable with Porter’s cluster mapping). 
Some grew from bottom-up in response to specific needs or opportunities 
(Tyneside); others developed their core themes and targets through self­
auditing (Bergisches Land). Audits played a role in the acquisition of 
funding (RSC), or strategic reevaluation (NOF = Northern Offshore 
Federation). In general, the results endorse the idea that ongoing learning 
and feedback, with a strong participatory role for business, is a more 
appropriate approach than a linear scheme, in which policy design is based 
on ex-ante identification of ‘business needs’. Specific SME audits were 
carried out by the RSC and in Bergisches Land, which helped to tailor the 
initiatives to their client groups.
Setting objectives: Tracing cluster objectives revealed a much more 
varied and dynamic picture than initially envisaged. The variation in 
objectives is particularly striking. While none of the case studies fails to 
mention regional competitiveness, and all somehow invoke a notion of the 
benefits from relational assets, there is less clarity about specific goals. 
This is due primarily to the fuzziness of the cluster concept and the 
innovative character of the initiatives. Cluster-oriented ideas are employed 
to serve specific regional purposes, such as preventing relocation, 
improving local linkages, facilitating inter-firm learning etc. In translating 
the fuzzy notion of clustering into concrete initiatives, however, the setting 
of priorities largely reflects the context in which projects are developed, 
and the specific ideas of the decision makers at the point of planning. 
Variations stem from context conditions (including terms of funding and 
evaluation), as well the specific preferences of the initiators.
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The explorative and often arbitrary nature of setting objectives is 
confirmed by the way objectives appear as moving targets. The RSC has 
shifted from an intensive process of cluster building to more emphasis on 
facilitating and more generic forms of business support. The Aragonese 
case shifted from creating new limited companies as local leaders to a 
more gradual process of concentration. In Bergisches Land, the initial 
objective of creating regional assets by linking two sectors was overtaken 
by the priority of facilitating inter-firm learning. In all these cases, the fact 
that firms were engaged on a longer term basis contributed to these 
changes and learning processes.
Implementation through brokers: To achieve their - albeit often moving
- targets, the initiatives generally rely strongly on the input of brokering 
and expert contributions. Brokering is especially important for developing 
the relational dimension of regional economic development. The present 
study has provided ample evidence of the crucial role of brokers. A 
distinction can be made between the clusters geared to associational 
strategies and ‘institution building’ at industrial/sectoral level, and to more 
network and learning-oriented initiatives. For the first category, the 
associational initiatives, the role of initiators from the sector itself have 
proved to be crucial (ASSA = Automotive Sector Strategic Alliance, 
NOF), either as triggers or even as coaches throughout the project. The 
same applies to the local wine regulators in Aragón.
In the case of the successful networking/learning initiatives, brokers and 
experts with an industrial background also proved to be most effective 
(Bergisches Land). The RSC has been able to thrive with the help of 
public sector brokers. This can be explained in part by reference to the 
specific type of knowledge these brokers embodied, knowledge that 
facilitated effective public partnerships and guidance with grant 
application. Even here. support was sought from the industrial sector. The 
first RSC clusters were assisted by industrial figureheads as independent 
advisors. Where no appropriate mediators with a business background 
were available, as in some of the German cases, projects had difficulties in 
creating commitment and trust among participating businesses. This again 
endorses the significance of the nature and quality of brokering.
Cluster composition: The nature of cluster composition is closely related 
to the nature of the cluster initiative. The associational initiatives are 
membership-based and generally open to all the firms in relevant sectors 
within a demarcated area. The spatial restriction was especially noticeable 
in Aragón, where the initiatives were geared to four specific areas in the 
larger region, and where the aim was to involve all the firms in those areas, 
but none outside. The Bergisches Land initiatives were open to all local 
SMEs in the enrolment phase, but were subsequently closed. The RSC 
clusters, on the other hand, are closed. The can only be changed by 
changing the membership list in the cluster contract, following the 
procedure laid down in the contract, thus incurring transaction costs. 
However, the RSC clustering service is in principle open to all kinds of 
SMEs in the area, with no strict application of territorial boundaries.
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Evaluation and monitoring: The organisation of evaluation also depends 
on the nature of the initiative. There is only one case where evaluation is 
largely informal, based on the generally observed sectoral performance, 
namely, the Aragonese wine cluster. The institutional/associational 
initiatives, and the RSC, are obliged to make evaluations for public 
funding bodies. The RSC and NOF are also strong in self-monitoring and 
producing regular reports for the wider public. The German projects are 
evaluated in depth after the end of the projects, both to account for the 
expenditure and to draw lessons for future initiatives. The results, 
however, also show how much the implementation of and reporting on 
projects is geared towards the evaluation of processes and standards, as 
laid down by the assessing bodies. This applies especially to the way 
networking is translated in terms of numbers of participants, meetings, 
etc., and to the translation of the competitive position of firms into 
product inquiries made etc. In some cases, notably the RSC, there was a 
tension between the more qualitative nature of self-monitoring, and the 
more quantitative external evaluations. It is obvious that, for this kind of 
initiative, more thought should be given to evaluation methods that really 
contribute to improvements in cluster approaches.
8.1.3. Business development perspective: How do firms see their benefits 
from clustering?
Three types of business benefits have been distinguished here in the 
context of cluster initiatives:
1. direct benefits to individual firms,
2. collective benefits stemming from business networking, and
3. benefits stemming from interaction with support organisations.
Direct benefits: Through participating in cluster initiatives, firms may be 
able to improve their existing business capabilities. All the case studies 
confirm this, although with considerable differences in type and extent of 
improvements. Improving labour skills is an important result, which is 
shared by ASSA, NOF, the chemical industry in the Bergisches Land, and, 
in limited cases, by the RSC. Quality and environmental certification is 
supported in nearly all cases. Marketing at firm level shows advances in 
the RSC clusters and the Aragonese wine cluster. Quality improvements 
feature in the Aragonese case, the RSC clusters, and the German 
automotive clusters. In the same case studies, a variety of managerial 
issues was also dealt with. Surprisingly, innovation does not appear as a 
prominent issue, although attention is paid to technological issues in 
almost all cases. This is manifested most strongly in the NOF, which also 
pays attention to procurement issues.
Some of these benefits represent almost purely individual gains, in the 
sense that clustering has been instrumental in business-level modernisation, 
with certification (e.g. ISO 9000-13000) as the clearest example. Other 
benefits, such as skills improvement and management changes, combine 
individual benefits with cluster effects. This means that there are spillover 
effects to other cluster members or even to the wider regional economy,
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and that the benefits would be reduced if the cluster disappeared. Cluster 
effects are most prominent in the case of marketing. While firms may again 
draw individual lessons from their cluster experiences, marketing efforts 
generally involve using the cluster and its regional embedding as a brand 
image. Such collective gains depend on the clustering dimension, as shown 
most clearly in the cases of the RSC and Aragonese wine DOC’s.
While collective benefits are referred to by brokers, policy makers and 
cluster analysts, it is essential for participating businesses to obtain 
individual benefits. For SMEs, in particular, ‘hard’ benefits are the main 
justification for their investments and commitment. The study confirmed 
that, in general, firms appear to be more interested in learning from other 
firms or engaging in collective lobbying than in contributing to collective 
cluster assets. From an SME perspective, an important aspect of clustering 
appears to be the social encounter with peer firms or firms in related 
businesses in order to improve individual business performance. The 
emphasis on inter-firm learning for individual benefits even occurred when 
the initiatives were initially grafted onto a (trade) linkage model 
(Bergisches Land, some RSC clusters). While the primary investment 
made by the business thus consisted of time and some administrative loads, 
returns are counted in terms of improved business performance or 
products. In addition, in some case studies (Aragón, some RSC clusters), 
firms have benefited from grants won through the cluster.
Business networking: The second level of business benefits consists of 
those gains that stem from, and are dependent on, inter-firm collaboration. 
This includes three types of results:
1. Starting with the emphasis on inter-firm learning, the creation of a 
social network and relational assets reflects such a benefit. In areas 
characterised by rather individualistic business attitudes, such as 
the North East and Bergisches Land, building trust and social 
networking among SMEs emerged as crucial outcomes of the 
cluster initiatives.
2. Another type of benefit which has emerged from the case studies 
and also from the associational initiatives (NOF, ASSA), is the 
building of a collective lobbying position. In practice, the position 
of SMEs appears to be less strong than that of larger firms.
3. Closer to the original cluster philosophy is the forging of new 
supply linkages and the shaping of a common identity, as shown by 
most of the RSC clusters. The NOF also presents a new approach 
to supply chains as part of a new contracting regime in the offshore 
industry. The Aragonese wine sector presents a somewhat deviant 
case in this respect, since changes in the production chain are 
framed within a transition from co-operative to more rationalised 
and concentrated forms of production.
The extent to which these advantages will endure remains an open 
question, particularly in the case of more temporary initiatives. With the 
RSC, it is hoped that the organisation will obtain a more permanent status. 
This would allow it to help business clusters to address problems that may
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arise in the future, e.g., as a result of opportunistic behaviour. In this way, 
the organisation could help to sustain the level of social capital 
accumulated in the region.
Institutional networking: Cluster initiatives have brought firms closer 
together and they have also forged links between the private and public 
sectors. In what respects have these links served business needs? In 
particular, has the support sector managed to improve its reputation 
among the business sector? The results are quite mixed in this respect. On 
the one hand, there are some good examples of improved links and 
reputation. The most prominent cases here are the RSC and the 
Bergisches Land (chemical industry), although in the latter instance, the 
public sector remained partly concealed behind intermediaries. The 
benefits to firms consisted of access to information about other forms of 
support and assistance to grant applications. Public-private links have also 
been developed through ASSA and the NOF, which were able to build on 
already existing links. On the other hand, the automotive initiative in 
Bergisches Land and the Aragonese wine initiative are cases where some 
of the firms still regard the regional support sector with suspicion.
We can give a final judgement on this question only when the exact 
intentions of the regional support agencies are known, and this is the issue 
to which we now turn.
8.1.4. Regional policy perspective: How should cluster initiatives be arranged 
in order to optimise regional benefits?
Anchoring cluster benefits into the regional economy: shaping ‘club 
goods’: Regions will particularly benefit from cluster initiatives if the latter 
produce a kind of ‘sediment’, that is, nurture assets or ‘club goods’ that 
may serve wider purposes than the cluster alone. Practical examples of 
such assets are training facilities, infrastructure, support centres and 
industry associations. Less tangible assets are the stock of cluster-related 
knowledge diffused in the region, commitment of regional actors to 
support certain economic activities, and contributions to the regional 
economic identity (Figure 1). The case studies include good examples of 
both categories. Shaping identities is part of all the initiatives and has 
succeeded most in the cases of Aragón and the marine activities in the 
North East (both NOF and RSC). In the latter case, the development of 
institutions in itself presents a valuable ‘club good’ that can be used by a 
variety of actors. Improvements in the labour market were observed for all 
the initiatives in the North East, where there is perceived to be a general 
skills shortage in the region, and for chemical production in Bergisches 
Land. Contributions to infrastructure improvements have been more 
limited and largely indirect, notably through the interventions of core firms 
and associations in the automotive and offshore industries (in the latter 
case, the contribution to the infrastructure is manifested primarily through 
the arrest of further dismantling of harbour-related activities).
Demonstration effects: Beyond their own remits, have cluster 
developments infected the wider regional economy with collaborative and
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associational attitudes? This does indeed seem to be the case in all the 
regions. In the North East, this ‘infection’ is institutionalised in the form of 
the RSC, which has gradually extended its sectoral coverage, while the 
organisation receives much attention from policy actors all over Europe. 
Similarly, the NOF acts as a role model for comparable initiatives in other 
sectors, including those outside the region. In Aragón, policy makers have 
embraced the cluster approach and further initiatives are expected in other 
indigenous sectors.
A sensitive issue remains the survival of existing clusters and cluster- 
related institutions. Cluster facilitators generally try to avoid failures, 
since, apart from posing evaluation problems, they are expected to tarnish 
the image of clustering and the brokering agencies. For the benefit of both 
the firms and the region, however, failures should be accepted and even 
expected. The study has shown that continued assistance geared to cluster 
survival may lead to a situation where client firms become the ‘babies’ of 
the facilitating organisation. Facilitating clustering should stand at arm’s 
length from the participating firms and continued assistance should be 
offered only at the instigation of business. Evaluations should focus less on 
the benefits for individual firms and pay more attention to wider regional 
effects and the innovative nature of the cluster initiatives.
Embedding of cluster initiatives in regional specialisation strategies:
The cluster case studies discussed here present predominantly ‘stand 
alone’ initiatives, which are not part of wider cluster policies. Where 
facilitating clustering has been extended to other sectors, as in the North 
East, it reflects an emergent pattern rather than a predefined strategy. In 
nearly all cases, however, the cluster initiatives are part of other forms of 
regional policy. Institution building in the North East, for instance, is 
closely associated with the attraction and embedding of foreign investors. 
The support to the wine sector in Aragón is part of a rural development 
policy. Indeed, even for the RSC, the focus on clustering emerged only 
after the local council had already started to anchor SMEs in the local 
economy. Nevertheless, by embarking on clustering, all these cases 
developed an orientation towards networking, inter-firm learning and 
regional specialisation. In most cases, this link contains a defensive 
element, i.e., the aim behind clustering is to bind existing firms to the 
region. The German initiatives, in particular, take such a position. The 
North East and Aragonese cases, on the other hand, are more growth 
oriented, although they remain close to existing regional strengths. A 
further trend towards diversification may be expected in the future, in 
which the ambition to nurture new strengths may grow.
The learning dimension of clusters: Clusters have been described as a 
specific level of social interaction and governance which allows for new 
forms of learning. Rather than a binary world characterised by a support 
sector and business clients, cluster initiatives embody an associational level 
with its own learning dynamics. The nature and depth of this dynamic may 
vary. When clustering is geared towards ‘institution building’ or an 
associational process, this intermediate level manifests itself as such. In
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other cases, social interaction and learning are supported by the facilitating 
of clustering, structured in regular meetings, workshops, etc.
The extent to which learning is part of cluster dynamics depends both on 
the design of the initiative and the kind of chemistry emerging during the 
project. Projects conceived in a top-down way, where initiators leave little 
room for knowledge creation and reflexivity during the project, will 
obviously tend to be less self-adaptive than initiatives with a strong 
learning-orientation. A lack of learning orientation was illustrated, for 
instance, in the Aragonese case, where policy makers changed the project 
only when confronted with strong protests from within the targeted 
business sector. A positive learning curve could be observed with the 
RSC. While the initial projects were based on strong premises about the 
aim and means of clustering, a more open and qualified approach emerged 
over time, in which more was left to the client firms. The Bergisches Land, 
finally, showed a marked difference between a less successful project, in 
which much knowledge had been acquired beforehand, and a more 
effective project where knowledge gathering had mostly been part of the 
project itself. While this had been born out of necessity, rather than 
deliberate policy design, it gave firms the opportunity to have a greater 
share in the project and, therefore, a greater commitment and reflexivity.
To what extent have the initiatives supported regional learning agendas? 
Different answers can be given to this. In general, cluster initiatives are 
seen as innovative forms of regional policy and are praised for the way 
they support new forms of business engagement. In this sense, all the 
initiatives seem to have contributed to policy learning and to greater 
awareness of the specific knowledge needs of SMEs in the regional 
economy. Among firms, the initiatives have helped to change business 
attitudes, notably towards more openness to other firms and even support 
agencies. More specifically, clusters have formed bridges between firms 
and knowledge centres, which has contributed to the tailoring of support 
services to business needs. The problem of monitoring cluster initiatives 
remains, together with the reliance on short-term financing. This appears 
to limit the extent to which initiatives can be innovative and learning 
effects can spill over to the regional economy.
Cost-effectiveness of regional business support: Cluster initiatives, with 
the facilitating of networking and ‘institution building’ as a primary 
investment, are a cheap form of business support. With the exception of 
Aragón, where substantial amounts were initially spent on business 
transformation, this has been borne out by the various case studies. In 
some cases, such as the industry associations, self-financing covers a 
substantial part of the costs. Moreover, since they generally involve 
contacts between public, private and other actors, cluster arrangements 
appear to be a fruitful basis for grant applications, as shown in particular 
by the RSC. Thus not only do cluster initiatives impose a low burden on 
the local public purse, but they may also lever out additional sources of 
income.
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Besides the pecuniary benefits, the cluster initiatives have proved to be 
effective forms of assistance, not only to facilitate clustering, but also as a 
vehicle for other forms of business support. The latter is particularly 
evident where clustering does not so much present a goal as a method of 
business support (learning-oriented clusters). Cluster-related institutions, 
such as the RSC and NOF, act as effective brokers between client firms 
and the wider environment of business support and grant provision. In this 
way, cluster-oriented ‘institution building’ appears to be a welcome 
complement, rather than a threat to existing forms of business support.
8.1.5. Coming together: Aligning business and regional interests:
This study started with the idea that, when initiatives are developed to 
support business development at the regional level, the interests of 
individual firms and regional actors may differ. What is good for firms is 
not necessarily good for the region (e.g., when firms intend to relocate 
business activities or curb local sourcing) and what regional actors do is 
not always appreciated by firms (e.g. when regional actors induce more 
innovative and competitive forms of behaviour among local firms). 
However, since the region needs the firm, and firms will benefit from a 
supporting regional environment, the challenge is to bring interests and 
commitments together. This has been a central theme throughout the 
discussion of the clustering concept and the case studies.
Making the distinction between business and regional interests does not 
mean that, in practice, a clear division can be observed between these two 
categories. The regional economy is a complex political world in which 
local firms and regional actors may have as many differences among them 
as between them. Indeed, other dividing lines may be identified, for 
instance between small-scale indigenous economic development (SMEs 
and related business support organisations) and large-scale production 
(large firms, foreign producers, inward investment agencies, RDAs). The 
business-regional distinction is made here specifically to put regional 
development strategies in perspective and to illustrate the value of cluster 
approaches.
The need for distinguishing business and regional interests has been 
confirmed in the empirical work. Too often the notion of ‘business needs’ 
appeared to be used in an uncritical way, in which those needs were 
perceived as final objectives of support. Considering those needs in the 
wider perspective of regional development, responding to the more global 
targets of employment creation and sustain local productive capacity, was 
a step generally not taken. On the contrary, various case studies appeared 
to conflate means (business development) and ends (regional 
development). The only exceptions here are the case of Bergisches Land, 
and more recently, the RSC, through their specific attention for the way 
SMEs are embedded in the local economy.
So to what extent have actors in the policy/support domain been able to 
attune initiatives to regional interest? To some extent, this depends on 
how regional interests are articulated in the region and how they are
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presented within the specific cluster initiatives. A common trend detected 
in the case studies, however, is an upward learning curve. Although many 
initiatives start with a strong business orientation, in time cluster initiatives 
appear to be receptive to specific regional issues. For instance, a theme put 
on the agendas of many cluster initiatives is skill development. Also, in 
time, cluster initiatives seem to become less reliant on the originally 
participating firms, becoming more part of the regional socio-economic 
structure at an (inter)sectoral level. This makes clusters less the support 
vehicle of a particular group of firms and more the catalyst for the 
development of regional sectors. Core elements which sustain such 
developments are cluster assets as ‘club goods’ - associational structures, 
research centres, training institutes, business service centres, etc. - that 
underpin regional specialisation and competitiveness. This bears on what 
has been identified before as the crux of the cluster approach, that is, 
relating the structural level of regional specialisation with the relational 
concepts of networks, ‘governance’ and systems of knowledge 
accumulation at the micro/meso level.
From a business interest perspective, the remaining question is to what 
extent are businesses in such relational systems committed to the regional 
cause? Here a positive exchange can be observed. Cluster initiatives have 
helped firms to widen their scope of action, both through interacting with 
peers and other actors in the region and through looking outward to new 
markets and sources of information. The region has become important, not 
in the sense that business interaction is more localised, but that the 
regional environment plays a specific supportive role in business 
development and learning. Virtually all cluster cases show that, when this 
process is effective, businesses are more attached to the region. In 
practice, cluster settings provide a two-way flow of information. 
Businesses learn more about the region and its institutional capacity and 
variety. And businesses can voice their collective interests, their ideas 
about future strategies, and suggestion for practical contributions to 
regional development through these settings. Obviously, there are many 
other settings which facilitate this (e.g. Chambers of Commerce), but the 
cluster approach can make an effective contribution here.
8.2. Recommendations for business support: planning the route 
to success
A clustering strategy can be seen as a path that improves regional 
specialisation by changing the way a group of firms with related activities 
work individually and collectively. Both the start and end point of this path 
are specific in time and place. The only criterion of success is that the end 
point shows higher levels of regional specialisation and competitiveness 
than the starting point. Since the specificities are important, no general 
‘good practice’ model of clusters should be envisaged. Concerning the 
various choices that have to be made, like the ones indicated in the Pro 
Forma, the most important aspect is thus that they are properly justified. 
That is, the path of development needs to be clearly demarcated and the 
cluster approach needs to match the ambition to go from beginning to end.
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Several suggestions can be made about how to set out a development 
route. These suggestions are linked to the two basic development 
perspectives distinguished: the business and regional development 
perspective.
Setting objectives
With respect to the business development perspective, a first note is that 
public funding should not be spent on just fulfilling business wants. As a 
matter of principle, when such wants are revealed, they should be met in 
the market. If this does not happen, other ways should be sought to 
overcome failings in the market (for instance by temporarily subsidising 
commercial business service providers).
Where public bodies intervene in business development, business wants 
should be taken into account but the remit should go further. A core task 
of public support should be to make firms aware of new strategic 
directions and superior modes of behaviour. Indeed, it may even be argued 
that, particularly in laggard regions, support agencies have an important 
role to play in business modernisation through coaching. So support 
agencies and their client firms maintain complex and often delicate 
relationships. On the one hand, agencies are expected to customise their 
services as well as possible to their target group; on the other hand, the 
agencies pursue their own agenda of changing business behaviour and 
modernisation. An essential factor in enabling this interaction is 
communication, as a way to create commitment and trust. A specific 
dimension in clustering, moreover, is monitoring the communication and 
interaction among firms. Major problems can arise when firms feel that 
they are sidelined in the decision-making process or when some perceive 
the distribution of benefits against the investments made as unfair. Good 
practice is reflected in a feeling among client firms that these issues are 
addressed in the support agency’s approach.
An additional point is the way intensive interaction between firms and 
cluster facilitator helps to improve the access to and delivery of business 
support at large. Recent decades have seen a proliferation of support 
initiatives and organisations in many countries, often resulting in much 
confusion and even aversion among firms. Cluster institutions such as real 
service centres have been presented as agencies well placed to broker, in a 
‘one-stop’ fashion, between firms and the support sector. While this 
involves an extra step in the support process, it is generally considered as 
good practice because of its contribution to support impact and 
effectiveness.
The regional policy level, on the other hand, presents the most difficult 
issues. In an ideal world, one could give some indications of what good 
practice should entail in policy terms:
1. a link between cluster initiatives and wider sectoral strategies,
2. a balance between bottom-up cluster initiatives and top-down 
mapping and facilitation of clusters,
3. a position of a facilitating agency as a spider in a web of support 
activities, and
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4. a system of monitoring and accountability that secures proper 
spending of public finance.
In the real world, however, innovative approaches often meet resistance 
from other, more established organisations. Not only among firms but also 
among the support sector, they thus face an uphill struggle to get their 
message across. In some cases, therefore, the most appropriate short-term 
strategy may be one of tactical isolation rather than embedding.
What remains vital, nevertheless, is the way cluster initiatives work to the 
benefit not only of client firms but also of the region at large. Good 
practice in regional economic terms may thus include the creation of 
certain sector-specific assets, such as information points or training 
centres, accessible for other firms in the region; it may also include the 
stimulation and monitoring of demonstration effects, notably in the area of 
changing business behaviour and the aptitude to collaborate. A tricky issue 
in this context is that of picking winners. Cluster initiatives generally aim 
at presenting a model case that should be followed up by others. 
Therefore, choosing firms that are not the most needy in a region may 
reflect a good approach. However, a core question is how the initiatives 
reach out to more marginal parts of a regional economy. Only by achieving 
that, may cluster initiatives be expected to make a real contribution to 
economic development and sustainable employment creation.
Learning as goal and method
Regarding cluster facilitation, it is important that the support organisation 
works and sees itself as a learning organisation. In the different steps from 
initiation to evaluation set out above, the interesting issue is how the 
different approaches and decisions are made transparent and justified, and 
how this process has changed from cluster to cluster through a process of 
learning and feedback. Pre-support audits are potentially vital sources of 
information, although in many cases a more gradual approach of 
discovering needs and capabilities may be preferred. Setting objectives is 
essential, and they should be specified and clarified on paper. Yet, setting 
objectives should be seen as an ongoing process. Clustering involves a 
dynamic process, which may be accompanied by changes in objectives and 
strategic direction. Monitoring and evaluation, finally, should go beyond 
the organisations to which the agency is directly responsible (such as 
funding bodies). Because the project is funded publicly, and because of the 
significance of demonstration effects, the projects should be made 
transparent to a wider public.
Clustering in practice
This study has explored a variety of cluster-oriented initiatives. In addition 
to the general comments already, the following more detailed comments 
can be made on the basis of the cluster analysis:
- Sharp differences exist in the approaches followed, particularly 
between countries. This is largely due to the variations in support 
structures and the wider context of business support and regional 
policy. Yet a common factor in all cases is the wish to change business
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behaviour and instil collaborative attitudes, within the broader 
ambition to strengthen the regional economic structure.
- There are strong variations in what clustering means for various 
support agencies and firms. Sometimes clusters are the final goal of an 
initiative, and their continuation is seen as imperative. In other cases, 
clusters are more a method serving other purposes. Nonetheless, the 
projects always help to overcome business isolation and improve 
strategic direction.
- A shared problem for cluster facilitators is how to motivate firms. 
Many firms join primarily to acquire access to the public sector and 
thereby funding opportunities, while they are often sceptical about 
inter-firm collaboration and partnerships.
While refraining from postulating a ‘best practice’ of clustering, various
points of good practice can be identified:
1. clustering should be interpreted as a dynamic process, which 
requires strong feedback and learning within the support sector as 
well as from and among firms;
2. cluster initiatives require regular reviews and updates of objectives 
and strategic directions, based on in-depth sectoral knowledge 
which goes beyond the direct wants of the firms involved;
3. transparency should be part of communication not only to the 
organisations directly responsible but also to the wider community;
4. support projects should avoid too much engagement with client 
firms (especially in the long run);
5. instead, clustering should evoke strong demonstration effects 
within and across sectors;
6. clustering should take an integral approach of business 
development, which avoid to be fixated on innovation; issues of 
positioning and modernisation may be as important as innovation;
7. the right balance should be developed between brokering activities 
to facilitate clustering and the provision of customised economic 
intelligence.
A summary of the recommendations is included in Table 2.
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